Daniel's Special Care Limited, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWHC 1979 (Admin)

[2026] EWHC 1979 (Admin)Case No AC-2026-LON-000289
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 30/07/2026
Before
DUNCAN ATKINSON KCSITTING AS A DEPUTY HIGH COURT JUDGE
Between
THE KING (ON THE APPLICATION OF DANIEL’S SPECIAL CARE LIMITED)ClaimantTHE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENTDefendant
Jonathan METZER (instructed by Afaque SOLANGI of Law Lane Solicitors) for ClaimantAmelia WILLIAMS (instructed by Government Legal Department) for DefendantHearing Hearing date: 23 July 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 30 July 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................DHCJ DUNCAN ATKINSON KC

DUNCAN ATKINSON KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge

[1]The Claimant seeks to renew their application for permission to challenge the decision of the Secretary of State for the Home Department (‘SSHD’), dated 13 October 2025 (‘the Revocation Decision’), to remove the Claimant from the register of licensed providers, maintained pursuant to the Immigration Rules. The effect of this revocation was to remove the Claimant’s ability to continue sponsoring migrant workers under the Workers and Temporary Workers Scheme.[2]Permission was refused by David Pittaway KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, on 2 June 2026. The Claimant seeks to renew their application on five grounds:(a) The decision involved material mistakes as to fact (Grounds 1 and 3);(b) Allied to these mistakes there was a breach of the duty as set out in Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside MBC [1977] AC 1014 (Ground 2);(c) There was a failure properly to exercise the discretion to revoke (Ground 5); and(d) The decision reached an irrational conclusion on salary payments to relevant workers (Ground 4).[3]I have listed them in that order because there was a consensus at the oral hearing on 23 July 2026 that Ground 4 was the central issue for the grant of permission. It was not possible for me to give a decision as to permission at that hearing for logistical reasons, and this judgment now does so. I repeat my gratitude to counsel for the Claimant, Jonathan Metzer, and the Defendant, Amelia Williams, for their focused and helpful submissions.

Circumstances relevant to the decision challenged

[4]The Claimant is a care provider business based in England which provides domiciliary care for vulnerable service users. The Claimant was granted a sponsor license on 2 December 2021. The Defendant undertook a compliance visit on 24 February 2025 to assess the Claimant’s suitability as a sponsor, which led to the Defendant suspending the Claimant’s sponsor license on 23 July 2025.[5]The alleged breaches identified were concerned with shortfall of working hours and pay, failure to retain historical contact records, and a failure to conduct timely and valid right to work checks. In relation to the first of those issues, shortfalls of working hours and pay, the suspension letter stated that the Claimant was “consistently failing to offer [its] sponsored workers the hours guaranteed on their CoS (‘Certificates of Sponsorship’) and in turn the salary” in respect of three relevant sponsored workers, who I will identify here as RA, AO and RO. The assessment period for these workers in the suspension letter were as follows:(i) for RA, the six-month period between the months ending 26th August 2024 and 26th January 2025 inclusive;(ii) for AO, the five-month period between the months ending 26th August and 26th December 2024 inclusive; and(iii) for RO, the six-month period between the months ending 26th August 2024 and 26th January 2025 inclusive.[6]The Claimant provided a response to the suspension letter on 18 August 2025. The Defendant considered the Claimant’s submissions and subsequently revoked the Claimant’s sponsor license on 13 October 2025. That is the decision in issue.[7]In relation to the shortfall of working hours and pay, the Revocation Decision stated that this issue had not been addressed and that Annex C1 (aa) of Part 3 of the Workers and Temporary Workers: guidance for sponsors (‘the Sponsor Guidance’) applied, as follows: i) In relation to RA, it was noted that it had been explained that his hours were less than his stated CoS due to the hospitalisation and death of service users and 19 days of unpaid leave that he had taken. Further, whilst it was noted that payslips had been provided for RA for the months ending 31st May to 31st July inclusive which showed that he was “receiving the amount specific on his CoS” throughout those months, “your client has not provided back payments to RA for the shortfall received in August and December 2024”. ii) In relation to AO, it was noted that her timesheet had been provided to evidence sickness related absences from 24th to 26th September and 29th September to 6th October 2024 but considered that the Claimant had “consistently underpaid AO every month, despite the short time away with sickness” and that no explanation had been provided as to the shortfall in pay during August, November, December and January. Further, whilst it was noted that payslips had been provided for AO for the months ending 31st May to 31st July inclusive which showed that she was “paid correctly” throughout those months, “it does not mitigate the loss of income during August – December 2024” and the Claimant had not provided backdated payments. iii) In relation to RO, it was noted that it had been stated that her salary was less than her CoS due to her taking 21 days of unpaid leave across the financial year of April 2023 to March 2024. Further, whilst it was noted that payslips had been provided for RO for the months ending 31st May to 31st July inclusive which showed that she “received the correct amount of monthly salary as per her CoS” throughout those months, the Claimant had not provided backdated payments “for the £1,430.97 loss of earnings.”[8]In relation to the other issues identified earlier, it was noted: a) That the Claimant conducted both manual and electronic visa checks and that once these were completed the relevant employee’s immigration status and evidence were placed in physical files and uploaded onto the Claimant’s IT system, which had been called Care Planner and was now called ‘Nourish’. In relation to visa checks, in that context, it was noted that physical visa checks were conducted when they started work, and it was considered that “you have not supplied evidence of your system ‘Nourish’ where your client stores their visa checks”, such that Annex C2 (b) of Part 3 of the Sponsor Guidance applied. b) That the Claimant had stated that all records of employees, including historical details, were kept on both physical files in the office and on Nourish, but it was considered that “your client has failed to provide evidence of their system, Nourish, and therefore we are unable to verify if they keep historical contact details of their workers”, such that Annex C2 (b) of Part 3 of the Sponsor Guidance applied.[9]For completeness, in terms of chronology, the Claimant submitted a Pre Action Protocol (PAP) on 04 November 2025. The Defendant responded to the PAP on 18 November 2025 and maintained the Revocation Decision The Claimant submitted a second PAP on 18 December 2025, which the Defendant responded to on 02 January 2026 and again maintained her Revocation Decision.

