Darren Hewitson, R (on the application of) v Parole Board for England and Wales [2026] EWHC 2219 (Admin)

[2026] EWHC 2219 (Admin)Case No AC-2026-LDS-000111
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
Venue Leeds Combined Court
1 Oxford Row
Venue Leeds, LS1 3BGDate 26/08/2026MR S KARIM KC(SITTING AS A DEPUTY HIGH COURT JUDGE)
THE KINGClaimantPAROLE BOARD FOR ENGLAND AND WALESDefendantSECRETARY OF STATE FOR JUSTICEInterested Party
Olivia Beach (instructed by SL5 Legal) for ClaimantNon-attendance by the Defendant and the Interested PartyHearing Hearing dates: 18 August 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 26 August 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................

Mr S Karim KC :

[1]By way of a claim form dated 1 May 2026, Darren Hewitson (“Claimant”) challenges, by way of judicial review, the decisions of the Parole Board of England & Wales (“Defendant”) dated 26 February 2026, which refused a request for an oral hearing. A provisional decision was made on 13 January 2026. I read these decisions as a composite. The Claimant was until recently a prisoner at HMP Edinburgh. I was informed at the hearing that he had been transferred to HMP Durham on 12 August 2026.

Parties’ Position

[2]Parties’ Position Ms Beach appeared before me on behalf of the Claimant. The Defendant did not attend and neither did the Interested Party. The Defendant had filed an Acknowledgment of Service dated 29 May 2026 and a Legal Position Statement dated 1 June 2021. The acknowledgment states that the Parole Board will, “… not normally seek to defend the decision of a panel refusing release or request for an oral hearing. The Parole Board, in line with the case law, will remain neutral and not actively defend the decision under challenge…”[3]Ms Beach articulated two grounds of challenge, namely:(1) Procedural Unfairness - the Defendant has failed to properly consider the Claimant’s request for an oral hearing and the decision is contrary to the principles to be derived from R (Osborn, Booth and Reilly) v Parole Board for England and Wales [2013] UKSC 61, and(2) Breach of Article 5(4) European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) – The Defendant’s decision to refuse an oral hearing is contrary to Article 5(4) ECHR. Permission was granted on both grounds by Mr Pilgerstorfer KC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) on 29 June 2026.

