Olawadamilare Olaifa, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Bexley [2026] EWHC 1945 (Admin)

[2026] EWHC 1945 (Admin)Case No AC-2025-LON-003095
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 29 July 2026
Before
DHCJ GUY VASSALL-ADAMS KC
Between
THE KING (ON THE APPLICATION OF OLAWADAMILARE OLAIFA)ClaimantLONDON BOROUGH OF BEXLEYDefendant
The Claimant appeared in Person for in personRiccardo Calzavara appeared for DefendantHearing Hearing date: 9 July 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down electronically at 10.30am on 29 July 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................DHCJ GUY VASSALL-ADAMS KC

DHCJ Guy Vassall-Adams KC:

[1]This is a claim for judicial review in which the Claimant contends that the Defendant council, in the course of exercising its duty to house her and her family, breached its Public Sector Equality Duty under s.149 Equality Act 2010 (“PSED”) vis-à-vis her youngest, disabled child (the “Son”), failed to make arrangements for ensuring that her Son’s welfare was safeguarded and promoted as required by s.11 Children Act 2004 and failed to comply with the family’s human rights under Article 8 ECHR, the right to respect for a private and family life.[2]These are the three surviving grounds of challenge, the first two grounds having been refused permission on the papers by the order of Jon Halford, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge. Those grounds were that the Council had breached its duty to secure the Claimant suitable accommodation under s.193(2) of the Housing Act 1996 and had failed to undertake remediation work to address various hazards such as damp and unsafe flooring under the Housing Act 1996. I mention the original grounds of challenge at the outset as they are important context given that the grounds on which permission was granted relate to the same underlying facts and concern, in substance, a challenge to the suitability of the Claimant’s accommodation, albeit one with the needs of her Son at the fore.[3]The Defendant defends this judicial review on three main grounds. First, it contends that the claims are now academic as a result of events that have taken place since this claim was issued on 29 August 2025, including an offer of permanent accommodation and an offer of temporary accommodation, as a result of which this claim no longer attacks the right target. Secondly, the Defendant submits that the Claimant had an adequate alternative remedy, in the form of a statutory review and appeal to the County Court. Thirdly, the Defendant denies that it has breached the PSED, its duty to have regard to the best interests of the Claimant’s children or the family’s Article 8 rights. Statutory framework Housing Act 1996

Statutory framework

[4]The legal duties of local housing authorities towards persons who are homeless, or threatened with homelessness, are governed by Part VII of the Housing Act 1996 (the “HA 1996”). This case is concerned with s.193 of the HA 1996, which applies where a local housing authority is satisfied that an applicant is homeless and eligible for assistance and has a priority need, are not satisfied that the applicant became homeless intentionally and where the initial duty under s.198(B)(2) has come to an end. In those circumstances, s.193(2) provides that “Unless the authority refer the application to another local housing authority (see section 198), they shall secure that accommodation is available for occupation by the applicant.” This is known as the “main housing duty”.[5]The accommodation provided to the applicant must be suitable: ss.206, 210. Relevant case law establishes that the accommodation must be suitable in relation to the applicant and to all members of the applicant’s household normally residing with the applicant. This requires an assessment of the needs and reasonable requirements of the applicant and his or her family and the location of the proposed accommodation may also be relevant to that assessment: Waltham Forest LBC v Saleh [2020] PTSR 621, CA at [17(1)]. Suitability is a relative not an absolute concept and there can be different standards of suitability although the housing authority should be satisfied that the accommodation reached a minimum standard of suitability even if it was not ideal: Waltham Forest LBC at [25].[6]The main housing duty is automatically discharged in circumstances where a person either accepts an offer of permanent accommodation under Part VI of the HA 1996, or refuses an offer of permanent accommodation, having been informed of the consequences of refusal or acceptance and of their right to seek a review of the suitability of the accommodation: s.193(6)(c) and s.193(7).[7]A person who is not satisfied about the suitability of the accommodation offered in performance and/or discharge of the main housing duty may seek a review of the suitability of the accommodation offered to him, under s.202 HA 1996. The outcome of such a review may be appealed to the County Court on a point of law: s.204 HA 1996.[8]The authority has a power to accommodate a person pending the outcome of the review on the suitability of the accommodation offered: s.188(3). The authority retains that power during the period for advancing a s.204 appeal to the County Court and, if such an appeal is brought, until the appeal is finally determined: s.204(4).

