“50.27.—(1) This rule applies where a party wants the High Court to reopen a decision of that court which determines an appeal or an application for permission to appeal. (2) Such a party must— (a) apply in writing for permission to reopen that decision, as soon as practicable after becoming aware of the grounds for doing so; and (b) serve the application on the High Court officer and every other party. (3) The application must— (a) specify the decision which the applicant wants the court to reopen; and (b) give reasons why— (i) it is necessary for the court to reopen that decision in order to avoid real injustice, (ii) the circumstances are exceptional and make it appropriate to reopen the decision, and (iii) there is no alternative effective remedy. (4) The court must not give permission to reopen a decision unless each other party has had an opportunity to make representations.”
“11(iv) Exceptionally events can occur after the decision on the extradition hearing (if there is no appeal) or of the Divisional Court or of the Supreme Court (on any appeal) which would make extradition incompatible with the requested person’s human rights. … (vi) The provisions … are therefore intended to permit the determination of such issues by the courts by way of an appeal. The express language of the new provisions makes it clear a court can only consider such an appeal if it is both necessary to avoid a real injustice and the circumstances are exceptional and make it appropriate to consider the appeal.”
“9. … particular attention to the expectation that the jurisdiction under Crim PR 17.27 will not be exercised unless something has developed after the determination of the appeal. The jurisdiction is not designed to allow a disappointed party to the appeal to reconsider his arguments, material and evidence and come back to the court to have another go. Furthermore, we would emphasise the importance of finality in extradition cases by noting the observations of Lord Thomas in Abu Hamza v Government of the United States of America[2012] EWHC 2736 (Admin) at [21] and [22], namely that there is an overwhelming public interest in both the proper functioning of extradition arrangements and in honouring extradition treaties as well as there being an equally high importance in the finality of litigation. Finality of litigation is particularly important in extradition cases: “because of the public interest in an efficient process, the need to adhere to international obligations and to avoid a recurrence of the delays which have so disfigured the extradition process in the past and to which successive appeals over time can subject it.”” “because of the public interest in an efficient process, the need to adhere to international obligations and to avoid a recurrence of the delays which have so disfigured the extradition process in the past and to which successive appeals over time can subject it.””
“Late on13 August 2025 , we became aware of developments in other proceedings, which made it essential to lodge the application to re-open even without an expert report. We expect the expert report in the course of the next two to three weeks, and are doing all we can to expedite matters …”
“133. … The extensive evidence which persuaded the District Judge that there were strong grounds to believe that the appellant would face a real risk of proscribed treatment at the hands of the several bodies engaged in investigating him, did not focus or depend on the location at which such questioning occurs. 134. The evidence is that the use of proscribed treatment to obtain confessions is commonplace and endemic. The evidence indicates that the focus on obtaining confessions flows from being under-resourced, lacking modern investigation techniques or sufficient personnel; and from the lack of will to stamp out the use of torture, reflected in the failure to ratify UNCAT. Those factors would be unaffected by whether investigating bodies have the opportunity to question the appellant in their own detention facilities or can only do so at Tihar prison. In addition, there is some (albeit more limited) evidence of the use of violence by investigation officers, against those under investigation, to extort money. The latter motive would be unaffected by the location of questioning, and the appellant is likely to be at increased risk of extortion because he is, or would be perceived to be, a wealthy man. 135. The assurance regarding the appellant’s location would only remove the established real risk of proscribed treatment, or lessen it to such an extent that it does not meet the threshold, if those involved in investigating the appellant would be inhibited by the location from acting in the way that the District Judge found there is otherwise a real risk they would do. In determining this question we have taken into account all the evidence we have received regarding Tihar Prison, including that which we have addressed above and below (some of which has only come into existence since the District Judge gave judgment).”
