Nursing & Midwifery Council v Moras Masih [2026] EWHC 2094 (Admin)

[2026] EWHC 2094 (Admin)

AC-2026-LON-002605

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING'S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date 7 August 2026

Before

MR JUSTICE GRIFFITHS

Between

NURSING & MIDWIFERY COUNCILApplicant

MORAS MASIHRespondent

James Edenborough (employed by the Applicant) for Applicant

Lucy Chapman (instructed by the Royal College of Nursing) for Respondent

Hearing date 21 July 2026, further written submissions 24 and 30 July 2026

Judgment (Approved)

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30 on 7 August 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

.............................

MR JUSTICE GRIFFITHS

[1]This is an application under Article 31(8) of the Nursing and Midwifery Order 2001 (SI 2002/253) for a 6 month extension of an interim order imposed on the Respondent imposing conditions on his registration as a nurse. The applicant is the Nursing & Midwifery Council (“the NMC”). The respondent is Mr Masih.

The issues

[2]The NMC asks me to extend the interim order on the basis that an Interim Conditions of Practice Order remains necessary for the protection of members of the public.

[3]Two arguments are advanced by Mr Masih in opposition to the NMC’s application. i) The NMC has not complied with the requirements of Article 31(6) and (11) because it allowed more than six months to pass since a court-ordered extension of an interim order (on 9 December 2025) without conducting a review of whether an interim order is “necessary for the protection of the public”. The six-monthly review requirements are mandatory. A review of 16 June 2026 continued the interim order more than six months after the order on 9 December 2025, and the decision of that review to continue the interim order was therefore wrong (although the interim order did not expire until 3 July 2026 and it was, therefore, still in force in June 2026). (“Issue 1”) ii) An interim order is in any event not now necessary for the protection of the public and the prejudice to Mr Masih were it to be continued is such that an extension should be refused. (“Issue 2”)

The law

[4]Article 31of the Nursing and Midwifery Order 2001 (“Article 31”) provides, so far as material, as follows: Interim Orders by a Practice Committee 31. —(1) This article applies where—(a) an allegation against a registered professional has been referred to a Practice Committee but— (i) that Committee has not reached a decision on the matter; or (ii) in a case to which article 26(6) applies, where the Investigating Committee refers the matter to the Fitness to Practise Committee; (…) (2) If the Practice Committee is satisfied that it is necessary for the protection of members of the public or is otherwise in the public interest, or is in the interests of the person concerned, for the registration of that person to be suspended or to be made subject to conditions, it may— (a) make an order directing the Registrar to suspend the person’s registration (an “interim suspension order”), or

(b) make an order imposing conditions with which the person must comply (an “interim conditions of practice order”), during such period not exceeding eighteen months as may be specified in the order. (3) In a case coming within paragraph (1)(b) or (c), such an order may be made at the same time as an order made under article 26(7) or 29(5)(a) to (c). (…) (5) Subject to paragraphs (6), (7), (9) and (12) the order mentioned in paragraph (2) shall cease to have effect— (a) in a case falling within paragraph (1)(a)— (i) when the Investigating Committee reaches a decision under article 26(2)(d)(i) that there is no case to answer, (ii) when the Investigating Committee agrees undertakings with the person concerned under article 26(5A), (iii) where in respect of an allegation mentioned in article 22(1)(b), the Investigating Committee reaches a decision in respect of the allegation, (iv) when the Fitness to Practise Committee reaches a decision in respect of the allegation in question; (…) (6) In a case falling within paragraph (1)(a), an order made under paragraph (2) must be reviewed by either the Committee which made the order or where the matter has been referred to the Fitness to Practise Committee by the Investigating Committee pursuant to article 26(6)(b)(ii), by the Fitness to Practise Committee— (a) within the period of six months beginning on the date on which the order was made, and that Committee must thereafter, for so long as the order continues in force, further review it before the end of the period of six months beginning on the date of the decision of the immediately preceding review; (b) where new evidence relevant to the order has become available after the making of the order. (7) Where an interim suspension order or an interim conditions of practice order has been made under this article (including this paragraph) then either the Practice Committee which made the order or, if the matter has been referred to the Fitness to Practise Committee by the Investigating Committee pursuant to article 26(6)(b)(ii), the Fitness to Practise Committee, that Committee may, subject to paragraph (15)— (a) revoke the order or revoke any condition imposed by the order; (b) confirm the order;

(d) if satisfied that to do so is necessary for the protection of members of the public or is otherwise in the public interest, or is in the interests of the person concerned, replace an interim conditions of practice order with an interim suspension order having effect for the remainder of the term of the former;

(e) if satisfied that the public interest, including the protection of members of the public, or the interests of the person concerned would be adequately served by an interim conditions of practice order, replace an interim suspension order with an interim conditions of practice order having effect for the remainder of the term of the former. (8) The Council may apply to the court for an order made by a Practice Committee under paragraph (2) or (7) to be extended, and may apply again for further extensions. (9) On such an application the court may— (a) extend (or further extend) for up to 12 months the period for which the order has effect; (b) replace an interim conditions of practice order with an interim suspension order having effect for the remainder of the term of the order as extended; (c) replace an interim suspension order with an interim conditions of practice order having effect for the remainder of the term of the order as extended. (10) In this article, references to an interim suspension order or interim conditions of practice order include such an order as so extended. (11) For the purposes of paragraph (6), the first review— (a) after the extension of an order by the court pursuant to paragraph (9)(a) or after the replacement of an order by the court pursuant to paragraph (9)(b) or (c), must take place within the period of 6 months beginning with the date on which the court extended that order or replaced the order, as the case may be; (b) after the replacement of an interim conditions of practice order or an interim suspension order by a Practice Committee pursuant to paragraph (7)(d) or, as the case may be, paragraph (7)(e), must take place within the period of 6 months beginning with the date on which the replacement order was made. (12) Where an order has effect under paragraph (2), (7) or (9), the court may, on an application being made by the person concerned— (a) in the case of an interim suspension order— (i) terminate the suspension, (ii) replace the interim suspension order with an interim conditions of practice order; (b) in the case of an interim conditions of practice order— (i) revoke or vary any condition imposed by the order, (ii) replace the interim conditions of practice order with an interim suspension order; (c) in either case, substitute for the period specified in the order (or in the order extending it) some other period which could have been specified in the order when it was made (or in the order extending it), and the decision of the court under any application under this paragraph shall be final. (…) (14) The Practice Committee shall notify the person concerned giving its reasons where it makes an order under paragraph (2) or any decision under paragraph (7) and shall notify him of his right to apply to the court. (15) No order under paragraph (2) or (7)(c) to (e), or, in a case where paragraph (5)(b) applies, under paragraph (7)(b), shall be made by a Practice Committee in respect of any person unless he has been afforded an opportunity of appearing before the Committee and being heard on the question whether such an order should be made in his case. (16) At any such hearing, the person concerned shall be entitled to be represented whether by a legally qualified person or otherwise.” Interim Orders by a Practice Committee (a) an allegation against a registered professional has been referred to a Practice Committee but— (i) that Committee has not reached a decision on the matter; or (ii) in a case to which article 26(6) applies, where the Investigating Committee refers the matter to the Fitness to Practise Committee; (a) make an order directing the Registrar to suspend the person’s registration (an “interim suspension order”), or (b) make an order imposing conditions with which the person must comply (an “interim conditions of practice order”), (a) in a case falling within paragraph (1)(a)— (i) when the Investigating Committee reaches a decision under article 26(2)(d)(i) that there is no case to answer, (ii) when the Investigating Committee agrees undertakings with the person concerned under article 26(5A), (iii) where in respect of an allegation mentioned in article 22(1)(b), the Investigating Committee reaches a decision in respect of the allegation, (iv) when the Fitness to Practise Committee reaches a decision in respect of the allegation in question; (…) (a) within the period of six months beginning on the date on which the order was made, and that Committee must thereafter, for so long as the order continues in force, further review it before the end of the period of six months beginning on the date of the decision of the immediately preceding review; (b) where new evidence relevant to the order has become available after the making of the order. (a) revoke the order or revoke any condition imposed by the order; (b) confirm the order; (c) vary any condition imposed by the order; (d) if satisfied that to do so is necessary for the protection of members of the public or is otherwise in the public interest, or is in the interests of the person concerned, replace an interim conditions of practice order with an interim suspension order having effect for the remainder of the term of the former; (e) if satisfied that the public interest, including the protection of members of the public, or the interests of the person concerned would be adequately served by an interim conditions of practice order, replace an interim suspension order with an interim conditions of practice order having effect for the remainder of the term of the former. (a) extend (or further extend) for up to 12 months the period for which the order has effect; (b) replace an interim conditions of practice order with an interim suspension order having effect for the remainder of the term of the order as extended; (c) replace an interim suspension order with an interim conditions of practice order having effect for the remainder of the term of the order as extended. (a) after the extension of an order by the court pursuant to paragraph (9)(a) or after the replacement of an order by the court pursuant to paragraph (9)(b) or (c), must take place within the period of 6 months beginning with the date on which the court extended that order or replaced the order, as the case may be; (b) after the replacement of an interim conditions of practice order or an interim suspension order by a Practice Committee pursuant to paragraph (7)(d) or, as the case may be, paragraph (7)(e), must take place within the period of 6 months beginning with the date on which the replacement order was made. (a) in the case of an interim suspension order— (i) terminate the suspension, (ii) replace the interim suspension order with an interim conditions of practice order; (b) in the case of an interim conditions of practice order— (i) revoke or vary any condition imposed by the order, (ii) replace the interim conditions of practice order with an interim suspension order; (c) in either case, substitute for the period specified in the order (or in the order extending it) some other period which could have been specified in the order when it was made (or in the order extending it),

