Law Lane Solicitors, R (on the application of) v The Legal Ombudsman [2026] EWHC 199 (Admin)

[2026] EWHC 199 (Admin)

Case No AC-2025-LON-002146

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING’S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date 3 February 2026

Before

ANDREW KINNIER K.C.

Sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court

THE KING

(On the application of LAW LANE SOLICITORS)

Between

THE LEGAL OMBUDSMANDefendant

MAISOUR GRAM

Interested Party

Zane Malik K.C.(instructed by Law Lane Solicitors) for Claimant

Remi Reichhold (instructed by the Legal Ombudsman) for Defendant

The Interested Party was neither present nor represented

Hearing Hearing dates: 13 January 2026

JUDGMENT

ANDREW KINNIER K.C. sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court:

[1]Law Lane Solicitors, the Claimant, renews its application for permission to bring a judicial review challenging the decision of the Legal Ombudsman (dated 14 March 2025) (“the decision”) to uphold the complaint against it brought by Mr Maisour Gram, a former client and the Interested Party in these proceedings. The Legal Ombudsman found that the service provided by the Claimant to Mr Gram was not reasonable and it was directed to make a total payment of £66,320.27 in relation to compensation, a refund of fees paid and a waiver of unpaid fees.

PART 1 - preliminary matters

[2]The efficient progress of this claim has been hindered by a series of procedural breaches by the Claimant. The detail and consequences of those breaches are considered below but at this stage I should note that the Claimant’s skeleton argument in support of its renewed application for permission and its renewal hearing bundle were only served on the day of the hearing (13 January 2026). Because the bundle had not been successfully uploaded to allow me to read it before the hearing, I reserved judgment to allow me to consider its contents in light of the Claimant’s skeleton argument. I did so without prejudice to any sanctions that might be imposed in response to the Claimant’s failure to comply with the directions on service of the skeleton argument and the bundle.

[3]In relation to the skeleton argument, no criticism is made of Mr Malik KC who appears on behalf of the Claimant and has only recently been instructed. Indeed, I am grateful to him for the pragmatic and realistic way in which he assisted the court. I am also grateful to Mr Remi Reichhold, counsel for the Legal Ombudsman, not only for his measured submissions but also for his helpful supplemental bundle which was lodged in time. PART 2 – the background The factual background

PART 2 – the background

[4]In March 2018, Mr Gram instructed the Claimant to help him recover funds he had invested in a business. In December 2020, Mr Gram’s claim was successful: the other side was ordered to repay his investment and to pay his costs.

[5]On 2 August 2022, Mr Gram lodged a formal complaint to which the Claimant responded on 26 August 2022. The next day, Mr Gram brought the complaint to the Legal Ombudsman. Three matters were accepted for investigation: Complaint 1:(a) “The firm says that they agreed to fixed fees of £2,500 and £25,000 plus VAT (a total of £33,000 including VAT) and have received £28,012 from Mr Gram and also retained the sum of £6,723,44 received from the other side for costs and say they have offset this amount from money owed by Mr Gram. In contrast, Mr Gram says he only agreed to a fixed fee of £25,000 (inc. VAT) and he has paid the firm approx. £39,000 (inc. VAT). The firm say Mr Gram still owes £4,988 but Mr Gram says this is not correct as he has paid more than the firm says, and that firm has not accounted for all the money correctly; the firm did not set out the likely cost of a barrister at the outset, so it was not until the case had reached the final stage that Mr Gram was aware of the costs; the firm did not give a cost/benefit analysis, so Mr Gram went ahead without knowing the costs and if it was worth proceeding.” Complaint 2:

(b) “The background to this aspect is that costs of £80,000 were ordered by the court (order of 6 November 2020) to be paid by the other side to Mr Gram. The firm took no action regarding security for costs and this amount has not been received. The firm has not provided appropriate advice as to how this sum might be recovered.” Complaint 3:

(c) “The background to this aspect is that following the trial and the judgment the firm sent, on 8 June 2021, an invoice for £15,000 for the work they said had been carried out. The firm never provided an estimate for post-judgment work and no agreement was made regarding carrying out the work or any fees to be charged.”

