Yusuf Jama, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Justice [2026] EWHC 2045 (Admin)

[2026] EWHC 2045 (Admin)Case No AC-2025-LON-000535
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 31/07/2026HIS HON JUDGE DIGHT CBE
THE KING, on the application of YUSUF JAMAClaimantSECRETARY OF STATE FOR JUSTICEDefendant
Rabah Kherbane (instructed by SL5 Legal) for ClaimantAdam Payter (instructed by Government Legal Department) for DefendantHearing Hearing dates: 17 and 19 February 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 31 July 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................HIS HON JUDGE DIGHT CBE

His Hon Judge Dight CBE :

[1]The claimant, who was born on 3 March 1985, is a Category A prisoner currently serving two terms of imprisonment at HMP Whitemoor (“the Prison”) in Cambridgeshire for(i) the murder of a police officer on 18 November 2005, for which he was sentenced at Newcastle Crown Court on 22 December 2006 to life imprisonment with a minimum tariff which will expire in November 2040; and(ii) rape in January 2008, for which he was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment for public protection. I take the details of these offences from the claimant's Statement of Facts and Grounds. “5.1 Murder: This index offence is dated 18 November 2005. Mr Jama was 19 years old at the time. The offence concerned an armed robbery of a shop. Two police officers were called to the scene. As the three “gunmen” fled, of which Mr Jama was a part, one of them opened fire by use of an automatic weapon. One of the officers who attended, PC Beshenivsky, was killed. The other was injured. Mr Jama was sentenced on 22 December 2006… His minimum tariff is 33 years, 11 months, and ten days… 5.2 Rape: This was an offence of “group rape” at a party, in which Mr Jama “enthusiastically joined”. Mr Jama was convicted of the offence in January 2008. The offence was committed while Mr Jama was “on the run” for a short period after the shooting above. He was under the influence of both drugs and alcohol at the time…as a result of the above incident. Mr Jama was sentenced to a term of Imprisonment for Public Protection.” He has now been a prisoner for more than 19 years and has never had an oral hearing for security re-categorisation purposes.[2]A Category A prisoner is “a prisoner whose escape would be highly dangerous to the public, the police or the security of the State, and for whom the aim must be to make escape impossible”. The focus of the definition is on the risk to the public, police or State if the prisoner were to be at large. The focus is not on the risk or chances of the prisoner escaping.[3]By these proceedings, which were issued on 21 February 2025, the claimant challenges the decision made by the Category A Review Team (“the CART”) of the Directorate of Security for the Prison on 21 November 2024 not to hold an oral hearing when refusing to downgrade the claimant’s Category A security status (“the Decision”). The defendant is responsible for the actions of the CART. The claimant seeks a declaration that the Decision was unlawful and a mandatory order requiring the CART to remake the Decision after affording the claimant the opportunity to take part in an oral hearing.[4]In essence the claimant says that the decision not to hold an oral hearing in the particular circumstances of this case was wrong, unfair, not reasoned and not in accordance with the defendant’s applicable policy and guidance.[5]Permission to apply for judicial review was originally refused on paper by Lang J on 30 July 2025. The reasons which she gave for refusing permission were as follows:
“Ground 1: The Defendant’s decision was detailed and provided four clear reasons why it was not necessary to hold an oral hearing: (1) the information contained within the reports was readily understandable; (2) the Claimant had not identified any important factual dispute going directly to the issue of his risk; (3) the Claimant was not at an “impasse”; and (4) the Claimant was far away from his tariff expiry. The Defendant determined that an oral hearing was not appropriate or necessary for the reasons he gave, which were adequate for a decision of this nature. Ground 2: For the reasons set out in paragraphs 43 – 54 of the SGD, the Defendant’s decision not to hold an oral hearing was not in breach of PSI 08/2013. It was a lawful exercise of the Defendant’s judgment, based on the facts and circumstances of this case, which were properly taken into account. Ground 3: Ground 3 duplicates the submissions made on Grounds 1 and 2. Even a short hearing would not have yielded any practical benefit, for the reasons already given.”
[6]Permission was granted by Foster J in an order made on 22 October 2025. I was told by counsel that the judge gave permission at an oral hearing because it was arguable that if one stepped back and looked at all of the factors together their cumulative effect might tend towards an oral hearing.

The claimant’s record

[7]Prior to the current sentences the claimant had eight convictions for twelve offences committed from the age of 15 onwards, including four counts of failing to surrender. Since being imprisoned the claimant has been convicted of two further offences, both being grievous bodily harm against other prisoners, namely wounding with intent, in 2007 and 2008.