Factual Background

[4]Factual Background The Claimant was sentenced on 8 March 2008 to a sentence of Imprisonment for Public Protection (“IPP”), with a minimum term of four years which expired on 28 March 2012. He is also subject to concurrent IPP sentences which were imposed on 10 October 2008 with a minimum term of 39 months, which ran concurrently with the original sentence with a similar expiry date, and on 21 October 2011 with a minimum term of 40 months. Despite being at resident at His Majesty’s Pleasure in Scotland, he remains subject to the jurisdiction of the Parole Board for England and Wales.[5]It is common ground that the Claimant has never been released from custody; that he has spent just over 18 years in custody and more than 11 years since the expiry of the minimum term for his most recent sentence.[6]In a decision letter dated 13 January 2026, the Defendant did not recommend release or transfer to open conditions. At the time of this decision, the Claimant was not legally represented and had made no representations. He did so, however, via his current legal representatives on 9 February 2026 culminating in the final decision dated 26 February 2026. In the decision dated 13 January 2026, under the heading of “Any Other Information” the Defendant stated: “The Panel has considered the principles set out in the case of Osborn, Booth and Reilly (2013) UKSC 61 concerning oral hearings. It considers that an oral hearing would not be necessary or proportionate in this case due to reasons pertaining to level of assessed risk and insufficient evidence of reduction in risk, as well as very clear concerns about likelihood of compliance with the proposed risk management plan. The Panel recognises that Mr Hewitson is significantly post-tariff. In making their decision in his case, the Panel has acknowledged the Supreme Court’s guidance (Osborn -v- Parole Board [2013] UKSC 61) to ‘scrutinise ever more anxiously whether the level of risk is unacceptable, the longer the time the prisoner has spent in prison following the expiry of his tariff’.[7]The following is also relevant under the heading of “Reasons”:
“2.1. Mr Hewitson’s last Parole Board review took place by oral hearing on 27 June 2024. Since that time there have been mixed reports about his engagement with staff, other prisoners, and the regime. An Intelligence Summary Report dated 29 September 2025 outlines eleven entries between September 2024 and June 2025; eight of which are coded B21 or A11 which the panel understands to indicate moderate to high levels of reliability. Most of these relate to his hostility and threats towards others and/or concerns that his risk of harm to others or himself is increasing. He is reported to have received a positive MDT result in March 2025 which indicated use of Subutex. The security entries indicate that Mr Hewitson, who was at HMP Dumfries at the time, was very unhappy there. … 2.10. The current panel recognises that, importantly, the frequency of violence towards others seems to have reduced over the last ten or fifteen years. It has been suggested that Mr Hewitson is now more likely to use serious self-harm as a coping response to triggers. Unfortunately, Mr Hewitson’s custodial behaviour demonstrates that there is some way yet to go in developing adaptive and protective strategies to manage the risk factors identified. The panel also recognises that the prison setting may be serving to reinforce and repeatedly trigger Mr Hewitson’s negative beliefs and mistrust of others, despite any efforts made by the staff involved in his case. It is unclear whether secure settings with a more therapeutic and trauma-responsive approach than a mainstream prison have been seriously considered for or by him. … 3.1. Mr Hewitson is serving three concurrent indeterminate sentences for public protection. The panel is of the understanding that the most recent tariff expiry date passed in February 2015. Mr Hewitson is assessed by OASys as presenting a medium-low likelihood of committing further offences. The most recent psychological risk assessment (PRA, K. Manning, October 2023) assessed him as presenting a high risk of causing serious harm. It was also highlighted in the PRA that Mr Hewitson’s ‘psychological circumstances tend to change very quickly and unpredictably’. Ineffective cognitive processing and emotional instability are ongoing factors linked to risk of harm to others, as well as himself. Ms Manning opined that risk is likely to increase and become more imminent should Mr Hewitson be released from prison. Dr Manning endorsed the view of her colleague Dr Brown who had, earlier in 2023, completed her own PRA with regard to Mr Hewitson and concluded that community release ‘could result in unpredictable acts of violence towards random individuals onto whom he may displace his feelings’. The panel considers that these assessments remain relevant due to the limited changes in Mr Hewitson’s overall circumstances since they were undertaken. 3.2. In their most recent report (24/06/25), the COM states that Mr Hewitson ‘should not be released and his risk is not manageable in the community. Mr Hewitson has maintained poor progression through custody and any release at this stage would be unmanageable’. The COM also makes the observation that, whilst Mr Hewitson would prefer to remain in the Scottish Prison Service (SPS) due to proximity to his family who live in the Edinburgh area, transferring to a prison in England would likely afford him greater access to more therapeutic settings.”
