“A refreshing way to give up£150 ”
“59 First, with respect to Directive 89/104, it follows from the Court's case law on the definition of use by a third party, for which provision is made in Art.5(1) of that directive, that the exclusive right conferred by a trade mark was intended to enable the trade mark proprietor to protect his specific interests as proprietor, that is, to ensure that the trade mark can fulfil its functions and that, therefore, the exercise of that right must be reserved to cases in which a third party's use of the sign affects or is liable to affect the functions of the trade mark, in particular its essential function of guaranteeing to consumers the origin of the goods (seeCase C-206/01 Arsenal Football Club [2002] E.C.R. I-10273, [51] and [54]). 60. That is the case, in particular, where the use of that sign allegedly made by the third party is such as to create the impression that there is a material link in trade between the third party's goods and the undertaking from which those goods originate. It must be established whether the consumers targeted, including those who are confronted with the goods after they have left the third party's point of sale, are likely to interpret the sign, as it is used by the third party, as designating or tending to designate the undertaking from which the third party's goods originate (see, to that effect, Arsenal Football Club, cited above, [56] and [57]). 61. The national court must establish whether that is the case in the light of the specific circumstances of the use of the sign allegedly made by the third party in the main case, namely, in the present case, the labelling used by Budvar in Finland. 62. The national court must also confirm whether the use made in the present case is one "in the course of trade" and "in relation to goods" within the meaning of Art.5(1) of Directive 89/104 (see, inter alia, Arsenal Football Club, [40] and [41]). 63. Where those conditions are satisfied, it follows from the case law of the Court that, in the event of identity of the sign and the trade mark and of the goods or services, the protection conferred by Art.5(1)(a) of Directive 89/104 is absolute, whereas, in the situation provided for in Art.5(1)(b), the proprietor, in order to enjoy protection, must also prove that there is a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public because the signs and trade marks and the designated goods or services are identical or similar (see, to that effect,Case C-292/00 Davidoff [2003] E.C.R. I-389, [28], andCase C-291/00 LTJ Diffusion [2003] E.C.R. I-2799, [48] and [49]). 64. However, where the examinations to be carried out by the national court, referred to in [60] of this judgment, show that the sign in question in the main case is used for purposes other than to distinguish the goods concerned-- for example, as a trade or company name--reference must, pursuant to Art.5(5) of Directive 89/104, be made to the legal order of the Member State concerned to determine the extent and nature, if any, of the protection afforded to the trade mark proprietor who claims to be suffering damage as a result of use of that sign as a trade name or company name (seeCase C-23/01 Robelco [2002] E.C.R. I-10913, [31] and [34]).”
“Can you tell me where you have seen it?”
“Do you have any comments about any of these products?”
“Have you seen any of these products before?”
“Q. You thought at that stage you had seen both of them? A. No, actually. I was just saying that this sentence is like a little bit ambiguous. I have only looked at this again recently. When I am saying it is the same as the other, what I mean is that is what I thought it was, I thought it was Magic Tree. When it says, "I have seen them in the same place", because she said, "Where have you seen this product?", I said, "Well, in the same place as what I thought I had seen the other one", but I had not seen the two together. Q. Yes. You had not seen the two together and in fact you had not seen the first one at all? A. No, obviously not. No, I presumed it was Magic Tree. Q. As soon as you saw the second one you realised that the first one was not the one you thought it was? A. Yes. ”
“Q. You did not actually think it was the Christmas edition? A. Well, I did actually, or a Christmas edition of the first product -- the second product. I thought it was a Christmas edition of the second product. To me it looks like a Christmas edition of that product.”
“Q. What were you thinking, what were the options? A. Is it a new product? Has it has been made by someone who is looking to bring something out for Christmas as a novelty Christmas item? I think it was October time, but I had been out Christmas shopping early, and it just looked like a Christmassy version of what was already available. Q. “A Christmassy version of what was already available"? A. Yes. Q. Who did you have in mind as to what was already available? A. The Magic Tree option that was -- that I knew from years ago.”
“Q. You said at the time you thought it was a Magic Tree or Forest Fresh product? A. That is correct. 74. Q. But you were not certain? A. I saw it. I was asked what my first thoughts were. I believe what I said was it is Magic Tree and I believe it is a Forest Fresh scent. Q. What about the CarPlan at the bottom? A. I did not take no notice of that at first. I just sort of saw it and sort of assumed it was something in partnership with CarPlan maybe or some kind of promotion or something. That was my initial thoughts.”
“Q. In the questionnaire, you were shown, first of all, the single air freshener, the CarPlan one. A. Yes. Q. You were asked whether you seen that and you said: "Yes, on mirrors and in petrol stations." Then, in your witness statement, you say: "When I was taken to question 1" – this is by the solicitor afterwards -- "I said that I did not know whether I had got confused at the time." Were you asked some question? Were you asked whether you were confused when you said "yes"? A. No, I was not asked if I was confused. I just thought that it was important to point out that, at the time I said I had seen the first image before, I had not seen the other images and when I saw the other images I realised that I had not and that I had been confusing it with the other images. Q. I see. As soon as you saw the second lot, you realised that you had not seen the first one? A. Exactly.”
