“For the purposes of this Clause the "Maximum Amount" during the First Claim Period shall be£25,000,000 , during the Second Claim Period shall be£10,000,000 , during the Third Claim Period shall be£5,000,000 and during the Fourth Claim Period shall be£2,500,000 . Any amounts payable to the Purchaser, or any Designated Purchaser, or any member of the Purchaser's Group in respect of all Claims shall be recoverable only from and to the extent of: (a) the sums held from time to time in the Retention Account; and (b) any sums actually recovered by the Purchaser, or any Designated Purchaser or any member of the Purchaser's Group under the Purchaser Insurance Policy The Purchaser (on its own behalf and on behalf of any Designated Purchaser or any member of the Purchaser's Group) agrees that it will look solely to the sums referred to in (a) and (b) above and will have no recourse for any Claim to any assets of the Warrantors, other than to the sums held from time to time in the Retention Account.”
“Neither of the Warrantors shall have any liability in respect of any claim arising under the Warranties (other than the Tax Warranties) unless the Purchaser has served on them a written notice of that claim on or before the expiry of the First Claim Period (being fifteen calendar months from the Completion Date), or, in respect of a claim arising under the Tax Warranties or the Tax Covenant, six months following the sixth anniversary of the Completion Date. (a) In each case, the Purchaser shall be required, at the same time as giving such notice of a Claim to give such details of the Claim as the Purchaser then has, including the Purchaser's then best estimate given in good faith of the amount of the liability of the Warrantors in respect thereof. (b) The Claim shall be deemed to have been withdrawn, and the Warrantors shall no longer be liable in respect thereof, unless the Purchaser has issued and served proceedings in respect thereof within 12 months of the date of such written notice provided that if the relevant notice was given in respect of a Claim which was then contingent only, such period of 12 months shall commence on and from the date on which the relevant Claim ceases to be contingent and becomes actual.”
“If the Purchaser or Designated Purchaser has not made any Second Claim Period Retention Claim(s) prior to the expiry of the Second Claim Period . . . there shall be released to the Sellers' Solicitors on behalf of the Sellers on the second Business Day following the expiry of the Second Claim Period, an amount equal to the lesser of (i) the Second Claim Period Maximum Released Amount and (ii) such amount as leaves in the Retention Account an amount equal to£5,000,000 ”
“Any claim (whether sounding in rescission for undue influence or otherwise) that you have” were construed to mean: “Any claim sounding in rescission (whether for undue influence or otherwise) that you may have”
“Finally, on this part of the case, I must make some comments upon the judgment of the Court of Appeal. Leggatt LJ said that his construction was ‘the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used’. I do not think that the concept of natural and ordinary meaning is very helpful when, on any view, the words have not been used in a natural and ordinary way. In a case like this, the court is inevitably engaged in choosing between competing unnatural meanings. Secondly, Leggatt LJ said that the judge’s construction was not an ‘available meaning’ of the words. If this means that judges cannot, short of rectification, decide that the parties must have made mistakes of meaning or syntax, I respectfully think he was wrong. The proposition is not, I would suggest, borne out by his citation from Alice Through the Looking Glass. Alice and Humpty Dumpty were agreed that the word ‘glory’ did not mean ‘a nice knock-down argument’. Anyone with a dictionary could see that. Humpty Dumpty’s point was that ‘a nice knock-down argument’ was what he meant by using the word ‘glory’. He very fairly acknowledged that Alice, as a reasonable young woman, could not have realised this until he told her, but once he had told her, or if, without being expressly told, she could have inferred it from the background, she would have had no difficulty in understanding what he meant.”
“It is not for a party who relies upon the words actually used to establish that those words effect a sensible commercial purpose. It should be assumed, as a starting point, that the parties understood the purpose which was effected by the words they used; and that they used those words because, to them, that was a sensible commercial purpose. Before the court can introduce words which the parties have not used, it is necessary to be satisfied (i) that the words actually used produce a result which is so commercially nonsensical that the parties could not have intended it, and (ii) that they did intend some other commercial purpose which can be identified with confidence. If, and only if, those two conditions are satisfied, is it open to the court to introduce words which the parties have not used in order to construe the agreement. It is then permissible to do so because, if those conditions are satisfied, the additional words give to the agreement or clause the meaning which the parties must have intended.”