[8]Following receipt of the January decision, the Claimant then instructed his current legal representatives. The Claimant’s legal representatives submitted detailed representations on 9 February 2026 requesting an oral hearing. Within those representations, the following was noted:
“5. Mr Hewitson has been unrepresented until very recently. He is currently located at HMP Edinburgh. It has not yet been possible for detailed instructions to be taken by his new legal representative and his parole dossier was only received on 9 February 2026. These representations have been prepared at short notice to ensure that they are submitted in advance of the deadline for requesting an oral hearing. ... 8. It is submitted on Mr Hewitson's behalf that his risk can be managed in the community and it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public from the risk of serious harm that he remains confined to custody; and there is a no more than a minimal risk that he would commit a further offence that could cause serious harm to the public if he were released. 9. In light of his application for release, the principles of fairness and what is at stake for Mr Hewitson and the need for anxious scrutiny of continued detention for post-tariff IPP prisoners, it is requested that directions are made for this review to proceed to an oral hearing. It is submitted that in compliance with the principles set out in Osborn, Booth and Reilly [2013] UKSC 61 (and reiterated in an oral hearing is required in this case.” ... Representations 19. These submissions request that an oral hearing is directed for Mr Hewiston’s case. 20. Mr Hewitson has not had the benefit of any legal advice in connection with this current review. His previous parole hearing was concluded on the papers (341). Mr Hewitson did not attend earlier oral hearings listed for that review and the Panel’s decision letter notes the significant concerns which staff had at the time concerning his mental health (339). 21. It has not been possible in the very short period of time since his current representative has been instructed to take detailed instructions. However, it is evident that Mr Hewitson disputes several of the security entries in his dossier, that he is highly distressed by his current location at HMP Edinburgh, that he does not have any meaningful progression pathway and that he is in despair. 22. It does not appear that any kind of IPP Progression Panel has been conducted for Mr Hewitson. This is not acceptable. Mr Hewitson is serving IPP sentences. The fact that he is located in Scotland does not obviate the need for HMPPS, in conjunction with the Scottish Prison Service, to ensure that a meaningful IPP Progression Panel is facilitated, ideally with input from Mr Hewitson’s legal representative as well as Mr Hewitson himself. 23. It is maintained on his behalf that, whilst in his current situation, he poses a significant risk to himself, having made several self-harm and suicide attempts, the risk that he poses to others has reduce significantly. This is alluded to in the decision letter of 19 January 2026: 2.10. The current panel recognises that, importantly, the frequency of violence towards others seems to have reduced over the last ten or fifteen years. It has been suggested that Mr Hewitson is now more likely to use serious self-harm as a coping response to triggers. Unfortunately, Mr Hewitson’s custodial behaviour demonstrates that there is some way yet to go in developing adaptive and protective strategies to manage the risk factors identified. The panel also recognises that the prison setting may be serving to reinforce and repeatedly trigger Mr Hewitson’s negative beliefs and mistrust of others, despite any efforts made by the staff involved in his case. It is unclear whether secure settings with a more therapeutic and trauma-responsive approach than a mainstream prison have been seriously considered for or by him. 24. It is important that the Panel conducts its own comprehensive risk assessment, and explores the means by which any residual risk can be managed. His legal representatives intend to commission an independent psychological risk assessment to help inform this process. If the Panel conclude after an oral hearing that he does not meet the release test, their terms of reference still require consideration of open conditions and fair assessment of any continuing areas of risk that need to be addressed. This will require an oral hearing at which he can be represented and at which Mr Hewitson can, with appropriate support and reasonable adjustments, give oral evidence.”