[6]On 29 October 2024, following a consideration of the complaint, the investigator concluded that it should be upheld. The Claimant disagreed and so the complaint was submitted to the Legal Ombudsman for re-consideration. On 20 February 2025, the Legal Ombudsman gave a provisional decision, a step which was prompted by his decision to change the wording of some of the complaints to the following:

“(1) (a) The firm has not charged its fees in accordance with the costs information provided to Mr Gram. (b) The firm did not set out the likely cost of a barrister at the outset so it was not until the case had reached the final stage that Mr Gram was aware of the costs. (c) The firm did not give a cost/benefit analysis, so Mr Gram went ahead without knowing the costs and if it was worth proceeding. (2) (a) The firm took no action regarding Security for Costs and this amount has not been received. (b) The firm have not provided appropriate advice as to how this sum (Mr Gram’s £80,000 costs) might be recovered. (3) The firm never provided an estimate for post-judgment work and no agreement was made regarding carrying out the work or any fees to be charged.”

[7]The Legal Ombudsman later upheld the complaint but for different reasons. In those circumstances, the parties were given an opportunity to provide further comment before a final decision was made. On 14 March 2025, the Legal Ombudsman issued the final decision.

[8]On 14 April 2025, the Claimant sent a pre-action protocol letter followed by a supplemental letter on 28 April 2025. The Legal Ombudsman responded on 13 May 2025.

The legal background

[9]For present purposes, the relevant legal context can be summarised thus:(a) The Legal Ombudsman scheme was established under the Legal Services Act 2007 (“the Act”) which defines its jurisdiction and allows scheme rules to be published. A complaint which relates to an act or omission of a person (known as “the respondent”) in carrying on an activity is within the jurisdiction of the Legal Ombudsman’s scheme if it is not otherwise excluded: s. 125(1). A complaint is excluded from the jurisdiction of the Legal Ombudsman’s scheme if the complaint has not first used the respondent’s complaints procedure “in relation to that complaint”: s. 126(1). Scheme rules may provide that s. 126(1) does not apply in specified circumstances: s. 126(3).

(b) The 2019 scheme rules applied to Mr Gram’s complaint. Two provisions are relevant: first, r.

4.1 stated the general rule that ordinarily a complainant cannot use the Legal Ombudsman’s scheme unless the complainant has first used the respondent’s complaints procedure; secondly, r.

4.2 provided that the scheme may be used where the Legal Ombudsman considered that there were exceptional reasons to consider the complaint without it having been made first to the respondent.

[2008] EWHC 2142 (Admin)

. One of the purposes of the Legal Ombudsman’s scheme is to enable complaints to be resolved quickly, with minimal formality and by an independent person: s. 113(1) of the Act. To achieve that statutory object, the Court of Appeal has emphasised that the courts should not import undue formality into the scheme nor view it legalistically: Maxwell v. The Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education

[2011] EWCA Civ 1236

, para. 38; Miller

[2018] EWCA Civ 144

, para. 55.

(d) In Crawford, the court held that the principles in the higher education complaints case of R (Siborurema) v. Office for the Independent Adjudicator

[2007] EWCA Civ 1365

applied to the Legal Ombudsman’s scheme. Popplewell J found that the scheme was intended to resolve complaints swiftly and informally with the Legal Ombudsman doing the best that he can on limited material and without hearing detailed evidence. To achieve its aims, the Legal Ombudsman may rely on evidence which would not be admissible in court, and he may draw adverse inferences from a failure to provide information or documents. In resolving complaints by reference to the statutory criterion of what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances, the judge concluded, at para. 20(2) of the judgment, that the Legal Ombudsman is “… afforded a considerable latitude of discretion. The test is what “in his opinion” is fair and reasonable. He is not bound by the Approved Regulator’s code of conduct although he must take account of it. He may apply his own standards of what he considers to have been good practice at the time.”

