Kelechi Cecelia Obi, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Departments [2026] EWHC 2217 (Admin)

[2026] EWHC 2217 (Admin)

Case No AC-2025-LDS-000247

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING’S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Venue The Courthouse 1 Oxford Row Leeds LS1 3BG

Draft judgment circulated to parties: 7 August 2026

Date Judgment date: 24 August 2026

Before

BENJAMIN DOUGLAS-JONES KC

(Sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court)

THE KING

Between

(on the application of KELECHI CECELIA OBI)Claimant

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENTDefendant

Craig Holmes (instructed by SPM Legal CIC Solicitors) for claimant.

David Manknell KC (instructed by Government Legal Department) for defendant.

Hearing Hearing date: 26 June 2026

JUDGMENT

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MR DOUGLAS-JONES KC:

Introduction

[1]Pursuant to CPR 7.3, the claimant brings two judicial review claims within a single action. She proceeds with permission having been granted in respect of all grounds by His Honour Andrew Saffman, sitting in retirement as a Judge of the High Court, and challenges:(i) the defendant’s decision of 12 August 2025 to curtail her leave to remain in the United Kingdom ("the curtailment claim"); and

(ii) the defendant’s decision of 10 September 2025, which is a negative reasonable grounds (“RG”) decision of the Immigration Enforcement Competent Authority (“IECA”) finding that she was not a victim of human trafficking or modern slavery ("the trafficking claim").

[2]Through the curtailment claim the claimant alleges that:(i) the decision-making process was procedurally unfair “in that it took a significant discretionary decision, which was to be based on a rounded assessment of all relevant circumstances, without any notice or recourse to the claimant such that she might make meaningful representations as to what the outcome might be”; and

(ii) the defendant failed to take account of material matters (this ground involves considerable overlap with the first).

[3]There was a third ground, alleging that the defendant applied an unpublished policy. In light of evidence filed and served by the defendant, this ground was abandoned. I need say no more about it.

[4]Through the trafficking claim the claimant contends that the defendant erred in finding that she was not a victim of exploitation by virtue of:(i) failing to apply the correct test when considering whether the claimant was a possible credible victim of trafficking in human beings: in particular, the claimant averred that the defendant applied the wrong test when considering the purpose of trafficking in human beings- component (c) of Article 4 of the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (“ECAT”);

(ii) irrationality on account of contradictory conclusions: the claimant contended that the defendant had acted irrationally in concluding that (i) the means of trafficking (component (b) of Article 4, ECAT) were present but (ii) no menace of penalty was present in the context of considering the purpose of trafficking (component (c) of Article 4, ECAT);

(iii) failure to give adequate reasons as to why the claimant’s case did not meet the low "reasonable grounds" threshold for suspected exploitation; specifically, she argued the decision did not explain why certain legal standards (like proving a "menace of penalty") were required, nor why compelling evidence, such as working for free under threat of visa cancellation and forced wage repayments, was deemed insufficient to meet the test; and

(iv) irrationality: the facts gave rise to reasonable grounds to suppose that the claimant was recruited for the purposes of exploitation and, in fact, exploited; she was required to work for free (and sometimes asked to pay an additional amount to her employer) in order to preserve her immigration status.

[5]Following an exchange of pre action protocol letters, the defendant maintained both the curtailment decision and the trafficking (RG) decision. The claimant issued the judicial review claims in November 2025. I have structured this judgment to reflect the fact that I am considering two judicial review claims. I will address the curtailment claim first, followed by the trafficking claim, under the following headings: The curtailment claim(i) Facts relevant to the curtailment claim: [6] to [16];

(ii) The Curtailment Decision of 12 August 2025: [17] to [22];

(iii) Legal framework- the curtailment claim: [23] to [40];

(iv) Submissions- the curtailment claim: [41] to [42];

(v) Analysis- the curtailment claim: [43] to [59]; The trafficking claim and the negative reasonable grounds decision

(vi) Further factual background relevant to the trafficking claim: [60]-[62];

(vii) The trafficking decision of 10 September 2025 [63]-[66];

(viii) Legal framework– the trafficking claim: [67] to [80];

(ix) Submissions– the trafficking claim: [81] to [87];

(x) Analysis- the trafficking claim: [88] to [97]; and

(xi) Conclusion in respect of both curtailment and trafficking decisions: [98]. The curtailment claim Facts relevant to

The curtailment claim

[6]The claimant, a Nigerian national, entered the United Kingdom on or about 16 September 2023. She arrived as a student, having been assigned a Confirmation of Acceptance for Studies (CAS) on 14 July 2023 to study Nutrition in Practice at Leeds Beckett University. Her husband, Godson Chibueze Anumodu, and her three year old son accompanied her as dependants.

[7]After completing her studies, the claimant sought to transition to the skilled worker route. On 15 February 2025, she applied for leave to remain (“LtR”) as a skilled worker- a nutritionist. This application depended on her proposed employer, Renaissance Nurseries (“the employer”), assigning her a certificate of sponsorship (“CoS”).

[8]On 15 February 2025, the employer assigned the claimant a CoS to work as a nutritionist. This role specified a gross salary of £26,000.00. Her duties comprised educating children on nutrition, designing healthy and balanced meal plans, ensuring food safety and hygiene compliance during preparation and storage, and supporting children with eating disorders, food allergies, or intolerances. Notably, the claimant never held leave to work as a care worker in the adult social care sector.

[9]The claimant never received a full copy of the CoS, although the defendant has now provided it in these proceedings. She understood the CoS was for employment commencing on 20 February 2025 and concluding on 19 February 2028.

[10]On 14 May 2025, the Home Office granted the claimant's LtR application, with validity until 4 March 2028. This leave also extended to her husband and son.

[11]The claimant’s position is that the promised employment proved to be a pretext for her exploitation at the hands of the employer. She was made:(i) to pay for the costs of her own application;

(ii) to fund some of the employer's expenses;

(iii) to work part-time hours well below the promised minimum, in breach of her skilled worker visa conditions;

(iv) to pay both her own and the employer's tax liabilities; and

(v) to withdraw and return her salary to the employer immediately upon receipt.

[12]Consequently, the claimant could not pay the sums demanded by the employer. This situation arose not least because the employer denied her the work hours necessary to meet those demands. The claimant relied on this job as her sole income. However, the employer required repayments that exceeded her actual earnings.

[13]When the claimant questioned these practices, the employer immediately dismissed her without notice. According to the claimant, she received notification of her dismissal on 19 May 2025. She did not report this termination to the Home Office at any time.

[14]On 20 May 2025, the employer notified the Home Office that it had ceased sponsoring the claimant, stating:

"The worker is not a good fit for a role in our organisation and we have faced challenges since starting her employment. As an organisation, we reserve the right to terminate employment during the probation period if the employee is not the right fit in our organisation."

[15]When the employer dismissed her, the claimant was pregnant. Her due date was 18 September 2025. She delivered her baby early on 19 August 2025 via caesarean section. The surgery required a recovery period of approximately six weeks. Following the birth, the claimant’s baby, Chimamanda, became critically ill. She was treated in hospital but, tragically, died on 26 September 2025.

