Graham Phillips, R (on the application of) v The London Borough of Islington [2026] EWHC 2243 (Admin)

[2026] EWHC 2243 (Admin)

Case No AC-2025-LON-004314

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING’S BENCH

Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date 27 August 2026

Before

Nigel Cooper KC

Between

THE KINGClaimant

THE LONDON BOROUGH OF ISLINGTONDefendant

Fergus Randolph KC and Joshua Hitchens (instructed by Savic & Co. Solicitors) for Claimant

The Defendant did not attend the oral hearing

Hearing Hearing date: 23 July 2026

JUDGMENT

This judgment was handed down remotely by circulation to the parties' representatives by email and released to The National Archives. The date and time for hand down is deemed to be 10am on Friday 28 August 2026.

Nigel Cooper KC:

Introduction

[1]This is the Claimant’s renewed application for permission to seek judicial review of two decisions by the Defendant, namely(i) the Defendant’s decision on 27 August 2025 to refuse to reduce or exempt the Claimant’s liability for council tax and

(ii) the Defendant’s refusal on 12 September 2025 to extend a stay on enforcement of the council tax liability beyond 10 October 2025.

[2]The Claimant attended the oral hearing on 23 July 2026 by leading and junior counsel and, following the hearing, provided a written note titled “Note on nature of interference and proportionality assessment” (“the Note”). The Defendant informed the Claimant and the court that it would not be attending the oral hearing but would continue to rely on the matters set out in its Acknowledgement of Service and Summary Grounds of Defence.

Background

[3]Background On 14 February 2003, the Claimant purchased a property within the London Borough of Islington (“the Property”), which has been his primary place of residence since. There is no dispute that until he was made a designated person under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (“the Regulations”), the Claimant met all liabilities connected to the property including council tax.

[4]The Foreign Secretary designated the Claimant on 26 July 2022 pursuant to the Regulations. At the time of his designation, the Claimant was in the Donbass region of Ukraine, a war zone. He was apparently generating social media output for his YouTube channel, which he says had more than 350,000 subscribers and generated a good income.

[5]The Claimant says that following his designation, he had no access to his bank accounts and no means of supporting himself, his YouTube channel having been taken down following a petition by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (“the FCDO”).

[6]On 02 August 2022, the Claimant sought an Administrative Review of the decision to sanction him, which was ultimately rejected by the FCDO. The Claimant subsequently applied to the High Court seeking set-aside of his designation pursuant to s.38 of the Sanctions and Money Laundering Act 2018. On 12 January 2024, his application was dismissed by Mr. Justice Johnson (

[2024] 1 WLR 2227

). In his judgment, the Judge records the impact of designation on the Claimant, including his inability to earn funds and pay his debts including his council tax liability. He also records that at the time of the judgment, the Claimant refused to apply for OFSI licences on the basis that sanctions were, in his view, illegal and illegitimate and that he did not wish to “buy into” the system ([40] and [41]). On 09 May 2024, the Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal the judgment of Johnson J (CA-2024-000346). The Claimant has no further domestic remedy through which he can challenge his designation. The European Court of Human Rights has yet to make any determination on his application to that court.

[7]The Claimant says that he is currently unable to leave the Donbass region and that he has been granted temporary residence due to lack of means.

[8]In September 2022, the Defendant issued a summons for non-payment of council tax. The summons was withdrawn on 14 October 2022.

[9]On 13 July 2023, a Council Tax Liability Order was made on the application of the Defendant.

[10]On 23 January 2024, contrary to his position prior to and at the time of the judgment of Johnson J., the Claimant obtained a licence from OFSI permitting him to spend £1,979.67 per month to meet his basic needs. However, the Claimant says that the licence does not allow him to earn money or allow for others to pay him or transfer funds to him. The Claimant also says that his application to OFSI for permission to fundraise on UK platforms has been refused and that the current licence also prevents him from using funds to return to the United Kingdom (see paragraph 6 of the licence).