Relevant law

[10]Under powers vested in the SSHD by s.3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971, the Immigration Rules provide that foreign nationals may enter the United Kingdom as workers if sponsored by an employer. The SSHD is responsible for awarding licences to employers who may then grant certificates of sponsorship to workers as permitted by the licence.[11]As was observed in The King (on the application of Prestwick Care Limited, Malhotra Care Homes Limited, Malhotra Care Homes and (Sunderland) Limited, Trading as Prestwick Care) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 184, (hereafter ‘Prestwick’) at para.4:
“The scheme provides a way of addressing skill shortages in the labour market and a fast track for entry into the country for those individuals who are sponsored... The scheme is heavily dependent on trust and there is plainly the potential for abuse. The SSHD has to ensure and enforce compliance with the scheme as part of her overall management of immigration.”
[12]In Prestwick, at paragraph 24, the Court approved the two fundamental principles identified by Allison Foster QC, then sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, in R (Operation Holdings T/A Goldcare Homes) v SSHD[2019] EWHC 3884 (Admin) (at paragraphs 21-22): “(i) Those who benefit most directly from migration, that is to say employers, education providers or other bodies who bring in migrants, must play their part in ensuring that the system is not abused; and (ii) The Home Office needs to be sure that those applying to come to the UK to undertake work or to study are indeed eligible to do so and if a reputable employer or education provider genuinely wishes to take them on. This provides the context for the application of the scheme, and reflects, as was said by McGowan J [at first instance] in London St. Andrew's College v SSHD [2014] EWHC 4328 (Admin) at [13] , that the obligation of a sponsor is to carry out its responsibilities " with all the rigour and vigilance of the immigration control authorities ". This approach is found throughout the case law”.[13]In the appeal from that decision in London St Andrew’s College [2018] EWCA Civ 2496, Haddon-Cave LJ reiterated that approach:
“The starting point for this analysis is to emphasise that the watchword for the sponsorship system is trust. As the authorities have repeatedly said, the efficacy of the sponsorship system depends fundamentally on trust… This fundamental point is too often overlooked, or ignored, by claimants seeking to challenge the suspension or revocation of their sponsor licence… A key responsibility is to identify which of the migrants applying for student visas have both the ability and intention to study, and which are merely trying to use study in the UK as an excuse to come to, live or work in the UK… The second point to emphasise is that, under the sponsorship system, the discretion accorded to the SSHD to suspend or revoke Tier 4 (or Tier 2) sponsorship licences is very broad. This is necessarily so because the system depends on the SSHD trusting those accorded HTS [Highly Trusted Sponsor Status] to carry out roles and responsibilities previously accorded to immigration officers.”
[14]The Sponsor Guidance both assists Sponsors as to their duties, sets out how the scheme is to operate, and addresses the circumstances in which a licence may be revoked and the criteria for this. Section C10 of the Guidance addresses “the circumstances in which we will, or may, revoke your sponsor licence”. These circumstances, in overview (paragraph C10.1), include “where…there is a serious or systematic breach of your sponsor duties”. In so far as is relevant: a) Annex C1 lists the circumstances in which “we will revoke your licence”. Annex C1(aa) states that “a sponsor licence will be revoked if you pay a sponsored worker less than you have said you would on a worker’s CoS”. b) Annex C2 sets out the circumstances in which the Defendant will normally revoke a licence, unless there are exceptional circumstances.

