Jaysukh Ranpariya v Government of India [2026] EWHC 682 (Admin)

[2026] EWHC 682 (Admin)Case No AC-2023-LON-001951
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 23/03/2026
Before
MR JUSTICE SHELDON
Between
JAYSUKH RANPARIYAApplicantGOVERNMENT OF INDIADefendantTHE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENTInterested Party
Hugh Southey KC, Florence Iveson, Zoe Brereton (instructed by HJA Birds) for ApplicantClair Dobbin KC, Rachel Scott KC (instructed by Crown Prosecution Service) for Defendant for The Secretary of State was not represented at the hearing.Hearing Hearing dates: 17th February 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 2pm on 23/03/2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................MR JUSTICE SHELDON
[1]The Applicant, Jaysukh Ranpariya (also known as Jayesh Patel) makes a renewed application for leave to appeal from the decision of District Judge Griffiths ordering his extradition to India to face a series of charges, including for murder and four allegations of conspiracy to murder. Leave to appeal was refused on the papers by Jeremy Johnson J on 30 September 2025.[2]Seven grounds of appeal are now relied upon (Ground 4 not being renewed):(i) Ground 1: The judge was wrong to find that there were adequate particulars of conduct, as required to by s.78(2)(c) of the Extradition Act 2003 (“the 2003 Act”) (‘the Particularisation Issue’);(ii) Ground 2: The judge was wrong in finding that she could be sure that the offences in the Request were extradition offences as required by s.78(4)(b) of the 2003 Act (‘the Extradition Offences Issue’);(iii) Ground 3: The learned judge erred in finding that there was sufficient evidence to make a case to answer for each offence, pursuant to s.84(1) of the 2003 Act (‘the prima facie case issue’);(iv) Ground 5: The judge erred in finding extradition is not prohibited by s.87 of the 2003 Act, read with article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the Convention’), because of the real risk that the Applicant will be tortured while in custody in India (‘the Article 3 Torture Issue’);(v) Ground 6: The judge was wrong not to find that extradition is prohibited by s.87 of the 2003 Act read with article 3 in light of the conditions of detention he would face in India, including inadequate medical care (‘the Article 3 Prison Conditions Issue’);(vi) Ground 7: The judge erred in finding extradition was not prohibited by s.87 of the 2003 Act read with article 3 in light of, the real risk he would receive a sentence of life without parole (‘the LWOP issue’);(vii) Ground 8: The learned judge erred in finding that extradition is not prohibited by s.91 of the 2003 Act because the Applicant’s mental condition means that it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite him (‘the Section 91 Issue’).[3]The application for renewal was dealt with at a hearing lasting one day. The Applicant was represented by Hugh Southey KC, Florence Iveson and Zoe Brereton; the Government of India was represented by Clair Dobbin KC and Rachel Scott KC. The District Judge’s Judgment[4]The hearing before the District Judge took place over 19 days. The judgment ran to 836 paragraphs and 296 pages. Following the District Judge’s decision that(i) the Applicant’s extradition to the India to face a criminal prosecution complies with his rights under the Convention,(ii) there were no bars to this extradition request, and(iii) extradition did not amount to an abuse of process, the case was sent to the Secretary of State for the Home Department who ordered extradition on 23 June 2023. The Submissions[5]The submissions on behalf of the Applicant can be summarised as follows. With respect to Grounds 1 and 2, the material relied upon in support of extradition (an affidavit sworn by Deepan Bhadran, a senior superintendent of police), a charge sheet, and evidence in the form of statements from witnesses, failed to particularise the conduct alleged to constitute each separate offence that the Applicant was charged with. The documents provided failed to specify what the prosecution will need, or seek, to prove in order to establish guilt. Whilst there are factual allegations recorded in the material, these are not clearly linked to specific charges. As a result, it cannot be established what conduct extradition is sought for, and that the conduct amounts to extradition offences.[6]It was submitted that the District Judge failed to consider whether section 78(2)(c) of the 2003 Act was met (that is, the requirement that the documents consist of or include the particulars of the offence specified in the request); and the District Judge failed to identify the essence of the conduct which would constitute each of the foreign offences.[7]This was illustrated most clearly by consideration of the second allegation, where the particulars provided could not properly be regarded as identifying a charge of conspiracy to murder, or disobeying orders contrary to section 135(1) of the Gujurat Police Act.[8]With respect to Ground 3: it was submitted that there were a variety of matters on which the District Judge erred in her approach to the evidence. Furthermore, it was submitted that a prima facie case against the Applicant could not be made out without the evidence of the co-accused, and their evidence was not admissible.[9]With respect to Ground 5: it was submitted that the District Judge applied the wrong standard of proof in determining whether or not the Applicant was at risk of torture if he was to be extradited to India. The District Judge required the Applicant to prove to the criminal standard (or at least the civil standard) with respect to past instances of torture, when the approach should have been whether a plausible case had been made that the Applicant had been subject to torture in India in the past. This infected the District Judge’s findings as to the real risk of the Applicant being subject to proscribed treatment upon return.[10]Further, it was submitted that the District Judge’s approach to the assurances provided by the Government of India was wrong. It was not sufficient to decide that the assurances were given in “good faith”, but whether there was cogent evidence that called the assurances into question which there clearly was. The District Judge should have asked whether there was an ability to control the police, especially as the Divisional Court has recently found that “the use of proscribed treatment to obtain confessions [in India] is commonplace and endemic”: see Bhandari v India [2025] EWHC 449 (Admin) at [134]. The Divisional Court has also found that the acceptance of torture or other serious mistreatment as a method of evidence gathering goes beyond the police and investigating bodies, and it was held at [136] to be “unlikely” that the applicant in that case “could look to prison officials for protection from the organisations that are engaged in investigating him.”