[11]The Claimant says that as a consequence he is destitute, unable to generate income and has no means of meeting his council tax liability. The Defendant does not accept this position.

[12]On 22 February 2024, the Claimant received a Notice of Enforcement of the Council Tax Liability Order made on 13 July 2023 requiring payment of the outstanding debt by 06 March 2024 or his belongings would be seized. No steps have, however, been taken to enforce the liability order.

[13]On 30 April 2025, the Claimant received an e-mail from the Defendant confirming that his council tax balance stood at £7,256.74. The Defendant sent a further Council Tax Summons for a liability order to be heard on 17 July 2025. The Claimant wrote to the Defendant on 09 July 2025 seeking an exemption from the obligation to pay council tax in accordance with Islington Council policy for people who are prisoners of the state. Subsequently on 30 July 2025, the Claimant clarified that he was seeking the exemption on the basis that he fell within Class D(1)(a) of the Council Tax (Exempt Dwellings) Order 1992 because the Property was his sole or main residence, which he was unable to occupy because he is detained elsewhere by an Order of the Court.

[14]On 27 August 2025, the Council confirmed that the Claimant was not exempt from the payment of council tax because the exemption applies only to individuals that are sentenced and imprisoned by a UK court. On 12 September 2025, the Council confirmed that the freeze on recovery action would end on 10 October 2025.

[15]The Claimant’s claim form for judicial review is dated 17 November 2025, and the court records show that a bundle with a copy of the claim form in it was submitted to the court on 19 November 2025 and was sealed by the Court on 02 December 2025.

[16]The Claimant seeks permission for judicial review on two grounds: i) that the Defendant’s refusal to reduce or waive the Claimant’s council tax liability and the decision to pursue enforcement action is illegal under s.6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 because there is a breach of the Claimant’s rights under Article 1 of Protocol 1 (“A1P1”) of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”). In summary, the Claimant says that the decision of the Defendant to enforce a council tax liability, which the State has stripped him of the ability to pay, is an arbitrary and disproportionate interference with the Claimant’s A1P1 rights. ii) that the Defendant’s refusal to reduce or waive the Claimant’s council tax liability and the decision to pursue enforcement action is irrational because it fails to take account of relevant considerations and is unreasonable to the Wednesbury standard. In particular, the Claimant says that: a) the Defendant has failed to turn its mind to whether it should exercise its discretion under s.13A of the Local Government Finance Act 1992 (“the 1992 Act”) in the Claimant’s favour given that his inability to meet his liability for council tax arises from his designation under the UK sanctions regime; and b) given the Claimant’s unique situation where the State has deprived the Claimant of his ability to meet his liabilities, the Defendant should have exercised its discretion under s.13A in his favour and its refusal to do so was unreasonable.