[16]Due to her alleged treatment at the hands of the employer, the claimant has initiated proceedings in the Employment Tribunal for unpaid wages and other remedies. She also reported the employer to the West Yorkshire Police (“the police”) for exploitation. I deal with this further in the context of the trafficking claim, below.

The Curtailment Decision of 12 August 2025

[17]The Curtailment Decision of 12 August 2025 On 12 August 2025, the defendant issued a letter cancelling the claimant's LtR and her dependants' leave-in-line (the leave afforded to a dependent family member to stay in the UK which expires at the same time as the main applicant's visa). This decision, made without notice, curtailed her leave. It brought forward the expiration date of her leave from 20 March 2028 and granted a 60-day grace period from 12 August, meaning her leave would expire on 11 October 2025. The letter stated, "You now have until 11 October 2025 to either leave the United [K]ingdom or make another application to stay here".

[18]The defendant set out the reasons for cancellation within the letter:

"Your permission has been cancelled under Part 9.27.1(d) of the Immigration Rules because you have stopped working for Renaissance Nurseries Leeds Ltd."

[19]The decision-maker assessed the impact of the decision on the best interests of the affected child. The defendant concluded that the claimant would return to Nigeria with her husband and son as a family unit. This would allow them to continue their family life together. Balancing this against the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control, the defendant deemed cancellation appropriate. The defendant did not find the circumstances of the claimant’s case sufficient to exercise discretion in the claimant's favour so as to permit her to remain in the UK.

[20]Under the heading "Next steps", the letter stated:

"You must now do one of the following before your permission ends: - tell us any other reasons you think you should be allowed to remain in the UK by making a new application - seek help and advice on returning home - leave the UK If you think there are other reasons why you should be allowed to stay in the UK: If you think you have a reason to stay in the UK that you have not yet told us, you must tell us now. If you do not tell us as soon as you can of any reasons why you should be allowed to stay, and you apply later you may lose any right of appeal against a refusal of that application. If you want to seek legal advice you must do so now."

[21]At the time of this decision, the claimant had not contacted the Home Office regarding her employment difficulties. The Home Office only knew that the employer had ended her sponsorship and dismissed her because she was "not a good fit" in their organisation. The claimant did not respond to the invitation to provide alternative reasons to remain. She submitted an application for variation of her leave in December 2025, having made an application for a fee waiver on 8 October 2025.

[22]At the date of the hearing, the claimant was entitled to remain, her application to vary having been treated as made in time, pending its determination.

Legal framework- the curtailment claim

[23]Legal framework- the curtailment claim The sponsorship scheme has its roots in statute. By section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971 (“the 1971 Act”) the Secretary of State is required to lay before Parliament rules as to the practice to be followed for regulating the entry into and stay in the United Kingdom of persons who require leave to enter. The Immigration Rules (HC 395) are made under that power. As Lord Sumption explained in R (New London College Ltd) v SSHD

[2013] UKSC 51

, and as the Court of Appeal recorded in R (Prestwick Care Ltd and Supporting Care Ltd) v SSHD

[2025] EWCA Civ 184

at [4] to [5], the statutory power to administer the system of immigration control necessarily extends to a range of ancillary and incidental administrative powers. Section 3(3)(a) of the 1971 Act empowers the defendant to cancel or curtail a person's limited leave to enter or remain.

[24]At the material time, Part 9.27.1(d) of the Immigration Rules (which has since been replaced by SUI 33.1) provided:

“Worker does not start work or ceases their employment 9.27.1. A person’s entry clearance or permission on the Skilled Worker … [route], may be cancelled if: … (b) they or their sponsor confirm that their employment, volunteering, training or job shadowing has ceased or will cease before the end date recorded on the Certificate of Sponsorship; or … (d) they cease to work for their sponsor. Sponsor loses licence or transfers business”

[25]On 1 June 2023, guidance for Home Office staff was published in respect of this Rule:

“Suitability: Section 5 additional grounds for cancellation of entry clearance, permission to enter and permission to stay” (“the cancellation guidance”). The cancellation guidance sets out in respect of the scenario “Worker does not start work or ceases their employment (9.27.1)”: “A person’s entry clearance or permission may be cancelled where: … • they cease to work for their sponsor and they are on one of the following routes: • Skilled Worker • … You should consider why the worker has not started work (if known) and how that came to notice. For example, if a worker or their sponsor notifies the Home Office that the start date of the job has been delayed because some equipment has not arrived it would not normally be appropriate to cancel their entry clearance or permission. However, if the sponsor notifies the Home Office that the worker has not started the job, or has stopped attending work, and the sponsor has not been able to contact them despite attempts to do so over a few weeks, and it appears that the worker has therefore ceased to do the job, it would normally be appropriate cancel the permission with immediate effect. If you are satisfied that a worker has ceased to work, you should use the following text as a guide when drafting your cancellation decision. You must fully explain why you have decided it is appropriate to cancel their entry clearance or permission. You must also set the date on which the cancellation takes effect.” and they are on one of the following routes: You must also set the date on which the cancellation takes effect.”

and they are on one of the following routes:

[26]The cancellation guidance includes guidance on whether cancellation should be immediate or whether there should be a grace period:

“Deciding the cancellation date When cancelling a person’s entry clearance or permission, you must decide when that cancellation should come into effect. It may not always be appropriate to cancel with immediate effect, so a date in the future may be used, for example where studies are due to end earlier than the original expected date, permission should normally be cancelled from the new end of studies date. Calculating the new date of expiry for permission cancelled to 60 days (or other period) Where the reason for cancellation is not the fault of the applicant but is, for example, due to the actions of their sponsor, you should normally allow them 60 days to find a new sponsor. When you cancel permission to 60 days (or other period), you must allow the person 60 days (or other) starting from the date the decision is served. You must allow an extra day for deemed service of postal decisions, to account for the fact that the decision may not be despatched until the following day.”

Calculating the new date of expiry for permission cancelled to 60 days (or other period)

[27]As indicated through the text quoted at [25], the cancellation guidance provides the form of wording to be used for cancelling a sponsee’s LtR. It includes a section headed “Requesting further information before cancellation” with the subheading underneath that:

“When to consider asking for further information”

. The text reads:

“You should make a cancellation decision based on the available information, providing that is sufficient to inform your decision. In the majority of cases, you will be able to make a decision after reviewing the available information, such as a sponsor notification that the person has ceased work or study. In some circumstances, it may be appropriate for you to ask a person to provide additional information before making a cancellation decision. For example, you may need further information to decide whether cancellation should be with immediate effect, or the person should be given 60 days (or other period) to make a new application. Another example would be where a couple have a child and evidence suggests the child is unwell or at a key stage in their education. Cancellation of permission to a period of more than 60 days could be appropriate to allow the child to complete a course of medical treatment or to complete their studies. You may need further information about the child’s medical treatment or education before making a decision to enable you to give effect to your duty to consider the best interests of the child. … It may also be appropriate to cancel permission to a period of more than 60 days where cancellation is linked to pregnancy, serious ill health or a serious medical condition that means the person would be unable to leave the UK before their permission expires. … It may be appropriate to seek further information on the person’s condition to make sure their permission is cancelled to expire on an appropriate date. The appropriate date is the earliest date on which their pregnancy, serious ill health or medical condition would allow them to travel. In the above example, this would be the date on which the person is declared free of the infection.”

