“The man never intended to put it in joint names but always determined to have it in his own name. It seems to me that he should be judged by what he told her – by what he led her to believe – and not by his own intent which he kept to himself. Lord Diplock made this clear in Gissing vGissing [1971] A.C. 886, 906.”
“It seems to me that this answer raises a clear inference that there was an understanding between them that she was intended to have some sort of proprietary interest in the house: otherwise no excuse would have been needed.”
“ … [T]hese facts appear to me to raise a clear inference that there was an understanding between the plaintiff and the defendant, or a common intention, that the plaintiff was to have some sort of proprietary interest in the house; otherwise no excuse for not putting her name onto the title would have been needed.”
“the fact that the men’s statements were excuses ... does not mean that the men were thereby acknowledging an agreement whereby the woman would have a share.”
“As to the link between common intention and detriment, useful guidance may in the future be obtained from the principles underlying the law of proprietary estoppel which in my judgment are closely akin to those laid down in Gissing v Gissing. In both, the claimant must to the knowledge of the legal owner have acted in the belief that the claimant has or will obtain an interest in the property. In both, the claimant must have acted to his or detriment in reliance on such belief. The two principles have been developed separately without cross fertilisation between them: but they rest on the same foundation and have on all other matters reached the same conclusions.”
“It is possible that the House of Lords will one day decide to solve the problems presented by these types of case by assimilating the two principles. But they have not yet been assimilated and we must continue to regard cases such as the present as being governed by the principles of Gissing v Gissing.”
“If these problems are to be solved by an analysis based on constructive trust, which requires the imputation of some common intention at the time of acquisition, then, as Nourse LJ observed in Stokes v Anderson[1991] 1 FLR 391 (at 399F), ‘the court must supply the common intention by reference to that which all the material circumstances have shown to be fair’. That is, I think, what Waite LJ had in mind when he referred, in Midland Bank plc v Cooke and Another[1995] 2 FLR 915 , 927G, to ‘equity’s assistance in formulating a fair presumed basis for the sharing of the beneficial title’ in a case where the parties ‘had been honest enough to admit they never gave ownership a thought’. Once it is recognised that what the court is doing, in cases of this nature, is to supply or impute a common intention as to the parties’ respective shares (in circumstances in which there was, in fact, no common intention) on the basis of that which, in the light of all the material circumstances (including the acts and conduct of the parties after the acquisition) is shown to be fair, it seems to me very difficult to avoid the conclusion that an analysis in terms of proprietary estoppel will, necessarily, lead to the same result; and that it may be more satisfactory to accept that there is no difference, in cases of this nature, between constructive trust and proprietary estoppel”
“If you are willing I would love to try to pick up the pieces and to return to that happiness we once had? … I know we also have another problem which seems to have upset you greatly and one we have talked about, that is money, but if the business is really doing well and you get the Roger saga sorted out hopefully you will see a bit of light through the trees quite quickly.”
“ … The wording of the Hill Samuel agreement suggested that it may be possible to take up and continue the loan agreement for, we hope, 4 more months which will allow for a final resolution of affairs.”
“… having regard to the fact that the proposed£100,000 borrowing on Penny’s property is to be utilised for the repayment of your Hill Samuel borrowing, to protect Penny she should be given a corresponding mortgage over Caradoc. I prepared a mortgage deed and enclose a copy of it for your information. Once Penny’s new mortgage offer has been issued I can complete the necessary blanks in the enclosed. I am sending a copy of this letter to Penny for her information.”
“I understand it [is] proposed that you will shortly transfer to [Mrs van Laethem] a 50% shareholding in Great Central Railway Company (Southern Division) Limited, and that Penny has agreed to release her existing charge from the land comprised in the enclosed Transfer Deed. In view of the complexity and potential conflict of interests between you and Penny, I do not feel that I am in a position to advise Penny regarding this matter as well as yourself, and I would suggest that she obtains independent legal advice. In particular I confirm that I expressed to you my concern at the vulnerable position that Great Central Railway Company (Southern Division) Limited would be in if planning permission was not obtained or if planning permission was obtained with conditions on it which you did not comply with within the five year period. … I have also prepared a Form 53 to be signed by Penny to release her existing mortgage from the property to be transferred. I enclose this and would be grateful if you would have this signed by Penny in the usual way.”
“We are buying this privately and for an agreed sum of£225,000 ”
“From this you will see that while you are company secretary you are not a director, and the shareholders are Kim and the executor(s) of his father’s estate (that I assume is also Kim). I think that this only serves to underscore what you already suspected but it does confirm that you potentially have no ‘interest’ in the building plots and hence reinforces my belief that you would be well advised to consult a solicitor.”
