“10. The Secretary of State notes that the applications are not being pursued on the basis of a personal permission (IR13.22-13.24); however, the intention is that the premises shall be occupied as an embassy by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). For the reasons given at IR13.25-13.30, he agrees that any ethical or similar objections to the provision of an embassy for a specific country cannot be a material planning consideration (IR13.27). He further agrees that PRC is not a material consideration in itself, and nor are any moral, ethical or cultural considerations which may or may not arise from the PRC as occupants (IR13.29). For the same reasons, the Secretary of State considers that the same is true of general (as opposed to site- specific – see paragraph 11 below) concerns around national security arising from the identity of the proposed occupants. The Secretary of State agrees with the Inspector’s overall approach to the identity of the proposed occupants (IR13.29). He notes the Inspector’s comments at IR13.93 and considers that non-site-specific national security concerns would be dealt with by other means, via other legal processes and by various agencies, including under the Vienna Conventions (see footnote 9 below), and that this is not something that can be controlled through the planning system. 11. However, the Secretary of State further notes that a number of site-specific issues related to the proposed occupants have been raised (IR13.25.1-13.25.5), including matters related to security. This includes concerns relating to the proximity of telecommunications cables at the Wapping Telephone Exchange (IR10.95 and IR10.296). He considers that site-specific matters linked to the identity of the proposed occupants, including in relation to national security, are capable of being material planning considerations, and these matters are addressed below. Insofar as they are material to the planning case before him, the Secretary of State has taken site-specific national security considerations into account in reaching his decision.”
“17. Both documents were provided to the Secretary of State. He has carefully considered whether it was necessary for these documents to be shared with parties for comment before a decision was taken, noting that representations to the inquiry from Royal Mint Court Residents’ Association (RMCRA) and RMTRA refer to these documents not being publicly available and raise concerns regarding the clarity of security measures. He has concluded that it was not necessary to share these documents before proceeding to a decision. Security arrangements were fully canvassed at the inquiry, with the Inspector’s conclusions being set out at IR13.146-13.156. Conditions 25, 26, 27 and 35 in Annex B2 deal with security (IR13.191-13.192 and IR13.199), as does the s.106 at schedule 3 (IR13.205-12.210). The Secretary of State’s conclusions on these matters are at paragraphs 53-60 below. Neither document deals with new matters which were not discussed at the inquiry. Both documents are inputs to other publicly available documents. The Security Statement is referred to in paragraph 9.2 of the Design and Access Statement, which was an inquiry document. The Blast Assessment was commissioned by LBTH at the request of the CTSA and formed an input into the CTSA advice which was subsequently provided to LBTH. The CTSA advice informed the Committee Reports for the original refused application, and the current application. These Committee Reports were both inquiry documents. While not every piece of information in the Security Statement and the Blast Assessment was directly before the inquiry, the Secretary of State does not consider that the information they contain would meaningfully add to the material information on which the decision is based, or would result in a different conclusion on security arrangements or the decision as a whole. The wider statutory framework and the substance deriving from these documents was considered by the parties and the Inspector, and security measures will be subject to future approval by LBTH under proposed conditions 25, 26 and 35, with details of CCTV being subject to approval under condition 27. 18. The Secretary of State has considered his duties under Rule 17 of theTown and Country Planning (Inquiries Procedure) (England) Rules 2000 . He is not, as a result of his consideration of these documents, disposed to disagree with a recommendation of the Inspector, and he was not therefore required to notify parties of this evidence, or to disclose the contents of the documents or circulate them. He has further concluded, for the reasons set out at paragraph 17 above, that it was not necessary to circulate the documents to the parties prior to reaching a decision as a matter of general procedural fairness. 19. As the Secretary of State has concluded that it was not necessary to share these documents, he has further concluded that it was not necessary to reopen the inquiry or share them under a s.321 direction.”
“49. For the reasons given at IR13.117-13.121, the Secretary of State agrees that the risk of disruption from protest activity to those living directly adjacent to the site are limited (IR13.119), and that the risks of disruption to local residents more broadly would likely be occasional, and not at a level which would justify the refusal of the proposed use at the site on such grounds (IR13.120). He has further taken into account the proposed mitigation measures (IR13.122- 13.123). 50. Overall, the Secretary of State agrees with the Inspector at IR13.124 that, while it is accepted that protest activities would be likely to occur at the site, the impacts would be appropriately managed to reduce their effects on the highway network as well as on the local residents. He agrees that there would be no policy conflict arising from the proposals in this regard, and does not consider that the impact of protest activities is a matter which would justify a refusal of permission in this case.”
“54. The Secretary of State agrees with the Inspector that terrorist attacks are serious, devastating the lives and communities affected by them, and it is right to consider this matter seriously (IR13.139). However, he also agrees with the Inspector that whether or not a specific threat would arise from the proposed use of the site is somewhat academic because the threat to the UK from terrorism is currently assessed as being ‘substantial’, meaning an attack somewhere in the UK is likely (IR13.139). 55. The Secretary of State considers that the potential for a terrorist threat is material to the decision in this case. He has taken into account that the MPS has not objected in respect of terrorism concerns, and that FCDO/HO have also not raised any objections relating to terrorist activities (IR13.143). The Secretary of State notes that those bodies have particular expertise and responsibility in terms of counter terrorism and places significant weight on their not having objected on this issue. 56. The Secretary of State agrees with the Inspector that should there be a terrorist attack, neighbouring residential properties, in particular those at St Mary Grace’s Court, would be vulnerable. However, he also agrees that, by their nature, terrorist attacks are indiscriminate in their nature and have far reaching and deadly consequences (IR13.141). 57. The Secretary of State has also taken into account the planning policy approach set out in the Framework, which refers to appropriate and proportionate steps that can be taken to reduce vulnerability, increase resilience and ensure public safety and security, and the LP (IR13.140 and 13.144). He agrees that fundamentally the policy basis relates to design matters and designing out crime and reducing risk, and further notes that the Designing Out Crime Officer for the MPS has not raised any objections (IR13.145). 58. The Secretary of State has taken into account the broader national risks of a terrorist attack; the lack of evidence of a specific identified terrorist threat to the proposed use; the absence of an objection from bodies responsible for counter terrorism; and the security measures which would be put in place (see paragraph 59 below). For the reasons set out above, he considers that while the threat of terrorism is undoubtedly a serious matter which he has taken into account in reaching his decision, in the circumstances of this case it does not weigh against the decision.”