(b) of the Sponsor Guidance Part 3 states:

“As a result of information available to us, we are not satisfied you are using a process or procedure necessary to fully comply with your sponsor duties.”

The Claimant’s Grounds

[15]I will address the Claimant’s grounds in the order listed at paragraph 2 above, and take grounds 1 and 3 together. Grounds 1 and 3: Material mistake of fact and/or failure to have regard to material evidence[16]The Claimant contends that the decision is flawed in its application of Annex C2(b) of Part 3 of the Sponsorship Guidance by material mistakes and/or a failure to have regard to material evidence, in particular evidence provided by the Claimant in response to the suspension letter. In particular: a) The Claimant asserts (ground 1) that the Defendant was factually incorrect to state in the Revocation Decision that the Claimant has failed to provide evidence of their IT system, called the ‘’Nourish’’ system, where checks are conducted and employee data is recorded. The Claimant points to evidence provided in its response to the suspension letter, and the Defendant maintains there is insufficient evidence of “Nourish”. b) The Claimant submits (ground 3) that the Defendant has not engaged with their submissions regarding the discrepancy in passport copies. Additionally, the Claimant states they are entitled to rely on paper records of passport copies, in combination with electronic records. The Claimant avers a failure to consider the adequacy of these paper records. The Defendant maintains that the SSHD was entitled to conclude that the Claimant did not have a system in place to monitor the immigration status of sponsored employees and prevent illegal working. The Defendant submits that the passports were raised as only a reference to the Claimant’s lack of monitoring system. The Defendant was entitled to reach a determination on the material that had been been provided by that time.[17]I do not consider these grounds to be arguable. There is an issue as to the extent to which the material evidence was available both in the first instance and after the suspension letter. This, ultimately, is a matter for the assessment of the Defendant, with which the Court should be slow to interfere. The Court’s role in the present context is supervisory and the SSHD is entitled to maintain a fairly high index of suspicion and a “light trigger” in deciding when and with what level of firmness she should act. The Court should respect the experience and expertise of the SSHD when reaching conclusions as to a sponsor’s compliance, and the grounds advanced are not arguable to the contrary.

Ground 2: Unlawful failure to comply with Tameside duty

[18]Allied to their ground 1, the Claimant argues that if the Defendant did not receive the ‘Nourish’ evidence referred to in the Claimant’s response of 18 August 2025, the Defendant should have made further enquiries in accordance with her duty set out in Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside MBC [1977] AC 1014. The Claimant submits that the ‘Tameside’ duty, as identified by Lord Diplock at 1065b, requires a decision maker to have “[asked] himself the right question and take reasonable steps to acquaint himself with the relevant information to enable him to answer it correctly”. That being the case, the Claimant argues that the Defendant should have taken steps to obtain that which was alluded to in, but not provided with, the Claimant’s response to the suspension letter.[19]The Defendant does not accept this. The Claimant was presented with an appropriate opportunity via the Suspension Decision to provide evidence regarding the “Nourish” software, and it was a matter for the Claimant to do so. As the Revocation Decision makes clear, the Defendant considered all the material that was available by the time of that decision, including that provided in response to the suspension letter. The Defendant states, as was held in R (Plantagenet Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Justice [2014] EWHC 1662 (Admin), that the Court should not intervene merely because they consider that further enquiries would have been desirable. Intervention should only occur if no reasonable decision maker could have been satisfied on the basis of the enquiries made that it possessed the information necessary to make the decision. It is clear from that approach that the criticism made by the Claimant in this regard is untenable, and this ground is unarguable.

Ground 5: Unlawful failure to exercise discretion or to give adequate reasons

[20]The Claimant’s position is that contrary to Prestwick Care Ltd & Ors v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 184, the Defendant has failed to exercise her discretion and consider the adverse effect that a revocation would have on the Claimant’s workers, stakeholders, and vulnerable service users. The Defendant maintains that whilst the Revocation Decision considered the Claimant’s submissions in full, the systematic breaches ultimately warranted revocation of the Claimant’s sponsor license.[21]In this regard, I respectfully agree with the determination of David Pittaway KC in refusing permission:
“In my view, the Defendant’s decision letter of 13 October 2025 and the response to the PAP letter of 2 January 2026 are carefully drafted setting out the basis upon which the decision to revoke the licence was taken. The Defendant submits, in my view, correctly, that the authorities make clear that the Defendant has a wide discretion in respect of whether to revoke a skilled worker sponsor licence, including the fragility of the privilege of being granted such a licence.”
[22]Given the conclusion I have reached in relation to grounds 1-3, this ground would only remain arguable if ground 4 is determined to be arguable. In that eventuality, there would be an arguable issue as to the extent of the SSHD’s discretion to revoke, pursuant to Annex C1 to the Sponsorship Guidance. I shall return to this below.

