“A substantial reputation and goodwill have, over half a century or more, been acquired by the name ‘Advocaat’ as that of a drink with recognisable qualities of appearance, taste, strength, and satisfaction.”
“(1) a misrepresentation, (2) made by a trader in the course of trade, (3) to prospective customers of his or ultimate consumers of goods and services supplied by him, (4) which is calculated to injure the business or goodwill of another trader (in the sense that this is a reasonably foreseeable consequence) and (5) which causes actual damage to the business or goodwill of the trader by whom the action is brought or (in a quia timet action) will probably do so.”
“It seems to me, however, as it seemed to Danckwerts J., that the principle must be the same whether the class of which each member is severally entitled to the goodwill which attaches to a particular term as descriptive of his goods, is large or small. The larger it is the broader must be the range and quality of products to which the descriptive term used by the members of the class has been applied, and the more difficult it must be to show that the term has acquired a public reputation and goodwill as denoting a product endowed with recognisable qualities which distinguish it from others of inferior reputation that compete with it in the same market. The larger the class the more difficult it must also be for an individual member of it to show that the goodwill of his own business has sustained more than minimal damage as a result of deceptive use by another trader of the widely-shared descriptive term. As respects subsequent additions to the class, mere entry into the market would not give any right of action for passing off; the new entrant must have himself used the descriptive term long enough on the market in connection with his own goods and have traded successfully enough to have built up a goodwill for his business.”
“But the fact that in each of these first three cases the descriptive name under which goods of a particular type or composition were marketed by the plaintiffs among others happened to have geographical connotations is in my view without significance. If a product of a particular character or composition has been marketed under a descriptive name and under that name has gained a public reputation which distinguishes it from competing products of different composition, I can see no reason in principle or logic why the goodwill in the name of those entitled to make use of it should be protected by the law against deceptive use of the name by competitors, if it denotes a product of which the ingredients come from a particular locality, but should lose that protection if the ingredients of the product, however narrowly identified, are not restricted as to their geographical provenance.”
“Of course it is necessary to be able to identify with reasonable precision the members of the class of traders of whose products a particular word or name has become so distinctive as to make their right to use it truthfully as descriptive of their product a valuable part of the goodwill of each of them; but it is the reputation that that type of product itself has gained in the market by reason of its recognisable and distinctive qualities that has generated the relevant goodwill. So if one can define with reasonable precision the type of product that has acquired the reputation, one can identify the members of the class entitled to share in the goodwill as being all those traders who have supplied and still supply to the English market a product which possesses those recognisable and distinctive qualities. It cannot make any difference in principle whether the recognisable and distinctive qualities by which the reputation of the type of product has been gained are the result of its having been made in, or from ingredients produced in, a particular locality or are the result of its having been made from particular ingredients regardless of their provenance; though a geographical limitation may make it easier (a) to define the type of product; (b) to establish that it has qualities which are recognisable and distinguish it from every other type of product that competes with it in the market and which have gained for it in that market a reputation and goodwill; and (c) to establish that the plaintiff's own business will suffer more than minimal damage to its goodwill by the defendant's misrepresenting his product as being of that type. … So, on the findings of fact by Goulding J. to which I referred at the beginning of this speech, the type of product that has gained for the name ‘advocaat’, on the English market the reputation and goodwill of which Keelings are seeking to take advantage by misrepresenting that their own product is of that type, is defined by reference to the nature of its ingredients irrespective of their origin. The class of traders of whose respective businesses the right to describe their products as advocaat forms a valuable part of their goodwill are those who have supplied and are supplying on the English market an egg and spirit drink in broad conformity with an identifiable recipe.”