Interim Orders by a Practice Committee

[5]The scheme of Article 31 is, therefore, that power is given to the NMC panel to make an interim order imposing conditions of practice, or for suspension, but that order cannot last for more than 18 months. Even before expiry of the 18 months, there is an obligation to conduct a review “within the period of six months beginning on the date on which the order was made” and, after that, another review “before the end of the period of three months beginning on the date of the decision of the immediately preceding review”. There is an additional obligation to conduct a review in any event when relevant new evidence becomes available.

[6]The only way in which an interim order can be extended beyond its maximum 18 months is by application to the court. The court only has power to extend an interim order for a maximum of 12 months. However, there is no limit on the number of applications to the court so there can be more than one court-ordered extension. If an extension is granted by the court, there must be a review by the NMC within six months.

[7]The person affected by an interim order also has a right to apply to the court, either to terminate the interim order, or vary its conditions, or revise the date of expiry.

[8]In General Medical Council v Hiew

[2007] EWCA Civ 369

[2007] 1 WLR 2007

, the Court of Appeal gave guidance in a case concerned with the similar regulatory regime of the General Medical Council. The Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of Bean J, who had refused an extension of 12 months and granted one of only 6 months, Bean J protesting that:

“…the way the application for a 12-month extension is put is inviting the court almost to act as a rubber stamp. It is plain from the structure of section 41A that the court is not bound simply to endorse a decision of the [Interim Orders Panel] that extensions should be granted, and particularly not where, as here, the allegations against the doctor were first made more than two years ago and the first appearance before the [Interim Orders Panel] was 18 months ago.”

[9]Per Arden LJ in Hiew at para 26 (with whom Lawrence Collins and Tuckey LJJ agreed):

“Parliament could have provided that the IOP or Fitness to Practise Panel, rather than the court, should have power to determine whether the period of any interim suspension order or conditional order should be extended. The courts could then review that determination on an application for judicial review in an appropriate case. That is not, however, the scheme for which Parliament has provided. Parliament has not provided that the IOP or the Fitness to Practise Panel should in this respect simply operate in the shadow of judicial review, but rather that the courts should have the power and duty to consider whether any extension of time beyond the initial period is appropriate. Under this scheme, the exercise in decision-making is to be performed by the court as the primary decision-maker.”

[10]Hiew gives the following guidance about the evidence to be presented to the court and the approach the court should adopt: i) The test for granting an extension is the same as the test for making the original interim order, namely, the protection of the public, the public interest or the practitioner's own interests (para 28). ii) The court can take into account such matters as the gravity of the allegations, the nature of the evidence, the seriousness of the risk of harm to patients, the reasons why the case has not been concluded and the prejudice to the practitioner if an interim order is continued (para 28). iii) The onus of satisfying the court that the criteria are met falls on the regulatory body applying for an extension. The standard of proof is the civil standard, namely, the balance of probabilities (para 28). iv) The judge must reach his decision as to whether to grant an extension on the basis of the evidence on the application (para 29). v) The judge will need to examine that evidence “with care” (para 29). vi) The evidence should not be perfunctory or in summary form only. It must give reasons for the application to a requisite level of detail. The witness statement should fairly explain, in summary, but as a self-standing document, the reasons for applying for an extension (para 29). vii) The judge should not have to elicit information from the submissions of counsel or from a large volume of contemporary documents (para 29). viii) That said, it is not the function of the judge to make the findings of primary fact about the events that have led to the interim order (para 31). ix) There is no express threshold test to be satisfied, such as that there is evidence showing a case to answer. But if the judge can clearly see that the case has little merit, he can take that into account, although such cases are likely to be rare (para 31). x) The evidence on the application will include evidence as to the opinion of the GMC, and the Interim Orders Panel or Fitness to Practise Panel, as to the need for an interim order. It is for the court to decide what weight to give to that opinion. It is certainly not bound to follow that opinion. Nor should it defer to that opinion. All that is required is that the court should give that opinion such weight as in the circumstances of the case it thinks fit (para 32). xi) Except in those rare cases where the allegations are obviously without foundation, the court will express no view on the merits of the case. Its function is to ascertain whether the allegations made, rather than their truth or falsity, justify an extension. In general, it need not look beyond the allegations (para 33).

[11]Delay is relevant. The court is entitled to consider the reasons why the case has not been concluded (Hiew para 28). Delay may breach a nurse’s rights under

Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights

and the Human Rights Act (Nursing & Midwifery Council v Persand

[2023] EWHC 3356 (Admin)

at paras 12 and 26). Unexplained or unjustified delay may be relevant to the question of the prejudice to the practitioner if the extension is granted (cf Hiew para 28). Per Lady Poole in Nursing and Midwifery Council v JH and JF

[2025] CSOH 51

at para 17:

“Delay in the internal proceedings before the NMC may be relevant to the court’s role in determining petitions for extension of time of interim orders in various ways. The reasons why a case has not been concluded is a factor for the court when considering whether or not to extent the time period of an interim order. Put another way, the balance of rights in a proportionality assessment may alter. The absence of any repetition, coupled with the passage of time, may mean risk is sufficiently reduced that an interim order is no longer justified. The severity of the effects of the interim order on the rights of the member may no longer be outweighed by the importance of the objective.”

[12]Because the court considering an extension is exercising an original jurisdiction, and not merely conducting a review of an earlier decision by the regulator, it may consider new developments and (where appropriate) fresh evidence and arguments: Sandler v General Medical Council

[2010] EWHC 1029 (Admin)

at para 12.

[13]Extension applications are often not opposed, but the court’s role “is not merely to rubber stamp the decision of the regulatory body”: Nursing and Midwifery Council v JH and JF

[2025] CSOH 51

per Lady Poole at para 3.

The facts

[14]The respondent is a nurse registered since April 2002. He specialises in adult nursing.

[15]The respondent’s case first came before a panel of the NMC Investigating Committee on 13 November 2018, when it was decided that no interim order was necessary,

[16]On 21 January 2021 new concerns were raised.

[17]On 1 March 2021, a panel of the Fitness to Practise Committee (“panel”) imposed an Interim Conditions of Practice Order for 12 months. But on 20 July 2021 a panel decided to revoke it after less than 4 months.

