"28. Some regional editions of the Cable Guide magazine had a few pages which contained text of specific relevance to that region. These pages were referred to as the "region-specific Telewest talks section"
"Provided that you are able to comply with the terms of this agreement, we will, in return, provide you with the Services ..."
"Monies are being collected on behalf of and will be remitted to Telewest Communications (Publications) Limited for the supply of the magazine."
"First, as I have already said, the concept of "supply" for the purposes of VAT is not identical with that of contractual obligation. Secondly, in consequence, it is perfectly possible that although the parties in any given situation may conclude their contractual arrangements in writing so as to define all their mutual rights and obligations arising in private law, their agreement may nevertheless leave open the question, what is the nature of the supplies made by A to B for the purposes of A’s assessment of VAT. In many situations, of course, the contract will on the facts conclude any VAT issue, as where there is a simple agreement for the supply of goods or services with no third party involved. In cases of that kind there is no space between the issue of supply for VAT purposes and the nature of the private law contractual obligation. But that is a circumstance, not a rule. There may be cases, generally (perhaps always) where three or more parties are concerned in which the contract’s definition (however exhaustive) of the parties’ private law obligations nevertheless neither caters for nor concludes the statutory question, what supplies are made by whom to whom. Nor should this be a matter for surprise: in principle, the incidence of VAT is obviously not by definition regulated by private agreement. Whether and to what extent the tax falls to be exacted depends, as with every tax, on the application of the taxing statute to the particular facts. Within those facts, the terms of contracts entered into by the taxpayer may or may not determine the right tax result. They do not necessarily do so."
"20. It must be observed, first, that it is common ground that where a competition such as that in issue in the main proceedings is organised there is reciprocal performance within the meaning of the Tolsma judgment between the organiser of the competition and the competitors, the remuneration received by the organiser in the form of entry fees constituting the value actually given in return for the service he supplies to the competitors. 21. It is clear, next, that adopting the approach of making the existence of a legal relationship in the Tolsma sense depend on the obligations of the provider of the service being legally enforceable would compromise the effectiveness of the Sixth Directive, in that it would have the consequence that transactions falling within that directive could vary from one member state to another because of differences which might exist between the various legal systems in this respect. 22. ... 23 . ...[I]t cannot be validly maintained that no legal relationship in the Tolsma sense exists, because the obligation on a provider of services is not enforceable, where the impossibility of seeking enforcement of that obligation derives from an agreement between the provider of services and the recipient, such an agreement constituting the very expression of a legal relationship in that sense."