"A person infringes a registered trade mark if he uses in the course of trade in relation to goods or services, a sign which --(a) is identical with or similar to the trade mark, and (b) .... where the trade mark has a reputation in the United Kingdom and the use of the sign, being without due cause, takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark."
“The trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit a third party from using, in the course of trade, a. …. b. indications concerning the kind, quality ….or other characteristics of goods …; c. ….. provided he uses them in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters.” provided he uses them in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters.”
“3. (1) The following shall not be registered or if registered shall be liable to be declared invalid: (e) signs which consist exclusively of: - the shape which results from the nature of the goods themselves, or - the shape of goods which is necessary to obtain a technical result, or - the shape which gives substantial value to the goods;”
“Even though it is only a picture which is formally the subject of the registration, both sides, in my judgment rightly, treated it as a registration covering also a three-dimensional shape. It would be quite artificial to regard a straight picture of a thing, and the thing itself, as significantly different under a law of trade marks which permits shapes to be registered”
“78. The rationale of the grounds for refusal of registration laid down in Art.3(1)(e) of the Directive is to prevent trade mark protection from granting its proprietor a monopoly on technical solutions or functional characteristics of a product which a user is likely to seek in the products of competitors. Art.3(1)(e) is thus intended to prevent the protection conferred by the trade mark right from being extended, beyond signs which serve to distinguish a product or service from those offered by competitors, so as to form an obstacle preventing competitors from freely offering for sale products incorporating such technical solutions or functional characteristics in competition with the proprietor of the trade mark. 79. As regards, in particular, signs consisting exclusively of the shape of the product necessary to obtain a technical result, listed in Art.3(1)(e), second indent, of the Directive, that provision is intended to preclude the registration of shapes whose essential characteristics perform a technical function, with the result that the exclusivity inherent in the trade mark right would limit the possibility of competitors supplying a product incorporating such a function or at least limit their freedom of choice in regard to the technical solution they wish to adopt in order to incorporate such a function in their product. 80. As Art.3(1)(e) of the Directive pursues an aim which is in the public interest, namely that a shape whose essential characteristics perform a technical function and were chosen to fulfil that function may be freely used by all, that provision prevents such signs and indications from being reserved to one undertaking alone because they have been registered as trade marks (see, to that effect, Windsurfing Chiemsee, paragraph 25)”
“30. The immediate purpose in barring registration of merely functional shapes or shapes which give substantial value to the goods is to prevent the exclusive and permanent right which a trade mark confers from serving to extend the life of other rights which the legislature has sought to make subject to limited periods. I refer, specifically, to the legislation on industrial patents and designs.”
“The subsection is only concerned with shapes having ‘substantial value’. That requires a conclusion as to whether the value is substantial, which in my view requires that a comparison has to be made between the shape sought to be registered and the shapes of equivalent articles. It is only if the shape sought to be registered has, in relative terms, substantial value that it will be excluded from registration. In the present case, the shape registered by Philips has a substantial reputation built up by advertising and reliability and the like. That in my view is not relevant. What has to be considered is the shape as a shape. If that is done I do not believe that the evidence established that the registered shape has any more value than other shapes which were established to be as good as and as cheap as that which is registered… ”
“1. The following shall not be registered or if registered shall be liable to be declared invalid: (c) trade marks which consist exclusively of signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to designate the kind, quality ……………..……or other characteristics of goods…”
“2 A trade mark shall also be liable to revocation if, after the date on which it was registered, (a) in consequence of acts or inactivity of the proprietor, it has become the common name in the trade for a product or service in respect of which it is registered;” (a) in consequence of acts or inactivity of the proprietor, it has become the common name in the trade for a product or service in respect of which it is registered;”
“First, he must establish a goodwill or reputation attached to the goods or services which he supplies in the mind of the purchasing public by association with the identifying “get-up” (whether it consists simply of a brand name or a trade description, or the individual features of labelling or packaging) under which his particular goods or services are offered to the public, such that the get-up is recognised by the public as distinctive specifically of the plaintiff’s goods or services. Secondly, he must demonstrate a misrepresentation by the defendant to the public (whether or not intentional) leading or likely to lead the public to believe that goods or services offered by him are the goods or services of the plaintiff. Whether the public is aware of the plaintiff’s identify as the manufacturer or supplier or the goods or services is immaterial, as long as they are identified with a particular source which is in fact the plaintiff. For example, if the public is accustomed to rely upon a particular brand name in purchasing goods of a particular description, it matters not at all that there is little or no public awareness of the identity of the proprietor of the brand name. Thirdly, he must demonstrate that he suffers or, in a quia timet action, that he is likely to suffer damage by reason of the erroneous belief engendered by the defendant’s misrepresentation that the source of the defendant’s goods or services is the same as the source of those offered by the plaintiff”