[18]On 9 June 2022, further concerns were identified.

[19]On 3 August 2022, a panel decided not to impose an Interim Order.

[20]Investigations continued.

[21]After a hearing, on 8 December 2022 a panel imposed an interim order for a period of 9 months. Due to subsequent extensions and variations, it is this interim order (but extended in time and varied from time to time as to terms) that I am asked to extend today, over three and a half years later.

[22]At first review on 12 May 2023, a panel decided to vary the Interim Conditions of Practice Order but, with those variations, it was continued.

[23]At second review on 27 June 2023, a panel decided to continue the Interim Conditions of Practice Order.

[24]On 27 July 2023, the NMC informed Mr Masih that the investigation had been completed and the case would be considered by case examiners.

[25]At a first High Court hearing on 30 August 2023 the High Court extended the Interim Conditions of Practice Order for 12 months, to 6 September 2024.

[26]On 6 September 2023, case examiners referred the case to the Fitness to Practice Committee for decision. There was then a delay of four months (attributed to “a backlog of cases”) when nothing happened at all, because no lawyer was allocated to the case.

[27]At third review on 20 December 2023, a panel decided to vary the Interim Conditions of Practice Order but it otherwise continued.

[28]On 2 February 2024, after a four month delay, the case was allocated to a lawyer in the NMC case preparation and presentation team.

[29]Ten weeks later, on 12 April 2024, that lawyer completed a review and recommended a substantive hearing.

[30]At fourth review on 24 May 2024, a panel decided to replace the Interim Conditions of Practice Order with an Interim Suspension Order. This was because it had been told that Mr Masih had been suspended by his current employer.

[31]In August 2024, the NMC scheduled a substantive hearing for 16 September to 11 October 2024 but these dates were later cancelled at the respondent’s request.

[32]At a second High Court extension hearing on 3 September 2024, the Interim Suspension Order was extended for 8 months (expiring on 5 May 2025).

[33]On 1 October 2024, the Royal College of Nursing requested an early review of the Interim Suspension Order because of a change in circumstances. This was because Mr Masih’s employer had completed its investigation and decided there was no case to answer. As a result, Mr Masih was no longer suspended.

[34]On 17 October 2024, the substantive hearing was relisted to take place from 3 to 28 March 2025.

[35]At fifth review on 28 October 2024, a panel decided to continue the Interim Suspension Order. They had, for no good reason, not been informed of the communication from the Royal College of Nursing on 1 October 2024 (above), and therefore proceeded on the incorrect basis that there was “no new information”.

[36]On 1 November and again on 18 November 2024, the Royal College of Nursing requested an urgent early review of the Interim Suspension Order given the incorrect basis of the fifth review. Nearly six weeks passed.

[37]At sixth review on 11 December 2024, a panel replaced the Interim Suspension Order with an Interim Conditions of Practice Order. This was over two months after the Royal College of Nursing had informed the NMC that the basis of the Interim Suspension Order had fallen away (on 1 October, above).

[38]On 28 January 2025, the respondent asked for the hearing listed for 3-28 March 2025 to be postponed due to difficulties in finding Counsel. However, a linked case remained listed for 14-17 April 2025. The substantive hearing of that linked case had already started and was being conducted over a period which exceeded one year, with many breaks. The substantive hearing of the linked case (as I know from a decision letter dated 4 September 2025 which was not in the applicant’s bundle but which was provided to me by the respondent) took place on 6-9 August and 12 August 2024, 14-17 April 2025, 24 June – 1 July 2025 and 1-2 September 2025. The result of that substantive hearing was that none of the charges were proved, the respondent’s fitness to practice was not impaired, and no measures were required to protect the public.

[39]On 28 March 2025, dates for a substantive hearing of the case with which I am now concerned were fixed (for 3 - 27 November and 1 December 2025).

[40]At a third High Court extension hearing on 23 April 2025, the Interim Conditions of Practice Order was extended for 8 months to 4 January 2026.

[41]At a seventh review on 11 July 2025, a panel decided to continue the Interim Conditions of Practice Order.

[42]On 19 September 2025, the NMC shortened the listing of the substantive hearing by one day, so that only the days 3 to 27 November 2025 would be available.

[43]On 24 October 2025, the NMC shortened the listing of the substantive day by another day, so that only 3-26 November 2025 was available.

[44]On 3 November 2025, the substantive hearing before a panel began. It was fixed to conclude on 26 November (above) but it continued only until 25 November, when it was adjourned part heard. I have not seen any decision letter in respect of that hearing. However, it appears from an undated but clearly official record of that hearing (which was not included in the applicant’s bundle but which was put before the court at pp 1-26 of the respondent’s bundle) (the “Record”) that the course of the hearing was unsatisfactory. i) At the start of the hearing, on 3 November 2025, the panel said that the charges were “generic and unparticularised and were unsupported by an evidence matrix”. The bundle “omitted many of the exhibits to witness statements”, and this “meant it was difficult to deliver (…) a fair hearing and difficult for the panel to give proper consideration to the competence and conduct issues raised” (Record p 6). ii) One week later, as the hearing continued, on 10 November 2025, errors in the charges were corrected and the panel amended the charges (Record p 7). iii) The panel heard a total of 12 witnesses. The nature of the evidence they gave, and the topics they covered, and who the witnesses were, is not in evidence before me. iv) The panel then heard a submission of no case to answer. After an initial assessment of all the evidence, it concluded that there was insufficient evidence, and therefore no case to answer, on the following charges: a) 1.1.5 b) 1.1.6 c) 1.17 d) 1.5 e) 1.15 f) 1.18.2 g) 1.20 h)2.1 i)

2.2 j) 2.4 k) 2.5 l) 2.7 m)

3.1 n)

3.2 o)

3.3 p)

3.4 q)

4.1 r)

4.2 s) 5. v) The panel also decided that there was no case to answer on charges 1.4 and 1.19, not because of insufficiency of evidence, but because (in the case of charge 1.4) the alleged incident was isolated, not particularly grave, not a fair sample of work, and therefore would not amount to misconduct and (in the case of charge 1.19) the respondent was new on the ward and there was nothing wrong with him asking for assistance in the way that was alleged; indeed, it was best practice for him to have done so (Record p 26). vi) There was not time to conclude the hearing and make a decision on the remaining charges. Therefore, the panel adjourned the hearing part-heard.

[45]According to the witness statement of Sam Hughes dated 28 May 2026 in support of the NMC’s application for an extension of the interim order, the panel “considered and decided to continue the IO [interim order] prior to adjourning the hearing”, i.e. on or before 25 November 2025. If true, that was an important fact, because it would mean that a body well-qualified to assess the evidence, because it had heard evidence and on the basis of it dismissed a number of the charges, had also turned its mind to whether it was still necessary for there to be an interim order for the protection of the public, and had decided that it was. Sam Hughes also presented it as an important fact, because in his chronology he put it in bold type for emphasis.

[46]However, it turns out that it was not true, although I only discovered this from a transcript of 25 November 2025 sent to me on 30 July, well after I had reserved my judgment at the end of the hearing on 21 July 2026. The transcript was sent in response to a query from my clerk, and not volunteered. I have no reason to think that Sam Hughes had seen the transcript either. There is no evidence that he was at any point closely involved with Mr Masih’s case.

[47]The transcript shows that on 25 November 2025 the panel was asked by the Legal Assessor whether, in relation to an interim order, “there needs to be one and, if so, what it should be”. There was then some discussion. Counsel for Mr Masih (Ms Shah) pointed out that a High Court extension was still in place, and Counsel for the NMC (acting as case presenter) correctly stated that it did not expire until 4 January 2026. Counsel for Mr Masih said that it was not usual for a panel to consider an order already in place unless it had reached the impairment stage, and also that the usual route for any review of a current interim order was that notice should be provided to the registrant so that he could provide documentation. The Legal Assessor and the NMC hearings co-ordinator agreed that Ms Shah was “absolutely right” and the Legal Assessor said (agreeing with Ms Shah) “The order will continue”; i.e. the order extended by the High Court on 23 April 2025 to 4 January 2026 would continue. His words were immediately repeated by the panel chair who said “The order will continue and so the panel does not have to see that order”. Therefore the panel neither looked at the current order nor decided that it was necessary for it to continue.