[11]Mr Southey KC also referred to the allegations of torture that had been made by the co-accused. That was entirely relevant to the situation that the Applicant was at risk of facing were he to be returned to India.[12]With respect to Ground 7, it was submitted that the District Judge was wrong to decide that there was no real risk that the Applicant would be sentenced to life imprisonment from which he would never be released if returned to India. This was contrary to the expert evidence of Professor Lau, who stated that “there is a risk that the GOI Assurance on Remission could be breached”, as there was a risk that a challenge to the assurance could succeed before the courts in India. This risk could be addressed by legislation (as had happened with the death penalty), but that had not been promised by the Government of India.[13]With respect to Grounds 6 and 8, it was submitted that the material before the District Judge, including the way in which the assurances were given by the Government of India in a reactive way to the expert evidence presented on behalf of the Applicant, raised real questions as to the ability of the Government of India to provide the Applicant with a safe environment. The expert evidence of Dr Mitchell was that he remained concerned as to whether “the Indian Government . . . have a full enough understanding as to what a safe cell really looks like” in circumstances where the Applicant was recognised as being a suicide risk.[14]The submissions made by Ms Dobbin KC and Ms Scott KC, on behalf of the Government of India, can be summarised as follows. With respect to Ground 1, it was submitted that the allegations in respect of which extradition is sought are amply particularised and encompass more than enough detail to enable the Applicant to understand what he is accused of and to raise any applicable arguments in defence of the proceedings. There is no requirement for particulars of the elements of the foreign law offence to be set out in the extradition request. Rather, what is called for is a description of the factual allegations which underpin the offences for which extradition is sought. This was clearly done.[15]It was submitted that the charge sheets, read together with the affidavits of Senior Superintendent Bhadran, demonstrate in respect of each of the four allegations made against the Applicant:(i) the nature and purpose of the conspiracy;(ii) the victim targeted;(iii) the relevant date period;(iv) the key locations;(v) the identity of the Applicant’s co-conspirators; and(vi) the Applicant’s role as the instigator of the criminal agreement (being the individual with a motive to seek to harm each of the victims).[16]With respect to Ground 2: the conduct described in the extradition request would constitute offences of murder and four conspiracies to murder in this jurisdiction and these are extradition offences. This was reflected in the notional English charges, which identified the particular English law offence said to constitute the essence of the conduct alleged. With respect to Allegation 2 (the attack on the home of Professor Rajani), this was amply set out in the materials considered by the District Judge.[17]With respect to Ground 3: the District Judge was entirely justified in finding that there was admissible evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case in respect of all four sets of allegations. This had been set out in exhaustive detail before the District Judge, and was conveniently summarised in a 50-page schedule. In particular, the District Judge did not err in her approach to the admissibility of certain categories of hearsay evidence relied upon by the Respondent. There was, as the District Judge found, a prima facie case on each of the four allegations without considering the evidence of the co-accused. With respect to the evidence of the co-accused, the District Judge was correct to decide that their statements were admissible as part of the prima facie case against the Applicant as they will be tried separately from him.[18]With respect to Ground 5: the District Judge’s rejection of the Applicant’s allegations of past torture was justified. Her approach to weighing the evidence relevant to those allegations – much of which turned on her assessments of the credibility of witnesses who were called and cross-examined – was careful and fair. The District Judge did not apply an unduly high evidential standard. The Applicant’s allegations were undermined by a considerable body of contemporaneous evidence, including the failure of the Applicant to mention that he was tortured on the various occasions when he was medically examined during the period of police and judicial custody in India, as well as the Applicant’s failure to make allegations of torture on his arrival in the United Kingdom or to seek help for any of the trauma said to arise from the alleged torture.[19]In any event, even though the District Judge rejected the Applicant’s allegations of past torture, she found that the assurances provided by the Government of India were adequate to meet any risk of Article 3 ill-treatment which may arise and determined that the assurances were given in good faith, were detailed and specific to the Applicant, and addressed the risk of the Applicant being “paraded” or suffering torture or ill-treatment at the hands of the police.[20]With respect to Grounds 6 and 8: The District Judge was entitled on the evidence to hold that appropriate and adequate healthcare provision will be available to the Applicant whilst in detention in Gujarat, such that his extradition would not be incompatible with his rights under Article 3 of the Convention, and would not be oppressive under s.91 of the 2003 Act. Similar undertakings to those given in this case have been upheld in other cases.[21]With respect to Ground 7: The District Judge was correct to find, on the basis of the Applicant’s own expert evidence, that he would not be at real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole if he was extradited.[22]Further, with respect to Grounds 6 to 8, it was submitted that the District Judge was entitled to rely on the diplomatic assurances provided by India as obviating any of the contended-for risks. In particular, the District Judge was entitled to find that the assurances have been given in good faith, they will bind India and they are appropriately detailed and specific to the Applicant’s case. There is binding authority as to the reliability of assurances provided by India to the United Kingdom; and nothing in this Court’s decision in Bhandari can be read as a departure from that established principle. Discussion

Introduction

[23]In determining whether to grant permission to proceed to a substantive hearing of the Applicant’s appeal, I am guided by the test that the Court is required to apply on appeal set out by Burnett LCJ in Love v Government of the United States of America [2018] 1 WLR 2889 at [25]-[26]:
“25. The statutory appeal power in section 104(3) permits an appeal to be allowed only if the district judge ought to have decided a question before him differently and if, had he decided it as he ought to have done, he would have had to discharge the appellant. The words " ought to have decided a question differently" (our italics) give a clear indication of the degree of error which has to be shown. The appeal must focus on error: what the judge ought to have decided differently, so as to mean that the appeal should be allowed. Extradition appeals are not re-hearings of evidence or mere repeats of submissions as to how factors should be weighed; courts normally have to respect the findings of fact made by the district judge, especially if he has heard oral evidence. The true focus is not on establishing a judicial review type of error, as a key to opening up a decision so that the appellate court can undertake the whole evaluation afresh. . . . 26. The true approach is more simply expressed by requiring the appellate court to decide whether the decision of the district judge was wrong. . . . The appellate court is entitled to stand back and say that a question ought to have been decided differently because the overall evaluation was wrong: crucial factors should have been weighed so significantly differently as to make the decision wrong, such that the appeal in consequence should be allowed.”

Grounds 1-3

[24]Applying the test in Love, I consider that, at least insofar as Allegation 2 is concerned (the shooting of Professor Parshottam Rajani on 14 November 2019), there is an arguable case with respect to grounds 1 and 2.[25]It is arguable that the material relating to Allegation 2 is insufficiently clear as to what is actually being alleged against the Applicant. I note, in particular, that on the one hand it is said that the attack on 14 November 2019 was for the purpose of intimidating Professor Rajani, and elsewhere reference is made to instructions being given by the Applicant that Professor Rajani should be killed.[26]I am not in a position, based on the submissions that were presented to me at the permission hearing, to reach any view on the possible merits of these grounds of appeal as they apply to Allegations 1, 3 and 4. I consider that the most sensible way forward, and best use of Court time, is to order a rolled-up hearing of permission to be followed by a substantive hearing with respect to those matters.[27]I also consider that Ground 3 is arguable. Mr Southey KC made a number of criticisms as to the way in which the District Judge assessed whether there was a prima facie case with respect to each of the allegations, and these appear to me to be arguable.[28]I do not consider that the alternative finding that the evidence of the co-accused is admissible on the authority of R v Pentonville Prison Governor, ex parte Schneider (1981) 73 Cr App R 200 provides a knock-out blow. It is arguable that Schneider should not have been followed by the District Judge. Further, there is a question to be considered as to the reliability of the evidence from the co-accused who, it is alleged, have made complaints of torture against the authorities in India. In that regard, I am prepared to grant an extension of legal aid for this matter to be explored in evidence as it may go to the question of the reliability of the co-accused’s evidence even if their evidence was otherwise admissible. Ground 5: Article 3 and risk of torture[29]I also consider that ground 5 is arguable, save for the contention that the District Judge erred in her findings as to what had happened to the Applicant when he was in detention in India and that the “risk” that the Applicant had been tortured previously was relevant to the assessment of risk as to the future if the Applicant was returned to India.[30]I consider that this ground is arguable (subject to the caveat as to what had happened in the past to the Applicant) in light of the decision of Bhandari which relied on some of the same evidence that was before the District Judge in this case. Similarly, the evidence relating to the co-accused and their allegations of torture may be relevant to this ground of appeal.[31]The Applicant cannot rely, however, on the contention that there was a risk that he had been tortured previously when in detention in India and that is relevant to future risk of torture, when the District Judge has found as a fact that the Applicant had not been tortured in India.[32]Mr Southey KC contended that the District Judge had erroneously determined whether the Applicant had made out a case that he had been tortured either on the criminal standard or at the very least on the civil standard, when all that was required was whether there was a risk that the Applicant had been tortured. In making this argument, Mr Southey KC sought to rely on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Karanakaran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] 3 All ER 449. In that case, Brooke LJ approved the approach that had been adopted in a number of Australian cases when assessing whether an applicant had a well-founded fear of being persecuted under the Refugee Convention. At p468d-469a, Brooke LJ set out a number of propositions of Sackville J in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam [1999] FCA 719, where it had been stated that in the context of an asylum claim that:
“(1) There may be circumstances in which a decision-maker must take into account the possibility that alleged past events occurred even though it finds that these events probably did not occur. The reason for this is that the ultimate question is whether the applicant has a real substantial basis for his fear of future persecution. The decision-maker must not foreclose reasonable speculation about the chances of the future hypothetical event occurring. (2) Although the civil standard of proof is not irrelevant to the fact-finding process, the decision-maker cannot simply apply that standard to all fact-finding. It frequently has to make its assessment on the basis of fragmented, incomplete and confused information. It has to assess the plausibility of accounts given by people who may be understandably bewildered, frightened and, perhaps, desperate, and who often do not understand either the process or the language spoken by the decision-maker/investigator. Even applicants with a genuine fear of persecution may not present as models of consistency or transparent veracity. (3) In this context, when the decision-maker is uncertain as to whether an alleged event occurred, or finds that although the probabilities are against it, the event may have occurred, it may be necessary to take into account the possibility that the event took place in deciding the ultimate question (for which see (1) above). Similarly, if the non-occurrence of an event is important to the applicant’s case, the possibility that that event did not occur may need to be considered by the decision-maker even though it considers that the disputed event probably did occur.”