[28]Further guidance entitled “Cancellation and curtailment of permission” was published for Home Office staff on 08 October 2024 (“the 2024 guidance”). It includes the following:

“Conducting interviews in advance of cancellation action As noted under ‘requesting further information before cancelling’, there are certain cases where the Secretary of State must give an applicant the opportunity to address an allegation before a decision to cancel is made. UKVI staff will primarily follow the minded to cancel process and serve a minded to cancel notification letter, or conduct an interview, as appropriate. The interview process in cancellation for deception cases or breach of conditions cases Allegations of conduct that could lead to permission being cancelled and require an interview to be carried out prior to taking cancellation action, include, but are not limited to: • allegations of deception, in any application for permission to enter or stay • breach of conditions: The interview process in cancellation for deception cases or breach of conditions cases o for example, working in breach of permitted hours o working when this is not permitted, for example when in UK as a visitor”

The interview process in cancellation for deception cases or breach of conditions cases

[29]The 2024 guidance also includes the following concerning pregnancy:

“When you make a decision to cancel the permission of an individual who is pregnant (or has just given birth), has a serious illness or a serious medical condition, you must consider whether you should apply your discretion to allow them more than 60 days permission to stay in the UK.”

[30]In terms of caselaw, a convenient starting point is Lord Mustill’s classic statement on how fairness applies in immigration cases in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Doody

[1994] 1 AC 531

, 560 (“Doody”):

“… (1) where an Act of Parliament confers an administrative power there is a presumption that it will be exercised in a manner which is fair in all the circumstances. (2) The standards of fairness are not immutable. They may change with the passage of time, both in the general and in their application to decisions of a particular type. (3) The principles of fairness are not to be applied by rote identically in every situation. What fairness demands is dependent on the context of the decision, and this is to be taken into account in all its aspects. (4) An essential feature of the context is the statute which creates the discretion, as regards both its language and the shape of the legal and administrative system within which the decision is taken. (5) Fairness will very often require that a person who may be adversely affected by the decision will have an opportunity to make representations on his own behalf either before the decision is taken with a view to producing a favourable result; or after it is taken, with a view to procuring its modification; or both. (6) Since the person affected usually cannot make worthwhile representations without knowing what factors may weigh against his interests fairness will very often require that he is informed of the gist of the case which he has to answer.”

[31]Building upon Lord Mustill’s statement in Doody, in R (Citizens UK) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

[2018] EWCA Civ 1812

, [2018] 4 W.L.R. 123 (“Citizens UK”), Singh LJ (with whom Hickinbottom and Asplin LJJ agreed), at [68]-[71], affirmed the following supplementary principles regarding the common law duty of procedural fairness:(i) courts will readily imply a duty to act fairly into a statutory framework, even where the underlying legislation is completely silent on fairness and does not expressly prescribe any particular procedure;

(ii) where a public authority is minded to make an adverse decision because it fundamentally disbelieves a critical factual account provided by an applicant, procedural fairness requires the decision-maker to put those concerns to the applicant (whether in an interview or by other appropriate means); an applicant must be given a fair opportunity to address and rebut the decision-maker's doubts before a final adverse decision is made; and

(iii) this elementary duty of fairness, particularly regarding giving an applicant a chance to respond to disbelief, is deeply embedded in the law of immigration.

[32]In R (Balajigari) v SSHD

[2019] EWCA Civ 673

(“Balajigari”), the Court of Appeal addressed indefinite leave to remain refusals under the historical paragraph 322(5), which provided a general ground for refusal based on undesirable conduct or character, arising from discrepancies in declared earnings. The Court held that before concluding an applicant has been dishonest, the Secretary of State is required "as a matter of procedural fairness to indicate clearly to the applicant that he has that suspicion; to give the applicant an opportunity to respond... and then to take that response into account;” at [55]. A written procedure, rather than a formal interview, will usually suffice; see [56].

[33]In R (Karagul) v SSHD

[2019] EWHC 3208 (Admin)

(“Karagul”), Saini J conducted a detailed study of Balajigari and distilled its requirements into three general principles. These were subsequently endorsed by the Court of Appeal in R (Wahid) v Entry Clearance Officer

[2021] EWCA Civ 346

(“Wahid”) as laying down the obligatory procedural safeguards when dishonesty is alleged:(i) an applicant must be given a chance to address claimed dishonesty, bad faith or disreputable conduct prior to a final decision, whether through an interview or a written "minded to" process;

(ii) an internal administrative review that precludes the applicant from submitting new evidence to rebut a finding of wrongdoing is highly likely to be unfair; and

(iii) the need for these common law protections is particularly acute where the legislature has removed the right of a merits appeal to an independent tribunal.

[34]The application of these protections is heavily dependent on the statutory context and the gravity of the decision. The Court of Appeal in Wahid clarified that while these strict safeguards apply to decisions with severe consequences, such as the refusal of indefinite leave to remain, the same procedural safeguards will not apply for less consequential applications, such as short-term visitor visas where the applicant can simply make a second application.

[35]Most recently, in R (Singaram) v SSHD

[2025] EWCA Civ 1375

at [55] (“Singaram”), the Court of Appeal reaffirmed the principle stated in Balajigari. Lewis LJ reiterated that where severe consequences such as the refusal of indefinite leave are at stake, the Secretary of State remains strictly bound by procedural fairness to disclose suspicions of dishonesty or reprehensible conduct and consider the applicant's response before drawing an adverse conclusion; see [55].

[36]In R (Kumar) v SSHD

[2024] EWHC 2619 (Admin)

(“Kumar”), Clare Padley, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, drew a distinction that is material to the present case. She held that this was not a case in which the claimant had breached any specific condition of his leave: both counsel confirmed that ceasing to study was not a breach of condition. The cancellation fell instead under the Part 9 rules as a case in which the claimant had ceased to meet the requirements of the route under which his permission was granted ([77]–[78]). That distinction, between a breach of conditions and a failure to maintain the requirements of a route, is also drawn in the cancellation guidance, which reserves the interview process for breach of conditions cases and deception cases, not for the category of case in which a sponsorship arrangement simply comes to an end.

[37]In Pathan v SSHD

[2020] UKSC 41

;

[2020] 1 WLR 4506

(“Pathan”), the Supreme Court held that the Secretary of State breached her common law duty of procedural fairness by failing promptly to inform the applicant that his sponsor’s licence had been revoked. However, the majority held that this procedural duty did not extend to a positive obligation to grant a specific period of grace to enable the applicant to make alternative immigration arrangements. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore and Lady Black JJSC delineated the boundary between procedure and substance at [108], holding that requiring the Secretary of State to supply a specific grace period "… would involve an extra extension of leave beyond that expressly set out in the legislation/Rules. Such an extension is a matter of substance.” Conversely, the requirement promptly to notify the applicant "may be properly characterised as a procedural duty to act fairly. It is not a duty to bestow. It is an obligation not to deprive."

