Glory Osarenren Otabor, R (on the application of) v Student Loans Company [2026] EWHC 2168 (Admin)

[2026] EWHC 2168 (Admin)Case No AC-2026-00-1114
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 12/08/2026MATTHEW BUTT KC
GLORY OSARENREN OTABORClaimantSTUDENT LOANS COMPANY LIMITEDDefendant
the Claimant appeared in person for in personChristian Howells (instructed by Browne Jacobson LLP) for DefendantHearing Hearing dates: 30 July 2026
APPROVED JUDGMENT
[1]In this case the Claimant, Mr Glory Otabor challenges a decision of the Defendant (the Student Loans Company Limited) dated 9 February 2026, to refuse his application for post-graduate funding, on the basis that he had not had continuous lawful leave to remain in the UK for a period of 3 years preceding the date of the application for student finance, and so did not satisfy paragraph 13 of schedule 1 to the Education (Postgraduate Master’s Degree Loans) Regulations 2016 (the 2016 regulations).[2]In short, the Claimant submits that the Defendant’s decision that he was not eligible for postgraduate student finance was unlawful on account of public law errors. The Defendant contests that claim. It submits that it has correctly applied the information provided by the Secretary of State for the Home Department (SSHD) as to the Claimant’s immigration history.[3]The Claimant is a litigant in person. The Defendant is represented by Mr Christian Howells of counsel.[4]Permission was granted on 9 June 2026 on the sole ground that the Claimant arguably satisfied the three year lawful ordinary residence requirement in paragraph13 of schedule 1 to the 2016 regulations, as defined in paragraph 1(3) of that schedule.[5]Other grounds were brought by the Claimant which focused upon a claimed legitimate expectation, but permission was refused on these grounds and the Claimant did not apply to renew in time or in the required manner. Mr Otabor ultimately did not seek to renew these grounds before me at the substantive hearing. I am conscious that he is a litigant in person and I am satisfied that the grounds upon which permission was refused are unarguable. II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES[6]The 2016 regulations are made pursuant to section 22 and 42(6) of the Teaching and Higher Education Act 1998.[7]Regulation 3(2) of the 2016 regulations (in force at the time) provides that a person is an eligible student to receive student finance if the Secretary of State determines that they fall within specified paragraphs of part 2 of schedule 1. This includes paragraph 13, termed the “long residence route” which requires that the person: (c) has been ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom and Islands throughout the three-year period preceding the first day of the first academic year of the course;[8]Paragraph 1(3) of schedule 1 is an interpretative provision and states that:
“For the purposes of this Schedule, a person is not to be treated as ordinarily resident in a place unless that person lawfully resides in that place.”
[9]Regulation 9(2) provides that the Secretary of State may take such steps and make such inquiries as she considers necessary to determine whether the applicant is an eligible student. The Secretary of State has delegated all relevant functions to the Defendant.[10]In order to understand the Claimant’s immigration history and the submissions the parties make in this regard, it is necessary to set out some provisions of immigration law.[11]The relevant parts of section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971 (the 1971 Act) provide: “3C Continuation of leave pending variation decision(1) This section applies if— (a) a person who has limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom applies to the Secretary of State for variation of the leave, (b) the application for variation is made before the leave expires, and (c) the leave expires without the application for variation having been decided.(2) The leave is extended by virtue of this section during any period when— (a)the application for variation is neither decided nor withdrawn,[12]Paragraph 34G of the Immigration Rules includes the following relevant provision: 34G. For the purposes of these rules, and subject to paragraph 34GB, the date on which an application is made is: (4) where the online application includes a request for a fee waiver, the date on which the online request for a fee waiver is submitted, as long as the completed application for permission to stay is submitted within 10 working days of the receipt of the decision on the fee waiver application.” III. THE APPLICATION FOR POSTGRADUATE FINANCE[13]In 2023 the Claimant enrolled as an undergraduate student. He was granted finance for that and possibly other educational purposes between the academic years which cover 2023 and 2026.[14]On 17 October 2025 the Claimant applied for student finance to study a postgraduate Barrister Training Course with Professional Legal Studies at the BPP University commencing in April 2026. In order to determine whether the Claimant was eligible, the Defendant made enquiries with SSHD.[15]On 17 December 2025 SSHD provided the Defendant with a Status Verification, Enquiries and Checking (SVEC) response which set out the Claimant’s immigration history. SSHD advised that the Claimant had not had lawful leave for the whole of the relevant 3 year period. On the same day, the Defendant wrote to the Claimant to advise that it had deemed him ineligible for postgraduate finance because he had not had lawful leave for the relevant 3 year period.[16]On 18 December 2025, the Defendant received a stage 1 appeal from the Claimant, together with a number of enclosures. The Claimant asserted that he had been lawfully resident in the UK up to the present date and that the information provided by SSHD was incorrect.[17]On 29 December 2025 the Claimant emailed SSHD and copied the Defendant requesting that SSHD correct the information provided to the Defendant.[18]On 4 January 2026 SSHD sent another SVEC to the Defendant, containing essentially the same information.[19]On 5 January 2026 the Defendant wrote to the Claimant notifying him that he was not eligible for student finance because he had not been lawfully resident in the UK for a 3-year period preceding the start of his course.[20]On 6 January 2026 the Claimant responded stating that he wished to appeal the decision.[21]On 9 January 2026 the Defendant responded in the same terms it had on 5 January 2026. On the same day, the Claimant submitted a request for reconsideration[22]On 13 January 2026 the Claimant provided the Defendant with a copy of correspondence he had sent in which he requested the SSHD to correct the information provided to the Defendant in the SVEC dated 17 December 2026.[23]On 9 February 2026 the Defendant refused the stage 1 appeal. The decision letter stated:
“I must highlight that the SLC defers in all matters regarding a student’s immigration history to the HO as it is the competent authority on such matters. The SLC does not possess any authority or discretion to disregard the information they provide.”