[33]At p469j-470a of Karanakaran, Brooke LJ stated that:
“For the reasons much more fully explained in the Australian cases, when considering whether there is a serious possibility of persecution for a convention reason if an asylum-seeker is returned, it would be quite wrong to exclude matters totally from consideration in the balancing process simply because the decision-maker believes, on what may sometimes be somewhat fragile evidence, that they probably did not occur.”
[34]Mr Southey KC also relied on the observations of Sedley LJ in Karanakaran at p479(c)-(d), discussing the approach that decision-makers should take in asylum cases:
“Such decision-makers, on classic principles of public law, are required to take everything material into account. Their sources of information will frequently go well beyond the testimony of the applicant and include in-country reports, expert testimony and—sometimes—specialised knowledge of their own (which must of course be disclosed). No probabilistic cut-off operates here: everything capable of having a bearing has to be given the weight, great or little, due to it. What the decision-makers ultimately make of the material is a matter for their own conscientious judgment, so long as the procedure by which they approach and entertain it is lawful and fair and provided their decision logically addresses the convention issues.”
[35]In my judgment, this approach to evidence in the context of claims under the Refugee Convention is not apposite in the present context where it was possible for the District Judge to make findings of fact on the basis of the evidence; and where the finding as to whether the Applicant had, in fact, been tortured was relevant to another key issue in the case: whether or not the Applicant was suffering from PTSD.[36]Furthermore, where a finding has been made that the Applicant was not tortured, and where the allegations are found not to be “credible”, it makes no logical sense to talk about a risk that the Applicant had been tortured when, on the District Judge’s findings there is no “plausible case” that torture took place: c.f. JK v Sweden [2017] 64 EHRR 15 at [99].[37]The District Judge’s finding with respect to whether or not the Applicant had been tortured when previously in detention was plainly open to her. In reaching that decision, the District Judge weighed up the evidence relevant to the allegations of torture. The District Judge’s assessments of the credibility of witnesses who gave evidence about the Applicant’s contention that he had been tortured were careful and fair.[38]The Applicant’s allegations were undermined by a considerable body of contemporaneous evidence, including the failure of the Applicant to mention that he was tortured on the various occasions when he was medically examined during the period of police and judicial custody in India, as well as the Applicant’s failure to make allegations of torture on his arrival in the United Kingdom or to seek help for any of the trauma said to arise from the alleged torture.[39]In this regard, and to illustrate the careful approach taken by the District Judge, I set out her findings at paragraph 482. It can be seen that these findings are extremely detailed, addressing all of the evidence relating to torture and the contentions made by the Applicant about that evidence. (I have not included all of the material relating to the different experts; but note that the District Judge rejected evidence of most of the experts and gave cogent reasons for this). “c. The Defendant has been in police detention in India in the past and has been in prison in India in the past. The Defendant has made no claims of torture whilst in prison in India and there is no evidence of torture against the Defendant whilst he was in prison. Whilst the Defendant did not give evidence to me in these proceedings, it is clear from all of the evidence I have read and heard in this case that the Defendant has, at no time, complained of torture whilst in prison in India. . . . e. In relation to the allegations of torture by the police in India, the Defendant has given accounts to various experts in this case and to staff whilst in prison in the UK. Whilst the Defendant has given accounts of torture to professionals in this case at various times, what is clear to me is that the Defendant’s accounts of torture have changed and he has given differing accounts in relation to the way in which the torture was carried out and indeed in relation to the dates that he was tortured. For example, his account of torture to Dr Mitchell has differences to the account given to Dr Pickering. There are also inconsistencies in the accounts he gave to Dr Pickering on different occasions. Whilst it is right to say that the general allegations of torture are broadly similar, the detail of those allegations have changed. Further, there are differences between the accounts he has given and other evidence that are available, such as records from the Court in India, in that some of the Defendant’s claims are not corroborated by that other evidence. I also bear in mind that the Defendant came to the UK using false documentation and he used a false identity in the UK to seek medical care for his diabetes, private dental treatment and for blood tests. That said, it is clear from his medical records that at no time did he seek any help for or complain of any issues with his mental health whilst in the UK and before his arrest on the warrant. Indeed, the Defendant did not seek any treatment for those matters which he claims are as a result of his torture, such as problems with his feet or other issues that he has complained of since he has been in custody in the UK. It is also important that the first time the Defendant claimed he was tortured by the police was not until April 2021, the Defendant having been remanded in custody since 17 March 2021. The Defendant did not mention that he had been tortured or that he had any issues with his mental health when he was initially remanded in custody in the UK. The Court records from India show that during the time he alleges he was tortured by the police he was produced before the Court. The Defendant was asked regularly by the Court whether he had suffered ill-treatment and that he stated he had not, on each occasion. Further, he was examined by doctors at this time and those records show he received