Representations

[9]This culminates in the final decision dated 26 February 2026 in which the Defendant states:
“We refer to the provisional decision of your parole review recently issued by a single member panel. As set out in the decision, you were allowed 28 days in which to consider whether to accept the decision or request an oral hearing. We confirm that you have requested an oral hearing via legal representations. Your legal representative had not been able to take your full instructions. However, the basis for this request relied heavily on the Osborn judgement, in that an oral hearing was necessary in the interests of fairness. An oral hearing is not required in every case. In your case there has been an absence of significant change since your last review, or since previous Psychological Risk Assessments were completed. The duty member concluded, on the basis of all of the material in the dossier and the information provided, that there is no reason to believe that oral evidence would assist in providing information that might mitigate the apparent level of risk presented, or would enable clarification of any points materially relevant to the assessment of risk, which are already clearly set out in the information supplied. The representations submitted have been considered and the request has been refused for the reasons stated above. The paper decision is therefore final, and your current review is now concluded in accordance with the Parole Board Rules – not applicable for reconsideration eligible cases”
[10]On 20 March 2026, the Claimant’s legal representative sent a Letter Before Action to the Defendant and the Interested Party. In a response dated 2 April 2026, the Defendant outlined the same position as contained in the Legal Position Statement.

Legal Framework

[11]Legal Framework No gloss is required beyond what Foster J outlined as the appropriate legal framework in R (Somers) v. Parole Board [2023] EWHC 1160 at [18]-[26]:18. By s28 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, the Parole Board is responsible for the (periodic) consideration of whether tariff-expired life prisoners should be released.19. The material provisions are as follows:
"28. Duty to release certain life prisoners (lA)This section applies to a life prisoner in respect of whom a minimum term order has been made; and any reference in this section to the relevant part of such a prisoner's sentence is a reference to the part of the sentence specified in the order. [ ... ] (5) As soon as- (a) a life prisoner to whom this section applies has served the relevant part of his sentence; and (b) the Parole Board has directed his release under this section, it shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to release him on licence. (6) The Parole Board shall not give a direction under subsection (5) above with respect to a life prisoner to whom this section applies unless- (a) the Secretary of State has referred the prisoner's case to the Board; and (b) the Board is satisfied that it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined. [ ... ] (7) A life prisoner to whom this section applies may require the Secretary of State to refer his case to the Parole Board at any time- (a) after he has served the relevant part of his sentence; and (b) where there has been a previous reference of his case to the Board, after the end of the period of two years beginning with the disposal of that reference; and [ ... ] and in this subsection "previous reference" means a reference under subsection (6) above or section 32(4) below." 20. By section 239(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003: "
It is the duty of the Board to advise the Secretary of State with respect to any matter referred to it by him which is to do with the early release or recall of prisoners." 21. The Parole Board Rules 2019, made by the Secretary of State in exercise of powers conferred by sections 239(5) and 330(3) and (4) of the 2003 Act make further provision on paper decisions and requests for oral hearings:
"19. Consideration on the papers (1) Where a panel is appointed under rule 5(1) to consider the release of a prisoner, the panel must decide on the papers either that- (a) the prisoner is suitable for release; (b) the prisoner is unsuitable for release, or (c) the case should be directed to an oral hearing. [ ... ] (6) Any decision made under paragraph (l)(b) is provisional. 20. Procedure after a provisional decision on the papers (1) Where a panel appointed under rule 5(1) has made a decision that a prisoner is unsuitable for release under rule 19(1)(b), the prisoner may apply in writing for a panel at an oral hearing to determine the case. (2) A prisoner who makes an application under paragraph (1) must serve the application, together with reasons for making an application, on the Board and the Secretary of State, within 28 days of the provision of the written record under rule 19(8). [ ... ] (5) If an application is served in accordance with paragraph (2), the decision about whether the case should be determined at an oral hearing must be taken by a member of the Board who- (a) is a duty member, and (b) was not part of the constituted panel appointed under rule 5(1) who made the provisional decision. (6) If the decision taken under paragraph (5) is that the case should not be determined at an oral hearing, a provisional decision under rule 19(1)(b)- (a) remains provisional if it is eligible for reconsideration under rule 28 and becomes final if no application for reconsideration is received within the period specified by that rule [ ... ]" 22. By Article 5(4) of the European Convention on Human Rights ("
ECHR"):
"Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful." 23. In Osborn (supra) and in Re Reilly [2013] UKSC 61, the leading authority on oral hearings in parole reviews, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider determinate sentence prisoners, recalled prisoners and also post-tariff lifers in the position of Mr Somers. Lord Reed, with whom the other Justices agreed, drew some general conclusions at the start of his judgment. The passages which follow are highly material to the Board's consideration in the present case and indeed they should form the backbone of any consideration as to affording an oral hearing where release or transfer to open conditions is in issue. 24. Lord Reed said the following at paragraph [2]: "(i) In order to comply with common law standards of procedural fairness, the board should hold an oral hearing before determining an application for release, or for a transfer to open conditions whenever fairness to the prisoner requires such a hearing in the light of the facts of the case and the importance of what is at stake. By doing so the board will also fulfil its duty under section (1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 to act compatibly with article 5(4) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in circumstances where that article is engaged. (ii) It is impossible to define exhaustively the circumstances in which an oral hearing will be necessary, but such circumstances will often include the following: (a) Where facts which appear to the board to be important are in dispute, or where a significant explanation or mitigation is advanced which needs to be heard orally in order fairly to determine its credibility. The board should guard against any tendency to underestimate the importance of issues of fact which may be disputed or open to explanation or mitigation. (b) Where the board cannot otherwise properly or fairly make an independent assessment of risk, or of the means by which it should be managed and addressed. That is likely to be the position in cases where such an assessment may depend upon the view formed by the board (including its members with expertise in psychology or psychiatry) of characteristics of the prisoner which can best be judged by seeing or questioning him in person, or where a psychological assessment produced by the Ministry of Justice is disputed on tenable grounds, or where the board may be materially assisted by hearing evidence, for example from a psychologist or psychiatrist. Cases concerning prisoners who have spent many years in custody are likely to fall into the first of these categories. (c) Where it is maintained on tenable grounds that a face to face encounter with the board, or the questioning of those who have dealt with the prisoner, is necessary in order to enable him or his representatives to put their case effectively or to test the views of those who have dealt with him. (d) Where, in the light of the representations made by or on behalf of the prisoner, it would be unfair for a "paper" decision made by a single member panel of the board to become final without allowing an oral hearing: for example, if the representations raise issues which place in serious question anything in the paper decision which may in practice have a significant impact on the prisoner's future management in prison or on future reviews. (iii) In order to act fairly, the board should consider whether its independent assessment of risk, and of the means by which it should be managed and addressed, may benefit from the closer examination which an oral hearing can provide. (iv) The board should also bear in mind that the purpose of holding an oral hearing is not only to assist it in its decision-making, but also to reflect the prisoner's legitimate interest in being able to participate in a decision with important implications for him, where he has something useful to contribute. (v) The question whether fairness requires a prisoner to be given an oral hearing is different from the question whether he has a particular likelihood of being released or transferred to open conditions, and cannot be answered by assessing that likelihood. (vi) … When dealing with cases concerning post-tariff indeterminate sentence prisoners, it should scrutinise ever more anxiously whether the level of risk is unacceptable, the longer the time the prisoner has spent in prison following the expiry of his tariff. (vii) The board must be, and appear to be, independent and impartial. It should not be predisposed to favour the official account of events, or official assessments of risk, over the case advanced by the prisoner. ... (ix) The board's decision, for the purposes of this guidance, is not confined to its determination of whether or not to recommend the prisoner's release or transfer to open conditions, but includes any other aspects of its decision (such as comments or advice in relation to the prisoner's treatment needs or the offending behaviour work which is required) which will in practice have a significant impact on his management in prison or on future reviews.