“60. The Secretary of State has taken into account representations on this matter including the concerns of RMCRA regarding the opportunity to review security arrangements. Taking into account his conclusions at paragraph 17 above, he agrees with the Inspector that the package of security measures proposed would be proportionate to the proposed use of the site (IR13.156). He further agrees that bringing a vacant and derelict site back into use, combined with the above measures, is likely to create a safer environment in the surrounding areas around the site, and could reduce crime (IR13.152). The Secretary of State agrees that the policy objectives set out in LP policy D11 and paragraphs 102 and 135(f) of the Framework would be met.”
“93. The Secretary of State has carefully considered the parties’ representations on this matter. As a starting point he notes that any planning permission and listed building consent would only be granted for the proposed development in accordance with the drawings in condition 2 of Annex B1 and condition 2 of Annex B2. He notes that of the 52 drawings which were originally marked as redacted, or listed as redacted in the drawing schedule, revised versions of 43 drawings have now been provided. Nine drawings from the original list in Annex A of the reference back letter of 6 August are unchanged, and no further versions of these drawings have been provided. He notes that no drawings are now marked as redacted, but has taken into account that the schedule to the applicant’s response of 20 August variously states in respect of a number of drawings that: ‘Use information for the smaller rooms/remaining rooms/ remaining spaces (areas with no public access) is not shown, which is however irrelevant to the planning.’ The Secretary of State has considered whether the drawings and other materials which are before him provide sufficient information to properly understand the development proposed and enable him to reach a conclusion on whether planning permission and listed building consent can be granted. In doing so, he has treated the application as being for a single composite development and has taken into account all elements of the proposal, even if in isolation some of those elements (such as the internal works) would not amount to development for the purposes of s.55 TCPA 1990. 94. In respect of staff accommodation, the Secretary of State has reviewed the drawings referred to at paragraph 90a above, and considers that they provide a sufficient level of information. His conclusions on amenity for future occupants are at paragraphs 84-87 above. 95. In respect of the location and site plans, and the masterplan for proposed works on Cartwright Street (referred to at paragraph 90b-c above), the Secretary of State considers that while details of internal rooms are not shown, that is not inappropriate where the planning purpose of the drawing is to deal with external matters. 96. The Secretary of State has considered the statements in the applicant’s Consolidated Drawing Schedule that the use information which is not shown is irrelevant to planning. He considers that it cannot be said definitively that use information is by its nature irrelevant to planning and incapable of being a material consideration. However, neither does he consider that the absence of this information must automatically lead to a refusal of permission and/or listed building consent. The extent of its materiality to the decision will depend on the particular circumstances of the case. 97. The Secretary of State has reviewed the 24 plans which do not show use information for all rooms. He has also reviewed room use information provided in some cases on cross sectional drawings. In the circumstances of this case, given the material which is before him, and the nature of the proposed embassy use, the Secretary of State does not consider that there is real as opposed to theoretical ambiguity as to what planning permission is sought for, or that it is impossible properly to understand the scope of the uses proposed. 98. The rooms for which no particular use is specified may only be used for any lawful embassy use. The Secretary of State has considered the potential planning impacts which could arise from the lawful use of these rooms. He considers that if rooms other than those specifically identified as being for staff or visitor accommodation were used for overnight accommodation, this could give rise to materially harmful impacts in terms of amenity, accessibility and fire safety, which have not been assessed. He considers it is appropriate to impose a condition preventing this, and has accordingly amended condition 31 in Annex B2. The representations received on this issue raise generalised concerns about the potential use of these rooms which he has taken into account. Other than the issue of staff and visitor accommodation, he does not consider that any lawful embassy use of the unmarked rooms would give rise to material adverse planning impacts. 99. Overall, for the reasons set out above, the Secretary of State considers that he has sufficient information before him to grant planning permission and listed building consent. Development in compliance with the drawings is secured via condition 2 of Annex B1 and condition 2 of Annex B2. The question of planning enforcement in the context of diplomatic immunity is addressed at paragraphs 103-105 below.”
“102. The Secretary of State has taken into account that the LFB provided general advice on the planning application, which noted the greyed out areas on plans, but did not object to the proposals. Taking into account his conclusions at paragraph 98 above, his imposition of a condition preventing areas which are not specifically identified as being for residential use being used for overnight accommodation, and the fact that the scheme will be implemented in accordance with the Fire Statement and Fire Strategy, the Secretary of State considers that the application makes adequate provision for fire safety.”
“103. The Secretary of State acknowledges that the immunity and privileges applicable to the applicant, its diplomatic premises and its officers to some extent curtails the traditional options for enforcing breaches of planning control. However, he does not consider that planning control in respect of the proposed development, or diplomatic premises generally, to be effectively unenforceable. Nor does he accept the apparent suggestion made in some of the representations that attaching any planning condition to a grant of planning permission for an embassy would be ineffective and unlawful. 104. Immunity does not affect the lawfulness of an act, and inviolability of diplomatic premises does not confer or imply exception from local laws or regulations. The Secretary of State expects States, including the PRC, to abide by the terms of any grant of planning permission, including its conditions, and notes thatArticle 41 of the Convention on Diplomatic Relations places an obligation on ‘all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State’. Where States contravene such laws and regulations, there are applicable remedies under the Vienna Conventions including declaring the head of the mission or member of the diplomatic staff persona non grata (Article 9) or, in extremis, severing diplomatic relations. 105. The Secretary of State has taken into account that the applicant has sought planning permission and listed building consent, and has participated constructively in the process. In his view this demonstrates the applicant’s willingness to engage appropriately with requirements under the planning system. Overall, he considers that the inevitable limits on planning control in this case, which are common to all diplomatic premises, do not constitute a reason for refusing planning permission in this case.”