Factual background

[8]From time to time during the period that he has been in prison there have been regular reviews of the claimant’s security categorisation. The review which led to the Decision took place on 24 October 2024. For the purposes of the review a dossier was prepared, dated 24 June 2024, and contained contributions from the claimant, his keyworker, his prison offender manager (“the Prison Offender Manager”) and Ms Tapley of the Prison Psychology Department. It is headed “Category A Dossier”. The claimant’s Prison Offender Manager, Ms Royal, recommended a downgrade to Category B. She noted that her section of the dossier was completed without input from the claimant because he declined to engage with her. She recommended that the claimant attend a PIPE unit, a “Psychologically Informed Planned Environment” which helps prisoners suffering from certain mental health conditions to progress and consolidate their skills.[9]Under the heading “Summary of key work sessions relating to positive behaviours or strengths during the reporting period” the claimant’s key worker said as follows:
“Mr Jama has engaged with me on a regular basis, we have put into practice his skills he has learnt during his 1 to 1 sessions with psychology, and we evidence this with situations and how he has learnt to apply himself compared to his previous ways consistently proving he has learnt how to manage his emotions and behaviours, and consolidate the skills he has been taught, we document this on nomis through key worker sessions. He follows the wing regime and often goes beyond what’s required of him to help staff workloads with what he can. Mr Jama has a privileged and trusted job of the wing servery worker which he has been in this position soon after returning to B wing. He engages with staff and peers on the wing as well as his OMU, and takes part in courses suggested to him, often taking part in extras including attending sessions with external motivational speakers. He is a nominated listener and provides support when required to his peers within Whitemoor.”
[10]Ms Tapley, of the Psychology Department of the Prison, provided a summary of the department's contact with the claimant which she specifically stated, in block capital letters, was not a risk assessment. It contained a chronological series of contacts between her department and the claimant running from October 2010 to June 2024. There was also a number of positive and negative entries, including security intelligence reports, which I will refer to below. The Psychology Department’s element of the dossier contained a section at paragraph 5.4 and following headed “Recommendations for progression”:
“5.4.1 There continues to be security intelligence regarding Mr Jama’s use of and involvement in the illicit supply of substances and use of and illicit supply of mobile phones. Mr Jama is encouraged to consider why he may be implicated in these behaviours and the function of his potential involvement in this, making links to his risk factors and identify how this links with offence paralleling behaviours. 5.4.2 Mr Jama would also benefit from exploring the impact his attachment style and safety/defensive behaviours (as identified in his CFT formulation) have on his ability to tolerate and manage his affect (sic) and interact with others, and how this links into continued offence paralleling behaviours. It is my experience, both in interview and disclosure of this report, that Mr Jama’s avoidant/ dismissive attachment style means he sees relationships as purely transactional and focused on getting his needs met. Therefore, he can present as dismissive, intimidating and overbearing as he attempts to get his own needs met. When it was reflected to him that his comments could be experienced as intimidating, he stated “it was not his problem”
. Within his CFT formulation, Mr Jama acknowledged having two identities as he was growing up; the “good schoolboy” to family due to them disagreeing with his substance use and the “antisocial” boy with peers who engaged in substance use. It is my opinion Mr Jama continues to utilise the two identities, presenting as the “good schoolboy” to those involved in his care and management and who may have influence on his progression, and the antisocial individual, who engages in the prison subculture with peers as a way of continuing to get his needs met, e.g. to progress and to fit/belong (postintervention report; J Child; May 2024). [That latter passage is a quote from the report of Ms Child in May 2024]. 5.4.3 In my opinion Mr Jama remains suitably located as a Category A prisoner due to ongoing concerns regarding offence paralleling behaviours. Whilst he has completed further intervention on his sexual offending, there remains concerns regarding his ability to put into practice the learning and insight developed. He is encouraged to reflect on the feedback provided in the report on his interpersonal style and ongoing offence paralleling behaviours and consider how he can apply his learning from the interventions completed to assist him in making genuine and meaningful changes to support his progression. This work could be completed together with his POM and key worker; however I would recommend Mr Jama considers the benefits of engaging in a progression PIPE. This would provide an environment conducive to ongoing consolidation, feedback and structured sessions to support development of learning and progression.” In other words Ms Tapley was plainly saying that the claimant has not changed enough to justify being downgraded from Category A.[11]Section 6 of the dossier contained the current assessment of risk made by the Offender Management Unit. That section identified what was described as “significant progress in how [the claimant] thinks and the impact this has on his immediate behaviour” and stated that it was positive that while on arrival he had been assessed as a high-risk Category A prisoner he was now a “standard” Category A prisoner but the author’s view was that there was still a risk of serious harm to the public. The comments under the heading “6.6 Recommendations for progression” were very positive and led to the conclusion that he had “shown enough of a reduction in risk to be considered for a downgrade to a Cat B prisoner.” That was a position which Ms Royal continued to support as evidenced in a later file note dated 28 January 2025.[12]There were references to negative reports for refusing to lock away and becoming abusive and for shouting abuse, threatening staff and inciting other prisoners to refuse to lock away.[13]The dossier also made references to security intelligence reports over the previous 12 months which “suggest a realistic possibility” that he was involved in the supply of drugs in the Prison and had access to and use of a mobile telephone.[14]The claimant’s solicitors commissioned an independent psychologist risk assessment from Dr Karyn Mannix who prepared a relatively lengthy report which was dated 25 July 2024 supporting the claimant’s downgrade to Category B and considered how the claimant would respond to a downgrade and what the risks would be (para 5.27 of her report). Her conclusions are set out in section 8 of the report:
“8.2 As outlined in the PSI 08/2013, I understand that the test for downgrading a Category A prisoner is whether the prisoner’s risk of reoffending if unlawfully at large has significantly reduced, such as evidence that shows the prisoner has significantly changed their attitudes towards their offending or has developed skills to help prevent similar offending. 8.3 Based on this assessment, there is evidence that Mr Jama has significantly reduced his risk of reoffending if unlawfully at large. This assessment (and previous psychological assessments) highlights that Mr Jama has completed all core risk reduction work, that he does not evidence entrenched personality traits that are functionally linked to his risk of recidivism, nor does he evidence risk paralleling behaviours. There have been no indications of planned, anticipated, or actual violence that would warrant Mr Jama’s continued detainment in a high secure environment. 8.4 Based on this assessment, Mr Jama is considered to pose a low risk of future sexual and non-sexual violence in custody (closed and open) and a moderate risk in the community. Risk of serious harm remains high were he to reoffend. Risk is not assessed as imminent and warning signs would likely be visible. In essence, there is evidence that Mr Jama has significantly reduced his risk of reoffending if unlawfully at large. 8.5 Mr Jama is someone who, arguably, does not have a clear or clinically relevant treatment pathway. A period on a PIPE is not necessary in terms of risk reduction, and it is not clear why or how this pathway would be responsive to his needs. Mr Jama’s limited memory of his sexual offence is unlikely to change in his current environment and should not hinder his progression. 8.6 If Mr Jama was re-categorised, there is no indication that he would pose an escape risk if he resided in conditions of lesser security. Re-categorisation would provide him with more opportunities to access and engage with appropriately responsive interventions, such as a TC, and this would undoubtedly provide an opportunity to explore further and understand his trauma and offending. Re-categorisation would also provide Mr Jama with greater access to further develop his protective factors (i.e. educational and vocational opportunities) which would help in managing his previous antisocial tendencies. 8.7 To conclude, for the reasons laid out above, it is my opinion that the test for downgrading is met in Mr Jama’s case, that his risk of reoffending if unlawfully at large has significantly reduced and that he demonstrates significantly changed attitudes to his offending, and Category A conditions on no longer necessary to manage his risk.”
[15]On 5 August 2024 the claimant’s solicitors, having received a copy of the dossier, and in the light of Dr Mannix’ report, made detailed and comprehensive submissions in a lengthy letter (of some 51 paragraphs) arguing that he should be downgraded to Category B. The submissions engaged head-on with the reports and recommendations in the dossier. The solicitor’s second submission was that “fairness will require an oral hearing to be directed in this case”.[16]On 16 August 2024 the Local Advisory Panel (which comprised the Deputy Governor of the Prison, 8 officials advisors, including the Head of Management Services, a psychologist, a trainee forensic psychologist, four prison offender managers, including the claimant’s own prison offender manager, a member of the security intelligence team and a clerk) recommended maintaining the claimant’s Category A classification after considering the submissions of the claimant’s solicitors and also, I infer, the report of Dr Mannix. The panel concluded in its own assessment and recommendation:
“…that there are at present no grounds on which a downgrading of your security category could be justified and that you should remain in Category A at this time. The Category A Team noted your representations but considered these also provide no substantial evidence that you have at this time achieved a significant reduction in your risk of similar reoffending if unlawfully at large. It considered that significant risk reduction must be shown before your downgrading. It considered that you should also show you can put relevant skills into practice over a sustained period. It is satisfied also that there are no grounds for an oral hearing for this review in accordance with the criteria in PSI 08/2013.”
In those final sentences the panel explained that in their view the evidence did not meet the required standard, which I deal with below, but also explained to the claimant how that evidence could be improved: “you should also show you can put relevant skills into practice over a sustained period”.[17]On 8 October 2024 further representations were made on behalf of the claimant by his solicitors suggesting that he was at an impasse which could be resolved by an oral hearing, particularly to deal with the security intelligence reports which he did not accept. Those submissions concluded with a challenge to the procedural fairness of the process. The question of an oral hearing was plainly in issue of importance to the claimant and was being pursued with vigour.