[38]In EK (Ivory Coast) v SSHD

[2014] EWCA Civ 1517

(“EK (Ivory Coast)”) the Court of Appeal (Floyd LJ dissenting) held that procedural fairness does not oblige the Secretary of State to postpone a decision and notify an applicant when a third-party sponsor withdraws a CAS due to an administrative error. The Court emphasised that the points-based system (PBS) places the onus on the applicant to provide valid documentation and is designed to process high volumes of applications expeditiously against strict, objective criteria. Sales LJ held at [31] that while the general public law duty of fairness supplements the PBS regime, it:

"... ought not to be applied in such a manner as to undermine its intended mode of operation in a substantial way. Application of the duty of fairness should not result in the public benefits associated with having such a clear and predictable scheme operating according to objective criteria being placed in serious jeopardy."

[39]R (Islam) v SSHD

[2025] EWCA Civ 458

(“Islam”) was an appeal against the refusal of permission to apply for judicial review. The applicant, a student, had applied to switch into the skilled worker route three days after a rule change (SW 1.5A, in force from 17 July 2023) which removed the ability of students to switch into work routes before completing their studies; it was common ground that his application was invalid because he satisfied none of the conditions which set the academic status and timing requirements in SW 1.5A for international students transitioning into sponsored employment. SW 1.6 was in these terms:

“An application which does not meet the validity requirements for a Skilled Worker is invalid and may be rejected and not considered.”

The sole question was whether "may" in SW 1.6 obliged the Secretary of State to consider whether to waive that invalidity before rejecting the application. The Court of Appeal held that it did not: SW 1.6 operates as a validity filter which extracts invalid applications from the system without any consideration of their merits, and is to be distinguished from refusal after substantive consideration of suitability and eligibility under SW 17.1 ([30], [32]).

[40]More generally, considerations relevant to a discretionary power fall into three categories: those the decision-maker must take into account, those it must not, and those it may take into account if it thinks fit. A consideration in the third category may lawfully be left out of account unless it is so obviously material that omitting it would be irrational; the weight to be given to it, including none at all, is a matter for the decision-maker: R (Friends of the Earth Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport

[2020] UKSC 52

;

[2021] PTSR 190

(“Friends of the Earth”), [116]–[121], drawing on Simon Brown LJ’s judgment in R v Somerset County Council, Ex p Fewings

[1995] 1 WLR 1037

, 1049.

Submissions- the curtailment claim

[41]Submissions- the curtailment claim Mr Holmes submitted in respect of ground(i) that rule 9.27.1(d), being discretionary, required the defendant to conduct an all-circumstances assessment before cancelling; that this was a breach of conditions case engaging the interview policy; and that, given the severity of the impact on a family with a mother experiencing high-risk pregnancy with no right of appeal or administrative review, the common law required prior notice and an opportunity to make representations. In his Grounds for Judicial Review, he described how “… the decision … has the effect of pushing the migrant (and any affected family members) towards the suite of measures deployed by the government as part of the hostile environment” and therefore the protections in Balajigari should apply. In so far as ground

(ii) is concerned he submitted that the defendant had failed to take account of the pregnancy, the employer’s conduct, and the family’s vulnerability, all of which were identified in the cancellation guidance and 2024 guidance as matters relevant to the exercise of discretion, and that the grace period date was fixed without any enquiry as to those circumstances.

[42]Mr Manknell KC sought to resist both grounds. With ground(i) he submitted that the permissive “may” in Part 9.27.1 and the cancellation guidance went no further than conferring a discretion not to cancel and did not import a duty of “rounded assessment of all relevant circumstances”; that the interview policy applied only to breach of conditions cases and immediate cancellations, neither of which applied here; and that the knowledge asymmetry required to trigger a Pathan duty was absent, the operative facts being known to the claimant and not to the Secretary of State. In respect of ground

(ii) he submitted that the matters relied upon had not been disclosed to the decision-maker and that no duty to seek them out arose; that they went at most to the length of the grace period, not the cancellation itself; and that the claimant had failed to use the 60-day period she was given.

Analysis- the curtailment claim

[43]Analysis- the curtailment claim Ground (i): Procedural Fairness It is convenient to consider ground (i) in a staged way: first, by examining the claimant’s submissions in respect of the permissive quality of rule 9.27.1(d); second, by considering the claimant’s argument that this is a breach of conditions case; and, third, by examining the common law principles which apply here.

[44]First, as to the nature of the defendant’s power, it is common ground that the word “may” in rule 9.27.1(d) is permissive; the defendant is not required to cancel leave in every instance where a sponsor ceases to act. However, it does not follow from this permissive grant that the rule imposes a procedural obligation upon the defendant to conduct an all-circumstances assessment of the migrant’s private life or vulnerability before deciding to exercise that power. The guidance serves to channel that discretion, but it does not convert the power into a duty of further inquiry. The existence of a discretion to refrain from cancelling is distinct from a duty to invite representations regarding every potential hardship factor.

[45]The claimant argues that Islam is distinguishable from this case, and I accept that submission. Islam concerned a validity threshold designed to filter out applications without substantive consideration of their merits. Here, the defendant was invoking a power that affects existing leave. However, while Islam does not apply to this case, the overarching principle that the duty of fairness must be interpreted in light of the specific statutory and regulatory context in which a power is exercised is well established: EK (Ivory Coast) at [31] per Sales LJ. In this instance, the regulatory framework governing the PBS is built upon objective, predictable criteria. Rule 9.27.1(d) is a tool of administrative enforcement. To read a mandatory, preliminary rounded assessment duty into the word “may” would be to impose a requirement that finds no anchor in the text of the rule or the primary purpose of the scheme.

[46]It follows that distinguishing Islam does not establish the duty the claimant needs. Her wider circumstances fall into the third of the categories in Friends of the Earth: matters the decision-maker may consider but need not. Such a consideration may lawfully be left out of account unless it is so obviously material that omitting it would be irrational; the weight to be given to it, including none at all, is for the decision-maker (Friends of the Earth, [119], [121]). The residual discretion not to cancel exists, but the defendant is not obliged to canvass it in every case.

[47]Second, I must consider whether this case should properly be characterised as a “breach of conditions” case. This is important to the claimant’s argument, as the claimant relies on the 2024 guidance to submit that an interview or further enquiry is appropriate where a breach has occurred. The claimant’s argument is that her leave was subject to a condition that she work for her sponsor, and that by ceasing to work, she objectively breached a condition of her leave. I reject this characterisation of the position in which the claimant found herself. Kumar ([77]–[78]) draws a clear distinction between a breach of conditions and a failure to meet (or to continue to meet) the requirements of a route. A breach of conditions arises where the individual performs an act specifically prohibited by the conditions of their leave (e.g., working more than the permitted hours, or working when prohibited from doing so). The cessation of employment is different: it is a failure to maintain the basis upon which the leave was granted. Rule 9.27.1(d) acts as a trigger: it acknowledges that the nexus between the sponsor and the migrant has been severed. The claimant seeks to elide the distinction between a restriction on her freedom to work (which required her to work for her sponsor) and a positive obligation to maintain that employment. The rule does not impose the latter; it merely dictates the consequence of the status quo changing.