“But it cannot, in my opinion, be essential that the class should be defined by reference to the locality in which the members produce the goods, provided it is clearly defined in some way. How can it matter whether the name by which the genuine product is known has a geographical origin or has no natural connection with the product, or is simply invented, provided that it is distinctive of a particular class of goods? In the present case, as in the champagne case, the plaintiffs are members of a class, which consists of all those who market in England the product genuinely indicated by a particular name. The fact that the name advocaat differs from champagne in respect that it has no geographical significance seems to me neither here nor there. It does have a definite meaning, as the learned judge held in the passage I have already quoted from his judgment at p. 21, and the misrepresentation here was I think of exactly the same kind as in the champagne case.”
“In the Court of Appeal [1978] F.S.R. 473 Buckley L.J. decided against the appellants mainly on the ground that he considered the name ‘advocaat’ to be purely descriptive and not distinctive, in contrast to champagne which he considered to be distinctive. He said (rightly in my opinion) at p. 482 that 'at least some measure of distinctiveness is essential for the trade name or description to be capable of giving rise to a claim to relief against passing off.' But in my opinion the learned Lord Justice did not give sufficient weight to the findings of the judge which I have already quoted, and especially to his finding ([1978] F.S.R. 1, 21) that advocaat ‘was a distinct and recognisable species of beverage.’ Goff L.J. seems to me to have made what I regard, with all respect, as the same error, when he said [1978] F.S.R. 473, 496 that it had not been found that ‘there was something to entitle the [appellant] to say that “advocaat” ... distinguishes their product or the products of some limited class from all other beverages of the like character...’ I do not think that the terms ‘descriptive’ and ‘distinctive,’ as applied to names of products, are mutually exclusive. Names which begin by being descriptive, such as Carrara marble and Vichy water and, of course, Champagne, may in the course of time become distinctive as well as descriptive. The name ‘advocaat’ although never descriptive, has, as Goulding J. found, become distinctive.”
“But the decision [in the Spanish champagne case] is in my opinion soundly based on the principle underlying the earlier passing off actions, which I take to be that the plaintiff is entitled to protect his right of property in the goodwill attached to a name which is distinctive of a product or class of products sold by him in the course of his business. It is essential for the plaintiff in a passing off action to show at least the following facts:- (1) that his business consists of, or includes, selling in England a class of goods to which the particular trade name applies; (2) that the class of goods is clearly defined, and that in the minds of the public, or a section of the public, in England, the trade name distinguishes that class from other similar goods; (3) that because of the reputation of the goods, there is goodwill attached to the name; (4) that he, the plaintiff, as a member of the class of those who sell the goods, is the owner of goodwill in England which is of substantial value; (5) that he has suffered, or is really likely to suffer, substantial damage to his property in the goodwill by reason of the defendants selling goods which are falsely described by the trade name to which the goodwill is attached. Provided these conditions are satisfied, as they are in the present case, I consider that the plaintiff is entitled to protect himself by a passing off action.”
“Of course, any established trader is liable to have his goodwill damaged by fair competition, and it is not every falsehood told by a competitor that will give him a right of action. But where the falsehood is a misrepresentation that the competitor's goods are goods of definite class with a valuable reputation, and where the misrepresentation is likely to cause damage to established traders who own goodwill in relation to that class of goods, business morality seems to require that they should be entitled to protect their goodwill. The name of the tort committed by the party making the misrepresentation is not important, but in my opinion the tort is the same in kind as that which has hitherto been known as passing off.”
“I have already adverted to the inconsistency between [the judge’s] finding that many members of the public would be deceived when buying Elderflower Champagne and the description of them as constituting a very small section of the public. The deception of many members of the public cannot be de minimis. To this I would add the confusion of those who would think that the defendants' product had some association with champagne, if it was not actually champagne. Further, it cannot be right that the larger the scale of the activities of a trader suing in passing off, the less protection it will receive from the court because of a comparison with the scale of the activities of a defendant who trades on a smaller scale. The question is whether the relevant activities of the defendants are on such a small scale leading to such a small injury that it can be ignored. On the evidence of the defendants' sales, I find it impossible to say that that is the case here.”
