“The court is not limited to any specific basis for assessing damages in lieu of an injunction under the Act. However, principle and practice suggest that the normal three bases are (a) traditional compensatory damages – i.e. a sum which compensates the claimant for past present and future losses as a result of the breach but not for the loss of the covenant; (b) negotiating damages – i.e. a sum based on what reasonable people in the position of the parties would negotiate for a release of the right which has been, is being, and will be breached; and (c) an account – i.e. a sum based on an account, that is, on the profit the defendant has made, is making and will make as a result of the breach.”
“It is obviously unwise to try and lay down any firm general guidance as to the circumstances in which, and the degree to which, it is possible to take into account facts and events which have taken place after the date of the hypothetical negotiations, when deciding the figure at which those negotiations would arrive. Quite apart from anything else, it is almost inevitable that each case will turn on its own particular facts...”
“After all, once the court has decided on a particular valuation date for assessing negotiating damages, consistency, fairness, and principle can be said to suggest that a judge should be careful before agreeing that a factor which existed at that date should be ignored, or that a factor which occurred after that date should be taken into account, as affecting the negotiating stance of the parties when deciding the figure at which they would arrive. In my view, the proper analysis is as follows. Given that negotiating damages under the Act are meant to be compensatory, and are normally to be assessed or valued at the date of breach, principle and consistency indicate that post-valuation events are normally irrelevant; but, given the quasi-equitable nature of such damages, the judge may, where there are good reasons, direct a departure from the norm either by selecting a different valuation date or by directing that a specific post-valuation date event be taken into account.”
“Of course, there is no reason to suppose that upon the facts, the parties would have agreed at all and to that extent the exercise is an artificial one. But that does not mean it should not be performed.” [Quote unchecked] Later at page 87 beginning just below letter D, Mr Mann considered the effect of the hypothetical negotiation. Amongst the features that he identified at subparagraph (e) he said that “the basis of the negotiation would be a split of the perceived gain. That gain would not be obvious and would be the subject of debate within the sort of variations that I have described.”