[48]Furthermore, the facility for holding an interview is not a universal safeguard; it is a specific procedural tool limited to two well-defined scenarios:(i) it applies to Balajigari-type cases, where the Secretary of State alleges dishonesty or reprehensible conduct and proposes an adverse decision based on that finding (as Karagul and Wahid confirm); and

(ii) it applies where the Secretary of State contemplates cancellation with immediate effect, necessitating an urgent opportunity for the individual to respond to the specific evidence prompting that immediate termination. Neither scenario is engaged here: the defendant made no allegation of wrongdoing, and the claimant was granted a 60-day grace period, which negated the need for the protective interview process associated with immediate, summary deprivation of leave. The policy threshold for an interview was not crossed in this case.

[49]Third, I consider whether the common law duty of fairness required the defendant to give the claimant notice before cancelling her leave. The applicable principles are those stated by Lord Mustill in Doody. Fairness is not a rigid rule applied the same way in every case; it depends on the circumstances (principle (3)). An essential feature of the context is the statutory scheme which creates the discretion (principle (4)). Generally, it requires that someone facing an adverse decision knows what is being said against them and has a chance to respond. The claimant argues that because her family’s LtR status was at stake during a high-risk pregnancy, fairness demanded more than she received. While I acknowledge the gravity of her situation, I conclude that fairness did not require prior notice for four reasons.

[50]First, this case involves the points-based sponsorship scheme, which is designed to process high volumes of applications based on objective, predictable criteria. As the Court of Appeal held in EK (Ivory Coast), the duty to act fairly should not undermine this system. Requiring the Home Office to invite representations every time a sponsor reports that a worker has left their job would impose an administrative burden that in my judgement the scheme is not built to carry.

[51]Second, the facts here do not show the asymmetry of knowledge that typically triggers a duty to warn. In cases like Balajigari and Citizens UK ([68]–[71]), the decision-maker had gathered information that was unknown to the applicant, or held a suspicion of dishonesty that the applicant had not been given a chance to answer. Here, there was no such evidence and no allegation of wrongdoing. That the claimant was no longer working for her sponsor was not a charge to be answered. It was a fact of which she had knowledge. The common law does not require a decision-maker to ask a person to explain facts within that person’s own knowledge in such circumstances.

[52]Third, the Supreme Court’s decision in Pathan does not assist the claimant. The duty in Pathan arose because the applicant did not know his sponsor’s licence had been revoked. That is not the position in this case. The claimant knew her employment had ended in May 2025. She was not deprived of a chance to answer an allegation; she was simply informed of the consequence of her own changed circumstances. The law does not impose a duty on the Home Office to provide extra time beyond that which the rules already allow.

[53]Fourth, the claimant’s own actions during the 60-day grace period are significant. When the Home Office cancelled her leave, it provided a 60-day window for her to leave the UK or to make a new application. The decision letter expressly invited her to provide any reasons she had for being allowed to stay. The claimant was, accordingly, able to act, and she did act, within that window. On 8 October 2025, before her leave was due to expire, she made an in-time application to vary her leave, which preserved her lawful presence pending its determination. Fairness is satisfied when an individual is given clear information and a genuine opportunity to act. The claimant had both, and made use of them.

[54]Fifth, whether to interview or to seek further information is a matter of procedural discretion for the caseworker. The Court will only intervene if the decision-maker’s choice of procedure is irrational or otherwise unlawful. There is no such error here. The notification was unambiguous, there was no allegation to put, and the guidance provides that where a sponsor notifies that a person has ceased work, the decision may be taken on the available information.

[55]The claimant’s remaining point is that this was a discretionary decision, at least as to the expiry date; that the guidance identifies pregnancy, serious medical conditions and children’s welfare as relevant to the length of any grace period; and that the date was fixed without enquiry of a family whose circumstances the guidance would have flagged. The point does not assist the claimant. The guidance treats those matters as reasons that may justify a longer period where the information is available or is raised; it does not make them a trigger for investigation, nor does it suggest they would prevent cancellation. The decision-maker did not know, and had no reason to know, of the pregnancy or the employer’s alleged conduct, neither having been disclosed by the claimant. As EK(Ivory Coast) establishes, the absence of proactive enquiry is not unfair where the subject had fair warning and the scheme proceeds on the available information.

[56]For those reasons the defendant was not required to give prior notice or to invite representations before curtailing the claimant’s leave. Ground (i) fails.

Ground (ii): Failure to Take Account of Material Matters

[57]Ground (ii): Failure to Take Account of Material Matters Ground (ii) requires me to assess whether the defendant failed to consider material matters: specifically, the claimant’s pregnancy, the employer’s conduct in ending the sponsorship, and the broader vulnerability of her family. Ground(i) concerned a procedural duty: whether the defendant should have sought information before making the decision. Ground

(ii) concerns a separate substantive duty: whether the decision-maker was required to weigh those matters when reaching the decision. The two duties are related but distinct.

[58]These matters fall into the third Friends of the Earth category: the decision-maker may take them into account but is not required to do so. A duty to take a matter into consideration requires, at a minimum, that the decision-maker knew of it, had reason to know of it, or was under a duty to inquire. The 2024 guidance does require the decision-maker to consider applying discretion where LtR is cancelled for a person who is pregnant. That obligation is triggered by knowledge of the pregnancy. The pregnancy and the employer’s conduct had not been disclosed, and the common law imposed no duty to seek them out. Failing to consider them was not unlawful.

[59]The matters relied upon go at most to the length of the grace period, not to the decision to cancel. Once the sponsor notified cessation of work, cancellation of LtR under rule 9.27.1(d) followed. The grace period is a separate discretion. The guidance permits a period of more than 60 days where pregnancy or serious illness would prevent departure in time; it does not prevent or delay the cancellation decision itself. The decision-maker had no information to suggest that 60 days was insufficient. The decision letter recorded that the decision-maker had considered the best interests of the claimant’s son under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, which required such consideration, and concluded that the family would return to Nigeria together. The claimant does not challenge that assessment. The claimant was given 60 days, and she used them. On 8 October 2025, before her leave expired, she made an in-time application to vary her leave, with the result that she remained lawfully present pending its determination. She therefore suffered no substantial prejudice from the length of the grace period she was afforded. Even if a longer grace period should have been given, it is highly likely that the outcome for the claimant would not have been substantially different, and I would be bound to refuse relief under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. Ground (ii) accordingly fails.

The trafficking claim and the negative reasonable grounds decision

[60]The trafficking claim and the negative reasonable grounds decision Further factual background relevant to the trafficking claim In an unsigned and undated document headed “My Statement” the claimant set out in late February 2025, following notification from the Home Office that the salary specified in the CoS fell below the skilled worker minimum, the claimant and her husband attended an emergency meeting at the employer’s office. At that meeting the employer imposed four conditions: the claimant would work only 20 hours per week; she would bear both the employee's and the employer's tax liability; she was required to return each month's salary payment in full within five days; and she could seek part-time work elsewhere but should inform the employer of such work. The claimant and her husband accepted the conditions under financial pressure, having already committed significant sums in visa and Immigration Health Surcharge fees and having been told that a refund would not be immediate. The claimant's witness statement records no express or implied threat by the employer or a third party who was said to be intimately involved in the arrangement, before or at the meeting, to cancel her sponsorship or to report her to the Home Office as a means of compelling that acceptance.