[48]On 8 December 2025, the Royal College of Nursing emailed the NMC to ask for the date of the next interim order review.

[49]On 9 December 2025, Paul Gayle, a lawyer in the Administrative Court Office of the High Court, exercising delegated powers, extended the interim order to 4 pm on 3 July 2026. This was the fourth High Court extension. It was a consent order following agreement between representatives of the NMC and Mr Masih. It was, in that sense, a rubber-stamp decision.

[50]On 9 January 2026, the Royal College of Nursing, having received no response to its enquiry of 8 December 2025 (above), chased for an urgent response “given the amount of time passed”.

[51]On 13 January 2026, the NMC responded saying:

“May I please kindly clarify which IO you are referring to please? If you are referring to the interim order review hearing I believe that is due to be scheduled later this month.”

[52]On 14 January 2026, the Royal College of Nursing referred to its earlier emails which provided the clarification sought, and again requested the date of the next interim order review hearing for Mr Masih.

[53]On 15 January 2026, the NMC said that Mr Masih’s case “will be listed around May 2026”.

[54]On 23 January 2026, the Royal College of Nursing wrote requesting “an early interim order review”.

[55]On 27 January 2026, the NMC replied:

“Our understanding is that the panel at the substantive hearing and after handing down on the facts, considered the necessity of the IO and decided to continue it on the same terms.”

That was factually incorrect. No such decision had been made. However, on the basis of this incorrect assertion, the email continued:

“Therefore, we do not think that there is a change of circumstances taking into consideration this information and do not consent to an early IO Review.”

[56]That was also incorrect. The panel’s dismissal of so many of the charges, after consideration of the evidence at a substantive hearing, was an important change of circumstances. It also meant that “new evidence relevant to the order” had “become available after the making of the order”, which meant it “must be reviewed”, as directed by Article (6)(b). There had been no interim order review since then, given that the panel on 25 November 2025 had decided not to conduct one.

[57]On 10 February 2026, the Royal College of Nursing queried the point, saying: “…we cannot see reference to this in the private reasons decision document. I ask that you provide reference to the IO being extended”.

[58]This was ignored, despite repetition of the request in an email from the Royal College of Nursing on 20 February 2026.

[59]The substantive hearing adjourned part-heard on 25 November 2025 resumed between 23 March and 2 April 2026, after a gap of almost four months. However, this hearing was itself adjourned part-heard because there was not enough time to conclude the case on those days. I have not seen any document which explains that in more detail. If, therefore, it was because of any defects in the NMC case or preparation, that is not known to me. The panel conducted no review of the Interim Conditions of Practice Order.

[60]On 7 April 2026, the Royal College of Nursing asked for a date for Mr Masih’s “upcoming interim order review”. This was ignored. Another request was sent on 1 May 2026. The NMC reply on 5 May 2026 said: “…we will be looking to list this case for an IO Review in September 2026”.

[61]On 28 May 2026, Sam Hughes of the NMC made his witness statement asserting, incorrectly, that there had been an interim order review in November 2025.

[62]An interim order review (the eighth review) was listed for hearing on 28 May 2026 but this too was ineffective because the NMC case was in such a terrible state that “the panel determined that it was not in a position to conduct a fair and informed review of the interim order at this hearing”. The particular difficulties referred to in the decision letter (which was not in the applicant’s bundle, or referred to in NMC’s evidence, but which was provided to me with the applicant’s skeleton argument) included: i) The panel did not know, and the NMC had not been able to tell it, what stage the substantive proceedings had reached. ii) The panel did not know, and the NMC had not been able to tell it, what the outstanding charges were. In particular, it had been drawn to the panel’s attention that the charge sheet presented to them by the NMC was inconsistent with the amended charge sheet being relied on during the substantive proceedings and a charge sheet most recently placed before the High Court. It turned out that the NMC representative had not been informed of the decision that many charges had been dismissed at a substantive hearing in November 2025.

[63]The abortive interim order review hearing on 28 May 2026 heard directly from Mr Masih, as well as his representative. The panel decision letter noted what he told them (with my emphasis added):

“You expressed considerable frustration and distress regarding the prolonged nature of the proceedings and the effect the interim order had had upon your professional and personal life. You informed the panel that you had practised as a nurse internationally for more than 40 years and that you had experienced significant financial hardship, difficulties obtaining employment and emotional strain as a result of the ongoing proceedings. You explained that your revalidation period was due to expire shortly and that, whilst your portfolio was largely complete, you remained short of the necessary practice hours because of the restrictions placed upon your employment opportunities. You further stated that many of the allegations initially brought against you had now fallen away and that you felt unfairly treated by the continuing delays.”

[64]The panel which met on 28 May 2026 did not make any decision about the Interim Conditions of Practice Order. It was obviously not in a position to do so, because of the NMC’s failure to give it the materials it needed for such a decision, including but not limited to the charge sheet. It directed “that the matter should be adjourned and relisted urgently once the relevant information and documentation had been obtained” (letter, p 3).

[65]I was told by Counsel for the NMC that the period of six months since the last review of the Interim Conditions of Practice Order expired on 6 June 2026. That was incorrect, as I now see from the transcript of 25 November 2025 provided to me for the first time on 30 July 2026. The last review was the seventh review on 11 July 2025, when a panel decided to continue the Interim Conditions of Practice Order (above). There had been no review in November or December 2025. The only reason that an interim order was in place was because of the consent order made under delegated powers by the High Court on 9 December 2025.

[66]On 16 June 2026, there was, at last, an effective hearing which reviewed the Interim Conditions of Practice Order. By this time, a period of over 11 months had elapsed since the last review. The record of this hearing (the “record”) was not in the applicant’s evidence or in the applicant’s bundle, but it was included the respondent’s bundle. Shortly afterwards, another copy was provided by the applicant when it lodged its skeleton argument. From this, I see that none of the three members of the June 2026 panel was on the panel which had taken evidence from 13 witnesses at the hearing in November 2025. The June panel was therefore not in a position to assess the evidence which the November panel had heard.

[67]The June panel found that the risk had been lowered, and decided to make the conditions of the Interim Conditions of Practice Order less onerous, but, with those amendments, to continue it.

[68]There is not much reasoning in the June panel decision. What reasoning there is in the record suggests that they based themselves entirely on reading the allegations and taking them at face value. Whilst that is a usual course (see Hiew at para 33), a great deal had happened since the allegations had been drafted. Many of them had been dismissed by the November panel. Other allegations from other sources had also been dismissed by other bodies. In fact, despite all the disciplinary enquiries and proceedings against Mr Masih since 2022, not a single charge had so far been upheld. This suggested that Mr Masih was a person against whom a number of people had made a number of allegations which could not be taken at face value. It was also the case that there was no evidence before the June panel that Mr Masih had been incompetent or misconducted himself in any respect since August 2022. I am told that he had made significant efforts at remediation so as to reduce his risk by his own efforts. These are referred to in general terms in the record (“your further training and reflections”). This was the ninth review (including the abortive review on 28 May 2026), but described itself as the eighth review.

[69]The seven previous reviews which the June 2026 panel identified (in the record) were those on 12 May 2023, 27 June 2023, 20 December 2023, 24 May 2024, 28 October 2024, 11 December 2024 and 11 July 2025. It did not refer to any review in December 2025 (and I now know that there was no such review). The record mentions two of the extensions granted by the High Court; namely, those on 3 September 2024 (to 5 May 2025), and on 23 April 2025 (to 4 January 2026). It does not mention the High Court extensions on 30 August 2023 (to 6 September 2024) or, more importantly, on 9 December 2025 (to 3 July 2026). It does not in its record identify the date of the current order which it was being asked to review. It refers only to “the current interim conditions of practice order” (record p 2). Based on the reviews and High Court extensions listed in the record (which did not, as I have said, include the extension granted by the High Court on 23 April 2025 to 4 January 2026), there was no current interim order. The June 2026 panel made no comment about this, and may not have noticed it, but it was aware of the requirement for six-monthly reviews, because that was referred to at the end of its own decision letter.

