“Outline application with all matters reserved, except means of access to site, for the demolition, modification & renovation of existing buildings, structures & site development. Provision of approx. 315 residential dwellings, mixture of employment, commercial/leisure, & aviation uses, including a ‘flying hub’ comprising control tower, heritage centre, visitor centre, café/restaurant, parachute centre, aviation archives & aircraft hangars. Provision of new vehicular access to surrounding highways network, car parking, & connections to surrounding footpath/cycle networks. Green infrastructure provision, including open space, play space, foot & cycle paths, & landscape enhancement areas; & sustainable urban drainage system & waste water treatment works. Associated vegetation removal, ground modification & engineering works.”
“... However, the condition of Hangar 3 remains of major concern, and part of the proposal is its repair and reuse. Sufficient evidence has now been supplied to demonstrate that the hangar can be restored/rebuilt. … The proposed rebuilt/restoration of the hangar is a major heritage benefit. The harm caused by the proposed new development that we have identified above has been minimised as far as possible through good design. We are content that in heritage terms alone, the heritage benefits outweigh the heritage harm. There will, of course, be wider planning issues for your authority to consider upon which Historic England are not qualified to comment. If you are minded to consider this application favourably, we suggest the imposition of suitably-worded planning conditions or a Section 106 agreement to guarantee the restoration of the listed hangar. We suggest you consider requiring completion of the main structural repair and hangar roof prior to any dwellings being occupied on the development. You could also consider requiring completion of all of the repairs as outlined in the cost plan prior to 50% of the dwellings being occupied. Such conditions would prevent the scenario of new development being built but the hangar remaining unrestored.”
“3. Prior to commencement of any works deemed necessary by the structural engineer’s report …. or for any other reason, that are in addition to those defined in the Cost Plan Rev A, details of those additional works shall be submitted to and approved in writing by the Local Planning Authority. Development shall be carried out in accordance with the approved details. Reason: To ensure the preservation of as much of the listed building as possible.”
“8. With regard to works proposed in addition to those described in the Cost Plan, a further application may be required if the additional works are extensive or the condition of the building is significantly different from that at the time of granting this consent. 9. For the avoidance of doubt, the ability of the applicant to commence the works hereby approved is not constrained by the outcome of any other planning application.”
“75. The agreed prime benefit is the restoration/rebuilding of Hanger 3, now a category ‘A’ priority building (‘Immediate risk of further rapid deterioration or loss of fabric’) in ‘Very bad’ condition on HE’s ‘Heritage at Risk’ Register. HE gives this benefit considerable weight. This is a benefit not just for this hanger but also to the adjacent two Grade II* hangers, the Grade II listed buildings and the Airfield CA. Other heritage benefits to all these assets are the demolition of the detracting buildings on the hanger apron (the café, building currently used by the parachute training company and the modern and unattractive airfield control towers). The Grade II camera obscura building would undergo repairs to its fabric and would also be subject to the above benefits. The SM and Stratford-sub-Castle CA would benefit from the improved relationship and visual accessibility of the former Roman Road route as part of the overall design for the Area A development: the linear park. 76. Much of the Council’s case in respect of the Hanger 3 prime benefit was pinned on the appellant’s alleged deliberate neglect of an obviously very important listed building that should be preserved. I note in this respect that the other two listed hangers, which are not owned by the appellant, are in much better condition, although I do not know why that is. However, I cannot accept that there has been ‘deliberate neglect’ in terms of NPPF paragraph 209. The appellant has attempted, albeit largely failed, to prop up the roof by the installation of various shipping containers on top of each other in order to support the Belfast trusses and scaffolding has been erected to try and preserve what is left of the roof following the extensive damage to it by Storm Isha in January 2024. 77. No advantage has been gained by the appellant if it has neglected Hanger 3, whether deliberately or not, in view of HE’s view that the benefit of restoring it has been weakened because much more rebuilding is now required than in 2019. Its restoration/rebuilding is of significant weight, whether such restoration amounted to essentially repair and refurbishment, as it would have been at the time of the previous appeal, or a substantial part-rebuilding exercise as it would now be. The difference is that it will now cost (the appellant) a lot more, but the weight I attach to its preservation is equally important now as it was in 2019, notwithstanding that the works to restore it need to take place as soon as possible, otherwise there may be no building at all to restore. 78. I acknowledge that there was no impediment to the appellant implementing the listed building consent PL/2024/00102 granted in March 2024 – indeed the consent positively encouraged it – and ideally it should have done so. But the damage from the storm had already occurred by then. The works required are obviously substantial and costly and it is quite conceivable that the appellant did not have a spare£3.31M to spend on implementing the necessary works that had been agreed as part and parcel of that application. Indeed, the appellant made clear during the Inquiry that the proposed residential development would be used to cross-subsidise the works to Area B, the new hanger etc buildings and the necessary works to preserve Hanger 3. I do not doubt that is the case.”