Ground 4: Irrational and/or unlawful conclusion on salary payments

[23]I regard the remaining ground as more difficult. The decision by the Defendant in relation to shortfalls in pay was important because it was the gateway to a determination under Annex C1(aa) of Part 3 of the Sponsor Guidance, where a determination under Annex C1 would lead more inevitably to a revocation decision. The Claimant contends that the Defendant has reached an irrational conclusion on shortfall of pay by not following R (Treal Care) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWHC 1797 and failing to consider short-term fluctuations such as unpaid leave, sick leave and short-term reduced shift availability within a six-month period.[24]Treal, like the present case, concerned a revocation decision reached on the basis of Annex C1(aa) where the SSHD had concluded that three sponsored workers’ salaries did not match their CoS. Simon Tinkler, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, provided helpful guidance as to the proper approach in such cases. At paragraphs 64-67, he said:
“The Guidance does not set out the period over which the SSHD should review a person’s pay when assessing whether the requirement has been met. The CoS, on the other hand, sets out an annual salary that the employee must earn. The assessment is whether the employee is being paid the required annual rate. Neither the Guidance nor the CoS impose an obligation for the employee to be paid that annualised rate on each day of the year, nor in each week of the year, nor each month of the year. If that were the case, then a person would fall foul of the rules if they were paid for a seven-day shift one week and a three-day shift the next week, or took two weeks unpaid holiday in a particular month, or did not work five days in one week as it contained a bank holiday. That would be nonsensical. The employees in this case had not worked for a full year when the compliance visit took place. There must therefore be some sort of assessment by the decision maker of pay over a period of time that is less than a year in order to assess whether the required annual salary is being paid. The decision maker has a wide discretion in making their decision in each case, based on the specific facts. There was, in my judgment, nothing inherently unreasonable in the decision maker selecting, in this case, the four-month period of May–August 2024 in which to assess compliance with the required annual pay rate. The decision maker, at various points, referred in addition to assessments being made for individual months. I address below the reasonableness of that in relation to each of the three individuals. In this case, it makes no difference to the outcome. I would have some doubt, however, that a decision maker could reasonably conclude that a person who is being paid at least the correct annualised salary when looked at over a four month period but who is below that level for a single month could be said to be paid less than the required annual rate.”
[25]The approach taken in the Suspension Decision was to consider the salary payments to the three relevant workers over five or six-month periods, between 26 August 2024 and 26 December 2024 or 26 January 2025, depending on the relevant worker. In itself, the Claimant accepts that this approach was not out of keeping with the guidance in Treal, provided that it remained clear that the ultimate question was whether each relevant employee was being paid the required annual rate and that this did not require that they be paid that annualised rate in each month of the year, as was made clear in Treal.[26]However, the Claimant submits that the Revocation Decision does not demonstrate that the additional pay information provided in response to the suspension letter had been considered. This data altered the extent to which there had been a shortfall in relation to the workers in question, on an annualised rate calculation. The Claimant submits that a proper analysis of all the data showed smaller shortfalls than had been identified, and ought to have led the SSHD to pause before revoking on that basis. Reliance on part of the material rather than the totality was arbitrary, and resulted in an irrational conclusion.[27]The Defendant maintains that the Claimant’s submissions do not negate the fact that the Claimant failed to report a shortfall on the Sponsor Management System (SMS), or the fact that the salaries of the 3 workers did not match what they were to be paid on their CoS. The Defendant points to the fact that Claimant’s response to the suspension letter demonstrates that such shortfalls had existed for a longer period. She further submits that the further payment information then provided shows that the Claimant had sought to alter the evidence on shortfall by belated payments to the workers, effectively skewing the overall assessment, and that such an approach was not to be countenanced.[28]In my judgement, it is properly arguable that, under the Treal guidance, it was incumbent on the decision maker when considering, in due course, whether to revoke the Claimant’s sponsor licence to properly consider the further evidence provided since the decision to suspend to determine whether each relevant employee was being paid the required annual rate, and not adopt an approach that required that they be paid that annualised rate in each month of the year. The detailed analysis in relation to the relevant workers in my judgement shows this ground to be arguable.[29]The Claimant’s submissions demonstrate that there is an arguable issue as to what period is taken by the decision maker, what material is taken into account and how it is assessed, and the extent of underpayment that should render revocation inevitable. That in turn, in my judgement, engages ground 5, and the wider issue of the extent to which the SSHD was entitled to exercise her discretion either to revoke or not in the circumstances contended for by the Claimant.[30]I therefore give permission on, but only on, grounds 4 and 5. I refuse permission on grounds 1-3.