[70]The June 2026 panel gave the background to the case by quoting word-for-word from what it described as “the previous review” (decision letter p 3). This will have been the review of 11 July 2025, which had taken place some 11 months before. It was, in my judgment, not a fair reflection of the reduced scope of the case following the dismissal of so many allegations at the hearing in November 2025. For example, it referred to “Dishonesty – in that you attempted to conceal the medication error in relation to patient 1”, but that charge (charge 1.1.7) was one of those dismissed in November 2025 and there was no remaining charge of dishonesty. The panel set out verbatim all the charges as they stood at the outset of the hearing in November 2025, before noting the reference numbers of the charges which had been dismissed and identifying the reference numbers of those that remained, and finding there remained a risk based on its own selection of them (which it set out in the record on p 14 of 20). The June panel noted that it had looked at what it called “the substantive hearing ‘no case to answer’ determination, dated November 2025”. It recognised that the test it had to apply was whether the interim order was “necessary for the protection of the public”. It said it was “mindful that its role was to undertake a risk assessment based on the information before it, and not to determine the facts of the case”.

[71]The June 2026 panel continued the Interim Conditions of Practice Order (with amendments) “for the remainder of the current interim order”. It did not specify the end date and it did not identify what it understood to be “the current interim order”. It referred, as I have said, to the High Court extension granted on 23 April 2025 to 4 January 2026 (which had already expired) but not to the High Court extension granted on 9 December 2025 to 3 July 2026. It is not clear from the documents shown to me that it knew what “the remainder of the current interim order” was.

[72]On 3 July 2026, Jonathan Richards, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, extended the Interim Order to 4 pm on 24 July 2026 so that it would continue until after the hearing date.

[73]After the hearing on 21 July 2026, I reserved my judgment. In order to maintain the status quo (and, therefore, in the public interest, in accordance with Article 31(2)), I extended the Interim Order until hand down of this judgment, or otherwise until further order.

[74]The substantive hearing which had been adjourned part-heard on 25 November 2025 was due to resume on 27-28 July 2026 as an in camera day for the panel without attendance by the parties (and I assume that has now happened), to be followed by a resumed substantive hearing, attended by the parties, on 1-4 September and 14-19 October 2026. Counsel for the NMC, in submissions to me, expressed the hope that this might finally resolve the outstanding charges and supersede any extension to the interim order I might be persuaded to grant, with a substantive decision on an ascertained basis. Thus, any extension I might grant could fall away on or soon after 19 October 2026. I see the logic of this submission, looking only at the dates in the diary, but the history of hearings which turned out to be ineffective, or which had to be adjourned part-heard, means that I cannot rely on it.

Witness statement of Sam Hughes

[75]The only witness statement presented to me in support of the application for an extension of the interim order is from Sam Hughes, Senior Case Manager in the NMC’s Professional Regulation Directorate (“Mr Hughes”), who has oversight of this case. His witness statement, which I have already mentioned, is dated 28 May 2026. It concentrates heavily on interim order decisions made in the period between 1 March 2021 and 15 July 2025, lengthy passages of which are quoted verbatim in the witness statement. However, it becomes highly selective in its treatment of later decisions.

[76]Mr Hughes refers to the hearing adjourned on 25 November 2025, and exhibits the schedule of charges. He also lists those charges upon which it was found that there was no case to answer. But the decision letter, although referred to, is not quoted nor exhibited in his witness statement. As a result, had the decision letter not been brought to my attention by Counsel for Mr Masih, I would have had no knowledge of the criticisms which I have quoted in para 44.i) above.

[77]I have already dealt with Mr Hughes’ misstatement that the hearing panel in November 2025 “considered and decided to continue the IO prior to adjourning the hearing.”

[78]Mr Hughes’ witness statement makes no reference to the abortive hearing on 28 May 2026, which was the same day as his witness statement. As a result, had the dismal state of the NMC case at that hearing not been brought to my attention when skeleton arguments were exchanged, I would not have known about it (see para 62 above).

[79]Mr Hughes’ witness statement obviously does not deal with events after 28 May 2026, given its date. But the evidence should have been updated for the hearing before me on 21 July 2026 in order to make it clear what was now important and what was not. The most recent review hearing and the revised conditions of practice which it had imposed were particularly important (para 66 above).

[80]No effort was made in the NMC’s evidence to particularise why, based on the reduced charge sheet, an interim order remains necessary for the protection of the public. No effort was made to indicate what, if any, evidence is now available to support the remaining charges, as opposed to the charges which have been dismissed. No attempt was made to analyse the real strength of the case in the light of the many parts of it which have fallen away. Given the vast amount of historic material which Mr Hughes referred to, and the significant omissions in the NMC evidence about the more recent history (there was no up to date version of the charge sheet, and the conditions of practice I was being asked to extend were not set out at all, since they derived from the June panel revision of them which the NMC evidence did not cover) such clarity was necessary if the court was to make a rational determination.

The charge sheet

[81]The NMC evidence did not set out the charge sheet which Mr Masih now faces.

[82]The charge sheet exhibited to the witness statement of Mr Hughes (exhibit SH/3) was said by Mr Hughes to be “as amended at the hearing” (para 26) but it included all the charges which were dismissed at the hearing, on 25 November 2025. Later in his witness statement (para 28), Mr Hughes listed the paragraphs of the charge sheet which had been dismissed on that occasion, but the editing exercise required as a result (see para 44.iii) above) was not performed. It was left to the reader both to realise that no up to date charge sheet had in fact been shown to the court and to construct it by going through the discredited charge sheet, cutting out the charges which had been dismissed.

[83]Further cuts are required by the decision letter which followed the interim review hearing on 16 June 2026, because that review did not find that there was any risk to the public or the public interest in respect of all the remaining charges, but only in respect of a selection of them. The selection appears to contain some typographical errors, of which the only one of significance is that it includes all the sub-paragraphs of 1.9 in their correct place in the number sequence, but ends, after 1.18.1, with “1.9”. That is either a repetition of 1.9 (which is unlikely) or (more likely) a typographical error for “1.19”, which would naturally come at this point in the number sequence. However, charge 1.19, although not dismissed on the basis that there was no case to answer, had been dismissed by the December panel on other grounds (see para 44.v) above).

[84]In oral submissions, the NMC relied on charges which had not been dismissed by the December 2025 panel, but which had also not been included by the June 2026 panel in its selection of those charges which indicated a risk to the public or the public interest (on p 14 of 20 in the record). For example, Counsel asked me to consider charges 1.2, 1.3 and 2.3, all of which the June panel had discounted. I think that was wrong.