“110. In reaching this conclusion, the Secretary of State has taken into account the issues around enforceability in diplomatic premises, as set out at paragraphs 103-105 above. He considers this is material to the question of whether conditions can lawfully be imposed. He considers that, taking a pragmatic view, it is reasonable for him to conclude that the conditions are likely to be adhered to by the applicant, and that the proposed conditions are therefore de facto enforceable.”
“The principles on which the court will act in a section 288 challenge 6. In my judgment at first instance in Bloor Homes East Midlands Ltd. v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government[2014] EWHC 754 (Admin) (at paragraph 19) I set out the "seven familiar principles" that will guide the court in handling a challenge under section 288. This case, like many others now coming before the Planning Court and this court too, calls for those principles to be stated again – and reinforced. They are: "(1) Decisions of the Secretary of State and his inspectors in appeals against the refusal of planning permission are to be construed in a reasonably flexible way. Decision letters are written principally for parties who know what the issues between them are and what evidence and argument has been deployed on those issues. An inspector does not need to "rehearse every argument relating to each matter in every paragraph" (see the judgment of Forbes J. in Seddon Properties v Secretary of State for the Environment (1981) 42 P. & C.R. 26 , at p.28). (2) The reasons for an appeal decision must be intelligible and adequate, enabling one to understand why the appeal was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the "principal important controversial issues". An inspector's reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether he went wrong in law, for example by misunderstanding a relevant policy or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But the reasons need refer only to the main issues in the dispute, not to every material consideration (see the speech of Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood in South Bucks District Council and another v Porter (No. 2) [2004] 1 W.L.R. 1953 , at p.1964B-G). (3) The weight to be attached to any material consideration and all matters of planning judgment are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the decision-maker. They are not for the court. A local planning authority determining an application for planning permission is free, "provided that it does not lapse into Wednesbury irrationality" to give material considerations "whatever weight [it] thinks fit or no weight at all" (see the speech of Lord Hoffmann in Tesco Stores Limited v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 1 W.L.R. 759 , at p.780F-H). And, essentially for that reason, an application under section 288 of the 1990 Act does not afford an opportunity for a review of the planning merits of an inspector's decision (see the judgment of Sullivan J., as he then was, in Newsmith v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and the Regions[2001] EWHC Admin 74 , at paragraph 6). (4) Planning policies are not statutory or contractual provisions and should not be construed as if they were. The proper interpretation of planning policy is ultimately a matter of law for the court. The application of relevant policy is for the decision-maker. But statements of policy are to be interpreted objectively by the court in accordance with the language used and in its proper context. A failure properly to understand and apply relevant policy will constitute a failure to have regard to a material consideration, or will amount to having regard to an immaterial consideration (see the judgment of Lord Reed in Tesco Stores v Dundee City Council [2012] P.T.S.R. 983 , at paragraphs 17 to 22). […] 7. Both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal have, in recent cases, emphasized the limits to the court's role in construing planning policy (see the judgment of Lord Carnwath in Suffolk Coastal District Council v Hopkins Homes Ltd.[2017] UKSC 37 , at paragraphs 22 to 26, and my judgment in Mansell v Tonbridge and Malling Borough Council[2017] EWCA Civ 1314 , at paragraph 41). More broadly, though in the same vein, this court has cautioned against the dangers of excessive legalism infecting the planning system – a warning I think we must now repeat in this appeal (see my judgment in Barwood Strategic Land II LLP v East Staffordshire Borough Council[2017] EWCA Civ 893 , at paragraph 50). There is no place in challenges to planning decisions for the kind of hypercritical scrutiny that this court has always rejected – whether of decision letters of the Secretary of State and his inspectors or of planning officers' reports to committee. The conclusions in an inspector's report or decision letter, or in an officer's report, should not be laboriously dissected in an effort to find fault (see my judgment in Mansell, at paragraphs 41 and 42, and the judgment of the Chancellor of the High Court, at paragraph 63).”
“[39] Mr Scoffield argued that the grant of an injunction would be effectual for a number of reasons. In particular, he stated that there was a hope that the grant of an injunction by the court would be sufficient to persuade the respondent to modify her actions as she would know the court had ruled her compliance with the Notices issued by the Council was required. I reject that submission because it is quite clear to date that the respondent has refused to recognise the authority of this court, she has not appeared before this court, she has ignored the Notices to date and there is nothing before this court to indicate that the granting of an injunction by this court would in some way ensure compliance. In fact, it seems to me from the correspondence that it would have the opposite effect. When the Council refused to accept that the Consul General, Madame Zhang Meifang, had immunity that actually led to a breakdown in discussions which were quite fruitful at that stage. [40] Secondly, Mr Scoffield said that the grant of an injunction would assist in the diplomatic effort with the Foreign Office and he referred to commentary in Diplomatic Law, Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 4th Ed. by Eileen Denza, Oxford University Press, pages 264-265 as authority for the proposition that intervention by the court will often assist in that process. I accept that in certain cases that is correct but the difference in this case is that the works that are being carried out are not private acts but rather are acts done on behalf of the sending State and therefore I consider that the grant of an injunction would hinder rather than assist diplomatic efforts. It seems to me that seeking the certificates from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office did have the effect of producing discussions at a high level through diplomatic channels and I think that that is something that would work much better than the grant of an injunction.”