[24]On 19 February 2026 the Claimant made a reconsideration request. The Defendant responded on 6 March 2026 and refused that request.[25]Whilst in this claim, the Claimant challenges the 09 February appeal decision, the correct target is in fact the original decision made 17 December 2025. No point is taken upon limitation, however, and the issues are identical. IV. IMMIGRATION HISTORY[26]The Claimant’s immigration history as disclosed in the SVEC includes following relevant events (some of which are to an extent disputed by Claimant). i. On 19 May 2023 leave to remain was granted valid to 30 December 2023. ii. On 07 November 2023 a fee waiver was submitted. This was rejected on 05 June 2024. iii. On 19 June 2024 a further fee waiver application was submitted. This was accepted on 23 August 2024 and on the same day a leave to remain application was submitted. iv. On 19 December 2024, family private life leave to remain was granted until 19 June 2027. V. DISCUSSION[27]The Claimant argues that the decision under challenge was unlawful as(i) it is inconsistent with the decision made in relation to his undergraduate and/or other student finance applications and(ii) it is based upon incorrect information and/or a misunderstanding of the information provided by the SSHD and/or that it is based upon a misunderstanding of the Immigration Rules.[28]The Defendant submits that it must defer to the information it is provided by SSHD in relation to immigration decision making. The Defendant further submits that the information which I have just summarised shows that the Claimant did not have three years in which he was ordinarily (for which one must read lawfully) resident in the UK and thus he was not therefore eligible for postgraduate finance.[29]I recognise that the Defendant’s primary position is that it must apply the information provided by the SSHD. Mr Howells argued that if I were to grant declaratory relief relevant to the Claimant’s immigration status then this would be binding upon the SSHD who is not a party to this claim. He submits in effect that the Claimant should have brought a claim against SSHD instead of or in addition to the SLC.[30]It might be thought unjust if a person were denied student finance on the basis of incorrect information provided by a government department or an error made by either SSHD, the Defendant or both. To ensure fairness to the Claimant, I have examined the underlying documents relevant to his immigration status with both parties. It would only be in the event of an apparent error by the SSHD that I would then need to resolve any legal complications which might arise from her absence in this claim.[31]The Claimant argues that he has been lawfully resident in the UK for many years and that at no point in the three year period before his postgraduate course began did he not have lawful residence status in the UK.[32]The Claimant’s Statement of Facts and Grounds and skeleton argument make two important claims in this regard: 1. he applied for indefinite leave to remain (ILR) on 07 November 2023; and 2. a letter from the Home Office dated 10 June 2024 asked the Claimant to resubmit a new fee waiver application within 10 working days to retain his lawful residence in the UK (my emphasis).[33]If these two claims are correct then it would suggest that(i) during the relevant period, the Claimant had an extant leave application (which could engage the protection of section 3C to the 1971 Act) and/or(ii) the 19 June 2024 fee waiver application provided the Claimant with a protected immigration status (or at least that SSHD informed him that this would be the case).[34]I found these two propositions difficult to reconcile with rest of the Claimant’s case. If Mr Otabor had already applied for ILR on 07 November 2023, he would not have needed to make an application for a fee waiver. Also, if he had an extant application dating back to 07 November 2023 then he would not need to make a further application for leave in August 2024. On the former point there is a dispute about what “submitting an application” means and on the latter point, Mr Otabor says that SSHD asked him to make an application and so he complied.[35]An examination of the relevant correspondence makes clear what happened in this case.[36]On 07 November 2023 Mr Otabor applied for a fee waiver. It took over six months for this to be determined.[37]Mr Otabor took me to an email from UK Visas and Immigration dated 07 November 2023. He relies on this as evidence that he also made a visa application on 07 November 2023. This email states: “Your visa application has been saved” (my emphasis). Mr Otabor argued strenuously that this meant he had submitted an immigration application on this date. I am unable to accept that argument. As I understand the position on 07 November 2023, the Claimant had completed (or partially completed) and saved his immigration application on the online portal, but he could not submit it because (he claims) he was unable to afford the fee.[38]Mr Otabor relied heavily upon a further email from UK Visa and Immigration dated 08 December 2023 which states that as the Claimant had applied for a fee waiver, he was covered by 3C leave. That was correct up to the point that a decision was made on that fee waiver application.