Other relevant statutory provisions

[9]The Claimant relies on s.149(1) of the Equality Act 2010, s.11 of the Children Act 2004 and Article 8 of the ECHR.[10]Section 149(1) of the Equality Act, which refers to the Public Sector Equality Duty (“PSED”), provides:
“A public authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to--- (a) eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by this Act; (b) advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it; (c) encourage persons who share a relevant protected characteristic to participate in public life or in any other activity in which such participation is disproportionately low.”
[11]Section 11 of the Children Act 2004, entitled Arrangements to safeguard and promote welfare, provides (so far as relevant):
“(2) Each person and body to whom this section applies must make arrangements for ensuring that— (a) their functions are discharged having regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children…”
[12]A local authority is one of the bodies to whom s.11 applies: s.11(1)(a).[13]Article 8 of the ECHR provides as follows:
“(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, of for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

The facts

[14]The Claimant first approached the Defendant’s Housing Options Service on 19 March 2019. She informed them that she had been placed in the Defendant’s Borough by the Home Office and wished to make a homelessness application to the Defendant.[15]On 2 July 2019, the Defendant accepted the main housing duty to the Claimant under s.193 of the HA 1996. The Claimant initially stayed in temporary accommodation provided by the Defendant in Erith, Kent. On 28 June 2021, she accepted temporary accommodation at another local address, 178 Hurstwood Avenue, Erith, Kent on a non-secure tenancy. 178 Hurstwood Avenue has been the Claimant’s family home for the past five years and all of her public law grounds of review relate to that address (the “Premises”).[16]The Claimant lives in the Premises with her three children aged 15,10 and 8, two older girls and a younger boy (the “Son”). The Son has Autism Spectrum Disorder, Global Development Delay, Sensory Processing Disorder and Speech & Language difficulties receptive and expressive which were diagnosed in April 2021.The Son presents with very challenging behaviour – including frequent meltdowns, jumping around and climbing everywhere and excessive head banging – and has to be supervised at all times.[17]The Premises was purchased by the Defendant on 28 August 2020. In his witness statement for the Defendant, Mr Blakemore explains that this property was purchased by the Defendant solely to be used as temporary accommodation for homeless applicants. The Defendant does not have a housing stock having carried out a housing stock transfer in 1998. This means that allocations under part 6 of the Housing Act 1996 are made by nomination agreements with housing associations.[18]The Premises is a three-bedroom semi-detached house comprising of a hallway, lounge, dining room and kitchen on the ground floor and three bedrooms and a bathroom on the first floor. The Premises is situated on the corner of Hurstwood Avenue and Colyers Lane. Colyers Lane is a busy road leading from Barnehurst to Erith. The plot on which the Premises sits is a corner plot and has the benefit of a large front garden which is on the junction of Hurstwood Avenue and Colyers Lane and a triangular shaped rear garden.[19]The Defendant bought the premises on the open market. It was in a good state of repair and refurbishment works were carried out before the Claimant moved in to make it up to the standard required for the Defendant’s temporary accommodation. The Claimant was the first tenant to occupy the Premises since the Defendant bought it. The Defendant reports that the carpets were new when the Claimant moved in.[20]On 19 September 2025, the Defendant made the Claimant a final offer of social housing, provided by a registered provider of social housing (Orbit) at 51 Peareswood Road, Kent DA8 2HL. This was an offer of permanent accommodation under s.193 of the HA 1996. The Claimant visited the accommodation and accepted the offer. Accordingly, on 8 December 2025 the Defendant informed the Claimant that its duty to her had been discharged by reason of her accepting the permanent accommodation. The Claimant did not seek a seek a review of that decision.[21]On 11 December 2025, the Claimant attended an appointment to sign the tenancy agreement and receive the keys to the permanent property. That appointment did not go to plan. On 17 December 2025, Orbit informed the Claimant that it could not proceed with the offer of a permanent property because she had been rude and abusive towards Orbit staff and refused to consent to relevant checks. Those allegations are disputed by the Claimant, who says she was keen to accept the permanent accommodation and surprised to learn that the offer had been withdrawn. I will not say any more about this as this is now apparently the subject of an appeal to the County Court.[22]On 16 February 2026, the Defendant informed the Claimant that its main housing duty to her under s.193 HA 1996 had been discharged by reason of her effective refusal of the permanent property. On 11 May 2026 that decision was upheld on review. The deadline for appealing that decision was 1 June 2026 and no appeal was brought by that date. However, the Claimant has apparently subsequently appealed against the review decision and applied for permission to appeal out-of-time.[23]On 30 June 2026, the Defendant made the Claimant a further offer of temporary accommodation at 91 Templar Drive, Thamesmead, London, SE28 8PF. That offer was made pending the determination of the out-of-time appeal which the Claimant has brought pursuant to s.204 of the HA 1996 against the Defendant’s review decision. As at the date of the hearing, the Claimant had yet to accept or refuse this offer.[24]On 1 July 2026, social workers informed the Defendant that the Claimant had removed the floor coverings in the Premises. The Defendant was informed that the carpets had been removed together with the gripper rods and associated fittings. The result is that significant areas of the Premises are left with bare concrete flooring and/or exposed floorboards. The Claimant accepted at the hearing that she had taken these steps as she felt that this was better than having carpet partially in place with exposed grippers that risked injury towards her children.