“...whether “there has been procedural unfairness which materially prejudiced the [claimant]” (Hopkins Developments Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government[2014] PTSR 1145 , para 49). This reflects the principle previously stated by Lord Denning MR in George v Secretary of State for the Environment(1979) 77 LGR 689 that “there is no such thing as a ‘technical breach of natural justice’… One should not find a breach of natural justice unless there has been substantial prejudice to the applicant as the result of the mistake or error that has been made”; and by Lord Wilberforce in Malloch v Aberdeen Corpn[1971] 1 WLR 1578 , 1595 that “[a] breach of procedure, whether called a failure of natural justice, or an essential administrative fault, cannot give him a remedy in the courts, unless behind it there is something of substance which has been lost by the failure.”
“9.2 Security details Proposals for the security enhancements of the new embassy site and buildings have been prepared by Cundall Security and have informed the design proposals illustrated in this report. Due to the nature of the subject, details of these proposals have been excluded from this report. Further information pertaining to the security details can be found within the ‘Security Statement’ prepared by Cundall (Security).”
“1. Introduction The proposed new Chinese Embassy is to be located at Royal Mint Court, London, EC3N 4QN (Application reference: PA/21/01327). There is a concern that this development might attract terrorist attacks which could have an impact on the neighbouring properties, as such Tower Hamlets Local Authority has instructed Arup Resilience Security and Risk to undertake an assessment to evaluate the likely impact of blast threats in the event of an explosion attack happening near the embassy or a crowded or publicly accessible area associated with the embassy.”
“St Mary Graces Court (building G), due to its close proximity to the rear of the embassy, would be the worst affected by VBIED or LVBIED attack at the rear of the embassy (location 3, 4, 5 and 7). The worst scenario could be possible building collapse or severe damage to building frame under LVBIED attack.”
“For Building G (St Mary Graces Court), maximum of 30% and 50% cracked glazing is expected for the VBIED and LVBIED scenarios considered, respectively. Furthermore, more than 25% high hazard glazing is predicted for a VBIED at 4 of the 7 locations, and for a LVBIED nearly 50% high-hazard glazing is predicted at 6 of the 7 locations. It is evident that for all but the furthest explosive devices, the glazing of the structure is expected to be extensively damaged, and the hazard to the occupants from flying fragments is expected to be relatively high. It is therefore strongly recommended that mitigation measures are applied to the glazing for the protection of the building’s residents.”
“7.90 The MPS CTSA advised that it would be beneficial to undertake a blast assessment for the public realm and neighbouring buildings to better inform the decision maker of any potential impacts linked to the use of explosive devices. Apart from large embassies, blast assessments are, on occasion, advised and undertaken for a range of buildings that may attract large crowds such as sports stadia, large railway stations, shopping malls or locations with high daily transitory populations such as financial districts. 7.91 The Council commissioned a blast assessment which was undertaken by a competent blast assessor on the Register of Security Engineers and Specialists (RSES). The MPS CTSA reviewed the blast assessment and provided a list of recommendations. The Council have taken these recommendations into consideration and have agreed to secure them as conditions or legal obligations, subject to planning approval. Non-planning recommendations would be passed to other relevant agencies. 7.92 The blast assessment has identified that successful blast events in selected locations would result in injuries and deaths to passers-by as well as structural damage and potential building collapse. The blast assessment must be framed in the context of the likelihood of such an event (blast) occurring. The CTSA has advised that there is no evidence that the application site itself is at greater risk of terrorism compared with the general threat level in the UK. However, ‘Crowded Places’ and ‘Publicly Accessible Locations’ with limited protective security measures are considered to be the most attractive places for potential terrorist activity. Taking account of the advice of the CTSA, there is no evidence that an embassy in this location presents a significantly greater terrorist risk than any other major embassy in London. 7.93 The CTSA has advised that blast attacks are considerably less likely than other, less sophisticated potential attack methodologies due to their complex nature and the ways in which explosive materials are well regulated and difficult to source in the UK. […] 7.95 The CTSA advice has been provided in accordance with their security recommendations having to abide by JASPAR principles of being Justifiable, Achievable, Sustainable, Practical, Affordable, Reasonable. The CTSA recommends that a proportionate response might be to implement broader mitigation strategies to manage the associated security risks, rather than focus on physical blast mitigation solutions that will not be sufficiently effective, also taking into account the likelihood of a blast event occurring. 7.96 Further to the above, the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) states that planning conditions must be necessary, relevant to planning, relevant to the development to be permitted, enforceable, precise and reasonable in all other respects. The NPPF states that legal planning obligations must be necessary to make the development acceptable in planning terms, directly related to the development and fairly and reasonably related in scale and kind to the development. 7.97 Security concerns of local residents may be capable of amounting to a material consideration when determining a planning application. However, the weight to be given to these issues as material planning considerations should be informed by a reasonable evidential basis. The security concerns raised by residents have been considered and advice has been taken from the Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Advisor. 7.98 For the reasons above, it is considered that the broad security measures (HVM bollards, Event/ Protest Management Plan, improvements to St Mary Grace’s Court accesses, Royal Mint Green financial contribution, CCTV financial contribution, street lighting and refuse bin review and possible replacement) outlined to be secured by grant of planning consent would be sufficiently appropriate and proportionate to maintain security around the application site.”