[85]The charge sheet which I have constructed for myself, in the absence of an up to date version in the evidence, therefore omits charges which have been dismissed, and also omits those not identified as raising a risk to the public or the public interest by the interim review panel which imposed the latest Conditions of Practice order on 16 June 2026. It is as follows:

“1. Failed to demonstrate the standards of knowledge, skill and judgment required to practise without supervision as a Band 5 nurse in respect of the following areas in that: Whilst working at the Uphill Stroke Unit: 1.1 On or around 31 March 2022; 1.1.1 Failed to count Patient 1’s respiratory rate accurately. 1.1.2 Failed to prioritise Patient 1’s transfer in order to commence nasal high flow oxygen. 1.1.3 Failed to Failed to complete Patient 2’s dressings in order for them to be transferred. 1.1.4 Failed to follow the correct process for ordering medication, and/or consider other options to obtain medication including looking in the Clinical Room / other drug trolleys to obtain the required medication. (…) 1.6 On or around 19 May 2022, whilst on a supervised round: 1.6.1 Hung fluid bottles that had the incorrect giving setting. 1.6.2 Having replaced the giving setting, failed to identify that there was a large amount of air in the giving set. 1.6.3 Failed to ensure that a patient had a safe blood glucose measurement prior to administering diabetic medication. 1.6.4 Left bags of medication unattended on a chair. 1.7 On or around 20 May 2022: 1.7.1 Attempted to use a Sera-Steady mobility aid on your own when it requires two people to use it. 1.7.2 Left the patient hanging over the bar of the Sera-Steady mobility aid. 1.7.3 Attempted to remove a canvass sheet from underneath Patient 4 using an incorrect and/or dangerous technique. 1.8 On or around 25 May 2022, completed an unsupervised medication round having been informed at a midpoint management meeting that you were to be supervised until the end of the performance management. 1.9 On or around 4 August 2022, during a supervised drug round: 1.9.1 Failed to provide water slowly to Patient A as required/requested. 1.9.2 On one or more occasions failed to identify/provide answers as to what the instructions in the drugs chart said. 1.9.3 Failed to identify that Patient C’s Bisoprolol medication was incomplete. 1.9.4 In respect of Patient D, failed to recognise that the prescription for ‘Prosource Plus Fluid’ was not Phosphate Sandoz, and 1.9.5 Failed to recognise the implications of administering Phosphate Sandoz unnecessarily. 1.10 On or around 16 August 2022: 1.10.1 On one or more occasions left a patient at high risk of falls unattended despite being told to stay with the patient. (…) 1.11 On or around 22 August 2022: 1.11.1 On one or more occasions left the drug trolley unattended and/or unsupervised. 1.11.2 Left the bedside medications cabinet open with the keys in the lock unattended. 1.12 On or around 24 August 2022: 1.12.1 Left keys in the patients opened Pods. (…) Whilst working on Draycott Ward: 1.13 On or around 19 December 2020: 1.13.1 Incorrectly categorised a patient’s wound as a deep tissue wound. 1.13.2 Used incorrect type of bandage to bandage the wound. 1.13.3 Failed to bandage the wound from joint to joint. 1.13.4 Failed to follow the patient’s care plan in respect of the wound. Whilst working on Hutton Ward: 1.14 On or around 3 September 2020, incorrectly administered Novorapid to a patient whose blood sugar levels were above 12mmols. [I leave this in because the reference in the decision letter of 16 June 2026 to charge 1.12 appears, from its place in the number sequence, to be a typographical error for 1.14] (…) 1.16 On or around 19 February 2019 left a patient unattended who subsequently had a fall. 1.17 On or around 20 February 2019, having re-positioned a patient’s nasal prongs: 1.17.1 Failed to assess / observe whether the patient was in respiratory distress before going on a break. 1.17.2 Failed to complete clinical observations before going on a break. 1.17.3 Failed to handover the patient to a doctor / nurse before going on a break. 1.18 On or around 20 February 2019: 1.18.1 Administered I/V medications having not been signed off as being competent. (…) Whilst working at Cefn Carnau Hosptial: (…) 2. On one or more dates set out in Schedule A [which were dates between 2019 and 2022], and on dates unknown, failed to work cooperatively with colleagues by: (…) 2.6 Completing an unsupervised medication round having been told you must be supervised due to concerns about your competence. (…) 2.8 Inappropriately delegating tasks to junior colleagues / colleagues. 3. On one or more dates set out in Schedule B [which were between 2019 and 2022], and on dates unknown, failed to treat patients with kindness, compassion or respect by: (…) 3.5 Administering medication / care without: 3.5.1 Introducing yourself. 3.5.2 Explaining the care you proposed to provide. 3.5.3 Obtaining consent. (…) And in light of the above, your fitness to practise is impaired by reason of your lack of competence as set out in charge 1, and by your misconduct as set out in charges 2, 3, 4 and 5.”

Whilst working at the Uphill Stroke Unit: 1.1.1 Failed to count Patient 1’s respiratory rate accurately. 1.1.2 Failed to prioritise Patient 1’s transfer in order to commence nasal high flow oxygen. 1.1.3 Failed to Failed to complete Patient 2’s dressings in order for them to be transferred. 1.1.4 Failed to follow the correct process for ordering medication, and/or consider other options to obtain medication including looking in the Clinical Room / other drug trolleys to obtain the required medication. 1.6.1 Hung fluid bottles that had the incorrect giving setting. 1.6.2 Having replaced the giving setting, failed to identify that there was a large amount of air in the giving set. 1.6.3 Failed to ensure that a patient had a safe blood glucose measurement prior to administering diabetic medication. 1.6.4 Left bags of medication unattended on a chair. 1.7.1 Attempted to use a Sera-Steady mobility aid on your own when it requires two people to use it. 1.7.2 Left the patient hanging over the bar of the Sera-Steady mobility aid. 1.7.3 Attempted to remove a canvass sheet from underneath Patient 4 using an incorrect and/or dangerous technique. 1.9.1 Failed to provide water slowly to Patient A as required/requested. 1.9.2 On one or more occasions failed to identify/provide answers as to what the instructions in the drugs chart said. 1.9.3 Failed to identify that Patient C’s Bisoprolol medication was incomplete. 1.9.4 In respect of Patient D, failed to recognise that the prescription for ‘Prosource Plus Fluid’ was not Phosphate Sandoz, and 1.9.5 Failed to recognise the implications of administering Phosphate Sandoz unnecessarily. 1.10.1 On one or more occasions left a patient at high risk of falls unattended despite being told to stay with the patient. (…) 1.11.1 On one or more occasions left the drug trolley unattended and/or unsupervised. 1.11.2 Left the bedside medications cabinet open with the keys in the lock unattended. 1.12.1 Left keys in the patients opened Pods. (…) 1.13.1 Incorrectly categorised a patient’s wound as a deep tissue wound. 1.13.2 Used incorrect type of bandage to bandage the wound. 1.13.3 Failed to bandage the wound from joint to joint. 1.13.4 Failed to follow the patient’s care plan in respect of the wound. 1.17.1 Failed to assess / observe whether the patient was in respiratory distress before going on a break. 1.17.2 Failed to complete clinical observations before going on a break. 1.17.3 Failed to handover the patient to a doctor / nurse before going on a break. 1.18.1 Administered I/V medications having not been signed off as being competent. Whilst working at Cefn Carnau Hosptial: 2.6 Completing an unsupervised medication round having been told you must be supervised due to concerns about your competence. (…) 2.8 Inappropriately delegating tasks to junior colleagues / colleagues. 3.5 Administering medication / care without: 3.5.1 Introducing yourself. 3.5.2 Explaining the care you proposed to provide. 3.5.3 Obtaining consent.

Whilst working at Cefn Carnau Hosptial:

[86]Charge 1 is reduced by 19 counts. Charge 2 is reduced from 8 counts to 2 counts. Charge 3 is reduced from 5 counts to 1 count. There is no longer anything left at all of charges 4 and 5. This last paragraph therefore required some deletion also, at least so as to read:

“And in light of the above, your fitness to practise is impaired by reason of your lack of competence as set out in charge 1, and by your misconduct as set out in charges 2 [and] 3 (…).”

[87]It is now between four and seven years since the dates of the incidents relied upon in what is left of the charge sheet (between February 2019 and August 2022).

[88]None of these charges has, of course, been proved.

The current Conditions of Practice

[89]The current Conditions of Practice are those imposed by the review hearing on 16 June 2026, which varied the previous Conditions of Practice. These Conditions of Practice did not feature in the evidence in support of the extension filed by the NMC. They first appeared as part of a respondent’s bundle (para 66 above). Since the application is for me to decide that those very conditions of practice are necessary for the protection of the public, such that I should impose them myself by extending the current interim order, the focus must be on them.