“The judge found that the appellants had not established a ‘likelihood of substantial damage.’ The reasons for his conclusion were that those who buy ‘Elderflower Champagne’ in the belief that it is ‘Champagne’ are few in number and that the defendants' activities are (at least as yet) on a relatively small scale. With respect to the judge, these reasons are not decisive against the appellants. Their case was and is, that the word ‘Champagne’ has an exclusiveness which is impaired if it is used in relation to a product (particularly a potable product) which is neither Champagne nor associated or connected with the businesses which produce Champagne. The impairment is a gradual debasement, dilution or erosion of what is distinctive (compare Sir Robin Cooke P., Wineworths Group Ltd. v. CICV [1992] 2 N.Z.L.R. 327 at 332). The consequences of debasement, dilution or erosion are not demonstrable in figures of lost sales but that they will be incrementally damaging to goodwill is in my opinion inescapable.”
“Like the judge, I do not think the defendants' product would reduce the first plaintiffs' sales in any significant and direct way. But that is not, as it seems to me, the end of the matter. The first plaintiffs' reputation and goodwill in the description 'Champagne' derive not only from the quality of their wine and its glamorous associations, but also from the very singularity and exclusiveness of the description, the absence of qualifying epithets and imitative descriptions. Any product which is not Champagne but is allowed to describe itself as such must inevitably, in my view, erode the singularity and exclusiveness of the description 'Champagne' and so cause the first plaintiffs damage of an insidious but serious kind.The amount of damage which the defendants' product would cause would of course depend on the size of the defendants' operation. That is not negligible now, and it could become much bigger. But I cannot see, despite the defendants' argument to the contrary, any rational basis upon which, if the defendants' product were allowed to be marketed under its present description, any other fruit cordial diluted with carbonated water could not be similarly marketed so as to incorporate the description champagne. The damage to the first plaintiffs would then be incalculable but severe.”
“In the present case I accept Mr. Thorley’s submission that, by parity of reasoning, the real risk of damage to the goodwill of the First and Second Plaintiffs from the Defendant's being allowed to continue calling its product ‘whiskey’ when it is not is the commencement of an insidious process of erosion of the integrity of the reputation or ‘aura’ of true whisky, which the Defendant rightly accepted that it has in the minds of potential consumers. Glen Kella may have flavour similarities to whisky, even though its appearance is wholly unlike that of whisky. The next drink not made by the traditional process of manufacture of whisky, seeking nonetheless to call itself whisky, may taste much less like true whisky, as well as looking wholly unlike it. Once the integrity of the undoubted concept of whisky made in the traditional manner is allowed to be breached it seems to me that (as Sir Thomas Bingham suggested in relation to Champagne) it is difficult to see where the line is to be drawn, and the true whisky producers such as the Second and Third Plaintiffs will see the reputation of whisky increasingly damaged by products less and less like true whisky being called ‘whisky.’”
“In the Champagne type of case, protection is given to a name or word which has come to mean a particular product rather than a product from a particular trader. Normally it is the perfect and perhaps only adequate term to describe the product. Just as an emulsion of fats and water together with other digestible ingredients derived from a cow is called milk and nothing else, so a sparkling white or rose wine made in a particular defined area in France by a process of double fermentation in the bottle is called champagne and nothing else. The word is entirely descriptive of the product. This is clear from the speech of Lord Diplock where the descriptive nature of the mark was referred to on numerous occasions… The fact that the extended form of action can, in the correct circumstance, protect descriptive words is of significance for a number of reasons. First, at one stage during the course of his argument, Mr Michael Bloch seemed to suggest that the plaintiffs could not succeed in this action because the expression Swiss chocolate was descriptive. However, it seems to me that type of argument will not of itself defeat a Champagne type of case.”
“It appears, therefore, that in this extended form of action it is mainly reduction of the distinctiveness of the descriptive term which is relied on as relevant damage.”