treatment, for example for his diabetes, but no evidence of ill-treatment was recorded or indeed reported by the Defendant. These documents are from the time that the Defendant alleges he was ill-treated by the police and I find they are important and yet Mr Bains placed no reliance on these documents or records. Mr Bains conceded that the law requires that detained persons are brought before the Magistrate and that they are required by law to verify whether there are any complaints about ill-treatment. Mr Bains confirmed that his evidence was that this law was often breached but he conceded that the evidence in this case for the Defendant was that this was in fact done, in that he was produced regularly before the Magistrate and he was asked about his treatment, which the Defendant regularly said no, including on days he now alleges mistreatment and that he was medically examined at this time. This is one of the reasons why I do not accept that the Defendant was tortured as alleged as the Court and medical records from this time indicate the opposite. I accept that the Defendant lodged a complaint or petition with the High Court in India on 19 December 2016, after he alleges he was tortured in India. I also note that this complaint was withdrawn on 20 December 2016, the following the day. The Defendant alleges that he withdrew the complaint as he was tortured and threatened in front of his family. That said, the Defendant has not given evidence before me in these proceedings and I have concerns over his credibility due to inconsistencies in his accounts to the various experts and accounts which can be said to be false by other evidence. This is important. Therefore, whilst it is right a complaint was lodged, I do not accept it was withdrawn as a result of threats and/or torture. Further, I note that the medical and court records from this time do not record any issues as a result of torture on many occasions. It is important therefore to note that the Defendant did not give evidence to me in these proceedings and I have not been able to hear the Defendant’s account of torture first hand nor have I had the opportunity of the inconsistencies in his account, the reasons for his delay in making such claims in India or in UK and the other evidence that contradicts his account being tested through his evidence. I find that this is important in this case for the reasons I will set out below. That said, I accept that there are the video clips of the Defendant, from the media and the anonymous witness from the media. There is one brief video, which shows the Defendant in police custody before he alleges he was tortured. It is clear from this video that the Defendant appears to walk without any gait or obvious signs of pain. Thereafter there is the video footage, which is piecemeal, which has been referred to as the “parading” video footage in this case. . . . I find that this was done to intimidate the Defendant and to humiliate him in a public way. I also accept that on this video the Defendant appears to be in some pain and/or discomfort, in that he is walking with an analgesic gait. That said, the Defendant is not wearing shoes and there could be a number of explanations for him walking in the way that is seen in the footage, as explained by Mr Matthews. The difficulty is, as set out above, that the Defendant did not give evidence about this before me. His accounts have been to the experts in this case and his accounts have differed. I cannot conclude, simply on the basis of the footage alone, that he was tortured prior to these videos. I need to be satisfied that he was in fact tortured and the evidence in relation to this, which is from the Defendant himself, I find, is unreliable and inconsistent. The Defendant, as I have said, did not make any claims of this initially when remanded and he did not seek treatment for any mental health issues prior to his remand in custody. Therefore, whilst I accept that the “parading” of the Defendant, as I have found it to be, is evidence of degrading treatment by the police in India, I am not satisfied that the Defendant was tortured before this “parading” or indeed at all whilst in police custody. In relation to the Defendant’s allegations of torture whilst in police custody in India, he claims that he suffered Falanga, that the soles of his feet were beaten with a belt. He claims that he was held down whilst this was done, although the account he gave to Dr Pickering about this changed. His account was also different to that given to Dr Mitchell and to Professor Katona. He also claims to have been hit around the ears and that he was subjected to genital electrocution. The medical examinations of his claims or torture in this way show no physical evidence to support these claims. Whilst the experts say that this does not rule out that he was tortured, there is no physical evidence, such as scarring or any other form of physical evidence, that supports his accounts. I accept that it is not unusual for torture in this way to leave any long-lasting signs but importantly in this case he was examined whilst he was in detention in India and presented before the Courts. There are notes from this time and there is no evidence of any signs of torture being identified. I find that this is significant when the Defendant has been inconsistent in the way in which he claims he was tortured by the police. The Defendant also claims that he was circumcised following the genital electrocution. He claims that this took place whilst he was in custody in India. Again, there is no reference from the medical records from this time that he was circumcised at the time he alleges. Further, I find that it is important to note that there are equally several other credible alternative explanations for this, as set out by Dr Mitchell, Mr Matthews and Dr Powrie. . . . Turning to the pains in the feet, Mr Matthews concedes that he cannot rule out the fact the Defendant was subject to Falanga but also he states that there is nothing to support it positively either, other than the Defendant’s self reports. Again, Mr Matthews provides alternative possible causes for pain in the feet which Dr Pickering, in my view, failed to take into account in her assessments or in her evidence. Similarly, Mr Matthews provides alternative explanations for the Defendant’s gait as seen on the video, such as osteoarthritis