The Decision

[18]The Decision, which was made by the Director of the CART, was contained in a short letter dated 21 November 2024 which stated that the claimant was to remain in “Category A (Standard Escape Risk)”. However, it referred to a report attached to the letter which was said to contain “a summary of the information considered and the reasons for the decision”. The four-page report was divided into various sections which started with four background type passages before moving on to sections headed “Present circumstances”, which included references to the contents of the dossier, “Representations”, “LAP recommendation” and, finally, “Reasons for the decision”, which was the longest part of the report covering two of the four pages. The section headed “Representations” referred to the two sets of submissions (cited above) from the claimant’s solicitors, who conduct this Judicial Review claim on his behalf, and the psychology report from Dr Mannix which they had commissioned.[19]The “Reasons for the decision” appear in the following extract from the report attached to the letter:
“The Director considered Mr Jama’s offending shows he would pose a high level of risk if unlawfully at large, and that before his downgrading can be justified there must be convincing evidence of a significant reduction in this risk. The Director noted that Mr Jama has been in custody for some years and has engaged in suitable intervention work. He recognised that Mr Jama has achieved a degree of progress through this work. The reports are however clear that concerns remain over Mr Jama’s ability to apply new skills over time and outside his present secure conditions, as reflected in some of his recent behaviour. He considered that Mr Jama has therefore reasonably been recommended for a PIPE unit to provide further evidence of consistent and effective development of skills to manage his behaviours and risk outside his present secure conditions. He recognised that the recorded security information is, by its very nature, unproven, and should not therefore be the only matter taken into account or have an undue influence on the review decision. He is however satisfied that such information can legitimately be taken into account in fully determining Mr Jama’s progress in addition to the other relevant information, including Mr Jama’s offending, the high risk posed by this offending, and the assessments of his progress through intervention work. The Director is satisfied that the recommendations by the POM or representations that Mr Jama should progress now to enable him to access further treatment do not provide convincing evidence that he has at this time achieved significant risk reduction if unlawfully at large. He is satisfied that such evidence must precede Mr Jama’s downgrading; and that his downgrading cannot be approved before this is shown solely to enable him access to further treatment in less secure conditions. He considered the other grounds for Mr Jama’s downgrading in the submitted representations and private psychology report (including completion of risk reduction work; lack of violence in custody; moderate risk in the community; lack of escape risk) also provide no convincing evidence he has at this time achieved significant risk reduction if unlawfully at large. He accepted that legal representatives and the private psychologists they commission are entitled to express their views. He noted however these representations are similar to many other legal representations (supported by assessments in commissioned psychology reports) in being based on their own interpretation of the criteria for downgrading or of the evidence needed to show significant risk reduction if unlawfully at large. These representations regularly claim such factors as acceptable behaviour, program completion, manageability and lower security, or access to further treatment provide indisputable evidence of significant risk reduction and grounds for downgrading; and that to disagree with this is either irrational or warrants an oral hearing. The Director is however satisfied that these factors do not inevitably provide such evidence. As stated above he is satisfied that, in the absence of convincing evidence of risk reduction, downgrading cannot be approved solely to access further treatment. He considered that such factors as good custodial behaviour, suggested manageability in lower security or the absence of violence in custody do not alone provide convincing evidence that significant risk reduction if unlawfully at large has been achieved. He considered that program completion in itself does not necessarily provide such evidence. He confirmed also that no evidence of an enhanced escape risk is required for prisoner’s placement in Category A. He had no knowledge that a private psychologist has the expertise to offer a relevant judgement on Mr Jama’s escape risk if in lower security, as shown in the submitted report. But in any event he confirmed that an absence of such evidence does not in itself provide convincing evidence significant risk reduction if unlawfully at large has been achieved. The Director noted that the private psychology report states, with apparent authority, that ‘the test for downgrading is met in Mr Jama’s case’. But he considered for the detailed reasons stated above that this is not supported by the reasoning in this report or the other submitted representations. The Director confirmed that in reaching his decision he has a duty to consider the safety of the public, the police or the security of the State. As stated above, he recognised the right of legal representatives and the private psychologists they commission to express their views. But he had no knowledge that they have any responsibility to consider the safety of the public, the police or the security of the State in making their representations or assessments. He considered this is borne out by the grounds for downgrading in Mr Jama’s representations. The Director considered there are in the meantime no grounds for an oral hearing for this review in accordance with the criteria in PSI 08/2013. He considered the available information and reasoning for the downgrading recommendations in the reports and representations [which] are readily understandable. He noted Mr Jama disputes recorded security information. He considered however Mr Jama has identified no important factual dispute going directly to the issue of his risk warranting an oral hearing. As stated above, he considered there is no basis to claim that the prison assessments in Mr Jama’s case depend solely on recent security information. He considered that an oral hearing is not appropriate or necessary solely to enable Mr Jama to make verbal representations or to further dispute recorded security information. [My underlining] For the detailed reasons above the Director…considered also that the submitted recommendations provide neither convincing evidence Mr Jama has at this time achieved significant risk reduction if at large, nor any other valid grounds for his downgrading. He did not accept disagreeing with these recommendations in itself represents a significant dispute justifying an oral hearing. He considered these facts alone could not however justify an oral hearing without other supporting grounds.He noted also that Mr Jama is many years from tariff expiry. He considered that no credible argument can be made that his Category A status is harming or preventing his future liberty or parole consideration. He considered also that Mr Jama remains free to engage further with his identified pathway in a PIPE unit to enable closer assessment of significant progress, and is not in an impasse. He considered there are no other issues relevant to this review that can be resolved only through an oral hearing. [My underlining] The Director considered that convincing evidence of significant reduction of Mr Jama’s risk of similar reoffending if unlawfully at large is not yet shown. He is therefore satisfied that Mr Jama’s downgrading cannot be justified and he must stay in Category A at this time.”