“As I have mentioned, Cadbury argued that there is no class of goods which can be identified with reasonable precision. It points to the fact that some members of the public who believe that the Swiss chocolate is a product with a connotation of quality, do not think that it comes from Switzerland. I have quoted above some witnesses who appeared to have that view. Further it says that quite a few people thought that chocolate which did not come from Switzerland did in fact come from there. For example some Lindt chocolate is made in France. It is not marked with the words Swiss chocolate. Nevertheless quite a few members of the public seem to have assumed it was Swiss chocolate. However these facts do not alter my view as to the identity of the class of goods entitled to use and exploit the reputation built up by the designation Swiss chocolate. The fact that public have no clear idea of the characteristics of the goods which have the reputation is of little consequence. In the case of Champagne, no doubt many members of the public who know of and rely on the reputation acquired by that designation, know nothing about double fermentation and do not know where the Champagne district of France is. Some may not even know that the wine with the reputation comes from France. This is irrelevant. What is required is to identify the class of goods which has built up and is entitled to exploit the goodwill, not whether the public appreciates the identifying characteristics of the class. Similarly the fact that some brand names, like Lindt, are so strong that members of the public treat them as if they were a statement of Swiss origin does not alter the fact that, save for very minor exceptions, the words ‘Swiss chocolate’ have been used only on chocolate made in Switzerland, presumably in accordance with Swiss food regulations. It follows that I reject this criticism of the plaintiffs' case.”
“The words ‘Swiss chocolate’ are, as the judge pointed out, [1998] R.P.C. 117, at page 129 line 31, descriptive in nature. They are clearly apt to describe chocolate made in Switzerland. But they are also apt to describe chocolate made to a Swiss recipe with Swiss expertise by a Swiss manufacturer. If the words are no more than descriptive—whether of the place of manufacture or of the identity of the manufacturer—they cannot found an action in passing-off. The judge identified the point, correctly in my view, in the following passage of his judgment, [1998] R.P.C. 117, at page 129 lines 31 to 36: ‘It is only if they [the words 'Swiss chocolate'] are taken by a significant part of the public to be used in relation to and indicating a particular group of products having a discrete reputation as a group that a case of passing off can get off the ground. I have had to bear this in mind when assessing the evidence of what the words mean to members of the public. If they convey nothing more than their descriptive meaning the action must fail.’ There were, therefore, two questions to be addressed on this part of the case: (i) would the words ‘Swiss chocolate’ have been taken by a significant section of the public in England at the relevant time to mean, and to mean only, chocolate made in Switzerland; and if so, (ii) did chocolate made in Switzerland have a discrete reputation, distinct from other chocolate, which the Swiss Chocolate Manufacturers were entitled to protect?”
“The cases on passing-off by the misuse of geographic terms are illustrations of a wider principle that it may be passing-off to misuse any sufficiently significant descriptive or generic term in relation to goods, services or a business for which it is inappropriate. For the misrepresentation to be a material one the descriptive or generic term must have a reasonably definite meaning and some attraction for the customer, or no one would ever rely on it and any misrepresentation would be immaterial. In other words, it must have some drawing power in its own right. The misrepresentation is actionable by a person damaged in the goodwill he has in relation to goods or services to which the term is properly applicable. There is a tendency to deny that terms like Champagne are descriptive or generic at all, reflecting the former dichotomy under which the only terms that could be protected were those which could be called ‘distinctive’. For the purposes of passing-off it is better to say that they are generic terms with well-defined meanings, which may consequently be protected despite the fact that they are not distinctive in the traditional sense of denoting a specific producer.”
“If a trader used the expression ‘French ball-bearings’ or ‘Italian pencils’ neither would convey to most members of the public anything other than that the ball-bearings and the pencils came from France and Italy respectively. There is, as far as I am aware, no public perception that ball-bearings from France or pencils from Italy form a discrete group of products having any particular reputation.”