or even that it was fictitious. I find that it is important that Mr Matthews identifies that there are alternative explanations for the symptoms described and self-reported by the Defendant and seen in the video. That is because the Defendant did not give evidence before me and he has not been consistent in his evidence to others in relation to his account of torture. Further, there are no medical findings which positively support that the Defendant was tortured in this case. There is also a lack of any corroborative evidence, such as medical records to show when the Defendant was circumcised, and indeed the Defendant, despite registering with a GP in the UK and seeking medical treatment, he did not do so for any of the matters he now complains of. I also had concerns over the impartiality of Dr Pickering, which I will deal with in more detail below. . . . I bear in mind that the Defendant’s issues regarding his mental health and his accounts of torture were not mentioned until after his remand in custody in the UK. The Defendant had been in the UK for some time and had registered with a GP, under a false name, to access medical treatment but had not mentioned nor sought no treatment for issues with his feet or his mental health. He failed to mention these when initially assessed in prison, mentioning only his diabetes. I also bear in mind that the Defendant has not given evidence in this case before me. His accounts of torture have not been consistent and the details of the torture he has alleged has changed to the various experts to whom he has given these accounts. Dr Pickering failed to address or refer to these differences or how it may undermine his account. Further, Dr Pickering led the Defendant in relation to some important matters when taking account which is a concern to me. Dr Pickering failed to refer to matters which may undermine her conclusions in her reports. . . . I note the suggestion from the Defence, supported by the evidence of Dr Pickering and Professor Katona, that the Defendant may not have sought treatment in the UK for his mental health as he was in hiding in the UK and that he may not have wanted to bring attention to himself and/or he was avoiding making such complaints so as to not re traumatise himself. That said, this is not the evidence of the Defendant himself to Professor Katona, as he conceded in his evidence to me. Further, I do not find this explanation credible. I agree with the evidence of Dr Blackwood. The Defendant was not a person “in hiding”, per se. The Defendant was a person in the UK who was using a false identity, namely a false name, passport and false bank accounts. The Defendant had registered in the UK for medical care under a false name and he had sought treatment for his diabetes and also private dental care. There is no reason, should he have had any mental health issues at this time, that he could not have sought help for this. The only accounts I have of the Defendant’s alleged torture are through his medical records, where he has given accounts to medical professionals, and of accounts he has given to the experts instructed in this case. Therefore, these are second hand accounts. All experts describe that the Defendant was able to give a clear account of his alleged torture in India. I find that with adaptions, the Defendant could have given evidence before me. He was able to give accounts to various experts in this case, on multiple occasions. I find that he could have given evidence before me. I find that his failure to do so, given the self-reports and inconsistencies in those accounts, is important and significantly affects the credibility of his claims to the extent I do not find them credible. I find, that with adaptions that this court is well used to implementing, the Defendant could have given evidence to me in these proceedings about his allegations of torture. I would have ensured that breaks were given, that questions were asked in a certain manner and limited the time that the Defendant could be asked about these matters. That said, the Defendant did not make any application in this regard and it was always clear that he would not be giving evidence before me. For all the reasons set out above, I do not find that the Defendant was tortured by the police in India. I do however find that the “parading” video is degrading treatment by the police when he was in their custody in India and that has given me some concerns. . . . ”

Grounds 6-8

[40]I do not consider that grounds 6-8 are arguable. Grounds 6 and 8: the Article 3 Prison Conditions Issue and Section 91.[41]I do not consider that it is arguable that the District Judge erred in deciding that extradition was not prohibited in light of the conditions of detention that the Applicant would face in India, including the provision of inadequate medical care; and, as a consequence, there was no arguable error in the decision of the District Judge that it would not be unjust or oppressive to extradite the Applicant to India in breach of section 91 of the 2003 Act.[42]The District Judge carefully considered the evidence with respect to the Applicant’s mental health, including his risk of suicide. The District Judge took on board the evidence of the various witnesses, and reached findings that were plainly open to her. Where the evidence of the medical experts was not accepted by the District Judge, she gave cogent reasons for her disagreement.[43]The District Judge found that the Applicant had a mild to moderate depressive illness, which has fluctuated to some degree whilst he has been in custody in the United Kingdom. The District Judge rejected a diagnosis of PTSD: this was predicated on the basis that the Applicant was tortured by the police whilst in India, and the District Judge had found that this had not occurred, as discussed above.[44]The District Judge found that the Applicant presents a risk of suicide, and that risk would be likely to increase should extradition be ordered, but that risk could be managed if he was to be returned to India. With respect to the risk of suicide, the District Judge found that this would be a “voluntary” act (as discussed in Turner v United States [2012] EWHC 2426 (Admin)) and that he was capable of resisting such an impulse:
“The Defendant does not suffer from a mental illness that removes his capacity to resist the impulse to commit suicide.”