The claimant’s ground of challenge (para 34 of Grounds)

[20]There is only one ground of challenge, namely that the refusal to hold an oral hearing before reaching the Decision was procedurally unfair because: i) the decision not to hold an oral hearing was poorly reasoned given what is said to be a “a crucial dispute on significant material explicitly relied on”; ii) the decision not to hold an oral hearing was in breach of the defendant’s own policy, namely Prison Service Instructions 08/2013, in respect of which it is said that all the factors identified in paragraph 4.7 of the Instructions tended towards an oral hearing in the present case; and iii) the decision not to hold an oral hearing was particularly unfair, wrong and unreasonable given that there could have been a short hearing “targeted at significant points in issue.”[21]The defendant’s position as set out in his grounds of defence is, in essence, that the Decision was made or reached in a way which was consistent with the correct standards of procedural fairness and that the decision not to hold an oral hearing was within the proper and lawful exercise of the discretion open to the defendant. In particular the defendant says that: i) the decision was properly reasoned in that the Director gave four clear reasons why it was not necessary to hold an oral hearing; ii) while it was accepted that there was a factual dispute about the veracity of the security intelligence reports the defendant denied that these were clear and substantial facts in dispute which went directly to the issue of whether the claimant would present a risk to the public if unlawfully at large, nor was it necessary to hold an oral hearing to consider the difference in views between the expert psychologists; iii) the third element of the claimant’s only ground of challenge raised the same arguments as in the preceding elements and added nothing new. The Law[22]By section 47 of the Prison Act 1952 the Secretary of State was empowered to make rules for the regulation and management of prisons which led to the Prison Rules 1999 [SI No. 728] which came into force on 1 April of that year. Rule 7 of the Prison Rules provided that prisoners “shall be classified, in accordance with any directions of the Secretary of State, having regard to their age, temperament and record and with a view to maintaining good order and facilitating training and, in the case of convicted prisoners, of furthering the purpose of their training and treatment as provided by rule 3.”[23]In accordance with that rule the Prison Service Instruction 08/2013 (“the Instructions”), entitled “The Review of Security Category – Category A/Restricted Status Prisoners”, “Provides establishments with instructions and guidelines regarding the procedures for reviews of Category A / Restricted Status prisoners’ security category, and for deciding and reviewing the appropriate escape risk classification of Category A prisoners.” The Instructions have been revised from time to time but the provisions relevant to this claim were last reviewed in 2014.[24]The Instructions, in the section headed “Executive Summary”, identify their purpose as “[setting] out guidelines for the procedures for reviews of Category A / Restricted Status prisoners’ security category, and for deciding and reviewing the appropriate escape risk classification of Category A prisoners.” A Category A prisoner is defined in paragraph2.1 as “a prisoner whose escape would be highly dangerous to the public, or the police or the security of the State, and for whom the aim must be to make escape impossible.” Paragraph2.2 explained that “the definition is concerned with the prisoner’s dangerousness if he did escape, not how likely he is to escape…”. The Instructions identify the desired outcomes of the Instructions as “1.2 Escapes of highly dangerous prisoners are prevented, ensuring public protection. 1.3 Category A (including Provisional) / Restricted Status prisoners’ categories are reviewed appropriately and on time and appropriate security measures are applied lawfully, safely, fairly, proportionately and decently.” By the time of the review in this case the claimant was categorised as no longer having a high escape risk but having a standard escape risk, namely he was assessed to be “A prisoner who would be highly dangerous if at large. No specific information or intelligence to suggest that there is a threat of escape.”[25]The provisions relating to reviews of a prisoner’s Category A status are to be found in section 4.[26]The core test to be applied by the decision maker when considering whether to re-categorise from A to B is to be found in paragraph 4.2:
“Before approving a confirmed Category A / Restricted Status prisoner’s downgrading the DDC High Security (or delegated authority) must have convincing evidence that the prisoner's risk of re-offending if unlawfully at large has significantly reduced, such as evidence that shows the prisoner has significantly changed their attitudes towards their offending or has developed skills to help prevent similar offending.”
The hurdle is, it seems to me, relatively high, requiring, as it states, “convincing evidence” to demonstrate the reduced risk of the prisoner reoffending if unlawfully at large. It also seems to me that this is not a direction or instruction in respect of the standard of proof but relates to the quality of the evidence necessary to meet that standard. In ordinary civil litigation it is not unusual for the court to require a better or higher quality of evidence to meet the usual standard of proof (balance of probabilities) having regard to the inherent likelihood or unlikelihood of the occurrence of the fact in issue: see Lord Hoffman’s example of whether it was a lioness or an Alsatian which might have been seen walking in Regent’s Park in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2001] UKHL 47.[27]Three specific sub-paragraphs deal with oral hearings:
“Oral Hearings 4.6 The DDC High Security (or delegated authority) may grant an oral hearing of a Category A / Restricted Status prisoner’s annual review. This will allow the prisoner or the prisoner’s representatives to submit their representations verbally. In the light of the clarification by the Supreme Court in Osborn, Booth, Reilly of the principles applicable to determining whether an oral hearing should be held in the Parole Board context. The Courts have consistently recognised that the CART context is significantly different to the Parole Board context. In practical terms, those differences have led to the position in which oral hearings in the CART context have only very rarely been held. The differences remain; and continue to be important. However, this policy recognises that the Osborn principles are likely to be relevant in many cases in the CART context. The result will be that there will be more decisions to hold oral hearings than has been the position in the past. In these circumstances, this policy is intended to give guidance to those who have to take oral hearing decisions in the CART context. Inevitably, the guidance involves identifying factors of importance, and in particular factors that would tend towards deciding to have an oral hearing. The process is of course not a mathematical one; but the more of such factors that are present in any case, the more likely it is that an oral hearing will be needed. Three overarching points are to be made at the outset: ● First,each case must be considered on its own particular facts – all of which should be weighed in making the oral hearing decision. ● Secondly, it is important that the oral hearing decision is approached in a balanced and appropriate way. The Supreme Court emphasised in Osborn that decision makers must approach, and be seen to approach, the decision with an open mind; must be alive to the potential, real advantage of a hearing both in aiding decision making and in recognition of the importance of the issues to the prisoner; should be aware that costs are not a conclusive argument against the holding of oral hearings; and should not make the grant of an oral hearing dependent on the prospects of success of a downgrade in categorisation. ● Thirdly, the oral hearing decision is not necessarily an all or nothing decision. In particular, there is scope for a flexible approach as to the issues on which an oral hearing might be appropriate. 4.7 With those three introductory points, the following are factors that would tend in favour of an oral hearing being appropriate: a. Where important facts are in dispute. Facts are likely to be important if they go directly to the issue of risk. Even if important, it will be necessary to consider whether the dispute would be more appropriately resolved at a hearing. For example, where a significant explanation or mitigation is advanced which depends upon the credibility of the prisoner, it may assist to have a hearing at which the prisoner (and/or others) can give his (or their) version of events. b. Where there is a significant dispute on the expert materials. These will need to be considered with care in order to ascertain whether there is a real and live dispute on particular points of real importance to the decision. If so, a hearing might well be of assistance to deal with them. Examples of situations in which this factor will be squarely in play are where the LAP, in combination with an independent psychologist, takes the view that downgrade is justified; or where a psychological assessment produced by the Ministry of Justice is disputed on tenable grounds. More broadly, where the Parole Board, particularly following an oral hearing of its own, has expressed strongly-worded and positive views about a prisoner’s risk levels, it may be appropriate to explore at a hearing what impact that should or might have on categorisation. It is emphasised again that oral hearings are not all or nothing – it may be appropriate to have a short hearing targeted at the really significant points in issue. c. Where the lengths of time involved in a case are significant and/or the prisoner is post- tariff. It does not follow that just because a prisoner has been Category A for a significant time or is post tariff that an oral hearing would be appropriate. However, the longer the period as Category A, the more carefully the case will need to be looked at to see if the categorisation continues to remain justified. It may also be that much more difficult to make a judgement about the extent to which they have developed over the period since their conviction based on an examination of the papers alone. The same applies where the prisoner is post-tariff, with the result that continued detention is justified on grounds of risk; and all the more so if he has spent a long time in prison post-tariff. There may be real advantage in such cases in seeing the prisoner face-to-face. Where there is an impasse which has existed for some time, for whatever reason, it may be helpful to have a hearing in order to explore the case and seek to understand the reasons for, and the potential solutions to, the impasse. d. Where the prisoner has never had an oral hearing before; or has not had one for a prolonged period. Timing of Annual Reviews Categorisation is reviewed within set timescales.”
[28]Several important principles are, in my view, to be drawn from these sub-paragraphs: i) Whether to grant an oral hearing is a matter of discretion for the decision-maker and therefore has to be made within the confines of the discretion afforded to them by the Instructions, balancing the factors on each side; ii) There are no hard and fast rules or bright lines and each case must be considered on its own facts; iii) It is recognised that oral hearings are rare; iv) The Instructions identify 4 factors or categories of factors which would tend to bring the balance down in favour of an oral hearing (4.7) but the approach to making that decision should be flexible (4.8); v) An oral hearing might be targeted at specific significant points in issue.[29]The context in which such decisions are made and the role of the CART has to be borne in mind. As Sales LJ held, in R (Hassett) v Secretary of State for

Justice [2017] EWCA Civ 331, at [60]:

“…it is legitimate to bear in mind that the director and other officials engaged in the process are not judges required to dedicate their full time and attention to categorisation decision-making but have wider management responsibilities in running prisons…it is a relevant consideration in assessing whether [fairness required an oral hearing] that courts should be careful not to impose unduly stringent standards liable to judicialize what remains in essence a prison management function.”
Thus on review by the court the Decision is not to be treated as a judicial decision in which a reasoned judgment is to be expected. The CART is carrying out a prison management function, not a judicial function, albeit necessarily forming and making judgements on important issues affecting prisoners, but, as the authorities make clear, the CART is not to be equated with the decision-making role and process of the Parole Board, which does make judicial decisions.[30]As Elisabeth Laing LJ held, at [108] in R (Clarke) v Secretary of State for Justice [2024] EWCA Civ 861, the decision-maker must apply the three overarching points in the bullets at the end of paragraph 4.6 whereas the examples in paragraph 4.7 were intended as guidance only and did not dictate what weight, if any, the decision-maker was to give to any of the factors: “Moreover, the language requires a decision-maker to make a series of judgments on the facts of the particular case: for example, whether a fact is 'important', whether a factor 'goes directly to the issue of risk', whether a dispute would be 'more appropriately resolved at a hearing', whether there is 'a real and live dispute on particular points of real importance to the decision' and so on. Unsurprisingly, paragraph 4.7 does not tell a decision-maker what those judgments should be on particular facts. It follows that a decision-maker who conscientiously applies his mind to the facts and makes the judgments which he considers arise on the particular facts will comply with paragraph 4.7. I reject Mr Rule's submission that the only answer which was available to the CART in this case, having weighed the factors identified in paragraph 4.7, was that an oral hearing was necessary. The CART is much better placed to make those assessments than the Judge was, and considerably better placed to make them than is this court.” [My underlining][31]At paragraph [28] of their judgement the Court of Appeal in Donald MacKay v Secretary of State for Justice [2011] EWCA Civ 522 held that “it is for the court to decide what procedural fairness requires, so that the issue on judicial review is whether the refusal of an oral hearing was wrong: not whether it was unreasonable or irrational” (per Gross LJ), emphasising both the potential advantages of an oral hearing and their rarity. As Elisabeth Laing LJ said in Clarke “The issue for the judge in relation to compliance with the policy was not whether those judgments were right, but whether it was open to the CART to make those judgments on the facts.” [109]. It does not seem to me that there is a real difference in the ways that the two members of differently constituted divisions of the Court of Appeal identified the test to be applied by judges in my position.[32]The four categories of factors referred to in paragraph 4.7 of the Instructions and mentioned in the extract cited from the judgment of Elisabeth Laing LJ above are(i) where there are important facts in dispute,(ii) where there is a significant dispute on the expert materials on particular points of real importance to the decision,(iii) where prisoner is post-tariff and the length of time he has been a Category A prisoner is significant;(iv) where there is an impasse; and(v) where the prisoner has never had an oral hearing before, or has not had one for a prolonged period.[33]In relation to what amounts to a significant dispute between experts was also considered by Sales LJ in Hassett at [69] where he held:
“I would add that even in a case where there is a significant difference of view between experts, it will often be unnecessary for the CART/Director to hold a hearing to allow them ventilate their views orally. This might be so because, for example, there may be no real prospect that this would resolve the issue between them with sufficient certainty to affect the answer to be given by the CART/Director to the relevant question, and fairness does not require that the CART/Director should hold an oral hearing on the basis of a speculative possibility that that might happen: see Downs at [45].”
In my judgment the same reasoning would apply when considering whether, in respect of a category (i) factor, there is a need for an oral hearing because of what is said to be an important fact in dispute.[34]What might amount to an impasse requiring an oral hearing was also considered by the Court of Appeal in Donald MacKay v Secretary of State for

Justice at [28] (also per Gross LJ):

“iii) The impasse capable of arising when the prisoner continues to deny the commission of the offences in question has already been discussed. A potential impasse may also arise where a prisoner needs access to opportunities to demonstrate that he can be trusted in a lower category, as otherwise he will have an almost impossible task in persuading the parole board that he should be released;… However, keeping him as a Category A prisoner may mean that he does not have access to such opportunities-and, for its part, CART (rather as it observed in the present case), with its own particular interest in the risk of escape, may be unwilling to risk downgrading the prisoner’s security categorisation without prior evidence of significant risk reduction. Although the existence of an impasse or inconsistency (for example, between the Parole Board and CART) may increase the likelihood of an oral hearing being required, it should not be thought that the mere existence of an impasse or inconsistency means that an oral hearing will be warranted. Moreover, for my part, the Court should not be too ready to conclude that there is an impasse or inconsistency when there may be no more than a difference of view, perhaps for very good reasons…”
[35]It seems to me that, although not specifically addressing the issue of an impasse, the following observation of Sales LJ in Hassett at [61] is of practical use to judges in my position:
“…if in asking the question whether upon escape the prisoner would represent a risk to the public the CART/director, having read all the reports, were left in significant doubt on a matter on which the prisoner’s own attitude might make a critical difference, the impact upon him of a decision to maintain him in Category A would be so marked that fairness would be likely to require an oral hearing.”