“As stated by Lord Oliver of Aylmerton in Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd. v. Borden Inc. [1990] R.P.C. 341 at page 407 the question on the issue of deception or confusion is ‘is it, on a balance of probabilities, likely that, if the appellants are not restrained as they have been, a substantial number of members of the public will be misled into purchasing the defendants' [product] in the belief that it is the respondents' [product]?’ The same proposition is stated in Halsbury's Laws of England 4th Edition Vol.48 para 148. The necessity for a substantial number is brought out also in Saville Perfumery Ltd. v. June Perfect Ltd. (1941) 58 R.P.C. 147 at page 175; and Re Smith Hayden's Application (1945) 63 R.P.C. 97 at page 101.”
“In general, proof of a single act of infringement by the defendant is sufficient to justify the claimant in bringing his action, and the evidence relied on is frequently the sale by the defendant of the spurious goods to the claimant or his agent, who has bought them merely for the purpose of procuring evidence. Though orders of this sort, generally referred to as trap orders, have not infrequently been the subject of unfavourable comment, they are often the only means by which evidence can be obtained, and, if they are fairly given, there is no impropriety in adopting this procedure. The object is to show what the defendant is doing or what is likely to be the result of some ambiguous advertisement or marking, and the orders must, therefore, be fairly given, and of a character which is not unlikely to occur in ordinary practice. Orders in writing, where they are practicable, are to be preferred; but in a class of business where orders are nearly always oral, a written order may inevitably arouse suspicion and, therefore, be of no practical use. In all cases the defendant should be promptly informed as to what is alleged to have occurred so that he may have the opportunity of investigating the incidents while the recollection of those concerned is fresh. All the circumstances surrounding trap orders have to be scrutinised with great care. The courts will not necessarily grant relief in respect of isolated instances which may not be sufficient to prove any apprehension that passing off is likely to occur, and the needs of the case may sometimes be met by a special order as to costs.”
“As to the trade orders I only say this, it is necessary always to be careful in these cases with regard to trap orders, especially where no opportunity of explanation is given to the person trapped, and where the information as to the trap only comes out later when legal proceedings have been taken.”
“It is unfortunate I have not had the help which I should have had in this case if, as soon as the incidents took place, information about them had been given to the Defendant, Mr Jobling, so that the matter could have been investigated within a few hours of the occurrence of the incident.”
“I am bound to say that I think that the plaintiffs have been extraordinarily dilatory in this case, the more so because the evidence upon which they are relying is, as I have already said, evidence of what is popularly described as a trap order and because, as is well known, and as I have no doubt the plaintiffs were told by their legal advisers, it is most desirable in cases where trap orders are put in, in order to enable both the defendants and the court to come to a conclusion as to whether the order was a fair trap or not, that defendants should know the circumstances of the trap order at the earliest possible moment after the order has been put in.”
“The object of the persons who asked for the ‘Aertex’ material was to obtain something which was not ‘Aertex’ material, and it has been pointed out again and again that, that being so, although trap orders are a necessity, they are to some extent an odious necessity and they had to be looked at, therefore, with the greatest suspicion. There are I do not think it right to say rules, but there is a practice which has grown up around these orders to the effect that, if you wish to rely on them and nothing else, you must either support them by some written evidence or you must at least bring them to the notice of the person, the assistant or whoever it is that it is trapped, at once, because otherwise the answer of the assistant always is, as it was in this case, that he or she does not remember the incident, and the Court is thereby not at all assisted to find out what the truth is. The fact that an assistant a month or so later says she does not remember the incident only proves the honesty of the assistant; but, if the matter is drawn to her attention within 24 hours, then she cannot say that in a Court, and at least I have the satisfaction of knowing what her reaction was soon afterwards. What happened about these orders? These people went to the shop with instructions by no means to give away what they were at. They withdrew secretly, no doubt delighted with their own successes, and no word was allowed to leak out to the Defendants. Nothing whatever was said about the August incident or the September incident, but after a considerable delay, on the 27th September, with no letter before action, a writ is issued. When the person in whose registered office the writ was issued rang up and asked what the particulars were, he was refused any. The Defendants first knew about it on the 2nd October when they received the evidences. Now that is exactly the way in which trap orders should not be given. It is exactly the way which many Judges have said makes the Court distrustful of the trap. Two orders of this kind -- standing as the only evidence of passing off which remains in this case if I reject the August 9th incident, as I do -- are, in my judgement not nearly of strong enough character to support a claim for an injunction of this sort. What exactly happened, I do not know. Something like what the Plaintiffs’ witnesses say may have happened, but whether they brought home to the attention of the two assistants the fact that they were really asking for the Plaintiffs’ goods, or did not do so, I'm left entirely in the dark. I think it would be quite wrong if I accepted such fragile evidence, with no confirmation at all, and which has been sedulously concealed sealed from the Defendants contrary to all the practice, of which the Plaintiff company and their advisers must be well aware.”