[90]They are as follows:

“For the purposes of these conditions, ‘employment’ and ‘work’ mean any paid or unpaid post in a nursing, midwifery or nursing associate role. Also, ‘course of study’ and ‘course’ mean any course of educational study connected to nursing, midwifery or nursing associates. 1. You may work for any employer, which may be an agency. Any agency placement must be a single location for a period of at least 1 month. 2. You must not be the nurse in charge of any shift. 3. You must ensure that you are indirectly supervised by a registered nurse at any time you are working. This means that you should be working at all times on the same shift as another registered nurse, but you do not need to be always directly observed by them. 4. You must have monthly meetings with your line manager, supervisor or mentor (or their nominated deputy) to discuss your professional conduct and capability in relation to the regulatory concerns, specifically: a) Record keeping b) Medication administration c) Wound care management d) Observations e) Working cooperatively with colleagues f) Treating patients with dignity and respect g) Diabetes care h) Patient care 5. Before any review you must provide your NMC case officer with a personal reflective piece detailing your practice, competence and learning in the following areas: a) Medication administration b) Wound care management c) Observations 6. You must keep us informed about anywhere you are working by: a) Telling your case officer within seven days of accepting or leaving any employment. b) Giving your case officer your employer’s contact details. 7. You must keep us informed about anywhere you are studying by: a) Telling your case officer within seven days of accepting any course of study. b) Giving your case officer the name and contact details of the organisation offering that course of study. 8. You must immediately give a copy of these conditions to: a) Any organisation or person you work for. b) Any agency you apply to or are registered with for work. c) Any employers you apply to for work (at the time of application). d) Any establishment you apply to (at the time of application), or with which you are already enrolled, for a course of study. 9. You must tell your case officer, within seven days of your becoming aware of: a) Any clinical incident you are involved in. b) Any investigation started against you. c) Any disciplinary proceedings taken against you. 10. You must allow your case officer to share, as necessary, details about your performance, your compliance with and / or progress under these conditions with: a) Any current or future employer. b) Any educational establishment. c) Any other person(s) involved in your retraining and/or supervision required by these conditions.”

The position of Mr Masih

[91]Mr Masih disputes all the charges against him and also disputes almost all the facts alleged against him. It is not suggested that his limited factual admissions would, by themselves, justify an interim order.

[92]He also reiterates the point he made to the interim review hearing on 16 June 2026 about the effect the interim order has had on his registration as a nurse. He says, producing evidence in support, that he has not been able to secure any work at all under the current Restrictions of Practice Order. He has applied for a very large number of jobs and has been told on multiple occasions that the interim order is the reason for his application being unsuccessful. That is supported by the evidence I have read.

[93]This has led to severe financial difficulties for his family, and the stress caused by this is affecting his health.

[94]The delays which I have outlined have at times led to him being kept either under a suspension order, or an inappropriately onerous conditions of practice order, for longer than was justified, because of the NMC’s slow reactions to changes in circumstances and (in the case of several of the hearings) because failings on the part of the NMC meant that even when hearings were convened, they were not able to reach complete decisions or, in some cases, any decisions.

[95]The upshot is that Mr Masih’s registration is about to expire and cannot be renewed as matters stand because he cannot work the number of hours required for re-registration.

Discussion

[96]The evidence presented by the NMC is incomplete and has in some respects been misleading. The failure to present an up to date charge sheet, the incorrect assertion that an interim order review based on the evidence of witnesses was performed in November 2025, and the failure to focus on the most recent interim order review of 16 June 2026, including the current conditions of practice, are particularly unsatisfactory.

[97]There has been a comprehensive failure by the NMC to meet the requirements in Hiew. The gravity of the allegations has not been fairly presented. It has been left to the court to construct the current charge sheet and an accurate and complete chronology. It was the respondent who first showed the court the current conditions of practice. The evidence in support of the allegations has not been dealt with at all, even in the summary fashion that would be sufficient for an application of this nature. The seriousness of the risk of harm to patients has not been addressed, because the most recent assessment of that (on 16 June 2026) was omitted from the NMC’s evidence (para ‎66 above).

[98]The substantive case has not been concluded because of consistent failures by the NMC to make reasonable progress. Charges which concern events no later than August 2022 were still not clearly formulated, or supported by an evidence matrix, at the start of the substantive hearing on 3 November 2025. Not enough time had been allowed for that hearing, and it was adjourned from 25 November 2025 until a resumed hearing which is now fixed for 1 September and is not expected to conclude until 19 October 2026. After the interim review hearing on 11 July 2025, no substantive consideration was given to the necessity of continuing any interim order until nearly a year later, on 16 June 2026. There was no High Court extension after that except the one made without any evidence being filed, and by consent, on 9 December 2025. When Mr Masih’s representatives pressed for an urgent review in the light of the dismissal of many charges in November 2025, they were wrongly told that there had been no change of circumstances since the last review (which they were wrongly told had taken place in December 2025) and were refused one. When a hearing to review the interim order was eventually convened, on 28 May 2026, it got nowhere, because the NMC was not even able to say what the remaining charges were, or what stage the substantive proceedings had reached. There had also been excessive delays at earlier stages.

[99]If the attention and resources which have been devoted to it are anything to go by, the NMC does not seem to think this is a very important case. Every level of the proceedings has been characterised by unjustified delay and confusing and inadequate evidence. This is true of the investigations, the panel hearings, and the application to me.

[100]Mr Masih has been seriously prejudiced by the NMC’s failure to progress his case to the point of a substantive decision. He has been subject to restrictions of one sort or another, including a period of suspension, ever since 8 December 2022. I am asked to extend the interim order for 6 months (until January 2027). By then, the restrictions will have lasted for over 4 years. If I grant an extension, it will be the sixth extension order granted by the High Court, not including the extension I granted after the hearing and pending delivery of this judgment.

[101]The court decides what weight to give to the opinion of a regulator’s panel. It is not bound to follow it and it should not defer to it (Hiew para 32). However, reliance on a panel decision cuts both ways. If the regulator by its delays, lack of urgency, lack of rigour, or in any other way signals that the matter is not receiving appropriate resources and attention, the court may take that into account. Failure to progress a case may indicate a lack of focus and urgency which, in the absence of a compelling explanation, might undermine the credibility of the application for an extension.

[102]If it appears from the evidence that the regulator will not reach a point when, by a substantive decision, it can ascertain whether an interim order is really necessary for the protection of the public until a date which is unnecessarily and excessively distant from its inception, the burden of an interim order may not be justified. Those who have had the benefit of interim orders are under a duty to keep the time when they are in force to a minimum. Interim orders are not a substitute for final orders. They are a holding operation. Applications to the High Court are not a matter of routine. They invite the court to exercise an original jurisdiction.

[103]Applications for interim orders go to the High Court for a reason. The court is there because of the importance of the extension to everyone affected, including the registered professional as well as the public. The court will not give extensions by default or without proper scrutiny. If the regulator takes an extension for granted, and submits a perfunctory application, it is likely to be refused or at least adjourned until deficiencies have been addressed. Any adjournment may be on terms that the regulator pays the costs of the ineffective hearing. Deficiencies may include important gaps in the evidence, lack of clarity in the charges, a failure to indicate (by way of an evidence matrix or otherwise) the nature of the evidence in support of the charges, lack of clarity about the relevant procedural history, and either too little or too much information for the court to be able to understand not only what it is being asked to do but why. The court must be equipped to decide, for itself, whether any interim order is necessary, what the terms of such an order should be, and how long it should last.

[104]An interim order should not usually last for more than a year or two, counting the whole of the time from its beginning (when imposed by a panel) to the end of the period of the extension sought from the court. This is indicated by the provisions in Article 31 for six-monthly (or three-monthly) reviews by a panel, while an interim order is in force. Article 31 allows the court to extend a panel order for a maximum of 12 months at a time.