[39]The letter from UK Visas and Immigration dated 10 June 2024 was the operative fee waiver decision. The letter enclosed an information sheet which stated: We have rejected your request for a fee waiver. In order to continue your legal immigration status, you must submit your immigration application within 10 working days from the receipt of this letter. If you submit an online immigration application before the 10 working days from the receipt of this letter, the date of your application will be the date on which you made your request for a fee waiver. If submitted after the 10 working days, the application date will be the date on which you make the online payment for the application. Your application will only be valid if you pay the specified fee as set out on the application form. Making a Fresh Request for a Fee Waiver If you want to make a fresh request for the application fee(s) to be waived, youmust complete the correct online form and submit the appropriate supportingevidence. VI. CONCLUSION (LAWFUL RESIDENCE)[40]Mr Otabor was not told that he had 10 working days to make a fee waiver application to continue his legal immigration status as he claimed in the documents he submitted before the court. He was told per the Immigration Rules that he had 10 working days to make an immigration application. I make clear I am not suggesting that Mr Otabor was attempting to mislead the court in this regard. I am sure he was not. I accept that this was a misquote that was made in error.[41]Ultimately, I did not understand Mr Otabor to be submitting that a fee waiver application was an immigration application for the purposes of section 3C of the 1971 Act and paragraph 34G of the rules but his position on this point was not clear. In fairness to Mr Otabor and given the importance of this issue, I examined whether this could be so. I do not, however consider that a fee waiver application is an immigration application applying the natural meaning of these phrases as defined under the 1971 Act and the Immigration Rules. Indeed, the Upper Tribunal has held that a fee waiver is not an immigration application for these purposes, see Hussain v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] UKUT 00082 (IAC).[42]Mr Otabor takes issue with the fact that the SVEC records the date upon which this fee waiver was rejected as 05 June 2024. He argues that this is inconsistent with the letter of 10 June 2024. I accept that the dates are different but I cannot see what significance this has. It seems likely that the decision was made internally on 05 June and Mr Otabor was notified of this on 10 June.[43]Returning to the chronology, Mr Otabor made a further application for a fee waiver on 19 June 2024 and this was granted on 23 August 2024. He then (as required) made an immigration application within 10 working days (indeed he did so on the same day). The confirmation email from UK Visas and Immigration can be contrasted with that which was sent on 07 November 2023. The 23 August email states: “Online application submitted” (my emphasis) with all relevant details including the relevant route applied for set out in the email.[44]In conclusion therefore, Mr Otabor was granted leave until 30 December 2023. He made an application for a fee waiver before his leave expired but he was notified of refusal on 10 June 2024. Once this happened, he would be covered by section 3C only if he made an immigration application within 10 working days. He did not do so. None of these decisions by SSHD are under challenge in this case.[45]The further fee waiver application made on 19 June 2024 did not engage section 3C. The Claimant did not make an immigration application until he was granted a fee waiver on 23 August 2024. There is therefore no basis to say that the SVEC was incorrect in stating that the Claimant had not been lawfully resident in the UK over the three year period prior to the application.[46]Mr Otabor claims that he was not told at any time that he was no longer lawfully resident in the UK. I make no specific finding in this regard but even if that is correct, it does not affect the status he held over that period. The 10 June 2024 letter was clear as to what would happen if he did not make an immigration application.[47]In conclusion, the SVEC from SSHD was materially accurate. I do not consider that the Defendant acted unlawfully or unreasonably by relying upon it. I do not consider that the Defendant’s position was wrong in law or that it acted irrationally. VII. OUTCOME UNREASONABLENESS / LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION[48]What was described as the Claimant’s outcome unreasonableness argument has a substantial overlap with his legitimate expectation argument upon which permission was refused. As I understand it, he submits that his position had not changed since he was granted undergraduate and/or other educational finance between 2023 and 2026. He argues there was as such no proper basis for the Defendant to come to a different decision in relation to postgraduate finance in 2026.[49]I have had regard to a witness statement from Katherine Hill of the Defendant who states that the SVEC which informed the decision in relation to the Claimant’s undergraduate study was dated 14 August 2023. On this date the Claimant met the eligibility criteria.[50]Ms Hill further states that whilst it is standard practice for the Defendant to obtain SVECs for each year of study, an oversight occurred in the Claimant’s case and no further SVECs were obtained and/or considered for the subsequent academic years.[51]Even if an error was made in relation to the Claimant’s second and/or third undergraduate years (in relation to which I make no finding) that does not render the decision in relation to his postgraduate application unlawful. These were different decisions applying different facts and regulations.[52]That permission was refused under the legitimate expectation ground was unsurprising. There was no clear and unambiguous promise that the Claimant would receive postgraduate finance. It is also well established that there can be no legitimate expectation that a public body will take action which it does not have power to take as a matter of law see R (Zafari)v HMRC [2023] EWHC 3013 at §18 and that where a mistake has been made by a body exercising a public function, the court should be slow to fix the public authority permanently with the consequences of that mistake, see R (Begbie) v The Department of Education and Employment [1999] EWCA Civ 2100 at §61. In my judgement, these considerations apply to the facts of this case.[53]The claim is therefore dismissed.