The procedural background

[10]Although the Claimant sought unsuccessfully to issue the claim form on 16 June 2025 and without a detailed statement of facts and grounds, proceedings were eventually issued on 1 July 2025 supported by a detailed statement.

[11]Sections B (paras. 3 and 4) and F (paras. 19-37) of the detailed statement contain the Claimant’s grounds of challenge. Although their content is diffuse and not wholly clear, the grounds can be summarised thus: Illegality:(a) This ground has two principal elements: first, the Legal Ombudsman wrongly applied the 2023 scheme rules and not the 2019 scheme rules: see paras. 19 and 20 of the detailed statement. Secondly, the Legal Ombudsman had no jurisdiction under s. 126(1) of the Legal Services Act 2007 (“the Act”) to deal with a complaint that had not first been submitted to and considered under the Claimant’s own complaints procedure: see paras. 4(1) and 22-23 of the detailed statement. In particular, the Legal Ombudsman had no jurisdiction to consider Mr Gram’s complaint that he had not authorised counsel’s fees: see para. 4(1). Irrationality:

(b) Under this ground, the Claimant attacks the Legal Ombudsman’s conclusions on complaints 1(a), (b), (c), 2(b) and 3. The Claimant essentially challenges the factual bases of the Legal Ombudsman’s conclusions in relation to each of those complaints: see paras. 4(2)-(12) and 24-37 of the detailed grounds. Procedural impropriety:

(c) It is alleged that the Legal Ombudsman failed to follow its own rules and guidance: see para. 23 of the detailed grounds. In particular, it is alleged that, the Legal Ombudsman acted contrary to advice, contained in a “frequently asked questions” part of its website, and decided some of Mr Gram’s complaints without allowing the Claimant to consider and resolve them.

[12]On 16 June 2025, the day on which the Claimant unsuccessfully sought to issue the claim, it also made an application for an extension of time for service of its detailed statement. No application was made to extend time for the issue of the claim even though, by that time, it was more than three months since the decision had been made. The Claimant relied on four reasons to justify an extension: first, the case was complex; secondly, it was having difficulty finding the relevant hard copy file; thirdly, the fee earners who handled Mr Gram’s matter were no longer employed by the Claimant which delayed efforts to obtain essential witness statements and case documents; fourthly, Mr Jatoi, the Claimant’s director, had been out of the country because of a medical emergency and his daughter’s engagement was “also making it difficult.”

[13]On 17 July 2025, the Legal Ombudsman filed and served his Acknowledgement of Service and Summary Grounds of Defence. In short, it was said that the claim had been issued out of time and there was no good reason to extend time. It was also submitted that none of the grounds was arguable and so permission should be refused.

[14]On 24 July 2025, the Claimant filed a Reply. To the extent that its content is relevant, the Reply conceded that the Legal Ombudsman had applied the correct scheme rules; it maintained that the claim was issued in time; it also repeated the allegation that the Legal Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to determine additional complaints regarding pre-trial fees or counsel’s fees.

[15]By an order dated 19 November 2025 (“the Order”), Marcus Pilgerstorfer KC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, refused permission and the application to extend time for issue of the claim.(a) As to timing, the judge treated the application as one for an extension of time to issue the claim. He concluded that the claim was not issued promptly or within three months. The judge considered whether he should extend time but he concluded that no good explanation had been provided to explain the delay. In particular, there was no explanation why the Claimant was able to prepare a detailed pre-action protocol letter in April 2025 but was unable to issue the claim promptly or within time.

