“(1) A “PPP administration order” is an order of the court made in accordance with section 221, 222 or 223 below in relation to a PPP company and directing that, during the period for which the order is in force, the affairs, business and property of the company shall be managed, by a person appointed by the court,— (a) for the achievement of the purposes of such an order; and (b) in a manner which protects the respective interests of the members and creditors of the company. (2) The purposes of a PPP administration order made in relation to any company shall be— (a) the transfer to another company, or (as respects different parts of its undertaking) to two or more different companies, as a going concern, of so much of the company's undertaking as it is necessary to transfer in order to ensure that the relevant activities may be properly carried on; and (b) the carrying on of those relevant activities pending the making of the transfer. (3) Schedule 14 to this Act shall have effect for applying provisions of theInsolvency Act 1986 where a PPP administration order is made. (4) Schedule 15 to this Act shall have effect for enabling provision to be made with respect to cases in which, in pursuance of a PPP administration order, another company is to carry on all or any of the relevant activities of a PPP company in place of that company. (5) Without prejudice to paragraph 20 of Schedule 14 to this Act, the power conferred bysection 411 of the Insolvency Act 1986 to make rules shall apply for the purpose of giving effect to the PPP administration order provisions of this Act as it applies for the purpose of giving effect to Parts I to VII of that Act, but taking any reference in that section to those Parts as a reference to those provisions. (6) For the purposes of this Chapter, the “relevant activities”, in relation to a PPP company, are the activities carried out, or to be carried out, by that company in performing its obligations under the PPP agreement to which it is party. (7) In this section— “business” and “property” have the same meaning as they have in theInsolvency Act 1986 ; “the court”, in the case of any PPP company, means the court having jurisdiction to wind up the company; “the PPP administration order provisions of this Act” means this section, sections 221 to 224 below and Schedules 14 and 15 to this Act.”
“…any company, other than the existing appointee or the new appointee, which is the holder of a licence under section 8 of this Act and which may be affected by the proposal mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) (b) above….”
“Where the meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous it is not for the judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give effect to its plain meaning because they themselves consider that the consequences of doing so would be inexpedient, or even unjust or immoral.”
“7 Such is the skill of parliamentary draftsmen that most statutory enactments are expressed in language which is clear and unambiguous and gives rise to no serious controversy. But these are not the provisions which reach the courts, or at any rate the appellate courts. Where parties expend substantial resources arguing about the effect of a statutory provision it is usually because the provision is, or is said to be, capable of bearing two or more different meanings, or to be of doubtful application to the particular case which has now arisen, perhaps because the statutory language is said to be inapt to apply to it, sometimes because the situation which has arisen is one which the draftsman could not have foreseen and for which he has accordingly made no express provision. 8 The basic task of the court is to ascertain and give effect to the true meaning of what Parliament has said in the enactment to be construed. But that is not to say that attention should be confined and a literal interpretation given to the particular provisions which give rise to difficulty. Such an approach not only encourages immense prolixity in drafting, since the draftsman will feel obliged to provide expressly for every contingency which may possibly arise. It may also (under the banner of loyalty to the will of Parliament) lead to the frustration of that will, because undue concentration on the minutiae of the enactment may lead the court to neglect the purpose which Parliament intended to achieve when it enacted the statute. Every statute other than a pure consolidating statute is, after all, enacted to make some change, or address some problem, or remove some blemish, or effect some improvement in the national life. The court's task, within the permissible bounds of interpretation, is to give effect to Parliament's purpose. So the controversial provisions should be read in the context of the statute as a whole, and the statute as a whole should be read in the historical context of the situation which led to its enactment.”
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”