(x) "

Paper" decisions made by single member panels of the board are provisional. The right of the prisoner to request an oral hearing is not correctly characterised as a right of appeal. In order to justify the holding of an oral hearing, the prisoner does not have to demonstrate that the paper decision was wrong, or even that it may have been wrong: what he has to persuade the board is that an oral hearing is appropriate. (xi) In applying this guidance, it will be prudent for the board to allow an oral hearing if it is in doubt whether to do so or not. (xii) The common law duty to act fairly, as it applies in this context, is influenced by the requirements of article 5(4) as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights. Compliance with the common law duty should result in compliance also with the requirements of article 5(4) in relation to procedural fairness." [Emphasis added to those parts with particular resonance for the present case.] 24. Lord Reed further held that in assessing whether procedural fairness required an oral hearing, a court must determine for itself whether a fair procedure was followed [65] and he drew particular attention to the need to avoid a sense of injustice in a prisoner, derived from the lack of opportunity to contribute:
"70. This aspect of fairness in decision-making has practical consequences of the kind to which Lord Hoffmann referred. Courts have recognised what Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers described as "the feelings of resentment that will be aroused if a party to legal proceedings is placed in a position where it is impossible for him to influence the result"
Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (No 3) [2009] UKHL 28; [2010] 2 AC 269, para 63). In the present context, research has established the importance attached by prisoners to a process of risk assessment which provides for their contribution to the process (see Attrill and Liell, "Offenders' Views on Risk Assessment", in Who to Release? Parole, Fairness and Criminal Justice (2007), ed Padfield). [ ... ]" 25. With regards to Article 5(4) of the ECHR, Lord Reed held: "112. [ ... ] Bearing in mind however that the continued detention of a post-tariff prisoner must be justified by his continuing dangerousness as independently assessed by the board, and taking account of the importance of what is at stake, it will in most cases be necessary as a matter of fairness that he should have an opportunity to appear in person before the board. 113. Since the board failed in its duty of procedural fairness to the appellants at common law, it follows that it also failed to act compatibly with article 5.4." 26. This approach, which has been the law for ten years now, has of course been reflected in the later case law see R (Stubbs) v Parole Board [2021] EWHC 605 (Admin), Upper Tribunal Judge Markus QC (sitting as a Judge of the High Court) and R (Welsh) v Secretary of State for Justice [2019] EWHC 2238 (Admin), a case of mine when sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court.