(b) The judge also considered the merits. He reminded himself that when reviewing a Legal Ombudsman’s decision, the court must have regard to the statutory purpose of the scheme (s. 113 of the Act); that it is intended to provide swift and effective resolution of complaints (s. 113(1)) and that the Legal Ombudsman must decide what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances (s. 137(1) of the Act): R (Crawford) v. Legal Ombudsman

[2014] EWHC 182

. The judge also reminded himself that the Legal Ombudsman must apply the scheme with minimum standards of fairness that are to be interpreted in light of the statutory context: Miller v. Health Commissioner for England

[2018] EWCA Civ 144

(c) As to the particular grounds: (i) The judge was not satisfied that the 2023 scheme rules applied because they only apply to complaints referred to the Legal Ombudsman after 1 April 2023: see para. 1.1 of the 2023 scheme rules. As Mr Gram’s complaint was referred on 27 August 2022, the 2019 scheme rules applied. The judge also noted that the Claimant appeared to accept that point: see para. 4 of the Reply and para. 14 above. (ii) The judge was not persuaded that the jurisdictional argument was arguable. He noted that although the Legal Ombudsman cannot re-craft a complaint, it was equally clear that complaints should not be treated as if they were formal pleadings. In any event, the Legal Ombudsman is ideally placed to reach a judgment about what a complaint is effectively concerned: Tenet Connect

[2018] EWHC 459

, para. 47; R (Rosemarine) v. Office for Legal Complaints

[2014] EWHC 601 (Admin)

, paras. 69-70. Given the substance of Mr Gram’s complaint, there was no arguable merit in the contention that the Legal Ombudsman exceeded the power to form a judgment about the true substance of the complaint. Similarly, there was no need for formal or strict link between the complaint as made to the solicitor’s firm and that made to the Legal Ombudsman. In any event, the Legal Ombudsman’s decision was made under paras. 4.2(b) and 5.3(c) of the scheme rules and in the provisional, not the challenged final, decision. In doing so, the Legal Ombudsman made no arguable error of public law because the Claimant had the opportunity to address the revised heads of complaint before the final decision was made. (iii) The judge was not satisfied that the irrationality arguments were arguable. He concluded that they amounted to nothing more than a disagreement with the Legal Ombudsman’s assessment. The judge noted that, as explained in Crawford, the Ombudsman has significant latitude to determine what in his opinion is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of the case. It was not arguable that the Ombudsman had exceeded that latitude or reached a perverse conclusion. (iv) The judge did not accept that the procedural arguments were arguable. (v) Finally, having regard to the guidance in R (Wasif) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department

[2016] 1 WLR 2793

, the judge was not persuaded that the claim was totally without merit.

[16]On 25 November 2025, the Claimant lodged its notice of renewal of the claim for permission. It said that:

“The Claimant seeks reconsideration of its grounds at the oral hearing as the Ombudsman exceeded jurisdiction by determining new complaint issues not raised with the firm, contrary to s. 126 of the [Act], without exceptional reason findings. The Final Decision was procedurally unfair as important adverse findings were never put to the Claimant. The Claimant also wants reconsideration of its application for extension of time.”

[17]On 5 January 2026, the Claimant applied for, and was later granted, an extended time allowance of 1½ hours for its renewal hearing.

PART 3 – the Claimant’s procedural breaches

[18]Mr Reichhold submitted, and Mr Malik KC rightly accepted, that the Claimant had committed the following procedural breaches:(a) The renewal notice failed to comply with para. 8.6 of PD 54A because it did not set out why it disagreed with the judge’s reasons for refusing permission.

(b) Contrary to para. 4(b) of the Order, the bundle was not served within 21 days of its service and there is no application for relief from sanctions for that failure.

(c) Contrary to paras. 4(d)(i) and (ii) of the Order, neither the skeleton argument nor the authorities bundle were served by 6 January 2026. No application for relief has been made in relation to the skeleton argument or the authorities bundle.

[19]If the bundle is not served on time and in accordance with the court’s directions, para. 4(c) of the Order provides for a sanction: permission will be determined on the basis of the renewal notice and the documents before the court at the paper stage unless the court directs otherwise. In response, Mr Malik KC invited me to consider costs as an appropriate sanction but to allow the Claimant to rely on the bundle.