[61]Work commenced in March 2025. The claimant was given fewer hours than the agreed 20 per week. The salary repayments were collected by the third party on behalf of the employer. On 9 May 2025, the third party refused to collect the cash payment the claimant had prepared, saying the sum was incomplete. On 18 May 2025, the employer sent a WhatsApp message setting out her business costs and demanding that the claimant hand over the outstanding sum by 19 May 2025 or she would cancel the agreement. On 19 May 2025, a proportion of the required money was collected from the claimant. That evening, she received an email from the employer terminating her appointment and sponsorship with immediate effect.

[62]Following the cancellation of her leave, the claimant contacted the police on or around 6 September 2025. On 8 September 2025, the police referred her case to the IECA, noting indicators that she was a victim of trafficking and modern slavery. The IECA is the UK Home Office unit that identifies and supports victims of modern slavery, handling referrals made through the National Referral Mechanism (“NRM”) in respect of foreign nationals who lack secure immigration status or who are in immigration detention. Established in November 2021, it operates alongside the Single Competent Authority (“SCA”), which handles other modern slavery cases.

The trafficking decision of 10 September 2025

[63]The trafficking decision of 10 September 2025 On 10 September 2025, the defendant, acting through the IECA, issued the negative RG decision. The defendant decided that there were no reasonable grounds to conclude that the claimant was a victim of trafficking or modern slavery.

[64]In assessing the legal definition of trafficking, the decision maker accepted that reasonable grounds existed to suppose that the employer had recruited (the act of trafficking in human beings under Article 4, ECAT; component (a)- see below) the claimant by means of deception (the means of trafficking; component (b)). However, the defendant did not accept that this recruitment occurred for the purposes of exploitation (the purpose of trafficking; component (c)).

[65]Specifically, regarding component (c), the decision letter concluded that she had not been subjected to forced labour, forced criminality, domestic servitude, sexual exploitation, organ harvesting, or any other form of exploitation. The decision maker also concluded that the employer held no intention to subject her to such treatment.

[66]The operative reasoning in the decision letter stated:

"Although you state you were forced to work 30 hours per month, no information has been provided to indicate that any work was exacted from you under any menace of penalty. You accepted the job from Aicha [the individual with control of the employer] due to economic necessity, and continued to work for her following you[r] being paid the wrong amount and the docking of your salary. It is considered that you were able to leave the job [of] your accord. Your employment was then terminated without notice on 19/05/2025, which was not your own decision. Whilst it is accepted that it would be distressing to not be given your guaranteed hours as outlined in your contract, and made to repay an overpayment in salary in large increments, the events described are considered to equate to a pay dispute and poor employment practices which is dissimilar to the definition of Modern Slavery/Human Trafficking as described within the decision annex."

Legal framework– the trafficking claim

[67]During the first stage of the NRM, a designated first responder refers potential victims to the SCA or the IECA (see above). Both authorities use a two-stage decision-making process. They first make a RG decision. They then make a conclusive grounds (“CG”) decision.

[68]Upon receiving a referral, the IECA must make a reasonable grounds decision. The authority should ideally make this decision within five working days. This stage acts as an initial filter to identify potential victims. It also enables access to support, including the recovery and reflection period under Article 13, ECAT.

[69]Reasonable grounds to believe is the same as the European Court of Human Rights’ standard ‘credible suspicion’; see R (TDT, by his litigation friend) v SSHD

[2018] EWCA Civ 1395

;

[2018] 1 WLR 4922

at [38]. SM v Croatia [GC], App no 60561/14 (ECtHR, 25 June 2020) clarifies the concept of credible suspicion. Credible suspicion arises when prima facie evidence indicates that a person is a victim of trafficking, slavery, or related exploitation. This means evidence which, on its face and without investigation, establishes trafficking, slavery, or related acts, provided no one challenges or counters it; see AM (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2020] UK’SC 17,

[2020] 1 WLR 1846

, [32].

[70]At the prima facie stage, the IECA conducts a preliminary assessment. It evaluates whether the available evidence indicates that the individual may be a victim of trafficking, slavery, or related exploitation. The authority must take this evidence at its highest and without challenge. This stage proceeds without a full investigation. It neither requires a high standard of proof nor permits a detailed credibility assessment.

Art 4, ECAT

[71]Art 4, ECAT Article 4, ECAT, is in identical terms to Article 3 of the international instrumentaddressing trafficking in women and children- the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000, which “supplements the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime” (“the Palermo Protocol”). Article 4, ECAT is in the following terms:

"For the purposes of this Convention: "

Trafficking in human beings" shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs; The consent of a victim of "trafficking in human beings" to the intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used; … "Victim" shall mean any natural person who is subject to trafficking in human beings as defined in this article."

[72]The Explanatory Report which accompanies ECAT set out in the context of trafficking in human beings at [89] that all three components: the act (a); the purpose (c) must be present for trafficking to be made out. ECAT does not define “forced labour” but there are several relevant international instruments. It then goes on to state at [90]:

“Article 4 ECHR prohibits forced labour without defining it. The authors of the ECHR took as their model the ILO Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (No.29) of 29 June 1930, which describes as forced or compulsory ‘all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily’.”

[73]In Van de Mussele v Belgium [1983] ECHR 13;

(1984) 6 EHRR 163

, the Court confirmed that the essence of forced or compulsory labour is work exacted under menace of penalty. The editors of Archbold Criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice 2006 say at 19-436:

“Van Der Mussele is a case that illustrates that the bar for offences of forced or compulsory labour may be set low. … In that case, the court held that a Belgian trainee lawyer who alleged that he had been subjected to forced labour by having to provide pro bono representation to a client during his pupillage may be able to establish the menace of a penalty on the basis that his refusal to do that work might result in his name being struck off the roll of pupils and thus prevent his ultimate registration as an advocate. The court held that “these prospects are sufficiently daunting to be capable of constituting the menace of a penalty”

. However, there, because the trainee had offered himself voluntarily, knowing he would have to do this work, and the work itself was not “unjust” or “oppressive” (it provided training and was being connected with the profession), the court concluded that in that instance the work did not constitute forced or compulsory labour.”

[74]The commentary in Human Trafficking and Modern Slavery Law and Practice (2nd edn, Bloomsbury Professional 2020), summarises forced or compulsory labour in these terms (at para 4.16):

“The drafters of the ECHR relied on the definition of ‘forced or compulsory labour’ contained in the ILO’s Forced Labour Convention[Van de Mussele, at [32]] and the ECtHR has relied on the ILO Conventions which are binding on almost all of the Council of Europe Member States for the purpose of interpreting Art 428. The Forced Labour Convention defines ‘forced or compulsory labour’ as meaning ‘all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily’ [Forced Labour Convention 1930 (No 29), Art 2(1)]. The ECtHR noted in CN v France [App No 67724/09 (2012), see para 77] that in the global report, ‘The cost of coercion’ adopted by the International Labour Conference in 1999, the notion of ‘penalty’ is used in the broad sense, as confirmed by the use of the term ‘any penalty’. It therefore considered that the ‘penalty’ may go as far as physical violence or restraint, but it can also take subtler forms, of a psychological nature, such as threats to denounce victims to the police or immigration authorities when their employment status is illegal.”

[75]In Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia (2010) 51 E.H.R.R. 1 it was said at [276], “For forced or compulsory labour to arise, the Court has held that there must be some physical or mental constraint, as well as some overriding of the person’s will.”