[105]A year or two should be regarded as a long time for the whole currency of an interim order, and not as a starting point to be routinely prolonged by multiple extensions. If progress is made within the primary timescales envisaged by Article 31, it will not be necessary to apply to the High Court at all. Multiple applications to the High Court indicate that something has gone wrong with the timetable, and require explanation and justification. A level of risk which tips the balance on a first application, will weigh less heavily when matters are over time added to the opposite side of the balance, such as culpable delay, prejudicial impact, or remediation. Each application for a High Court extension will be more difficult than the last.

[106]The need for protection of the public and the public interest are very important, when properly evidenced and presented. But the registrant is entitled to a fair process, and to have interim restrictions last no more than a reasonable time, given that they are imposed when no substantive findings have been made.

[107]The way in which the public is protected is not by the court granting interim orders whenever sought, on the basis of a shadowy impression of risk. It is by the regulator progressing its investigations in a fair and timely fashion so that secure conclusions are reached on the evidence as soon as reasonably possible, and an order is then made on a final basis, if at all. The duty to achieve that outcome is on the regulator. If the public is not protected because the regulator has wasted time, or not got the evidence needed to satisfy the court, the regulator has failed in its duty. If the court grants extensions based solely on an unparticularised assertion of risk, regardless of other factors such as the passage of time, deficiencies in the evidence, or unfairness to the professional, the court will have failed in its duty.

[108]Long delays between initial charges and the final decision are not only unfair to the made subject to an interim order. They are inimical to effective fact finding, because of the effect on available evidence and the recollection of witnesses.

[109]The regulator’s evidence must be candid and complete. It should never depend on the professional being present or represented and filling in gaps or correcting a false impression. The onus of proof is on the regulator. The evidence must be sufficient for the court to exercise its powers under Article 31(8) fairly and effectively. Proper disclosure requires precision and focus. It is not a question of volume. It is not achieved by throwing all the papers into an exhibit. The key points, both for and against an extension of time, should be succinctly put in the body of a witness statement, with an indexed and paginated exhibit in support. Most cases will require a cross referenced chronology.

Decision on Issue 1

[110]I agree with the respondent that the NMC did not comply with the requirements of Article 31(6) and Article 31(11).

[111]Article 31(6) provides: “(6) In a case falling within paragraph (1)(a), an order made under paragraph (2) must be reviewed by either the Committee which made the order or where the matter has been referred to the Fitness to Practise Committee by the Investigating Committee pursuant to article 26(6)(b)(ii), by the Fitness to Practise Committee—(a) within the period of six months beginning on the date on which the order was made, and that Committee must thereafter, for so long as the order continues in force, further review it before the end of the period of six months beginning on the date of the decision of the immediately preceding review;

(b) where new evidence relevant to the order has become available after the making of the order. (a) within the period of six months beginning on the date on which the order was made, and that Committee must thereafter, for so long as the order continues in force, further review it before the end of the period of six months beginning on the date of the decision of the immediately preceding review; (b) where new evidence relevant to the order has become available after the making of the order.

[112]When new evidence relevant to the Interim Conditions of Practice Order became available, as a result of the finding of the November 2025 panel that there was no case to answer on many of the charges, Mr Masih’s request for a review in January 2026 was refused. No review took place “when” new evidence relevant to the order became available. Instead, no review took place until over six months later.

[113]Article 31(11) provides:

“(11) For the purposes of paragraph (6), the first review— (a) after the extension of an order by the court pursuant to paragraph (9)(a) or after the replacement of an order by the court pursuant to paragraph (9)(b) or (c), must take place within the period of 6 months beginning with the date on which the court extended that order or replaced the order, as the case may be” (a) after the extension of an order by the court pursuant to paragraph (9)(a) or after the replacement of an order by the court pursuant to paragraph (9)(b) or (c), must take place within the period of 6 months beginning with the date on which the court extended that order or replaced the order, as the case may be”

[114]The Interim Conditions of Practice Order extended by Paul Gayle under delegated powers in the consent order of the High Court on 9 December 2025 (which was the fourth High Court extension) was not reviewed within six months. The next review was not until 16 June 2026, which was a few days later than the six-month time limit.

[115]Both these provisions are mandatory. They both use the word “must”.

[116]It does not follow that a failure to comply with them makes the underlying interim order fall away. It will be common for the date for review to fall within the currency of an interim order which does not expire at the six-month deadline point. None of the orders in this case expired at that point.

[117]Article 31(5) sets out situations in which an order “shall cease to have effect”, that is, shall cease to have effect before its expiry date. None of those situations includes a failure to conduct a six-month review in time. That suggests that Article 31 did not intend the interim order to cease to have effect just because that deadline was missed. If Article 31 had intended such a consequence, this is the point where I would have expected to see it made explicit. But there is no provision to that effect anywhere. It would be a draconian consequence if an interim order necessary for the protection of the public fell away automatically just because the six-month deadline was missed. That is not how I construe Article 31.

[118]The point is also argued more subtly, however. It is said that the failure to review in six months was a factor which should have led the June 2026 panel to decline to continue the interim order, such that its decision to continue the order was wrong.

[119]I am not persuaded by that. The deadline had been missed only by a few days. It would have been disproportionate to refuse an interim order because of that, if it otherwise seemed to be necessary for the protection of the public or in the public interest. Therefore, the June 2026 panel was not in my judgment wrong to continue the interim order for this reason.

Decision on Issue 2

[120]The more significant point is whether an extension of the interim Conditions of Practice Order is now necessary for the protection of the public and whether the court should grant it now.

[121]The existing Conditions of Practice Order has not been put in evidence by the NMC and no attempt was made in argument to go through it or to justify the conditions, individually or as a whole, as necessary for the protection of the public.

[122]Some of the conditions do not seem to have anything to do with the protection of the public but seem to be designed to keep the NMC informed (see conditions numbered 6 and 7 in para 90 above).

[123]Some of the conditions are excessively onerous in view of the nature and age of the allegations remaining (see conditions numbered 4 and 5).

[124]This is the fifth application to the High Court for an extension, not counting the two further short extensions granted in July to preserve the position during the hearing and until judgment.

[125]No good reason has been shown for the failure to conclude the case against Mr Masih before now (Hiew para 28).

[126]Mr Masih has been severely prejudiced by delay and by the effect of restrictions in the meantime, including at one point suspension, which have now been imposed on him for three and a half years.

[127]The seriousness of the allegations has been much reduced as so many of them have been dismissed.

[128]No allegation against Mr Masih has been proved or upheld in the 7 years since investigations against him began in 2018.

[129]All the allegations are now stale. The date range attributed to them is between 2019 and 2022, which is between 4 and 7 years ago.

[130]Mr Masih has undergone training and remediation since then and this was referred to by the last review panel in June 2026. No details of this have been investigated or put into evidence by the NMC; nor has any attempt been made to show why it does not reduce any current or future risk to an acceptable level.

[131]Only some of the allegations on the charge sheet describe incidents which, if proved, could have posed a risk to patients.

[132]None of the charges alleges specific harm to any patient attributable to misconduct or incompetence on the part of Mr Masih. Only two appear capable of doing so, and neither of those does so explicitly (charges 1.7.2 and 1.1.16).

[133]The June 2026 panel does not give enough reasons for its decision to make it persuasive.

[134]The panel which heard evidence in December 2025 has expressed no opinion on whether an interim order remains necessary for the protection of the public. No member of that panel was included in the June 2026 panel.

[135]No analysis or even description of the evidence now available to prove the outstanding charges has been provided to the court.

[136]It is evident from the dates and records of substantive but so far inconclusive hearings that the NMC has struggled to prove the charges which have not yet been adjudicated. The NMC’s evidence does not explain how these difficulties will be resolved in its favour if more time is given.

[137]Mr Masih’s registration as a nurse is about to expire and as matters stand he will not be able to re-register because he has not been able to accrue the number of working hours required.

[138]For these reasons, the NMC has not in my judgment satisfied the burden of proving that a continuation of the Conditions of Practice Order, in its current or even in a reduced form, is now necessary for the protection of the public. No other justification for a continuation (such as the public interest) has been shown.

Conclusion

[139]Consequently, the application for an extension of the interim order is refused.