[20]The importance of procedural rigour in judicial review proceedings has been repeatedly emphasised by the senior courts: see, in particular, R (Spahiu) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

[2018] EWCA Civ 2604

[2019] 1 WLR 1297

; R (Talpada) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department

[2018] EWCA Civ 841

. That importance is emphasised in the Administrative Court Guide: see para. 2.1 (on the need to comply with deadlines) and para. 13.9 (on relief from sanctions).

[21]Set against that background, I now turn to each procedural breach:(a) The renewal notice does not set out the reasons why the Claimant disagreed with the refusal of permission. On the contrary, the application only sought re-consideration of the jurisdictional and procedural unfairness grounds and the application for an extension of time. Two points arise: (i) As para. 9.4.5 of the Administrative Court Guide (2025) makes clear, it is not sufficient simply to state that renewal is sought on the original grounds, without seeking to explain the scope of the renewed application and the asserted error in the refusing judge’s reasons. If the refusing judge’s reasons are not addressed, the judge may make a costs order against the claimant at the renewal hearing and/or impose such sanction as the court considers appropriate. (ii) For present purposes, the Claimant’s renewal notice relied on two grounds of challenge in addition to the extension of time application. Having considered the Acknowledgement of Service, Summary Grounds and the refusing judge’s reasons, the Claimant (which was familiar with the substance of its own case) decided to concentrate on those two points only. Although Mr Malik KC’s skeleton argument sought to rely on an additional ground (mistake of fact), he did not seek to argue that it was mentioned or even prefigured in the renewal notice. No reason was given why the additional ground was not in the renewal notice or why it had not been raised between 25 November 2025 (when the notice was served) and 13 January 2026 (the day of the hearing when the Claimant’s skeleton argument was lodged). In the circumstances and bearing in mind the importance of procedural discipline in judicial review proceedings, the renewal application will be confined to the two grounds contained in the renewal notice and the application for an extension of time.

(b) The Claimant has given no explanation for the failure to serve the bundle in accordance with para. 4(b) of the Order. No application for relief has been made, an omission which was similarly unexplained. Absent any explanation or application, the sanction in para. 4(c) of the Order should apply. Permission will therefore be determined on the basis of the renewal notice and the documents before the court at the paper stage.

(c) Mr Malik KC told me that he had been instructed only recently and prepared the skeleton argument the day before the hearing. There is, however, no explanation of why he was instructed so late particularly when in mid-December 2025 the Claimant had cited Leading Counsel’s availability as a justification for an extended time estimate and an afternoon listing. Having regard to the three-part test in Denton v. TH White Ltd

[2014] EWCA Civ 906

, lodging the skeleton argument on the day of the renewal hearing and in clear breach of para. 4(d)(i) of the Order was a serious failing. It denied the court a proper opportunity to consider the Claimant’s arguments in good time before the hearing and it needlessly disrupted the Legal Ombudsman’s preparation. That said, although no satisfactory explanation has been provided for the delay or the failure to apply for relief, both Mr Reichhold and I were able to consider the skeleton argument before the hearing. In particular, Mr Reichhold was able to respond to its contents without the need for an adjournment. In the circumstances and bearing in mind that the Claimant’s default can be proportionately addressed by a costs order, the Claimant may rely on the skeleton argument but only to the extent that it deals with the jurisdictional and procedural unfairness grounds and the sought-for extension of time.

[22]The costs consequences of the Claimant’s procedural breaches are addressed at para. 34(a) below.

PART 4 – extension of time

[23]Mr Malik KC rightly accepted that the claim was issued neither promptly nor in time. As the decision was made on 14 March 2025, the three-month period expired on 13 June 2025. The claim was eventually issued 17 days later. Although the Claimant had not made an application for an extension of time to issue the claim, the refusing judge treated the application for an extension of time for service of the detailed grounds as one. I shall adopt the same approach. Mr Malik KC relied on the reasons previously relied upon by the Claimant which are summarised at para. 12 above.