[76]That the ECtHR recognises that threats need not be overtly violent is reflected through a number of well-known decisions. CN v UK Application No 4239/08 (13 February 2013); Chowdury and Others v Greece Application No 21884/15 and Siliadin v France (Application No 73316/01)

[2005] 43 EHRR 16

make it clear that psychological pressure, such as threats to be sent back to a migrant worker’s homeland will suffice. At [243], the ECtHR set out in FM v Russia, which concerned the labour exploitation of Kazakhstani nationals in Moscow who had been internationally trafficked into Russia:

“… Where an employer abuses his or her power or takes advantage of the vulnerability of his or her workers in order to exploit them, they do not offer themselves for work voluntarily … . The notion of "penalty" is to be understood in the broad sense, as confirmed by the use of the term "any penalty". The "penalty" may go as far as physical violence or restraint, but it can also take subtler forms, of a psychological nature, such as threats to denounce victims to the police or immigration authorities when their employment status is illegal.”

[77]In R (SM) v SSHD

[2024] EWHC 1683 (Admin)

, Sarah Clark KC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, held that a challenge to a competent authority decision is a classic public law review, not a rehearing or reassessment of the merits of the underlying decision (see [28]); the standard of review is more rigorous than that adopted in ordinary public law proceedings: it is appropriate for the reviewing court to exercise “anxious scrutiny” (at [29]); what matters in such a review, however, is “substance not semantics” (see [30]); and the Court will always keep in mind the scope of its “review” jurisdiction, and resist any temptation to allow its own views on the merits of the underlying matter influence its decision to find public law error (see [30] and [31]).

[78]As to the meaning of “a position of vulnerability” as one of the ways in which the means (component (b) of trafficking in human beings) may be made out, it was noted at [5] of R (BG) v SSHD

[2016] EWHC 786 (Admin)

“By abuse of a position of vulnerability is meant abuse of any situation in which the person involved has no real and acceptable alternative to submitting to the abuse. The vulnerability may be of any kind, whether physical, psychological, emotional, family- related, social or economic. The situation might, for example, involve insecurity or illegality of the victim’s administrative status, economic dependence or fragile health. In short, the situation can be any state of hardship in which a human being is impelled to accept being exploited. Persons abusing such a situation flagrantly infringe human rights and violate human dignity and integrity, which no one can validly renounce.”

[79]This reflects the amplified definition which appears in Article 2.2 of Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 5 April 2011, on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA (but which does not appear in Article 4, ECAT):

“A position of vulnerability means a situation in which the person concerned has no real or acceptable alternative but to submit to the abuse involved.”

This Article of the Directive is not retained EU law but it is relevant as persuasive evidence of the common European understanding of trafficking in human beings, which informs the ECtHR’s interpretation of

Article 4 ECHR

[80]And as to the assessment of whether a person is trafficked “for the purposes of exploitation” see R (AAM) v SSHD

[2025] EWHC 447 (Admin)

; [2025] 1 W.L.R. 3297 at [53] to [54], in which MacDonald J emphasised that no actual exploitation was necessary.

Submissions– the trafficking claim

[81]Submissions– the trafficking claim Ground (i) - failure to apply the correct test The claimant’s argument was that the trafficking decision conflated components (b) and (c) of the definition of trafficking in human beings under Article 4, ECAT by importing the concept of "menace of penalty" improperly into the enquiry as to whether the purpose of trafficking (under component (c)) was made out to the requisite standard; that concept, Mr Holmes submitted, belonged to the means component (b) and had no place in the purpose component (c) analysis. During the course of argument Mr Holmes, realistically, conceded that, on analysis, this argument did not stand up to scrutiny; see below.

[82]Mr Holmes also submitted that the decision had unlawfully relied on the claimant’s acceptance of the job and her continuation in work: this ignored the fact that when the means are present, consent is irrelevant to one’s status as a victim of trafficking. Mr Holmes relied on FM v Russia (ECtHR, Third Section, Applications nos. 71671/16 and 40190/18) for the proposition that threatened loss of immigration status constitutes a menace of penalty (see [243]) and contended that the employer's power to cancel her sponsorship equated to a menace of penalty.

[83]Mr Manknell KC submitted that "menace of penalty" was an ingredient of forced labour under component (c), not a feature of component (b) and sought to distinguish FM v Russia which concerned the employment status of illegal workers.

Ground (ii) - irrationality on account of contradictory conclusions

[84]Ground (ii) - irrationality on account of contradictory conclusions Mr Holmes submitted in support of ground (ii) that having accepted deception under component (b), the decision-maker acted irrationally and contradictorily in rejecting the claim under component (c). Deception was necessarily a precursor to exploitation.

[85]Mr Manknell countered this by submitting that components (b) and (c) address analytically distinct questions – the means of recruitment and the purpose of recruitment respectively. It was rational to find one satisfied without the other. The definition requires all three components to be fulfilled. Finding deception without finding forced labour is not contradictory.

Ground (iii) - failure to give adequate reasons

[86]Ground (iii) - failure to give adequate reasons The claimant identified five failures of reasoning.(a) The decision does not explain why a menace of penalty was required in order to demonstrate recruitment for the purpose of exploitation.

(b) It does not explain why the menace she in fact faced - the employer's power to cancel her sponsorship - was insufficient.

(d) It does not explain why working for free under threat of sponsorship cancellation did not meet the threshold.

(e) It does not explain why, against the low RG standard, the facts of her case did not at least satisfy that modest test. In response, Mr Manknell highlighted that the Decision Annex provided the applicable legal framework; that was incorporated into the decision; and the outcome was explained by reference to it.

Ground (iv) - irrationality

[87]Ground (iv) - irrationality The claimant submitted that the facts as accepted - recruitment under false pretences as to hours and salary, compelled repayment of wages in cash increments, work at nil or negative net remuneration, and sponsorship being terminated on the day of the final payment - plainly give rise to reasonable grounds to suspect exploitation or exploitative intent. She submitted through Mr Holmes that no rational decision-maker, properly directing herself to the low RG threshold, could have found otherwise. The defendant submitted in response that the wage repayment scheme, however unlawful as a matter of employment law, operated through financial pressure and contractual leverage rather than through any menace of penalty.

Analysis- the trafficking claim

[88]Analysis- the trafficking claim Ground (i) - failure to apply the correct test The applicable test was not in dispute. The definition of trafficking in Article 4, ECAT mirrors that in the Palermo Protocol. It requires three cumulative elements, or components, to be fulfilled: an act of recruitment or receipt (component (a)), effected by prescribed means including deception (component (b)), for the purpose of exploitation (component (c)). The Explanatory Report to ECAT, as the Decision Annex recorded, makes clear that all three must be present. The decision accepted that components (a) and (b) were made out to the requisite standard. Component (c) was found not to be made out because the decision-maker was not satisfied that the claimant had been subjected to any recognised form of exploitation, or that the employer had intended to subject her to one.