[17]The Defendant filed an Acknowledgement of Service and Summary Grounds of Defence dated 19 December 2025. The Defendant submitted that permission for judicial review should not be granted on the basis that: i) there was a suitable alternative remedy, namely an appeal to the valuation tribunal. ii) the claim is out of time because it was issued on 02 December 2025, more than three months after the first impugned decision. iii) the temporary asset freeze did not prevent the Claimant from paying his council tax and there were lawful routes including an application for a specific licence, which would enable the Claimant to pay his council tax. iv) to the extent that it is the practical effects of the targeted sanctions measures which are said to have prevented the Claimant from satisfying his council tax liability, those effects are precisely the mechanism by which the targeted sanctions measure is rationally connected to its legitimate aims. v) the proper mechanism to challenge the lawfulness of continued designation is an application for ministerial review under s.23 of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. The Claimant sought such a review, which was rejected by the Secretary of State and that rejection was upheld by Johnson J and the Court of Appeal. vi) generally, the recognition and enforcement by a billing authority of a statutory liability to pay council tax is in no way irrational or unlawful. This position is in no way affected by the continuation of sanctions measures which have been determined to be lawful. vii) so far as ground 1, illegality, is concerned, the Claimant’s case is misconceived. There is no violation of the Claimant’s A1P1 rights and a challenge to the proportionality of the asset freeze consequent on the Claimant being designated by the FCDO has already failed. The Defendant has a published policy for the exercise of its power under s.13A of the 1992 Act to reduce a resident’s council tax but the Claimant has not made any application under the Defendant’s resident support scheme. In any event, the Claimant has not established that he would be eligible for support in accordance with the Defendant’s published policy. Separately, the Claimant does not qualify for exemption from his liability to council tax under Class D(1)(a) of the Council Tax (Exempt Dwellings) Order 1992. viii) so far as ground 2 is concerned, there is no evidence that the Defendant has unlawfully fettered its discretion. Further, the Claimant is not legally disabled from paying his council tax and cannot establish a total inability to meet his liability. There is no basis to suggest that the Defendant’s decision not to reduce or exempt the Claimant’s council tax liability is Wednesbury unreasonable. Even if the freeze on the Claimant’s assets did affect his liability to pay council tax, this does not require the Defendant to stay enforcement action pending the delisting of the Claimant or to otherwise reduce the Claimant’s liability to nil. The Claimant has in fact had several years to pay with the Defendant having extended time to pay until 10 October 2025 without any payment being made. ix) Neither ground discloses a public law error.

[18]DHCJ David Pittaway KC refused the Claimant permission for judicial review on paper by an order dated 14 May 2026. He also ordered the Claimant to pay the Defendant’s costs of preparing the acknowledgment of service and summary grounds of defence, which he summarily assessed in the sum of £2,925.00. The Judge refused to make an order prohibiting the publication or dissemination of the Claimant’s address and limiting access to the court file (an order, which the Judge described as being in effect an anonymity order).

[19]In summary, the judge found that the claim had been issued within three months of the first decision impugned. However, for the reasons outlined in the summary grounds of defence, he considered that the claim that the Defendant acted illegally, irrationally or unreasonably to the Wednesbury standard was not reasonably arguable. He held that there was nothing to indicate that the Defendant acted unlawfully in exercising their very broad discretion under s.13A(1)(c) of the 1992 Act. He found that the Claimant’s financial difficulties might arise from the decision by the FCDO to designate him and thereby impose a temporary asset freeze, but this should not be conflated with the Defendant’s decision not to exercise its discretion in his favour.

[20]The Claimant served a Notice of Renewal on 21 May 2026 seeking to renew the Claimant’s application on two grounds: i) That the judge did not engage with any of the grounds of challenge but simply adopted the Defendant’s submissions wholesale rather than engaging with the exceptional nature of this claim for judicial review. ii) The judge failed to conduct any assessment of proportionality of the Claimant’s A1P1 rights.

The Law

[21]So far as material, s13A of the 1992 Act provides as follows: 13A Reductions by billing authority(1) The amount of council tax which a person is liable to pay in respect of any chargeable dwelling and any day (as determined in accordance with sections 10 to 13)— (a) in the case of a dwelling situated in the area of a billing authority in England, is to be reduced to the extent, if any, required by the authority's council tax reduction scheme (see subsection (2)); (b) in the case of a dwelling situated in the area of a billing authority in Wales, is to be reduced to the extent, if any, required by any council tax reduction scheme made under regulations under subsection (4) that applies to that dwelling; (c) in any case, may be reduced to such extent (or, if the amount has been reduced under paragraph (a) or (b), such further extent) as the billing authority for the area in which the dwelling is situated thinks fit.

(2) Each billing authority in England must make a scheme specifying the reductions which are to apply to amounts of council tax payable, in respect of dwellings situated in its area, by— (a) persons whom the authority considers to be in financial need, or (b) persons in classes consisting of persons whom the authority considers to be, in general, in financial need.