“Saint Mary Grace Court residents and buildings will be most vulnerable to explosive blasts from vehicle or person born improvised explosive devices that can easily penetrate or be placed inside the car parks, gardens and outdoor square that border with the proposed wooden fence and footbridge entrance into the Embassy. […] The above building massing and functional overview clearly shows the largest mass as Embassy House/Residences running the entire south to north boundary line with SMGC behind running as a boundary line in parallel. […] This review considers the entire North - South boundary façade of Embassy House to have no boundary protection from one or more N1G size VBIED(s) detonating alongside the SMGC car park boundary as the proposed wooden fence along the boundary line as stated by LS Cundall in the meeting with David Clarke and others on the 25th of February, would be ‘toast’ in the event of such an explosion.”
“During the call on the 25th of February, Cundall indicated they had not conducted any blast modelling of Embassy House along this boundary fence line as he considered it a minimal risk, however it is unclear if Cundall considered the risk of an N1G sized VBIED detonating within 6.6m of the Embassy façade and residential open balconies. Based on the above, the results of a blast assessment and modelling along the entire North South façade would need to ensure both the occupants and building are reasonably constructed and protected against such a VBIED device detonating from the SMGC within 6.6m and 9.658m at the north and south ends of the service road. Due to the high density of people and critical assets located in Embassy House it would be reasonable and risk prudent to do so. As LS stated in the meeting, a parked vehicle detonating at this point was a ‘medium hazard’. SMGC has considerably less than 20m stand-off to be able to withstand a 2,500 kg 4x4 pick-up (N1G) size VBIED. With no glazing, window frame, door frame or structural protection in place from this type of blast, this places SMGC at high risk. Therefore, in addition to Embassy House, a bomb blast assessment and modelling should also be conducted for SMGC to confirm the extent of damage and casualties such a high risk would produce. Based on a blast assessment and modelling, the required protective measures for SMGC can be put in place and confirmed if additional ones are required for Embassy House.”
“During a call on the 25th of February 2021, Cundall were asked what the impact of a VBIED would be on SMGC when detonating at the wooden fence line by David Clarke. The apparent and inferred advice given by Cundall was that: • This would be a ‘medium hazard’ as Cundall stated on the call there was more than 20m stand-off between the fence and the SMGC residences. • Normal household curtains would protect residents against flying plate glass. • Embassy House has bomb blast protection laminated glass to protect their residents. • The SMGC residential buildings would only suffer minor cracks. • The only injuries to residents would be some temporary hearing loss. • Cundall had not conducted any blast modeling or assessment on the collateral damage to SMGC from a VBIED directed against Embassy House from the SMGC car park as potential damage was considered to be minimal • Cundall had not conducted any blast modeling or assessment on the collateral damage to SMGC from a VBIED directed at the Embassy House East Smithfield Street service and car park entrance and the Embassy House Royal Mint Street car park exit. It is the opinion of this review that the exact stand-off distances should be known before giving such important advice and deciding what further assessment, modelling and then mitigation measures should be taken. The assessment should also consider the maximum size of VBIED likely to gain encroachment or penetration along the boundary perimeter. In so doing, as specialists in blast engineering, Cundall can conduct such assessments and modelling as directed….”
“Terrorism 13.136 RMCRA, FOSKD and TRA all raise significant concerns in respect of the potential threat from terrorism arising from the proposed embassy use and the safety of the neighbouring residents in which they represent [10.14, 10.131-10.136,10.188]. 13.137 In particular, RMCRA commissioned the Crilly Consulting: Security Design Peer Review (referenced as the Crilly Report) to assess the application proposals in terms of security impacts. This document was effectively adopted by FOSKD and TRA. This document concludes that the site would be attractive to terrorists as an iconic and symbolic site and that the estate will be located within a ‘collateral damage zone.’ It also identifies a number of specific vulnerabilities in the sites security design. 13.138 The evidence within the Crilly report is challenged by the applicant’s security witness, and each have sought to discredit the other in terms of expertise and the methodology of assessment of the likelihood of a terrorist attack. At the heart of this is a disagreement in terms of the level of threat that the proposed embassy poses and the resultant effects on neighbouring residents. 13.139 Whether or not a specific threat would arise from the proposed use of the site, both in terms of an embassy, or a Chinese Embassy is somewhat academic; the threat to the UK from terrorism is currently assessed as being ‘substantial’, meaning an attack somewhere in the UK is ‘likely.’237 Terrorist attacks are serious, devastating the lives and communities affected by them and in light of the terrorist threat level, it is right to consider this matter seriously. 13.140 For planning, the NPPF requires appropriate and proportionate steps that can be taken to reduce vulnerability, increase resilience and ensure public safety and security [6.33]. It is also recognised by the LP [6.28]. Fundamentally, the policy basis relates to design matters and designing out crime and reducing risk. 13.141 The site has a particularly close relationship with neighbouring residential properties at St Mary Grace’s Court, not least as this actually forms part of the wider site [10.3-10.4]. However, in terms of neighbouring residential properties being in a collateral damage zone, terrorist attacks are indiscriminate in their nature and have far reaching and deadly consequences. It is an unfortunate and unfathomable truth that if such an attack were to happen, residents would be vulnerable. But residents would be vulnerable should any attack take place in this location, regardless of its use. 13.142 I agree with the applicant that planning permission should not be blocked simply on the basis of a potential terrorist threat; if that was the case then nothing would ever be approved [8.19]. 13.143 It is important to note here that the MPS have not objected in respect or terrorism concerns; even their original objections did not make any specific response on this, although I note that the MPS letter of14 November 2024 notes the Crilly report and states that the vulnerability of residents at St Mary Grace’s Court should not be discounted. In making their comments on the applications, FCDO/HO have also not raised any objections relating to terrorist activities. 