“132. We agree with the respondent that, insofar as the challenge to the adequacy of the October 2022 Assurance is based on the reference to an assurance provided “by the investigation agency”, it is without merit. First, as the District Judge rightly observed, applying Giese v USA[2018] EWHC 1480 (Admin) ,[2018] 4 WLR 103 , Lord Burnett CJ (giving the judgment of the court), [38], the court should not view the respondent’s assurances “through the lens of a technical analysis of the words used” or approach them with suspicion that thegovernment “will do everything possible to wriggle out of them”
“1.6 Without prejudice to the above, all the five investigating agencies of India including CBI have confirmed in writing that his custodial interrogation is not required by them and even if it is required at any stage in the future, the same will not be done without taking prior consent [of the UK]”
“In continuation of the [previous] assurances, the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India further assures that: a. The extradition of Mr Nirav Modi is sought only for the judicial trial in India for the above-mentioned cases [as specified in our para 2 above] of CBI and ED in India. b. Following his extradition to India, Mr Modi will not be interrogated by the CBI in relation to the matters for which extradition is sought or in relation to any other allegations or proceedings. In future, if any need arises for his interrogation in relation to the other ongoing cases by the CBI, the same will be done only with prior recourse to the UK Courts/authorities for permission as per the conditions laid down by the UK Courts/authorities. c. Mr Modi will not be interrogated by the ED in relation to the matters for which extradition has been sought or in relation to any other allegations or proceedings. In future, if any need arises for his interrogation in relation to the other ongoing cases by the ED, the same will be done only with prior recourse to the UK Courts/authorities and as per the conditions laid down by the UK Courts/authorities. d. Mr Modi will not be interrogated by any other investigating agency (including the SFIO [Serious Fraud Investigating Office], DRI [Directorate of Revenue Intelligence] and CBDT [Central Board of Direct Taxes]) in relation to any ongoing allegation or proceeding. In future, if any need arises for his interrogation in relation to any other proceeding or allegation, the same will be done only with prior recourse to the UK Courts/authorities for permission and as per conditions laid down by the UK Courts/authorities. e. In accordance with the Rule of Specialty, Mr Nirav Modi will not be subjected to any trial concerning offences beyond the scope of the extradition offences without taking consent of the Government of the UK. Even after such a consent is granted, Government of India will not transfer him from the Arthur Road Prison to any other prison in India. There are fully functional video conferencing facilities available in Arthur Road Prison through which Mr Modi can be produced before any outstation Court in India.”
“4. In accordance with the above mandate, the GoI follows an established procedure whereby the Ministry of Home Affairs seeks inputs and confirmations from the concerned law enforcement agencies/authorities on extradition matters. These inputs are examined in detail, keeping in view the provisions of the Constitution of India as well as the applicable domestic legislation. Upon due examination and satisfaction, sovereign assurances, as required under the applicable extradition framework, are conveyed to the requesting foreign country. The assurances provided by the GoI are fully aligned with and derive authority from the Constitutional and statutory safeguards enshrined in Indian law. 5. In the re-opening proceedings filed by Nirav Modi, the Government of India's assurance dated 02.12.2025 has been submitted to the UK authorities after following the above-mentioned procedure. The necessary inputs and confirmations from the five investigating agencies namely Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), Enforcement Directorate (ED), Department of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT-IT) and the Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO), have been obtained by the Central Government. These inputs and confirmations of the law enforcement agencies/authorities form part of internal correspondence of Government of India. 6. The assurances provided by the Government of India are binding and will be scrupulously adhered to by all the law enforcement agencies/authorities in India. Further, the assurances are also enforceable including through courts in India.”
“Indian law and specifically the applicable extradition framework, in the present case provides no mechanism for Indian authorities or courts to cede control of or seek guidance from a foreign court in the conduct of domestic criminal investigations after an accused is extradited.” (see para 3.27 of his report dated16 January 2026 ) Justice Verma adds: “… in my opinion the authority of the UK courts ends at the point of ordering or approving extradition and once extradition is complete, the matters fall within the sole jurisdiction of the Indian authorities” (para 3.33) Overall, in his view: “… the assurance in Mr Modi’s case, therefore, appears to be a diplomatic promise rather than a legally enforceable formal assurance in India.”
“38 The principles relating to the assessment of assurances were summarised by the European Court of Human Rights in Othman v United Kingdom; 55 EHRR 1, paras 188–189. The overarching question is whether the assurance is such as to mitigate the relevant risks sufficiently. That requires an assessment of the practical as well as the legal effect of the assurance in the context of the nature and reliability of the officials and country giving it. Whilst there may be states whose assurances should be viewed through the lens of a technical analysis of the words used and suspicion that they will do everything possible to wriggle out of them, that is not appropriate when dealing with friendly foreign governments of states governed by the rule of law where the expectation is that promises given will be kept. The principles identified in Othman, which are not a check list, have been applied to assurances in extradition cases in this jurisdiction. A court is ordinarily entitled to assume that the state concerned is acting in good faith in providing an assurance and that the relevant authorities will make every effort to comply with the undertakings, see Lord Advocate v Dean[2017] UKSC 44 ;[2017] 1 WLR 2721 , para 36.”
“The assurance that matters is the one provided bythe respondent to His Majesty’s Government, and there is no carve out within that assurance which would enable, say, the CBI or the Income Tax Department to remove the appellant from prison for questioning.”