[24]Lewis LJ set out the correct approach to an application for an extension of time in R (AK) v. Entry Clearance Office (Islamabad)

[2021] EWCA Civ 1038

at para. 47:

“The courts do adopt a rigorous approach to such applications and it is well recognised that there is a public interest in judicial review claims being brought promptly and in any event no later than three months and a failure to do so and is seen as a significant and serious failure. The courts will consider and scrutinise carefully whether there is a good reason for the delay. They do consider other relevant circumstances whether the claim involves issues of public importance which it is in the public interest to resolve and also any prejudice to other parties of allowing the claim to proceed. In addition, section 31(6) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 specifically provides that where there has been undue delay the court may refuse to grant permission if granting a remedy would be likely to cause substantial hardship or substantially prejudice the rights of any person or be detrimental to good administration.”

[25]As the failure to issue a claim in time is significant and serious, the next question is whether the Claimant has given good reasons to justify it. Turning to each of the Claimant’s reasons:(a) The claim is not especially complex. In any event, the Claimant had been on notice about the substance and result of the Legal Ombudsman’s conclusion since February 2025. The Claimant had prepared a detailed pre-action protocol letter one month after the final decision was published and, in my judgment, had sufficient time to prepare the claim to ensure that it was issued promptly and within three months of the decision.

(b) The Claimant has not specified what hard copy file was needed to prepare the claim. It has also not explained why its contents are said to be relevant to the grounds of challenge or preparation of the claim in circumstances where most of relevant documentation was e-mail correspondence.

(c) There is no persuasive evidence that the departure of fee earners materially delayed preparation of the claim. In particular, the fee earners are not identified and there is no adequate explanation of their role in the case or their relevance to the subject-matter of the complaint. Secondly, the Claimant only served one statement, namely that made by Mr Jatoi, the firm’s director. There is no indication that Mr Jatoi’s evidence is in any way incomplete because fee earners left his firm. Thirdly, as most of the documents relied upon by the Claimant are e-mails, there is no reason why they could not have been found by the Claimant notwithstanding the fee earners’ departure. Finally, although Mr Malik KC submitted that of the Claimant’s 30 or so fee earners, only three were litigators, there was nothing to suggest that any of them were unable to prepare the claim in good time before time expired.

(d) The short point is, as the refusing judge found, there is no medical evidence to support an inability to bring the claim in time.

(e) In the circumstances, no good reason has been advanced for the failure to issue the claim promptly or within three months of the decision.

[26]Turning the broader circumstances, if an extension of time were granted, Mr Gram may suffer some prejudice because of the further time that would be taken to resolve the claim. That said, Mr Reichhold told me that judgment had been entered against the Claimant by Mr Gram which will protect his interests. I also accept that further delay may detract from the Legal Ombudsman’s aim of providing a swift resolution to complaints. On the other hand, if the application were refused, the Claimant would suffer the greater prejudice because, for the reasons set out below, he would lose the opportunity to argue the jurisdictional point at a full hearing.

[27]The Claimant’s poor compliance with case management directions and its exacerbating failures to apply for relief or to provide any explanation for its various defaults tend to point against the grant of the application. That said, past failings can be addressed by a costs order and future compliance can be achieved by sanctions such as an unless order.

[28]Viewing the case overall, notwithstanding the weight of the contrary factors, the fact that the Claimant has an arguable ground of challenge and the consequential prejudice should it not be allowed to argue its case at a full hearing, tip (but only just) the balance in favour of allowing the application. I therefore extend time for the issue of the claim to 30 June 2025.