“The Heritage Balance 95. I agree with HE that the totality of the proposed development (in Area A-C combined) will adversely impact the setting and thus significance of the SM [Scheduled Monument] and the Stratford-sub-Castle CA [Conservation Area] and the open character and thus significance of the Airfield CA [Conservation Area] and the settings of the listed buildings including the Grade II* listed hangars within it. But, like HE, I agree that the overall level of harm is towards the mid-range of less than substantial harm. Crucially, I agree with HE that the heritage benefits alone, including primarily the restoration/rebuild of Hanger 3 and the other benefits listed above, outweigh such harm for all the above reasons.”
“Repair and Restoration of Hangar 3 17. No dwellings shall be occupied (with respect to Areas A & C housing only) until completion of the main Hangar 3 structural repairs and Hangar 3 roof as outlined in the cost plan and Listed Building Consent (ref PL/2024/00102). No more than 160 dwellings shall be occupied (with respect to Areas A & C housing only) until completion of all of the Hangar 3 repairs as outlined in the cost plan and Listed Building Consent (PL/2004/00102). For each stage of the repairs an architect’s certificate of practical completion of the approved works shall be submitted to the Local Planning Authority. The condition will be discharged by confirmation in writing from the Local Planning Authority that the relevant works have been undertaken to its satisfaction. Such confirmation would include a site visit facilitated by the applicant. REASON: To ensure that the repairs to Hangar 3 are undertaken in association the building of the dwellings so that the heritage asset is rebuilt in accordance with the aims of policy CP25 and CP58 of the Wiltshire Core Strategy.”
“It is the author’s opinion, based upon the information and evidence gathered from witnesses, fire-fighters and detailed examination of the scene at the time, that the cause of fire is undetermined. From the enquiries completed it cannot be determined if this fire was set deliberately or not. There are no further lines of enquiry to pursue and a suspect (if it was set deliberately) cannot be identified. For closing as undetected at this time.”
“The main external walls of the hanger have structural defects many of which are likely to have occurred over a significant period of time due to the gradual deterioration of the hanger and poorly detailed and executed structural alterations over the history of the building. Other issues are likely to have occurred more recently due to the collapse of sections of the roof before April 2025. The most recent areas of damage caused by a storm in January 2024 are detailed in the Fielden + Mawson report 9765 / A04. There is no doubt that the fire in April 2025 has caused further damage, most significant of which is the damage caused by the collapse of the doors and their tracks. This has caused the collapse of the southern support piers on the south eastern elevation and damaged the southern support piers on the north western elevation. Damage has also occurred to the elevations adjacent these towers as they collapsed. There is no evidence of heat damage to the main structural walls. Significant areas of the roof and the doors at the north eastern end had already collapsed before the fire and the collapse of the remaining roof trusses does not appear to have caused further damage to the masonry walls. As a result the extent of work required to restore the hanger is not significantly different to the situation before the fire. The Fielden + Mawson report 9765 / A04 concludes that only three of the 34 roof trusses could be repaired. The rest required complete replacement. Therefore compared to the situation before the fire there are an additional three roof trusses to construct from new. There is also one more set of door support pillars to rebuild and some additional cracking to be repaired. All areas of masonry that require reconstruction should be able to reuse their original foundations which are still in place and appear to be undamaged. In conclusion the majority of the masonry structural walls and piers have not been damaged by the fire and can be reused in their current condition provided historic cracking is addressed. The walls have not been damaged by the heat of the fire and are generally plumb. Timber elements including the roof and timber lintels will required complete replacement as was the case before the fire in April 2025.”
“66. In our view, the time has now come to accept that a mistake of fact giving rise to unfairness is a separate head of challenge in an appeal on a point of law, at least in those statutory contexts where the parties share an interest in co-operating to achieve the correct result. Asylum law is undoubtedly such an area. Without seeking to lay down a precise code, the ordinary requirements for a finding of unfairness are apparent from the above analysis of CICB. First, there must have been a mistake as to an existing fact, including a mistake as to the availability of evidence on a particular matter. Secondly, the fact or evidence must have been “established”, in the sense that it was uncontentious and objectively verifiable. Thirdly, the appellant (or his advisers) must not been have been responsible for the mistake. Fourthly, the mistake must have played a material (not necessarily decisive) part in the Tribunal’s reasoning.”
“38 Although these categories are a useful and well-established list, it would be wrong to treat them as if they were embodied in statute or as necessarily exhaustive. That is particularly so as public law has developed in ways which were not in contemplation when Ex p Powis was decided. In R (Lynch) v General Dental Council[2004] 1 All ER 1159 , Collins J was prepared to allow some extension of the possibility of admitting expert evidence beyond the Ex p Powis categories in a case where a decision is challenged on the ground of irrationality. The judge accepted that, where an understanding of technical matters is needed to enable the court to understand the reasons relied on in making the decision in the context of a challenge to its rationality, expert evidence may be required to explain such technical matters. 39 We would extend this principle to a situation where, - as in the present case - it is alleged that the decision under challenge was reached by a process of reasoning which involved a serious technical error…..”
