“Where jurisdiction depends on a question of law or construction, the court will decide it rather than apply the good arguable case test: see cases at Dicey and Morris, para 11-127, n. 34 The cases cited are now, I think, to be found at 11-151 in the 14th Edition of Dicey & Morris at note 13. . That approach has consistently been applied to cases where jurisdiction has depended on the applicable law of a contract for the purposes of what is nowCPR 6.20 (5)(c). In such cases the court does not consider whether the claimant has a good arguable case that the contract is governed by English law, but rather whether the contract is governed by English law. Some of the most important cases on the applicable law of a contract at common law were decided under predecessors of this rule (e.g. Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp. v. Kuwait Insurance Co.[1984] AC 50 ) and I do not consider that anything in the Seaconsar case is intended to throw doubt on their approach. Accordingly in a case such as this, if jurisdiction depends on the identification of the applicable law, the claimant would have to satisfy the court that the applicable law was English law, and the good arguable case test would only have a role to play if there were a relevant factual issue (for example, if an express choice of law were said to be ineffective on the facts of the case). ”
“The Defendants each carried out or participated in or directed, procured or controlled the acts of copyright and/or database right infringement about which complaint is made herein and are jointly and severally liable for those acts. Pending disclosure and/or evidence, the Claimants rely on the following facts and matters: (i) The Defendants’ Website bears a Copyright notice which states “© Copyright 2003-2009, Sportradar AG”. (ii) The Defendants’ Website states that "Our Live Scores department is mainly operated from our office in Gera, Germany". The website also indicates that that office is part of the First Defendant.” (i) The Defendants’ Website bears a Copyright notice which states “© Copyright 2003-2009, Sportradar AG”. (ii) The Defendants’ Website states that "Our Live Scores department is mainly operated from our office in Gera, Germany". The website also indicates that that office is part of the First Defendant.”
"From a date presently unknown to the Claimants but prior to the issue of the Claim Form in these proceedings, the Defendants have used the whole or a substantial part of Football Live, without the consent of the Claimants or any of them. Pending disclosure and/or evidence, the Claimants rely on the following facts and matters: (i) The reproduction of data from Football Live on pop-up windows hosted on the Defendants' Website which are linked to from the Bet365 Website and the Stan James Website, during the 2008/2009 and 2009/2010 seasons. These pop-up windows appear when the "
“In my view a number of matters are apparent from this passage. First, merely passing on something which will inevitably be used for infringement is not authorising. This was the incorrect suggestion in the First Edition of The Modern Law of Copyright. Second, as Lord Templeman said, "lenders and sellers do not authorise infringing use". You have to do more than sell. Third, a crucial factor in a case like this is whether EE had any "control over the use" of its products "once they are sold".”
“[AG] is not involved in any way in the creation, reproduction or distribution of the Live Score Data in issue in this action. Further, [AG] does not exercise any control over the activities of [GmbH] beyond that provided by its position as corporate parent. So while it formally enjoys financial and voting control over [GmbH], it does not and has not in practice controlled or directed the activities of [GmbH] that are the subject of complaint in this action. In their Particulars of Claim, the Claimants define the website at betradar.com as “the Defendants’ Website”
“in relation to any contents of a database, making those contents available to the public by any means”
"The repeated and systematic extraction and/or re-utilisation of insubstantial parts of the contents of the database implying acts which conflict with a normal exploitation of that database or which unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the maker of the database shall not be permitted."
“Accordingly, it can be seen from the evidence referred to above in relation to reproduction that the Defendants and/or end users in the UK carry out the act of extraction when the data is downloaded from the Defendants’ server to the end user’s computer terminal.”
"the making available to the public of the work by electronic transmission in such a way that members of the public may access it from a place and at a time individually chosen by them"
“Where does the act of making available take place? This will often be a vital point where the transmission has occurred across national boundaries. In principle it resurrects the arguments which existed as to the place where a broadcast should be regarded as occurring. Again, however, since the restricted act is defined by reference to the "making available" of the work, and not its actual transmission or reception, it is suggested that the place where the apparatus is situated and from where access to the work can be obtained is the place where the restricted act occurs."”
“The new claim is an additional allegation of breach of the same contract as the contract giving rise to the claims issued in January. At one level, it has the same cause and objet as the remainder of the claim because the essential claim is for compensation for breach of obligations under and associated with the binders. But at another level, the cause of the jurisdiction clause claim differs from that of the remainder of the claims in the English proceedings because the facts relied on differ. The facts giving rise to the jurisdiction clause claim—the institution of the Greek proceedings—had not taken place when the claims were issued in January.”
“Fundamentally, it is the rights and obligations of the parties in relation to the same facts which, in my judgment, matters here. Each court will be concerned with the respective rights and obligations of the parties, however those are classified and determined by the national courts of each country. I consider therefore that, notwithstanding the different approach to the question of enforceability of the interest provisions and the consequent effect, the declaratory proceedings and the Mainz proceedings do involve the same cause of action within the meaning of Art.27.”
“It appears to me, however, that this is too narrow an approach, since otherwise it would be possible to argue that Art.27 did not apply to proceedings where a national court's decision, based on the application of its domestic law (which it found to be applicable under its rules of private international law) did not answer the question determinable by a different national court under its own law (which it regarded as applicable under its own rules of private international law). The way the claim is framed and the arguments in support of it may fall to be taken into account, but ultimately, the question must be seen broadly in terms of the judgment sought and not in terms of the issues raised on the way…”