[22]As will be apparent from the quotation above, s.13A requires a billing authority to have in place a council tax reduction scheme (which the Defendant does) and also provides for a wider discretion to reduce a resident’s council tax as the Defendant thinks fit. Section 13A does not expressly refer to staying enforcement of a council tax liability as an alternative to reducing that liability.

[23]A1P1 provides: Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.

[24]At the core of the Claimant’s challenge to the Defendant’s refusal to exempt the Claimant from his council tax liability, to reduce that liability or stay enforcement is his contention that the Defendant’s refusal is disproportionate and therefore a breach of his A1P1 rights. The Claimant is not challenging the Defendant’s policy for the exercise of its discretion under s.13A more generally.

[25]In support of his case, the Claimant relies on the decision in Shvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs

[2025] UKSC 30

in particular at [118] and [120] to [121]. Those paragraphs emphasise: i) that the Court must make its own assessment of whether a measure is proportionate to a legitimate aim. ii) that in doing so the Court must apply a four stage test, namely:(i) whether the objective is sufficiently important to justify the limitation of a fundamental right;

(ii) whether there is a rational connection between the means chosen and the aim concerned;

(iii) whether a less intrusive measure could have been used without unacceptably compromising the achievement of that aim and

(iv) whether a fair balance has been struck between the rights of the individual and the importance of the objective. iii) the Court’s role is to assess the lawfulness of the authority’s action against the substantive legal criteria which are inherent in the Convention rights, including the criterion of proportionality. The public authority decides on the action it will take, and hence is the primary decision-maker; but the court makes its own assessment whether such action is proportionate and hence, lawful or not.

[26]The Claimant also relied on Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury (No. 2)

[2014] AC 700

at [74].

[27]The Claimant rightly submits that the proportionality assessment is an exercise to be taken at the substantive hearing. The question at the permission stage is a narrower question, namely whether there is an arguable ground for judicial review having a realistic prospect of success; Sharma v Browne Antoine

[2006] UKPC 57

at [14(4)]. In the context of this case, the Claimant frames the question in the Note as “whether it is arguable that, when the judge at the substantive hearing conducts the proportionality assessment for themselves in accordance with Shvidler, they will conclude that the decision to charge [the Claimant] council tax, or more properly, the decision not to exempt him from, or reduce, his liability in the exercise of the discretion conferred by s.13A(1)(c) of the Local Government Finance Act 1992 was a disproportionate interference with his rights under Article 1, Protocol 1”.

[28]Inevitably, however, for the purposes of assessing whether there is a realistic prospect of the Claimant establishing that the Defendant’s actions were a disproportionate interference with the Claimant’s rights under A1P1, I must consider that question by reference to the four-stage test referred to in paragraph 25 above.

Discussion

[29]Discussion The claim for judicial review was filed with the court on 19 November 2025, within three months of the first impugned decision. I accept, therefore, that the claim is brought in time.

[30]So far as the Defendant relies on the Claimant having an alternative remedy, this is not a matter on which I need to reach any final conclusion given that: i) I agree with DHCJ Pittaway KC that the Claimant has no argument with any realistic prospect of success that the Defendant acted illegally, irrationally or in a way which is Wednesbury unreasonable; and ii) in circumstances where the Defendant did not attend the oral hearing, I did not hear submissions on the scope of s.16 of the 1992 Act and whether it applies to decisions relating to the enforcement of a liability rather than decisions as to whether a liability exists and the calculation of the amount of that liability.

[31]Turning to the grounds on which the Claimant seeks permission for judicial review, there are several preliminary points to be made before dealing with the Claimant’s argument under A1P1.

[32]First, the Defendant is a billing authority under the 1992 Act. It has a very broad discretion under s.13A(1)(c) to reduce the council tax liability in respect of any taxpayer. The Defendant exercises its discretion in accordance with its published policy, and the Claimant makes no general challenge to the lawfulness of that policy. Further, in exercising its discretion, the Defendant is entitled to consider not just the individual circumstances of the Claimant but also the interests of its residents and the aim of council tax in providing funds for local public services. More generally, it is inevitable in circumstances where the Defendant is entitled to exercise a discretion that there will be individuals who are unable to pay their council tax, but whose circumstances are such that the Defendant lawfully considers that a stay on enforcement is not appropriate or should come to an end.