“91. In summary, we have concluded in relation to the powers of this Court: i) An appeal to this Court on a question of law is confined to reviewing a particular decision of the Tribunal, and does not encompass a wider power to review the subsequent conduct of the Secretary of State; ii) Such an appeal may be made on the basis of unfairness resulting from “misunderstanding or ignorance of an established and relevant fact” (as explained by Lord Slynn in CICB and Alconbury); iii) The admission of new evidence on such an appeal is subject to Ladd v Marshall principles, which may be departed from in exceptional circumstances where the interests of justice require.”
“This fresh evidence was clearly available and should have been placed before Webster J. It is not the function of this court, as an appellate court, to retry an originating application on different and better evidence. We are concerned to decide whether the trial judge's decision was right on the materials available to him, unless the new evidence could not have been made available to him by the exercise of reasonable diligence or there is some other exceptional circumstance which justifies its admission and consideration by this court. That is not this case.”
“Section 12, which appears in Part III of the Act, provides that the decision to return a person into the custody of the requesting state is at the discretion of the Secretary of State. Subsection (2) sets out various circumstances in which it is provided (a) that the Secretary of State shall not make an order under that section and (b) that he may decline to make an order. The relevant subsection in this case is subsection (1), which confers a general discretion on the Secretary of State in these terms: "Where a person is committed under section 9 above and is not discharged by order of the High Court or the High Court of Justiciary, the Secretary of State may by warrant order him to be returned unless his return is prohibited, or prohibited for the time being, by this Act, or the Secretary of State decides under this section to make no such order in his case." The power which is given to the Secretary of State by section 12(1) to make no order in his case is an important part of the protections which the law provides to persons who are the subject of an extradition request. A provisional warrant for his arrest must first be issued under section 8 of the Act. Section 9 provides that, once arrested, he must be brought as soon as practicable before a court for committal to await the decision of the Secretary of State as to his return to the foreign state, Commonwealth country or colony which made the request. His committal is subject to review under the procedures set out in section 11, by which he has the right to make an application for habeas corpus in the High Court. Then there is the Secretary of State's discretion under section 12(1) not to order his return which, as these proceedings have demonstrated, is subject to judicial review by the court in the exercise of its supervisory power. Even after he has issued the surrender warrant the protections are not at an end. The Secretary of State has a continuing duty to keep the matter under review until the person is removed from this country for return to the place which made the request. This is because he has the power, should circumstances change, to withdraw the warrant before it has been implemented. It was in recognition of this duty that, although not obliged to do so by the statute, the Secretary of State agreed to consider the representations made in the light of his original decision letter before issuing his decision of21 December 1995 not to reverse his earlier decision and withdraw the surrender warrant.”
“The situation has changed since 1995 when the decisions were taken. So it is necessary first to mention the situation at that time and then to examine the situation at the present stage. Although we are concerned primarily with the reasonableness of the decisions at the time when they were taken we cannot ignore these developments. We are dealing in this case with concerns which have been expressed about human rights and the risks to the applicant's life and liberty. If the expectations which the Secretary of State had when he took his decisions have not been borne out by events or are at risk of not being satisfied by the date of the applicant's proposed return to Hong Kong, it would be your Lordships' duty to set aside the decisions so that the matter may be reconsidered in "the light of the changed circumstances.”
“37. The inspector’s note indicates that if he is required, as I say he must, to determine the question of causation and the appellant’s responsibility for the fire, if any, then real prejudice may arise to the appellant and, indeed, to the second defendant if he does so whilst the criminal proceedings remain in contemplation. As I have indicated, in their letter to him the Crown Prosecution Service invited him to postpone making any such findings; a position that they have reiterated, as I understand it, in recent email correspondence. Those matters show that it is, in fact, indisputably necessary to delay the proceedings on the ground (a) appeal in order to fulfil the objective of avoiding prejudice to the parties.”
“65.1 External injustice/vitating third party act. In a conventional judicial review case, the claimant relies on a ‘public law wrong’ for which the public authority defendant is some way responsible. However, in some special cases the Court will intervene, in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, because of a bigger picture: something has gone wrong which is external and not attributable to the public authority defendant. Recognised examples include: injustice or abuse of process caused by an anterior abuse of power; a defendant court’s decisions or proceedings made legally unsound because of third-party conduct; or public authority decision-making vitiated by reason of misleading information, misdirection or unfairness from an adviser or other relevant third party.”
“Planning control is the creature of statute. It is an imposition in the public interest of restrictions upon private rights of ownership of land. The public character of the law relating to planning control has been recognised by the House in Newbury District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment[1981] AC 578 . It is a field of law in which the courts should not introduce principles or rules derived from private law unless it be expressly authorised by Parliament or necessary in order to give effect to the purpose of the legislation. The planning law, though a comprehensive code imposed in the public interest, is, of course, based on the land law. Where the code is silent or ambiguous, resort to the principles of the private law (especially property and contract law) may be necessary so that the courts may resolve difficulties by application of common law or equitable principles. But such cases will be exceptional. And, if the statute law covers the situation, it will be an impermissible exercise of the judicial function to go beyond the statutory provision by applying such principles merely because they may appear to achieve a fairer solution to the problem being considered. As ever in the field of statute law it is the duty of the courts to give effect to the intention of Parliament as evinced by the statute, or statutory code, considered as a whole.”