“A colourless alcoholic spirit made esp. in Russia and Poland by distillation of grain etc; a glass or drink of this.”
“Whereas spirit drinks constitute a major outlet for Community agriculture; whereas this outlet is largely the result of the reputation which these products have acquired throughout the Community and on the world market; whereas this reputation can be attributed to the quality of traditional products; whereas a certain quality standard should therefore be maintained for the products in question if this outlet is to be preserved; whereas the appropriate means of maintaining this quality standard is to define the products in question taking into account the traditional practices on which their reputation is based; whereas, moreover, the terms thus defined should be used only for products of the same quality as traditional products so as to prevent their being devalued.”
“2. For the purposes of this Regulation spirit drink shall mean an alcoholic liquid: - intended for human consumption, - having particular organoleptic qualities and, except in the case of the products listed under point I of Annex III, a minimum alcoholic strength of 15 % vol, and - produced - either directly by the distillation, with or without added flavourings, of natural fermented products, and/or by the maceration of vegetable substances and/or the addition of flavourings, sugars or other sweetening products listed in paragraph 3 (a) and/or other agricultural products to ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin and/or to distillate of agricultural origin and/or to spirit as defined in this Regulation - or by the mixture of a spirit drink with: - one or more other spirit drinks, - ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin, distillate of agricultural origin or spirit, - one or more alcoholic drinks, - one or more drinks. However, drinks falling within CN codes 2203 00, 2204, 2205, 2206 00 and 2207 shall not be considered spirit drinks. … 4. Definition of different categories of spirit drinks For the purposes of this Regulation the following terms shall have the meanings indicated: … (q) Vodka: A spirit drink produced by either rectifying ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin or filtering it through activated charcoal, possibly followed by straightforward distillation or an equivalent treatment, so that the organoleptic characteristics of the raw materials used are selectively reduced. The product may be given special organoleptic characteristics, such as a mellow taste, by the addition of flavouring.” - intended for human consumption, - having particular organoleptic qualities and, except in the case of the products listed under point I of Annex III, a minimum alcoholic strength of 15 % vol, and - produced - either directly by the distillation, with or without added flavourings, of natural fermented products, and/or by the maceration of vegetable substances and/or the addition of flavourings, sugars or other sweetening products listed in paragraph 3 (a) and/or other agricultural products to ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin and/or to distillate of agricultural origin and/or to spirit as defined in this Regulation - or by the mixture of a spirit drink with: - one or more other spirit drinks, - ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin, distillate of agricultural origin or spirit, - one or more alcoholic drinks, - one or more drinks. However, drinks falling within CN codes 2203 00, 2204, 2205, 2206 00 and 2207 shall not be considered spirit drinks. For the purposes of this Regulation the following terms shall have the meanings indicated: … (q) Vodka: A spirit drink produced by either rectifying ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin or filtering it through activated charcoal, possibly followed by straightforward distillation or an equivalent treatment, so that the organoleptic characteristics of the raw materials used are selectively reduced. The product may be given special organoleptic characteristics, such as a mellow taste, by the addition of flavouring.”