[33]Second, so far as the Claimant seeks an exemption under Class D(1)(a) of the Council Tax (Exempt Dwellings) Order 1992, there can be no challenge to the Defendant’s conclusion that he is not entitled to the benefit of that exemption given that he is not detained in prison pursuant to an order of a court in the United Kingdom (see Schedule 1, paragraph 1 of the 1992 Act).

[34]Third, the email correspondence between the Claimant and his representatives on the one hand and the Defendant on the other does show(i) that the Defendant was aware of the Claimant’s financial circumstances in August and September 2025 when considering his application for exemption or for a continuing stay of enforcement and

(ii) that by September 2025 the Defendant had already allowed the Claimant a substantial period of time during which it had not taken enforcement action for his outstanding council tax liabilities from 2023 through to 2025.

[35]Fourth, the Claimant does not challenge the lawfulness of the 2019 Regulations. Further, there can be no challenge to the lawfulness of the Secretary of State’s decision to impose sanctions on the Claimant under the 2019 Regulations in circumstances where that decision and the subsequent refusal to review that decision have been upheld by this court and the Court of Appeal.

[36]Turning to the Claimant’s case that it has a realistic prospect of persuading the Court that the Defendant has acted in breach of the Claimant’s A1P1 rights, I do not consider that there is any such prospect for the following reasons. i) The court has already found that the decision to designate the Claimant under the Regulations and to maintain that designation was a proportionate measure, which was not a breach of the Claimant’s A1P1 rights. ii) The Defendant is a local authority pursuing the legitimate aim of funding local public services through the collection of council tax from its residents, including the Claimant. This is an objective which justifies the limitation of the Claimant’s rights under the first paragraph of A1P1. iii) There is a rational connection between the Defendant’s legitimate aim in the collection of council tax and its refusal to exempt the Claimant from his liability for council tax and its refusal to stay enforcement while the Claimant remains a designated individual. There is no lawful basis on which the Claimant can claim an exemption. The Council is entitled as a matter of its discretion to end the stay of enforcement that was in operation until the end of October 2025. More generally, the Defendant is entitled to conclude that the fact that a person is a sanctioned individual is not a ground on which to stay enforcement of that person’s liability to council tax. iv) There is no evidence to suggest that there was any less intrusive measure which the Defendant could have used to obtain payment of the Claimant’s council tax liability without unacceptably compromising the achievement of that aim. The Defendant had allowed the Claimant a significant period within which to pay his council tax, but no payments had been made. Further, as the Defendant points out at paragraph 18 of its summary grounds of defence,(i) the Claimant has not made any application to the Defendant for welfare support and

(ii) any relief granted in the exercise of its discretion under s.13A can be only temporary. v) In circumstances where the Defendant has a published policy for the exercise of its discretion under s.13A of the 1992 Act and has also allowed the Claimant a significant period of time in which to pay his council tax liability, it cannot realistically be argued that the Claimant’s rights have been infringed in a manner which is unfair when compared with the Defendant’s objective of obtaining payment of the Claimant’s council tax liability and more generally collecting the council tax required to fund local services.

[37]The essence of the Claimant’s case is that the State has frozen his assets and stripped him of the ability to raise any funds such that it would be unfair for the Defendant to now maintain a tax liability against the Claimant (see paragraph 7 of the Note). This simply highlights that the Claimant’s case against the Defendant is a collateral attack on the decision by the Secretary of State to designate the Claimant and impose an asset freeze on him. It is in the nature of an asset freeze that it is designed to put economic pressure on the person who has been designated. In circumstances where the asset freeze on the Claimant has been found to be lawful, there is no basis to suggest that it is unlawful for the Defendant, as a billing authority, to seek to enforce the Claimant’s council tax liability notwithstanding the existence of the asset freeze. This is particularly the case in circumstances where the OFSI licence granted to the Claimant allows payment of his council tax liabilities and where that licence expressly permits further variation should OFSI consider it appropriate to do so.

