‘The rules of law according to which cases of this nature are to be decided, do not admit of any dispute, so far as they are necessary to the determination of the present Appeal: and they have been acquiesced in on both sides. These rules are two; the first that the onus probandi lies in every case upon the party propounding a Will; and he must satisfy the conscience of the Court that the instrument so propounded is the last Will of a free and capable Testator. The second is, that if a party writes or prepares a Will, under which he takes a benefit, that is a circumstance that ought generally to excite the suspicion of the Court, and calls upon it to be vigilant and jealous in examining the evidence in support of the instrument, in favour of which it ought not to pronounce unless the suspicion is removed, and it is judicially satisfied that the paper propounded does express the true Will of the deceased.’ [67] Parke B went on to explain what is meant by the onus probandi in that context. He said: ‘The strict meaning of the term onus probandi is this, that if no evidence is given by the party on whom the burthen is cast, the issue must be found against him. In all cases the onus is imposed on the party propounding a Will, it is in general discharged by proof of capacity, and the fact of execution, from which the knowledge of and assent to the contents of the instrument are assumed, and it cannot be that the simple fact of the party who prepared the Will being himself a Legatee, is in every case, and under all circumstances, to create a contrary presumption, and to call upon the Court to pronounce against the Will, unless additional evidence is produced to prove the knowledge of its contents by the deceased. A single instance, of not unfrequent occurrence, will test the truth of this proposition. A man of acknowledged competence and habits of business, worth£100,000 , leaves the bulk of his property to his family, and a Legacy of£50 to his confidential attorney, who prepared the Will: would this fact throw the burthen of proof of actual cognizance by the Testator, of the contents of the Will, on the party propounding it, so that if such proof were not supplied, the Will would be pronounced against? The answer is obvious, it would not. All that can truly be said is, that if a person, whether attorney or not, prepares a Will with a Legacy to himself, it is, at most, a suspicious circumstance, of more or less weight, according to the facts of each particular case; in some of no weight at all, as in the case suggested, varying according to circumstances; for instance the quantum of the Legacy, and the proportion it bears to the property disposed of, and numerous other contingencies: but in no case amounting to more than a circumstance of suspicion, demanding the vigilant care and circumspection of the Court in investigating the case, and calling upon it not to grant probate without full and entire satisfaction that the instrument did express the real intentions of the deceased. Nor can it be necessary, that in all such cases, even if the Testator’s capacity is doubtful, the precise species of evidence of the deceased’s knowledge of the Will is to be in the shape of instructions for, or reading over the instrument. They form, no doubt, the most satisfactory, but they are not the only satisfactory description of proof, by which the cognizance of the contents of the Will may be brought home to the deceased. The Court would naturally look for such evidence; in some cases it might be impossible to establish a Will without it, but it has no right in every case to require it.’ (See (1838) 2 Moo PC 480 at 484–486, 12 ER 1089 at 1091.) [69] Confirmation that what has come to be known as the rule in Barry v Butlin is an evidential rule can be found in the judgment of Scarman J in Re Fuld (dec’d) (No 3), Hartley v Fuld (Fuld intervening)[1965] 3 All ER 776 ,[1968] P 675 . It was necessary, in that case, for the judge to decide whether the English requirements as to proof of knowledge and approval were a part of substantive law—in which case they would be irrelevant in the circumstances that the testator died domiciled in Germany; or whether they were rules of evidence—in which case they fell to applied as part of the lex fori. After referring to the reaffirmation, in Wintle v Nye, of the rule in Barry v Butlin, Scarman J said: ‘In my opinion, the whole point of the rule is evidential; it is concerned with the approach required of the court to the evidence submitted for its consideration. In the ordinary case proof of testamentary capacity and due execution suffices to establish knowledge and approval, but in certain circumstances the court is to require further affirmative evidence. The character of the rule as evidential emerges clearly from the speeches of VISCOUNT SIMONDS and of LORD REID.’ (See[1965] 3 All ER 776 at 781,[1968] P 675 at 697.) [71] It is, I think, this flexibility of approach within the civil standard of proof which lies behind the observations of Viscount Simonds in Wintle v Nye[1959] 1 All ER 552 at 557,[1959] 1 WLR 284 at 291: ‘In all cases the court must be vigilant and jealous. The degree of suspicion will vary with the circumstances of the case. It may be slight and easily dispelled. It may, on the other hand, be so grave that it can hardly be removed. In the present case, the circumstances were such as to impose on the respondent as heavy a burden as can well be imagined.’