“1. With the exception of juniper-flavoured spirit drinks as defined in Article 1 (4) (m) (1), for the spirit drinks listed below, the minimum alcoholic strength by volume for release for human consumption in the Community under one of the names listed in Article 1(4), with the exception of certain specific products whose alcoholic strength is indicated in Annex III, shall be as follows: … - 37,5% … vodka” … - 37,5% … vodka”
“Undenatured ethyl alcohol of an alcoholic strength by volume of less than 80% vol; spirits, liqueurs and other spirituous beverages.”
“1. For the purpose of this Regulation, "spirit drink" means an alcoholic beverage: (a) intended for human consumption; (b) possessing particular organoleptic qualities; (c) having a minimum alcoholic strength of 15 % vol.; (d) having been produced: (i) either directly: - by the distillation, with or without added flavourings, of naturally fermented products, and/or - by the maceration or similar processing of plant materials in ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin and/or distillates of agricultural origin, and/or spirit drinks within the meaning of this Regulation, and/or - by the addition of flavourings, sugars or other sweetening products listed in Annex I(3) and/or other agricultural products and/or foodstuffs to ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin and/or to distillates of agricultural origin and/or to spirit drinks, within the meaning of this Regulation, (ii) or by the mixture of a spirit drink with one or more: - other spirit drinks, and/or - ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin or distillates of agricultural origin, and/or - other alcoholic beverages, and/or - drinks. 2. However, drinks falling within CN codes 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206 and 2207 shall not be considered spirit drinks.” (a) intended for human consumption; (b) possessing particular organoleptic qualities; (c) having a minimum alcoholic strength of 15 % vol.; (d) having been produced: (i) either directly: - by the distillation, with or without added flavourings, of naturally fermented products, and/or - by the maceration or similar processing of plant materials in ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin and/or distillates of agricultural origin, and/or spirit drinks within the meaning of this Regulation, and/or - by the addition of flavourings, sugars or other sweetening products listed in Annex I(3) and/or other agricultural products and/or foodstuffs to ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin and/or to distillates of agricultural origin and/or to spirit drinks, within the meaning of this Regulation, (ii) or by the mixture of a spirit drink with one or more: - other spirit drinks, and/or - ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin or distillates of agricultural origin, and/or - other alcoholic beverages, and/or - drinks. 2206 and 2207 shall not be considered spirit drinks.”
“Spirit drinks shall be classified into categories according to the definitions laid down in Annex II.”
“15. Vodka (a) Vodka is a spirit drink produced from ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin obtained following fermentation with yeast from either: (i) potatoes and/or cereals, or (ii) other agricultural raw materials, distilled and/or rectified so that the organoleptic characteristics of the raw materials used and byproducts formed in fermentation are selectively reduced. This process may be followed by redistillation and/or treatment with appropriate processing aids, including treatment with activated charcoal, to give it special organoleptic characteristics. Maximum levels of residue for ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin shall meet those laid down in Annex I, except that the methanol content shall not exceed 10 grams per hectolitre of 100 % vol. alcohol. (b) The minimum alcoholic strength by volume of vodka shall be 37,5 %. (c) The only flavourings which may be added are natural flavouring compounds present in distillate obtained from the fermented raw materials. In addition, the product may be given special organoleptic characteristics, other than a predominant flavour. (d) The description, presentation or labelling of vodka not produced exclusively from the raw material(s) listed in paragraph (a)(i) shall bear the indication ‘produced from ...’, supplemented by the name of the raw material(s) used to produce the ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin. Labelling shall be in accordance with Article 13(2) of Directive 2000/13/EC.” (a) Vodka is a spirit drink produced from ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin obtained following fermentation with yeast from either: (i) potatoes and/or cereals, or (ii) other agricultural raw materials, distilled and/or rectified so that the organoleptic characteristics of the raw materials used and byproducts formed in fermentation are selectively reduced. This process may be followed by redistillation and/or treatment with appropriate processing aids, including treatment with activated charcoal, to give it special organoleptic characteristics. Maximum levels of residue for ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin shall meet those laid down in Annex I, except that the methanol content shall not exceed 10 grams per hectolitre of 100 % vol. alcohol. (b) The minimum alcoholic strength by volume of vodka shall be 37,5 %. (c) The only flavourings which may be added are natural flavouring compounds present in distillate obtained from the fermented raw materials. In addition, the product may be given special organoleptic characteristics, other than a predominant flavour. (d) The description, presentation or labelling of vodka not produced exclusively from the raw material(s) listed in paragraph (a)(i) shall bear the indication ‘produced from ...’, supplemented by the name of the raw material(s) used to produce the ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin. Labelling shall be in accordance with Article 13(2) of Directive 2000/13/EC.”