Analysis

[12]Ms Beach articulates that there has been procedural unfairness based on three main challenges, namely(1) IPP status and excess of tariff,(2) factual disputes in relation to the assessment of risk, and(3) the Claimant’s vulnerability.[13]The issue of magnetic importance, I determine, is in relation to the Claimant’s vulnerability, i.e., his mental health. The representations of 9 February 2026 refer to this issue when seeking an oral hearing, and Ms Beach in turn signifies the 13 January 2026 decision, which states that the Claimant is (underline added), “… likely to use serious self-harm as a coping response to triggers… the panel also recognises that the prison setting may be serving to reinforce and repeatedly trigger Mr Hewiston’s negative beliefs and mistrust of others, despite any efforts made by the staff involved in his case. It is unclear whether secure settings with a more therapeutic and trauma-responsive approach than a mainstream prison have been seriously considered for or by him.” This must be considered in the context of the Claimant’s diagnosis of a Borderline, Paranoid and Antisocial Personality Disorders, and the ensuing, “highly aroused levels of negative affect… pushing him easily into a ‘fight or flight’ state’” (this being set out in the 13 January 2026 decision letter as a risk factor).[14]The Defendant has failed, in my view, to grapple with this issue sufficiently or at all. Fundamentally, there are central and relevant questions posited in the 13 January 2026 decision letter, which are clearly germane to the issue of the risk assessment: Why is the Claimant being triggered to a ‘fight or flight’ situation by reason of his mental health? What can be done to mitigate this? Is the prison environment the right place? The Defendant asks itself the ultimate question about whether a more therapeutic and trauma-responsive approach would be appropriate but then fails to answer this question. The subsequent decision letter dated 26 February 2026 (post the Claimant’s submissions) clearly fails to specifically consider this at all. The relevance of this issue is set out in the Claimant’s representations at paragraph 24, which I entirely agree with, namely, “… It is important that the Panel conducts its own comprehensive risk assessment, and explores the means by which the residual risk can be managed. His legal representatives intend to commission an independent psychological risk assessment to help inform this process”.[15]On this basis alone, I agree that the Defendant fell into an error in law when refusing an oral hearing notwithstanding that one had been provided for 2 years earlier. I have reached this view adopting the approach of Fordham J in R (Clarke) v. Parole Board [2025] EWHC 190 (Admin) at paragraph 24, namely that I have reached a “different view” on a “hard-edge objective question”.[16]The Claimant’s mental health, at the very least, materially contributes to his extant risk. It is that risk that requires to be considered at an oral hearing bearing in mind, on the Defendant’s own analysis, there should be consideration of therapeutic and trauma-responsive approach and setting. This falls squarely within the non-exhaustive list outlined by Lord Reed in Osborn (supra) at paragraph 2(ii) and (ix). An oral hearing will be able to properly consider the assessment on risk arising and bearing in mind the unique characteristics of this Claimant (his mental health and diagnoses in particular), and will have, I determine, a significant impact on his management in prison or at future reviews; at a minimum the Defendant will be assisted by hearing oral evidence from a psychologist or psychiatrist. I agree entirely with Ms Beach when she submits that an oral hearing would enable the Claimant and his representatives to call evidence in support of his contention that the prison setting was exacerbating and not reducing his risk.[17]I remind myself of what was said by Stacey J in R (Lawrence) v. Parole Board [2020] EWHC 3774 (Admin) at paragraph 24:
"Where, as here, there may be issues of mental health problems fairness usually requires the grant of an oral hearing (see for example Hussain v UK [1996] 22 EHRR 1 ). The extent to which the presentation of mental health issues on 16 January 2020 was down to drug abuse is best explored at an oral hearing and are important issues and facts that require clarification. Mr Lawrence's account of what happened that day has not yet been sought."
[18]I also find that the decision of 26 February 2026 failed to engage with the Claimant’s submissions (as articulated or at all) and failed specifically to give adequate reasons.[19]The need for anxious scrutiny when dealing with post-tariff indeterminate sentence prisoners is trite as per Lord Reed in Osborn (supra) at paragraph 2(vi). I determine that for the reasons outlined above, the Defendant has failed to comply with this requirement. Foster J in Somer (supra) at paragraph 55 states that the reasoning in Osborn results in a presumption in favour of an oral hearing in such cases. If I may be so bold to suggest that it is a rebuttable presumption. In any event, in this case, fairness requires there to be an oral hearing for the reasons. It also follows that there has been a failure to act compatibly with Article 5(4).[20]It is also said by Ms Beach that there are several factual disputes, which have been raised by the Claimant and his legal representatives, specifically that the Claimant disputes several of the security entries in his dossier. Whilst there has been an omission in the final decision letter to deal with these points, I am not satisfied that this demonstrates that the Defendant fell into error or that they materially impact the requirement of an oral hearing.

Conclusion

[21]Conclusion Accordingly, I quash the decisions of 13 January 2026 and 26 February 2026, and I direct that an oral hearing is convened before the Parole Board as soon as reasonably practicable. I do not order expedition.[22]Finally, the speed at which this substantive hearing has been listed is credit to the regional Administrative Court in Leeds.