[38]Dealing briefly with the two specific grounds of renewal raised by the Claimant: i) I do not accept the criticism that DHCJ David Pittaway KC simply adopted the Defendant’s submissions wholesale. It is clear from the reasons given for his Order that while the Judge adopted the Defendant’s reasons for rejecting each of the Claimant’s grounds for seeking judicial review, he did so having considered the papers carefully and critically. ii) It is, likewise, wrong to suggest that the judge did not engage with the question of proportionality. This issue is addressed by the Defendant in its response to the first of the Claimant’s grounds of challenge (see paragraph 15 and following of the summary grounds of Defence), which the judge adopted. In any event, I have separately considered the question of proportionality and concluded that there is no realistic prospect of the Claimant’s challenge succeeding.

Conclusion

[39]For all the above reasons, I consider that the Claimant’s case against the Defendant has no realistic prospect of success and I refuse the Claimant permission to seek judicial review.

Other Orders

[40]Other Orders At paragraph 32 of his statement of facts and grounds, the Claimant seeks orders which are in effect a form of anonymity order requiring the sealing of the court file such that documents may only be released by order of the court, requiring the production of redacted copies of the Statements of Facts and Grounds as well as any summary or detailed grounds of resistance produced by the Defendant and prohibiting the publication or dissemination of the Claimant’s address.

[41]The Claimant did not, however, seek a withholding order before issuing his claim. Further, there is very limited evidence before me as to the current and actual level of risk on which the Claimant relies for the purposes of his application. In his judgment at [40] Johnson J. does refer to the Claimant having received many death threats; this was in 2024. More recently, in the Notice of Objections dated 28 May 2026 served on his behalf, the Claimant says that he remains at risk of assassination because he remains on the Ukrainian list, Myrotvorets, for liquidation.

[42]As is well known, anonymity orders and related orders limiting or preventing access to documents on the court file are a derogation from the principle of open justice (see CPR 39.2 and the notes thereto in Supreme Court Practice, vol 1) and initially I was minded to refuse the orders sought. On further reflection, however, I am prepared to make a limited form of order requiring notice to be given to the Claimant of any application by a non-party for access to copies of court documents under CPR 5.4C(2) and for the production of redacted statements of case to be made available to non-parties unless the Court otherwise orders pursuant to CPR 5.4C(6).

Costs

[43]Costs By his order dated 14 May 2026, DHCJ Pittaway KC ordered the Claimant to pay the Defendant’s costs of preparing the Acknowledgement of Service and Summary Grounds of Defence, summarily assessed in the sum of £2,925.00.

[44]The Claimant objects to that order for the reasons set out in Notice of Objections dated 28 May 2026. In summary, the Claimant repeats his position that he is destitute and prevented by the terms of his current OFSI licence from either fund-raising on UK platforms or returning to the United Kingdom.

[45]The matters now relied on by the Claimant as justifying his objection to paying the Defendant’s costs were matters which were before DHCJ Pittaway KC when he made his original order. Further, there is very little by way of evidence before the court as to the Claimant’s total means. If and to the extent that the Claimant requires a variation to his OFSI licence to enable him to pay the Defendant’s costs, he is able to apply for such a variation. Overall, there are no exceptional circumstances which justify a departure from the ordinary rule that a successful defendant who has filed an acknowledgement of service should generally recover the costs of doing so from the Claimant, whether or not they attend the permission hearing (see paragraphs 25.4.5.1 and 25.4.5.3 of the Administrative Court Guide 2025).

[46]Accordingly, I confirm the costs order made by DHCJ Pittaway KC but otherwise make no order as to costs.