The claimant’s submissions

[36]Notwithstanding the three strands of grounds of challenge, which I seek to identify as (i) to (iii) in paragraph 20 above, the main thrust of the claimant’s argument in his counsel’s skeleton and at the hearing before me was that the defendant’s officials had failed properly to apply the Instructions and had failed either to identify the correct factors in accordance with paragraph 4.7 or had given them insufficient weight. It was submitted that all of the factors in paragraph 4.7 were present and tended towards an oral hearing.[37]Of particular concern to the claimant were the security intelligence reports which, it was argued, were neither graded nor evaluated by the decision-maker. In respect of them it was said that there was a significant dispute of fact. The claimant submitted that he was not given a chance at an oral hearing to deny the allegations which would have enabled the decision-maker to determine their veracity and the claimant’s credibility in a fair way, which would have led to a fair resolution of the dispute. It was said that, in effect, it was only the negative entries in the dossier which counted against him in the review.[38]Secondly, it was submitted that there was a significant dispute on the expert materials and that, reiterating sub-ground (iii) of the claimant’s judicial review challenge, there could and should have been a short targeted hearing to resolve that dispute, which it was said fell squarely within the example of a factor set out at paragraph 4.7(b)of the Instructions. The claimant described the opinion of Dr Mannix as compelling and significant, but the prison psychology department came to an opposite view about whether the claimant should attend a PIPE unit to consolidate his learning. The claimant argued that the Director did not approach the claimant’s expert report in a balanced or open-minded manner. It was submitted that an oral hearing could have allowed the defendant’s officials to explore the report and decide what weight to give to what the expert had said.[39]In respect of the third and fourth factors specified in sub-paragraphs 4.7(c) and (d) of the Instructions I was asked to take account of the fact that the claimant, albeit far from tariff, had been a Category A prisoner for 20 years and had not been granted an oral hearing.[40]In conclusion it was submitted that that factors (a) and (b) were of direct and compelling importance and that factors (c) and (d) added weight to the overall balance which should have come down on the claimant’s side demonstrating the accumulation point made by Foster J at the renewed oral hearing for permission. The defendant’s submissions[41]The defendant submits that the Decision letter contained four clear reasons why it had been decided not to hold an oral hearing and that each of those reasons was open to the Director on the extensive material before him: i) The information contained within the reports was readily understandable ii) The claimant has not identified any important factual despute going directly to the issue of his risk; iii) The claimant is not at an impasse; and iv) The claimant is far away from the expiry of his tariff.[42]Alternatively, the defendant submits that the Decision was not unfair at common law given the fairness of the process which was adopted and followed.