“The plan behind the purchase of Oakleigh was the relocation of the enabling planning here. I have always viewed your mother’s capital as strictly her own, therefore it provided me with an opportunity to pay her back. A similar scheme was tried for the ‘Garden house’ but that was not so successful. She has options either for an entire settlement based on Oakleigh alone, or to share Oakleigh and participate in the planning gain which will nett potentially£250,000 for her, in addition to her share of Oakleigh. … I have conducted my relationship with your mother in a careful and honest way: we have shared resources and I have been careful to replace these and to build security for her quite independent of myself. A policy I have followed over the years.”
“I have spoken to Penny and to spare any confusions I have asked her to write a letter to you dealing with the issues of money and chargeholding. I will endorse and sign that letter to show my agreement with it. As the division of funds will not become an issue until funds are available to be divided, I have told her there is no pressing need until the exact details of the sale become clear: for example, some monies may be held in Escrow for the guarantees of the provision within the 106 agreement.”
“Kim and I have always agreed that when the land owned by Caradoc Estates Ltd [in] which we have both 50% percent shares was sold, it should be split equally between us, with both of us contributing£50,000 each towards the completion of the house to satisfy the 106 agreement. Kim says he will be writing to you to inform you of our bank details etc nearer the contract date.”
“It is not really possible to simply include you on the deeds at this stage, without first discussing one or two practical issues. For one thing, how would you see the project at Caradoc advance? What restrictions would be imposed if, for example, I wanted to sell before completion? If Caradoc is to be sold now and I am to cooperate, then I must be assured it is for the optimum possible amount whereas, from what you’ve told me, the current values for the site are not very attractive. … From your [e-]mail and from your solicitor’s letter this morning, the choice seems to be to include you on the deeds or to lose Caradoc. Though you say you ‘love’ the place, you are not even proposing any solution whereby you become the sole owner. Indeed, this was expressly ruled out in a previous letter from your solicitor. Up until now, I have based my view of any division, very much upon the principals [sic]we discussed at the outset. For example, 50% of the building land was always yours regardless of the actual circumstances. But then, the 50% was based upon the best realisable value. Harper showed that a sale was not necessarily the best way to achieve this. You then favoured the development solution which, of course, would be even more lucrative [sic]. Your true share was never in doubt and I would be pleased to verify this in a deed… or in whatever way you wished as part of a solution to our current problems. … As I stated in my last letter to your solicitor, the principal [sic] of 50% is also withdrawn pending the advice I might receive; which may be for a lesser amount.”
“I also enclose the letter discussed in respect of your mother’s capital and, while I am doing this in part to protect my own position, I still consider it essential that you ‘ring fence’ your mother’s position as a matter of priority.”
“Some considerable time ago Mr Brooker sold off to Mrs Van Laethem the former Kitchen Garden at Sulgrave Court and since that time he has had no interest in the property. He is not willing or able to transfer to Mrs Van Laethem any additional land above that which was sold off before the construction of the Garden House commenced. Please note that Ravens Oak Limited also have no interest in the property and never have had any interest, apart from the fact that they were employed as a Contractor to carry out construction work. In the circumstances the Notices that you have served are clearly misconceived and we would be grateful if you would confirm that they are withdrawn immediately and confirm that you will pay our reasonable legal fees for dealing with this matter. Please note that Mrs Van Laethem does not reside at Sulgrave Court.”
“ … The wording of the Hill Samuel agreement suggested that it may be possible to take up and continue the loan agreement for, we hope, 4 more months which will allow for a final resolution of affairs.”
“… having regard to the fact that the proposed£100,000 borrowing on Penny’s property is to be utilised for the repayment of your Hill Samuel borrowing, to protect Penny she should be given a corresponding mortgage over Caradoc. I prepared a mortgage deed and enclose a copy of it for your information. Once Penny’s new mortgage offer has been issued I can complete the necessary blanks in the enclosed. I am sending a copy of this letter to Penny for her information.”
“I have spoken to Penny and to spare any confusions I have asked her to write a letter to you dealing with the issues of money and chargeholding. I will endorse and sign that letter to show my agreement with it. As the division of funds will not become an issue until funds are available to be divided, I have told her there is no pressing need until the exact details of the sale become clear: for example, some monies may be held in Escrow for the guarantees of the provision within the 106 agreement.”
“Kim and I have always agreed that when the land owned by Caradoc Estates Ltd [in] which we have both 50% percent shares was sold, it should be split equally between us, with both of us contributing£50,000 each towards the completion of the house to satisfy the 106 agreement.”