13.144 Nonetheless, in line with planning policy, it is important that appropriate and proportionate steps are taken to secure mitigation for terrorist related threats. It is also important to assess other general security impacts, as part of considering matters of heathy and safe communities in the round. The detailed security design was not within the scope of the applicant's security witness' evidence. This was covered by the scheme architect's evidence, principally because it was all considered as an integral part of the scheme design process, which is how it should be. […] Security Measures 13.146 In terms of mitigation measures for safety and security, these would include HVM bollards and planters surrounding the site, including to the footbridge access to Embassy House along Cartwright Street. The measures would also involve contributions towards new CCTV and street lighting. […] 13.148 By their very nature, embassies also have their own relatively high security measures, as opposed to other uses. Public access is limited and there would be security measures at the various entry points into the site as well as within the site. This would also include the bridge access to Embassy House from Cartwright Street. 13.149 The vulnerability and weaknesses identified in the Crilly report include the proposed wooden fence to the rear of the site. This would replace an existing fence which is around 1m in height with a security rated wooden fence which would vary in height between 1.1-3m. In light of this, and also given the level differences between the rear of St Mary Grace's Court and the service access road, the scaling of the fence would be difficult. As acknowledged by the applicant, appropriate treatment could also be applied to the fence to address concerns relating to arson. A proposed condition relating to details of security measures to the undercroft of St Mary Grace's Court would also ensure security measures are assessed and implemented. 13.150 No fence would be provided to the rear of the dwellings which are located at the corner of Cartwright Street and East Smithfield as these would be located adjacent to the secure access point for the service road. 13.151 In making changes to the scheme design based on UK fire regulations, the applicant has also clearly demonstrated their commitment to ensuring safety and there is no reason to believe that the fire strategy, which would be subject to condition would not consider safety for all affected. Whether terrorist groups could exploit the strategy would go beyond a reasonable planning consideration. […] Conclusions on other security considerations 13.156 Overall, I consider that the package of security measures proposed would be wholly proportionate to the proposed use of the site. The policy objectives set out in LP policy D11 as well as paragraphs 102 and 135(f) of the NPPF would be met [6.28, 6.30-1 & 6.33].”
“17. — Procedure after inquiry […] (5) If, after the close of an inquiry, the Secretary of State— (a) differs from the inspector on any matter of fact mentioned in, or appearing to him to be material to, a conclusion reached by the inspector; or (b) takes into consideration any new evidence or new matter of fact (not being a matter of government policy), and is for that reason disposed to disagree with a recommendation made by the inspector, he shall not come to a decision which is at variance with that recommendation without first notifying [in writing]1 the persons entitled to appear at the inquiry who appeared at it of his disagreement and the reasons for it; and affording them an opportunity of making written representations to him or (if the Secretary of State has taken into consideration any new evidence or new matter of fact, not being a matter of government policy) of asking for the reopening of the inquiry.”
“[H]ad RMCRA had sight of the Security Statement and Blast Assessment before the SSHCLG’s decision to grant planning permission, we would have written to the SSHCLG to make the following points: a. We would have argued that on the basis of the disclosed material, this was not an in principle appropriate location for the proposed embassy. b. We would have said that all of the mitigation measures recommended in the Security Statement and Blast Assessment should be secured, and that without them the development would be unacceptable (leaving aside the in principle argument). c. We would have said that the proposed development, especially absent the recommended mitigation, breaches: i. National Planning Policy Framework (“NPPF”) paragraph 102(a) […] ii. NPPF paragraph 135(f) […] iii. London Plan Policy D11 […]” i. National Planning Policy Framework (“NPPF”) paragraph 102(a) […] ii. NPPF paragraph 135(f) […] iii. London Plan Policy D11 […]”
“[E]lementary fairness demanded that the claimant should also be given an opportunity to comment on his proposals.”
“[W]hile some issues raised at planning inquiries or hearings may be of less immediate concern to local residents, this issue was of vital importance to the claimant and his fellow local residents.”
“67 There is no doubt that one of the virtues of procedurally fair decision-making is that it is liable to result in better decisions, by ensuring that the decision-maker receives all relevant information and that it is properly tested. As Lord Hoffmann observed however in Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (No 3)[2010] 2 AC 269 , para 72, the purpose of a fair hearing is not merely to improve the chances of the tribunal reaching the right decision. At least two other important values are also engaged. 68 The rest was described by Lord Hoffmann (ibid) as the avoidance of the sense of injustice which the person who is the subject of the decision will otherwise feel. I would prefer to consider first the reason for that sense of injustice, namely that justice is intuitively understood to require a procedure which pays due respect to persons whose rights are significantly affected by decisions taken in the exercise of administrative or judicial functions. Respect entails that such persons ought to be able to participate in the procedure by which the decision is made, provided they have something to say which is relevant to the decision to be taken.”
“56. In order to consider the context of the site fully, and the concerns raised by RMCRA and others, the Inspector is invited to visit the following: • East Smithfield residential block – this is closest (8.5 metres from the boundary fence and final security check area). • Cartwright Street – to view the plaza and the park opposite. Also to highlight the area where the security bollards are planned to be placed compared to the land the Applicant actually owns. This site makes it clear that there has been no consideration of the consequences for residents • St Mary Graces - North car park to see the privacy issue raised by RMCRA, the useless wooden security fence and how close the two buildings are.”
“I wonder if the CTSA is aware that because of a blast assessment, the Applicant designed bomb blast walls and reinforced building design and glazing to protect from a blast at the service road entrance that directly abuts SMGC. If according to the CTSA and Applicant’s evidence, there is a low risk or remote chance of a vehicle bomb attack why does the CTSA advocate HVM measures and the Applicant design in HVM measures and their own bomb blast wall? Why have the residents of SMGC not been afforded the same protection, especially as SMGC is an asset owned by the PRC and the PRC is the Superior Landlord to the residents of SMGC. […] The boundary treatment along the border with St Mary Graces Court has not been comprehensively assessed. Original consultation with RMCRA was that any acceptable eastern boundary would need to replace the wooden fencing with a suitable bomb blast wall and their homes and windows reinforced against bomb blast the same as the proposed Embassy has reinforced their buildings and designed bomb blast walls to protect the Embassy.”