[45]The District Judge found that the risk of suicide was sufficient to engage section 91 of the 2003 Act, but decided that the assurances provided by the Government of India with respect to how the Applicant would be treated on his return, and what the prison conditions would be for him, could be relied upon and that, as a result, it would not be unjust or oppressive for him to be returned to India. The District Judge found that the assurances were specific and detailed: see paragraphs 704–705. The District Judge rejected the assertion that the assurances had been given in bad faith, finding that there was no cogent or credible evidence of that.[46]At paragraph 707, the District

Judge found that:

“The assurances provide for a similar level of care and treatment to that which he has received whilst in custody in the UK. Whilst there is no mental health team at the prison on a permanent basis, the GOI have clearly explained that this will be made available to the Defendant whilst he is in prison and the level of this care and treatment. They further provide that the Defendant will be transferred to hospital for specialist treatment should this be required. I find that the assurances that have been provided by the GOI set out suitable arrangements for the Defendant’s care and treatment in prison, in particular in relation to his mental health.”
[47]The District Judge also addressed the concerns that had been expressed about the cell in which the Applicant would inhabit, and the possibility of ligature points. The District Judge found that the assurances with respect to these matters had been given in good faith and could be relied upon. At paragraph 711, the District Judge stated that:
“I have seen the mesh that will be placed on the windows and doors and it has been explained that all other ligature will be removed and how this will be done. Whilst it was submitted on behalf of the Defendant that I should see these alterations, and indeed Dr Mitchell should be allowed to inspect the prison, I do not consider that this is necessary. As I have said, the GOI have engaged in these proceedings throughout. They have been proactive in providing assurances where none have been sought by the Court, to address concerns that have been raised and identified by the Defence. They provided the assurance when the issue with the ligature points was identified. I have no reason to believe that they are not taking this matter seriously or that they will not do what they have assured me they will do.”
[48]This assessment met the concerns raised by Mr Southey KC (which were essentially repeated before me) that the Indian authorities did not have the expertise available to prevent suicide attempts and that they were not committed to preventing suicides. The assessment made by the District Judge was not arguably flawed. She applied the correct legal test and there was a proper evidential basis for her to reach her conclusions. Thus, at paragraph 721, the District Judge stated that:
“I find that whilst the Defendant would clearly be at an elevated risk of suicide should I order his extradition, I find that it would not be worse than moderate severity, as found by Dr Blackwood on the occasions he has assessed him, but it is difficult to predict. I also find, that such an elevated risk of suicide in this case is a manageable risk, such as by removing the access to means for suicide, treating the underlying disorder with medications and other treatment and ensuring he had access to supportive networks and activities. I also bear in mind the detailed and specific assurances provided by the GOI in this case. I find that the Defendant will have access to, and be provided with, suitable treatment, medication and care for his mental health in prison in India. The GOI will have a copy of this judgment and will be aware of the risk of suicide that the Defendant presents.”
[49]In making each of her findings in this regard, the District Judge had directed herself properly on the law, and had taken into account all of the relevant evidence and arguments that were before her. The challenge under this head is essentially an attempt to invite the Court to re-hear the evidence below or to weigh the evidence differently. That is contrary to the test in Love. Ground 7: Life without Parole issue[50]I do not consider that it is arguable that the District Judge erred in finding that extradition was not prohibited on the basis that there was no real risk that he would receive a life sentence without parole if returned to India.[51]It had been raised on behalf the Applicant before the District Judge that the sentence he would receive in India would be life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. It was common ground that if this was the situation, this would contravene Article 3 of the Convention as there was no mechanism in law in India by which he could have his sentence reviewed or remitted.[52]The Government of India had, however, provided an assurance, as had the State of Gujurat, that the Applicant could apply for remission or premature release after 14 years of imprisonment and would not be precluded from consideration for state remission or premature release as a result of the State of Gujurat Policy. The District Judge found that these assurances were “clear and specific and they relate” to the Applicant.[53]The District Judge considered the expert evidence of Professor Lau. He was found to be a credible witness. His evidence was clear that the Gujurat Remission Policy would preclude the Applicant from remission should he be convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. The issue in the case, therefore, was whether the assurances were sufficient to obviate the risk that the Applicant would receive an irreducible life sentence, or whether a change of the law would be required.[54]The District Judge found that the assurances in relation to remission had been given in good faith. This had been conceded by Professor Lau. Professor Lau had, however, expressed concerns that the assurances could be breached. This was explained by the District Judge at paragraph 822 as follows:
“Firstly, there is judicial dicta that indicates that the GOI assurance on remission does not bind the sentencing powers of Indian Courts. Secondly, is the issue of whether the GOI and the Government of Gujarat can give an assurance to the effect that it will not be bound by its own Gujarat Remission Policy without breaching the right to equality before the law under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. He referred to cases where there have been complaints in relation to this, which I outlined when dealing with his evidence earlier in this judgment. Whilst in one case the High Court did not strike down the early release of a prisoner as unlawful he stated that they could have the jurisdiction to declare the remission of a person’s sentence unlawful. Therefore, Professor Lau explained in this case, anyone could bring action against the GOI and challenge the GOI Assurance on Remission as unconstitutional for breach of the constitutionally guaranteed right to equality before the law under Article 14.”