PART 5 – the Claimant’s grounds

[29]The jurisdictional ground can be summarised thus:(a) Section 125 of the Act provides that a complaint which relates to an act or omission of a person in carrying on an activity is within the jurisdiction of the Legal Ombudsman’s scheme if the complaint is not excluded from that jurisdiction by s. 126 of the Act.

(b) In turn, s. 126 of the Act materially provides that:

“(1) A complaint is excluded from the jurisdiction of the ombudsman scheme if the complainant has not first used the respondent’s complaints procedure in relation to the complaint … (3) Scheme rules may provide that subsection (1) does not apply in specified circumstances.” (c) The phrase “in relation to the complaint” is central to the Claimant’s jurisdictional point. It is said that the Legal Ombudsman only has jurisdiction to consider a complaint if the complainant has first used the respondent’s complaints procedure in relation to that complaint. Had Parliament intended that the Legal Ombudsman’s jurisdiction should be engaged in respect of all complaints so long as one complaint was made using the respondent’s complaints procedures, it would not have used the phrase “in relation to the complaint” in s. 126(1) of the Act. (d) Although r. 4.1 of the Legal Ombudsman’s scheme rules purports to reflect the jurisdictional bar in s. 126(1) of the Act, the Claimant submits that, as drafted, the rule does not explicitly link the respondent’s complaints procedure to “the complaint”

. As r. 4.1 cannot confer jurisdiction which Parliament has not given him, properly construed, the rule prevents the Legal Ombudsman from considering a complaint unless the complainant has used the respondent’s complaints procedure “in relation to that complaint”. (e) Rule 4.2(b) allows a complainant to use the Legal Ombudsman’s scheme if the latter considers that there are “exceptional reasons” to consider the complaint without it having been made first to the authorised person. Here, the Legal Ombudsman amended the complaint under r. 4.2(b) which he otherwise lacked jurisdiction to decide. Furthermore, he did so on an “untenable” basis: the detail of Mr Gram’s health condition was not specified and so the reader was unable to understand the Legal Ombudsman’s decision why “exceptional reasons” existed.

[30]Permission will be granted if a ground is arguable with a realistic prospect of success and is not subject to a discretionary bar such as delay or the availability of an alternative remedy: Sharma v. Brown-Antoine

[2007] 1 WLR 780

, para. 14.

[31]Having considered the papers that were before the court at the paper stage, the renewal notice and the parties’ submissions, I am satisfied that the jurisdictional ground is arguable. Notwithstanding the generous margin extended to the Legal Ombudsman’s exercise of his functions, I accept that it is arguable whether, properly construed, ss. 125 and 126 of the Act and rr. 4.1 and 4.2(b) of the scheme rules allow the Legal Ombudsman to consider a complaint which was not first raised with the Claimant. In reaching this view, I have carefully considered the judgment of HHJ Stephen Davies in the Rosemarine case and para. 76 in particular. Although it may be that in the end HHJ Davies’ conclusion is the answer to the jurisdictional ground, I accept that the Claimant has a properly arguable point that Rosemarine can be distinguished on its facts from the present case. The Claimant, therefore, has permission to rely on the jurisdictional ground.

[32]For the sake of completeness, I should note that the day after the hearing, on 14 January 2026, the judgment in The King (Sufian) v. The Legal Ombudsman

[2026] EWHC 28 (Admin)

was handed down. The Legal Ombudsman drew it to my attention following circulation of the draft judgment but made no submissions on its relevance to this case. Although the Sufian decision illustrates the significant obstacles confronting the Claimant, the jurisdictional ground as formulated by Mr Malik KC in his skeleton argument was not, as far as I can see, argued in that case.

[33]Notwithstanding its various formulations during the course of the litigation, the Claimant’s case on procedural unfairness can be distilled into one proposition: before revising the complaint, the Legal Ombudsman should have invited submissions from the Claimant. In my judgment, this ground is unarguable. The Claimant had the opportunity to make representations in answer to Mr Gram’s complaint. In particular, the Claimant was able to make representations to the Legal Ombudsman in response to the provisional decision. However, the Claimant decided to make no submissions at all in response to the provisional decision. In my judgment, paras. 30-32 of Mr Malik KC’s skeleton argument ignore the basic point that the Claimant had the opportunity to make submissions in response to the revised complaint but decided not to do so. Therefore, the Claimant is refused permission to rely on the procedural unfairness ground.