“We note that concerns have been raised about the fact that some drawings have been marked as being redacted. As the SoS letter notes, this matter was not raised at the Inquiry by the Inspector or any stakeholders or parties making representations. Similarly, the matter was not raised by the London Borough of Tower Hamlets (‘LBTH’) during the course of the applications. However, our clients are pleased to provide further information and to clarify the matters identified in the SoS letter, to the extent that they are material planning considerations and relevant to the decision. […] As a matter of principle, as the SoS notes, the grant of planning permission and listed building consent must make clear to all interested parties what has and has not been permitted. In this case, there can be no possible ambiguity as to the nature of the intended use of the premises, the floorspace proposed, the scale and external appearance of the proposed buildings and the operational effects of the development within its context e.g. traffic generation etc. All these matters were addressed in detail in the application and at the Inquiry. In the case of the listed building consent application, the details of all the works to the listed buildings have been provided in line with common practice. The proposed drawings, along with supporting documentation, are sufficiently clear as to the works proposed which would affect the character of the building as one of special historical/architectural interest, notably the entrance hall, stairwell and façade of the Johnson Smirke building and façade of the Seaman’s Registry. The Applicant does not consider that, as a matter of principle, that it is necessary or appropriate to provide full internal layout plans (which do not affect the external appearance, listed building matters or material planning considerations) in order to understand what has been permitted. An obvious parallel would be a modern office building, where planning applications commonly show simplified floorplates. With the spatial arrangement of such as desk layouts, internal partitions, break out areas, or associated storage areas etc being matters of internal layout driven by operational needs and not in any event subject to planning control or material consideration. Therefore, the Applicant asserts that the level of detail provided is entirely consistent with established planning norms and sufficient for the purpose of understanding what has been permitted. Furthermore, when read alongside the supporting documents, the proposals provide a clear and proportionate level of detail, including the intended use of individual floors. The Design and Access Statement in particular provides a more granular explanation of how each of the buildings will be used and how it has informed the proposed layout. […] Notwithstanding the above, and in order to provide a comprehensive response to the matters highlighted by the SoS, the Applicant has instructed David Chipperfield Architects, to consolidate the 43 drawings listed in Annex A of the SoS letter […] The Applicant considers the level of detail shown on the unredacted plans is sufficient to identify the main uses of the principle rooms. In these circumstances, we consider it is neither necessary nor appropriate to provide additional more detailed internal layout plans or details.”
“7. — General requirements: applications for planning permission including outline planning permission (1) Subject to paragraphs (3) to (5), an application for planning permission must— (a) be made in writing to the local planning authority on a form published by the Secretary of State (or a form to substantially the same effect); (b) include the particulars specified or referred to in the form; (c) except where the application is made pursuant to section 73 (determination of applications to develop land without conditions previously attached) or section 73A(2)(c) (planning permission for development already carried out) of the 1990 Act1 or is an application of a kind referred to in article 20(1)(b) or (c), be accompanied, whether electronically or otherwise, by— (i) a plan which identifies the land to which the application relates; (ii) any other plans, drawings and information necessary to describe the development which is the subject of the application.” (i) a plan which identifies the land to which the application relates; (ii) any other plans, drawings and information necessary to describe the development which is the subject of the application.”
“9.3.1 It is agreed that the submitted Fire Safety Statement and the additional improvements meet the requirements of London Plan Policy D12 and relevant Regulations, and compliance would be secured by planning condition.”
“Given what they had been told it is inconceivable that the planning officers could properly have rejected the application as failing to provide the particulars demanded by article 7(1) and their own guidance.”
“18 This is a short point. It involves the construction of two particular provisions which I have already set out. […] 20 On the ordinary and natural meaning of these provisions it appears to me that the map referred to in paragraph 1(a) of Schedule 14 is the map which must be drawn to the prescribed scale. Only one map accompanied each application. In each case it was the map produced as described above to a presented scale of 1:25,000 or larger, in that measurements on the map corresponded to measurements on the ground by a fixed ratio whereby a measurement of 1 cm on the map corresponds to a measurement of no more than 250 metres on the ground. Thus each such map was on a scale of not less than 1:25,000 and, in my opinion, satisfied regulations 2 and 8(2) of the 1993 Regulations. In my opinion each such map also satisfied paragraph 1(a) of Schedule 14 on the basis that it was drawn to the same scale.”
“[T]he criterion so established may itself be so imprecise that different decision-makers, each acting rationally, might reach differing conclusions when applying it to the facts of a given case. In such a case the court is entitled to substitute its own opinion for that of the person to whom the decision has been entrusted only if the decision is so aberrant that it cannot be classed as rational: Edwards v. Bairstow [1956] A.C. 14. The present is such a case. Even after eliminating inappropriate senses of "substantial" one is still left with a meaning broad enough to call for the exercise of judgment rather than an exact quantitative measurement. Approaching the matter in this light I am quite satisfied that there is no ground for interference by the court, since the conclusion at which the commission arrived was well within the permissible field of judgment. Indeed I would go further, and say that in my opinion it was right.”
“It is also important to bear in mind that many questions are not “hard-edged” and call for evaluation on matters of degree and opinion: see e.g. R v Monopolies and Mergers Commission, ex p. South Yorkshire Transport Ltd[1993] 1 WLR 23 , at 32 (Lord Mustill). In that case the statutory formula which had to be applied was whether an area was a “substantial part” of the United Kingdom. That was held not to be a “hard-edged” question but one that called for evaluation, a task that was for the primary decision-maker, subject to judicial review on conventional public law grounds.”