[55]The District

Judge addressed these concerns as follows:

“823. That said, Professor Lau explained that it may be different in the context of extradition cases. He conceded that there are legal arguments in support of the contention that a prisoner who has been the subject to an assurance given by the GOI in the context of extradition proceedings may be treated differently from a domestic prisoner without such differential treatment being a breach of Article 14. He referred to the case of Rosiline George v Union of India 1994 SCC (2) 80, which said that extradition is founded on the broad principle that it is in the interest of civilised communities that criminals should not go unpunished and on that account it is recognised as a part of the comity of nations that one State should ordinarily afford to another State assistance towards bringing offenders to justice. He further explained that in support of this, the GOI has been accorded plenary jurisdiction over matters relating to extradition and assurances or commitments made by the GOI at the international level with regard to extradition are within the competence of the executive, which is authorised to represent the Indian State in all matter international. The GOI may by agreement, convention or treaties incur obligations which in international law are binding upon the State. As long as these binding obligations do not affect the rights of the citizens, no legislative measure is needed to give effect to the agreement or treaty. Therefore, Professor Lau conceded that it is arguable that the considerations underlying any treatment of an extradited accused, such as not being subject to particular remission policy, are different from those underlying the denial of remission to a domestic convict. On this interpretation, the GOI assurance of Remission would not be held to be in breach of Article 14. 824. Dealing with the second of Professor concerns first, namely that anyone could bring action against the GOI and challenge the GOI Assurance on Remission as unconstitutional for breach of the constitutionally guaranteed right to equality before the law under Article 14, I do not accept that this would be successful in terms of extradition proceedings. I find that as set out in the case of Rosiline George v Union of India 1994 SCC (2) 80, extradition is founded on the broad principle that it is in the interest of civilised communities that criminals should not go unpunished and on that account it is recognised as a part of the comity of nations that one State should ordinarily afford to another State assistance towards bringing offenders to justice. I also find that the GOI may by agreement, convention or treaties incur obligations which in international law are binding upon the State. Given this, the GOI assurance, and that of the State of Gujarat, of Remission would not be held to be in breach of Article 14. 825. In relation to the first concern, the GOI assurance on remission does not bind the sentencing powers of Indian Courts, I find that this is right. Whilst in the case of Abu Salem, which is on-going before the Indian Supreme Court, Mr Salem has alleged that the solemn sovereign assurance given in his case has been violated, I note that the GOI has said it could not restrict the Court’s powers to impose a life sentence. I accept, as I have said, that this is right. The Court and only the Court can determine what sentence to impose. I note that the position of the GOI is that it is bound by the assurance but that it would not consider the question of implementation or violation until the 25 years has expired. The Supreme Court has been critical of the position of the GOI given the implication on future extradition proceedings and it has observed that the GOI has to stand by assurances given to foreign countries. That said, it is clear to me that the Court is therefore wanting to ensure that the assurance that has been given by the GOI is honoured. Therefore, whilst Professor Lau explains that the issue of whether the GOI could make an assurance which results in it breaching its own remission policy is not before the Supreme Court and this leaves open the risk that an Indian Court could ignore the GOI Assurance on Remission and sentence the Defendant to an irreducible life sentence, I do not find that this is the case.”
[56]In my judgment, that was a conclusion which the District Judge was entitled to reach on the basis of the materials before her. The District Judge’s assessment as to what the Supreme Court of India would do was one which she was entitled to reach on the basis of the materials before her. The whole argument made by Mr Southey KC on this point was speculative: would a third party seek to challenge the assurance that had been made with respect to the Claimant; if so, how would the Supreme Court of India deal with such a challenge. The District Judge was, for the reasons which she gave, entitled to dismiss such speculation.

Conclusion

[57]For the foregoing reasons, therefore, I grant permission with respect to Grounds 1-3 and 5 (but not insofar as this ground relies on the alleged “risk” that the Applicant was tortured whilst in detention in India, given the finding made by the District Judge that he was not tortured); and I refuse permission with respect to Grounds 6-8.