Conclusion

[34]For the reasons set out above, time for issuing the claim is extended to 30 June 2025 and the Claimant has permission to rely upon the jurisdictional ground only.

[35]There are two consequential points:(a) Subject to the parties’ submissions, I am provisionally minded to order the Claimant to pay the Defendant’s costs of the renewal application to be subject to summary assessment on the papers if not agreed. Having regard to the court’s broad discretion on costs and the Claimant’s various procedural failings and their consequences, my provisional view is that such an order appropriately achieves the overriding objective in this case. If the point is contentious, the parties are to lodge brief written submissions on costs of the hearing and any other costs points, limited to two sides of A4, 11-point font and 1.5 spacing, by 4 p.m. on Tuesday 3 February 2026.

(b) Standard case management directions are set out in para. 36 below. Given the Claimant’s poor procedural compliance thus far, I am provisionally minded to make the following unless orders: first, if the Claimant fails to comply with the direction on service of evidence in reply (para. 36(c)), it shall be debarred from relying upon such evidence; secondly, if the Claimant fails to comply with the direction on lodging its skeleton argument (para. 36(e)), it shall be debarred from relying upon a skeleton argument other than the one served for the renewal hearing and only on the jurisdictional ground. Again, if either or both proposed sanctions are contentious, the parties are to lodge brief written submissions on their principle and/or substance by 4 p.m. on Tuesday 3 February 2026. They are subject to the same page-limit, font size and spacing requirements as the costs submissions.

[36]I make the following case management directions:(a) The Legal Ombudsman must, within 35 days of the date of service of the order, file and serve (i) detailed grounds for contesting the claim or supporting it on additional grounds and (ii) any written evidence to be relied on.

(b) The Legal Ombudsman may comply with sub-paragraph (a)(i) above by filing and serving a document which states that its Summary Grounds are to stand as the Detailed Grounds required by CPR 54.14.

(c) Any application by the Claimant to serve evidence in reply must be filed and served, together with a copy of that evidence, within 21 days of the date on which the Legal Ombudsman serves evidence under sub-paragraph (a) above.

(d) The parties must agree the contents of the hearing bundle. An electronic version of the bundle must be prepared and lodged, in accordance with the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide Chapter 21 and the Guidance on the Administrative Court website, not less than 28 days before the date of the substantive hearing. The parties must, if requested by the court, lodge 2 hard-copy versions of the hearing bundle.

(e) The Claimant must file and serve a skeleton argument (maximum 25 pages), complying with CPR 54 PD para. 15 and the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide, paras. 20.1 to 20.3, not less than 21 days before the date of the substantive hearing.

(f) The Legal Ombudsman must file and serve a skeleton argument (maximum 25 pages), complying with CPR 54 PD para. 15 and the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide paras 20.1 to 20.3, not less than 14 days before the date of the substantive hearing.

(g) The parties must agree the contents of a bundle containing the authorities to be referred to at the hearing. An electronic version of the bundle must be prepared in accordance with the guidance on the Administrative Court website. The parties must, if requested by the court, prepare a hard-copy version of the authorities bundle. The electronic version of the bundle and if requested, the hard copy version of the bundle, must be lodged with the court not less than 7 days before the date of the substantive hearing.

(h) The time estimate for the substantive hearing is 1 day. If either party considers that this time estimate should be varied, they must inform the court as soon as possible.

[37]If my provisional views on costs and the unless orders are uncontroversial, I should be grateful if counsel could prepare a draft order. Otherwise, I will consider their submissions and decide any outstanding question on the papers.