“IMPORTANT INFORMATION Would all customers please note that it is an offence to describe or market products in any way which might confuse or mislead your customer. We have clearly segregated our range of light spirit in our price list and would strongly recommend that you follow the same procedure in any published material and on the shelf in store.”
“Any of various strong spirits resembling genever gin.”
“a number of the key consumption characteristics (how the drink should look and taste) of white spirits; such as versatility, neutral taste and colour profile, the ability to mix well with a wide variety of non-alcoholic drinks and significant flexibility as a mixing base for common cocktails”
“A premium alcoholic vodka blend that can be enjoyed with your favourite mixer, with or without ice.”
“We do not believe that the survey of the kind you propose will serve any useful purpose. Even if you disagree with us on this point, we do not see that it can establish more than the public perceive vodka to be a tasteless, distilled, high strength, clear spirit but have no clear view as to precisely what it is made of or precisely how it is distilled. These are all matters that our clients are prepared to admit.”
“Vodkat is not a vodka [22% not 37%] – it is a vodka blend but is used just like Vodka [ie mixers etc]. … The decline of the FAB market but rise in vodka consumption offers ICB an obvious opportunity with Vodkat.”
“To give an unknown vodka maximum exposure on a limited budget, designers from our branding and advertising agency Industry devised a unique campaign that revolved around the search for real people, rather than models to represent a brand. A national PR campaign was set up and eventually 15 ‘Vodkats’ were released on the world through national PR campaign, including TV advertising. Results On the creative work alone Vodkat was stocked in Sainsbury’s at the expense of their own label vodka. The campaign prompted a remarkable 1606% increase in sales of Vodkat (Nielsen MAT data to December 30th 2006).”
“A vodka-style product has landed on multiples’ shelves to offer drinkers an entry-level spirit with lower alcohol and price. Vodkat is described by producer InterContinental Brands as a premium spirit mix that can be enjoyed with ice or with mixers. The brand has a lower alcoholic strength than vodka, at 22% abv, and so can only be described as a vodka-style product.”
“ICB is to spend£2m on perimeter advertising at football grounds to promote its Vodkat vodka.”
“It’s telling that four of the seven fastest growing spirits brands are vodkas, or a vodka liqueur in the case of Vodkat. Since vodka overtook blended Scotch whisky to become the UK’s bestselling spirit in the off-trade for the first time last June, the category continues to race ahead. Intercontinental Brands’ Vodkat has grown on the back of this strong category growth, with sales up 43% to£22 million . Similarly, Halewood International’s Red Square has registered a 26% uplift, also to£22 million .”
“Product category Spirits : Vodka Item description Vodkat Vodka Blend … Palate All the taste of Vodka at a much lower abv … Item description Vodkat Vodka Blend Palate All the taste of Vodka at a much lower abv • Vodkat is the number one mid strength vodka brand in the UK … • Maximise your profits & give you customer promotions they want using Vodkat in place of full strength vodka”
“As a vodka drinker I bought this bottle of vodka on Saturday. The smell was terrible and the taste was disgusting….”
“Consumer protection officers from Stoke-on-Trent City have seized counterfeit vodka, in a raid on two premises in the city. Eight cases of Vodkat vodka were seized from shops in the Burslem and Stoke area after a tip from Customs officers. … Analysis has proved although the Vodkat vodka is fake, it is safe to drink. However officers believe that shoppers may have unwittingly bought bottles believing them to be the genuine article.”