Discussion

[43]I remind myself that there is no challenge to the substantive decision not to downgrade the claimant from a Category A prisoner to a Category B prisoner. The sole issue is whether the decision not to hold an oral hearing in order to reach that conclusion was wrong or unlawful because of a failure to comply with the defendant’s policy contained in the Instructions or because of a breach of procedural fairness at common law. In reality it seems to me that the assertion that the Decision was unfair at common law adds little if anything to the assertion that there was a failure to comply with the detailed provisions in the Instructions relating to oral hearings.[44]From the opening sentence of the section of the Decision headed “Reasons for the decision” it is apparent that in relation to the substantive decision the decision-maker correctly directed himself as to the test to be applied and the approach to be taken in making the decision:
“The Director considered Mr Jama’s offending shows he would pose a high level of risk if unlawfully at large, and that before his downgrading can be justified there must be convincing evidence of a significant reduction in this risk”
[45]It is also apparent from the passages that I have underlined in the quotation from the Decision in paragraph 19 above that the decision-maker directed himself correctly as to the test to be applied when considering whether to hold an oral hearing, specifically referring to “the criteria in PSI 08/2013”. The question is whether he arguably misapplied that test. For the reasons which I give below I have come to the conclusion that he did not and that he was entitled to reach the conclusion which he did. It is apparent from the Decision taken as a whole that the Director looked at each of the factors in 4.7 and applied his mind, not in a formalistic way but directed to the claimant’s particular circumstances and gave such weight to them as he felt was appropriate, the weight being a matter for him.[46]The claimant argues that his denial of the security intelligence reports was a specific important fact in dispute which should have tipped the balance towards holding an oral hearing. Was this a denial of an important fact, in dispute, which made it appropriate to hold an oral hearing? The only reports which the Director took into account are set out in the paragraph headed “Present circumstances” as “use of substances, refusal of body scanner and mobile phones”. That description of the reports is significantly less extensive and detailed than the reports particularised in section 7(a) of the dossier. The Director noted that these reports were in dispute in general terms but also noted that the claimant had not identified any specific factual dispute going “directly to the issue of his risk”, which I take to mean that the dispute was not viewed by the Director as being a dispute of an important fact. Earlier on in his decision the Director had specifically recognised that the allegations in the security intelligence reports were unproven and while it was material which he could take into account he reasoned that it should not and did not have an undue influence on his decision about categorisation. The brief way in which he described them at the beginning of the report supports the contention that he did not regard them as significant. He specifically identified the other evidence to which he gave more weight in making his decision. He concluded, for good reason, that there was no need to hold an oral hearing to resolve this dispute. It seems to me that an oral hearing in respect of these reports would have been unlikely to achieve more light than heat. The claimant’s credibility would have been in issue. The prison would not have been able to disclose the evidence on which they relied in support of the secret reports. It was open to the Director to conclude that an oral hearing would not have resolved the dispute with any real certainty. Given the limited weight or significance attributed to these reports by the Director there would, in my judgment, have been no point in having a hearing in respect of this issue and it was not wrong or unlawful for the Director so to conclude.[47]In respect of the claimant’s expert evidence the Decision shows that the Director specifically considered it, although he did not mention Dr Mannix by name. The claimant argues that there was a significant dispute on the expert materials which fell within the factor identified in paragraph 4.7(b) of the Instructions. Undoubtedly there was a difference in view, in that Dr Mannix argued that the claimant should be downgraded, whereas Ms Tapley, of the prison psychology department, said that the claimant had not changed enough to justify being downgraded from Category A for reasons which appear in the extract which I set out in paragraph 10 above, but was the Director entitled to conclude that this was not a significant dispute in respect of points of real importance to the decision concerning categorisation that it required an oral hearing to resolve the differences? First, I should deal with a related small point. Ms Tapley’s section of the dossier expressly stated that it was not a risk assessment. It seems to me that notwithstanding that “label” it was material containing important information and recommendations which the Director was entitled to take into account in reaching his decision.[48]Looking at the substance of this issue it seems to me that Ms Tapley and Dr Mannix were in broad agreement about the risk which the claimant would present in the community, but the difference was that Ms Tapley was of the view that, while he had made progress, he need to change further to justify recategorisation, whereas Dr Mannix was of the view that he had significantly reduced his risk of reoffending if unlawfully at large. Dr Mannix focusses on his attitudes (paragraphs 8.2 and 8.7) whereas Ms Tapley focussed on his skills (paragraph 5.4.3) which she said he had difficulty putting into practice and as a result would benefit from a PIPE unit, which the claimant’s prison offender manager agreed with. Dr Mannix also appears to have suggested that there was further progress to be made and that there were courses, albeit if the claimant were recategorized as a Category B prisoner, from which the claimant would benefit.[49]The conclusion as to whether the claimant should be downgraded was a matter for the Director, not the experts. In any event it would appear that in paragraph 8.6 of her report Dr Mannix addressed the wrong test (“risk of escape”) although the right test in paragraph 8.7. The differences between the experts essentially concerned their respective expert recommendations rather than the risk to the public if the claimant was unlawfully at large, which was a matter for the Director. An oral hearing would be unlikely to have resulted in their changing their recommendations. Dr Mannix report did not engage in any detail with Ms Tapley’s report about the existing risks or, in the Director’s view, address the correct test:
“The Director noted that the private psychology report states, with apparent authority, that ‘the test for downgrading is met in Mr Jama’s case’. But he considered for the detailed reasons stated above that this is not supported by the reasoning in this report or the other submitted representations. The Director confirmed that in reaching his decision he has a duty to consider the safety of the public, the police or the security of the State.”
[50]Any differences about the utility of further training, in particular reference to the PIPE unit, were not relevant to the current risk which the claimant presented if unlawfully at large but about future potential progress (and risk). As the Director correctly said in his Decision “the recommendations by the POM or representations that Mr Jama should progress now to enable him to access further treatments do not provide convincing evidence that he has at this time achieved significant risk reduction if unlawfully at large,”[51]I should add that given that both experts and the panel considered the benefit of further training it could not properly be argued that an impasse had been reached. A way forward had been suggested.[52]The differences of expert view did not need an oral hearing to determine and the Director was not wrong so to conclude. He had both reports which were clear in their reasoning and he was entitled to evaluate them and give them such weight as he thought fit in balancing all the relevant factors in reaching his decision, a matter for him alone, as to the risk to the public.[53]Factors (c) and (d) were, it is agreed, of less significance given that the claimant is far from tariff and cannot be considered for parole for a significant number of years. The mere fact that the claimant has been a Category A prisoner since sentence does not mean that an oral hearing would be appropriate.[54]In my judgment the Director applied the three overarching principles to be found in paragraph 4.6 of the Instructions and weighed the factors in a manner that he was entitled to do. Standing back and looking at the overall picture it cannot be said that the Director did not consider this application for an oral hearing on its own facts (first principle). The details of his decision for refusing the application and the background material referred to in the Decision made it plain that he did so. As to the second principle, as the analysis above shows, he identified the relevant factors and took them into account in reaching his decision: the weight was a matter for him. He gave reasons for his conclusion which demonstrate that he balanced those factors. Although he does not expressly refer to the third factor it is, in my view, apparent from the last line of the paragraph explaining why he had decided not to hold an oral hearing that he had considered the possibility of an oral hearing relating to specific issues or factors:
“He considered that there are no other issues relevant to this review that can be resolved only through an oral hearing.”
Thus, in my judgment, having regard to the test explained by Elisabeth Laing LJ in Clarke at [108], cited at paragraph 29 above the Director having“conscientiously [applied] his mind to the facts and [made] the judgments which he considers arise on the particular facts…[complied] with paragraph 4.7.”[55]This was not a case where in asking the question whether upon escape the prisoner would represent a risk to the public the CART/director, having read all the reports, was left in significant doubt on a matter on which the claimant’s own attitude might make a critical difference so as to have required an oral hearing.[56]Given that I have held that the defendant applied the Instructions and was entitled to reach the conclusion that there was no need for an oral hearing I turn then to consider whether there was a breach of common law fairness in this case. It seems to me, standing back, that the overall process was fair in that, as I have already held, the decision-maker directed himself as to the correct test to be applied, copies of all the materials on which he was to base his decision were provided to the claimant and his solicitors, the claimant knew the case which he had to meet, the claimant was in receipt of legal advice which is likely to have covered, I infer, the test to be applied and the quality of the evidence in the dossier and the steps which the claimant had to take to address the evidence (although I do not, of course, know what advice he was in fact given) and his lawyers and independent expert made very detailed submissions in a total of three documents (two from the lawyers and one from the expert) before and after the local panel made its recommendations. The claimant’s submissions were then considered by the Director before he applied the tests contained in paragraphs 4.6 and 4.7 of the Instructions. The weight to be given to the factors which he properly identified as relevant to the decision was a matter for the Director. He gave sufficient reasons for his decision, which addressed the challenges and submissions made on behalf of the claimant. The decision not to hold an oral hearing was not, in the circumstances, procedurally unfair. A further review – 09 October 2025[57]I also received evidence, in the form of a witness statement dated 25 November 2025 made by Mr Steve Easton, Head of the Category A review team for the Long Term and High Security Estate. Mr Easton tells the court that since the decision under challenge in these proceedings a further review has taken place which on 9 October 2025 determined, again, that the claimant was to remain in Category A. I have not taken this evidence into account in determining the challenge to the Decision in the instant case. However, had the instant challenge succeeded this additional evidence might have persuaded me to refuse to grant relief to the claimant in any event.

Conclusion

[58]The decision not to hold an oral was a lawful one and I would dismiss the claim. I would ask counsel to agree a minute of order dealing with the outcome of this claim and the costs incurred and submit it for approval and sealing. If those ancillary matters cannot be agreed the parties should request that this matter be relisted for a short consequentials hearing.