“[A] right of appeal does arise even when the local planning authority have formed the opinion that the application is invalid. The applicant is entitled to have the opinion of the Secretary of State on the question of validity. I reach that conclusion upon a purposive construction of the statutes and a consideration of the scheme as a whole. […] Regulation 3 of the Regulations of 1988 does not purport to make the local planning authority the sole judge of what plans, drawings and information are necessary to describe the development. (In this respect, the council are on stronger ground on thePlanning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 which does include the expression "such other particulars as may be required by the [local planning] authority.") […] Nothing in the judgment should be read as discouraging applicants for planning permission and listed building consent from providing appropriate detail with their applications or from co-operating with local planning authorities. Moreover, there could be requests for permission which are so deficient in form and substance that no reasonable local authority or Secretary of State could reasonably treat them as "applications" within the meaning of the legislation.”
“34. While it is the duty of Contracting States to take reasonable and appropriate measures to enable lawful demonstrations to proceed peacefully, they cannot guarantee this absolutely and they have a wide discretion in the choice of the means to be used (see, mutatis mutandis, the Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali judgment of28 May 1985 , Series A no. 94, pp. 33-34, § 67, and the Rees judgment of17 October 1986 , Series A no. 106, pp. 14-15, §§ 35-37). In this area the obligation they enter into under Article 11 (art. 11) of the Convention is an obligation as to measures to be taken and not as to results to be achieved.”
“51. Naturally, severe environmental pollution may affect individuals’ well-being and prevent them from enjoying their homes in such a way as to affect their private and family life adversely, without, however, seriously endangering their health. Whether the question is analysed in terms of a positive duty on the State - to take reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the applicant’s rights under paragraph 1 of Article 8 (art. 8-1) -, as the applicant wishes in her case, or in terms of an "interference by a public authority" to be justified in accordance with paragraph 2 (art. 8-2), the applicable principles are broadly similar. In both contexts regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole, and in any case the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation. Furthermore, even in relation to the positive obligations flowing from the first paragraph of Article 8 (art. 8-1), in striking the required balance the aims mentioned in the second paragraph (art. 8-2) may be of a certain relevance (see, in particular, the Rees v. the United Kingdom judgment of17 October 1986 , Series A no. 106, p. 15, para. 37, and the Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom judgment of21 February 1990 , Series A no. 172, p. 18, para. 41).”
“83. A governmental decision-making process concerning complex issues of environmental and economic policy must in the first place involve appropriate investigations and studies so that the effects of activities that might damage the environment and infringe individuals’ rights may be predicted and evaluated in advance and a fair balance may accordingly be struck between the various conflicting interests at stake (see Hatton and Others, cited above, § 128). The importance of public access to the conclusions of such studies and to information enabling members of the public to assess the danger to which they are exposed is beyond question (see, mutatis mutandis, Guerra and Others, cited above, § 60, and McGinley and Egan v. the United Kingdom,9 June 1998 , § 97, Reports 1998-III). Lastly, the individuals concerned must also be able to appeal to the courts against any decision, act or omission where they consider that their interests or their comments have not been given sufficient weight in the decision-making process (see, mutatis mutandis, Hatton and Others, cited above, § 128, and Taşkın and Others, cited above, §§ 118-19”
“[92] The judgment in any particular case by the national authorities that there are legitimate planning objections to a particular use of a site is one which the Court is not well equipped to challenge. It cannot visit each site to assess the impact of a particular proposal on a particular area in terms of impact on beauty, traffic conditions, sewerage and water facilities, educational facilities, medical facilities, employment opportunities and so on. Because planning inspectors visit the site, hear the arguments on all sides and allow examination of witnesses, they are better situated than the Court to weigh the arguments. Hence, as the Court observed in BUCKLEY, “in so far as the exercise of discretion involving a multitude of local factors is inherent in the choice and implementation of planning policies, the national authorities in principle enjoy a wide margin of appreciation”, although it remains open to the Court to conclude that there has been a manifest error of appreciation by the national authorities.”
“i) The application does not require a full merits review. It requires review on traditional judicial review grounds, together with consideration of whether the resulting decision engages article 8 and, insofar as it does, whether the adverse impact of the decision on the article 8 rights engaged is proportionate to the legitimate aims sought to be protected (including both the public interest, and the rights and interests of other individuals). ii) In considering whether the decision breached relevant article 8 rights, the court is required to consider the merits, with appropriate scrutiny, but it should do so bearing in mind that the inspector's function, assigned to him by the statutory scheme and ultimately Parliament, is to consider the merits of all material considerations, including any article 8 rights that are engaged. The inspector is an expert and experienced, and acts in a quasi-judicial capacity, which each warrant a wide margin of discretion. He is acting in an area of social policy, which in itself attracts a wide margin of discretion. As a result, considerable deference ought to be attached to his conclusion. iii) Proportionality is a question of substance and not form. If the inspector has clearly engaged with the article 8 rights in play, and considered them with care, given his wide margin of discretion, it is unlikely that the court will interfere with his conclusion on grounds of proportionality. If he has not – even if he has not referred to article 8 rights at all – on usual principles, the court will not quash his decision if his error is immaterial. If his error is material, then it is open to the court to find that the interference with the relevant human rights is in any event proportionate; or quash the decision.”
“In the first place, the proportionality test in para 41 above has been formulated specifically for cases where negative obligations under article 8 restraining the state from interfering with the rights in the provision are concerned. It cannot be applied in the same way and with the same rigour where the question is whether the state is subject to a positive obligation to take steps to assist an individual to enjoy those rights. Although, as the authorities explain, the ultimate question in both cases is whether a fair balance has been struck between the rights of the individual and the rights of others and the interests of the general community, where it is asserted that a positive obligation exists that question is addressed in a more general and less formalised way. For the reasons we have given, on proper analysis the appellant’s case is that he is owed a positive obligation by the state to adopt a different rehabilitation regime from which he would be capable of benefiting.”