[89]The claimant’s submission that the decision-maker conflated components (b) and (c) of the trafficking definition by importing a "menace of penalty" requirement into the purpose enquiry is misconceived. Component (c) requires recruitment for the purpose of exploitation; as the only potentially relevant form of exploitation on the accepted facts was “forced labour,” the decision-maker was required to enquire whether that specific standard was met. Forced labour is defined by ILO Convention No. 29 (applied in the Statutory Guidance at paragraphs 2.39–2.42 as the relevant standard for forced labour) as work exacted under the menace of any penalty and performed against the person’s will. This is underscored by authorities including Van de Mussele v Belgium. "Menace of penalty" is therefore not a feature of the means component of trafficking, (b), but an essential ingredient of the only species of exploitation in play under the purpose component, (c). During the course of discussion, when I put this to Mr Holmes, he rightly acknowledged that this analysis was correct. The IECA had to find prima facie evidence of exploitation; such exploitation had to amount to "forced labour or services" under Article 4 of ECAT; forced labour had to be exacted under a "menace of penalty"; and, consequently, the defendant was correct to use that standard to test the claim. It follows that there was no conflation of elements (b) and (c), and Ground (i) is bound to fail on this limb of the claimant’s argument.

[90]As to the second limb of Mr Holmes’ argument, the submission that consent is irrelevant to one’s status as a victim of trafficking does not assist the claimant for a related reason. Article 4 ECAT provides that a victim's consent to intended exploitation is irrelevant where any of the prescribed means have been used. The decision maker accepted deception under element (b). She did not find the claimant not to be a prima facie victim on the ground that consent was present. The references to economic necessity and continuation in work were directed at component (c); specifically at whether the work was performed involuntarily under menace of penalty- the conditions that must be satisfied for the forced labour example of the purpose component of trafficking to be fulfilled. The defendant addressed the correct question. Any apparent contradiction in approach stems from the fact that in this particular case component (c) could only have been fulfilled through the forced labour example in Article 4, ECAT. Forced labour requires that the work under a menace of penalty be carried out against the will of the employee. That is a quality of this example of component (c) which does not apply when considering other examples of exploitation precisely because they are of a different nature and/or degree.

[91]The reliance on FM and Others v Russia is misplaced given the facts of this case. The passage relied upon at [243] of the judgment needs to be seen in the context of migrant employees working illegally. The claimant was not in the UK illegally. She held valid LtR throughout her employment. The possibility exists that in some cases a menace of penalty might arise by virtue of exploitation at the hands of an employer, notwithstanding that the worker is in the UK lawfully (see for example R(COL) v Director of Public Prosecutions

[2022] EWHC 601 (Admin)

; [2022] 3 WLUK 239;

[2022] 2 Cr. App. R. 14

). The defendant’s finding in the trafficking decision that this was not prima facie such a case is, however, unimpeachable on the facts of the case in my judgement.

[92]The claimant's own witness statement contains no account of any express or implied threat by the employer to cancel her sponsorship or to report her to the Home Office as a means of compelling compliance. The statement records that she accepted the conditions at the emergency meeting under financial pressure, and that when she failed to pay the full amount on 19 May 2025, her sponsorship was terminated that evening. The termination followed her refusal to comply; it was not a threat that preceded and compelled compliance. What the statement describes is an exploitative arrangement entered into under the sort of economic necessity which the Statutory Guidance expressly places outside the forced labour definition (see § 2.42).

[93]The claimant's subsidiary submission is that the decision maker asked the wrong question by examining what actually occurred rather than assessing the employer's purpose at the moment of recruitment. Component (c) is directed at intention at the point of recruitment, not outcome thereafter. However, the decision expressly addressed intention, concluding that there was "no intention to subject you to" forced labour or any other form of exploitation. The right question was asked. The decision maker applied the correct legal test.

Ground (ii) - irrationality on account of contradictory conclusions

[94]Ground (ii) - irrationality on account of contradictory conclusions Ground (ii) is in my judgement a reframed version of the argument which featured in ground (i), which I analysed at [90] above. In my judgement there is no logical contradiction in concluding that a person was recruited by deception but was not recruited for the purpose of exploitation. Component (b) is concerned with the means of recruitment; component (c) is concerned with the purpose of it. Those are analytically distinct questions. A person can be induced into employment by false promises without being recruited for the purpose of subjecting her to forced labour. The component (b) finding does not determine the component (c) answer. The defendant’s approach to the three stage is what is envisaged by the architecture of the definition.

[95]The Decision Annex expressly explains that working for low wages or in poor conditions, or finding oneself unable to leave because of the absence of alternative employment, does not constitute forced labour. The claimant's argument reduces to the submission that deception under component (b) presupposes exploitative purpose under component (c). That contention effectively merges two distinct legal tests into one. Such an approach is at odds with the definition, which requires all three elements to be independently satisfied. The decision maker found them independently: deception was established, but forced labour was not. There is no irrationality in that. It follows that ground (ii) fails.

Ground (iii) - failure to give adequate reasons

[96]Ground (iii) - failure to give adequate reasons The legal standard for adequate reasons is well-established: they must be sufficient to enable the recipient to understand the basis of the decision and to identify any grounds for challenge (South Bucks DC v Porter (No. 2)

[2004] 1 WLR 1953

). The decision need not be elaborate, provided the essential reasoning is intelligible, adequate and enables the reader to understand what conclusions were reached on the principal issues. Applying this to the five sub-limbs of Ground (iii), first, limbs (a) and (e) are answered by the decision’s clear reference to the Decision Annex and the correct application of the facts to the legal test analysed in the context of grounds (i) and (ii) above. Second, limb (b) mischaracterises the decision: the decision-maker found that no menace of penalty existed; it did not go on to consider whether any such menace would have been sufficient to satisfy component (c). Third, limb (d) is similarly flawed; it criticises the decision maker for failing to address purported stated facts (working for free under threat) that were not in fact findings of fact of the decision maker or supported by the evidence. Finally, with limb (c) the decision adequately explained why the wage repayment scheme did not cross the reasonable grounds threshold. The decision described the scheme - being required to repay an alleged overpayment in salary in increments of £500 over five days - and characterised the events as “a pay dispute and poor employment practices,” expressly distinguishing them from the definition of modern slavery set out in the Decision Annex. The Decision Annex, incorporated by reference, quoted the Statutory Guidance (paragraph 2.42), which provides that forced labour cannot be equated with working for low wages, poor working conditions, or pure economic necessity. The chain of reasoning was complete: the facts as described did not amount to work exacted under a menace of penalty; accordingly the forced labour definition was not met; accordingly there was no prima facie evidence of the purpose of exploitation within the meaning which attaches to it in Article 4 ECAT. When the decision is read together with the Decision Annex, the path of reasoning is clear and the conclusion is logically coherent.

Ground (iv) - irrationality

[97]Ground (iv) - irrationality Ground (iv) adds nothing to ground (i). For the reasons I have set out above, the decision maker was entitled to find that the evidence did not give rise to a prima facie case of exploitation or exploitative purpose within the meaning of the relevant example of component (c) (i.e. forced labour).

Conclusion in respect of both curtailment and trafficking decisions

[98]Conclusion in respect of both curtailment and trafficking decisions It follows from the above analysis that both claims must fail and, accordingly, I dismiss both, claims for judicial review.

Note concerning the date of judgment hand down

[99]Note concerning the date of judgment hand down I delayed handing down this judgment in order to ensure that Counsel were not required to consider the draft judgment while they were on leave.