Applications at the hearing

[25]The Defendant applied for permission to rely on a witness statement from Melissa Jobson dated 3 |July 2023 to bring the factual position up to date. I regarded this evidence as relevant and granted permission for the Defendant to rely on it.[26]The Claimant applied for permission to rely on a new recently filed application bundle. After exploring the issues with the parties, it became apparent that the only area of contention was whether the Claimant should be allowed to rely on a report prepared by Lisa Malyon dated 31 January 2025. The report is a home visit report undertaken by Ms Malyon who represents a support network called Mums v Mould. The Claimant wanted to rely on the report as expert evidence. Ms Malyon has relevant qualifications, but I was not satisfied that I required expert evidence to resolve any issue in this case. Furthermore, her report was very much in support of the Claimant’s case and did not contain the expert declaration that any independent expert usually provides. In the circumstances I gave the Claimant permission to rely on any factual findings in the report, but not on any opinions expressed by Ms Malyon. I also informed Ms Malyon, who had kindly attended the hearing in the belief that she would be giving evidence, that her attendance was not necessary. Preliminary Issues Academic claim

Preliminary Issues

[27]The Defendant submits that this claim for judicial review is now academic. In summary, the Defendant submits that the following key legal steps have taken place. First, the Claimant applied to the Defendant for homelessness assistance. The Defendant concluded that it owed her the main housing duty. It exercised the duty by providing temporary accommodation, namely the Premises. The Claimant’s challenge relates to the suitability of the Premises. However, since the Claimant commenced these proceedings, the Defendant has discharged its main housing duty by offering her permanent accommodation at 51 Peareswood Road. There is a dispute over whether the Claimant refused that offer of permanent accommodation, but the Defendant’s review found that she had. The Claimant is now challenging that review decision through an out-of-time appeal to the County Court.[28]When an authority has discharged the main housing duty by reason of an offer of permanent accommodation and the applicant has sought a review, the main housing duty under s.193 HA 1996 is replaced by a power to accommodate a person under s.188(3) of the HA 1996. There is then a further power to accommodate pending appeal in s.204(4) HA 1996. Pending the outcome of the Claimant’s appeal, the Defendant has offered the Claimant temporary accommodation at Templar Drive exercising its s.204(4) power.[29]The Defendant points to the Claimant’s grounds of review and submits that the three grounds on which permission was granted are all process grounds tied to issue of the suitability of the Premises. Where the Claim Form asks the Claimant to give details of the decision she seeks to have judicially reviewed she describes it as the decision, omission or continuing failure of the Defendant “to lawfully discharge its duty under s.193(2) of the Housing Act 1996 to secure that suitable accommodation is available to the Claimant and her household”. After complaining about a number of hazards in the Premises, she founds the Article 8 ECHR breach on the allegation that “the Defendant has not remedied the hazards or relocated the family”. The PSED ground and the Children Act ground are similarly challenges to the process and/or outcome of the Defendant’s decision that the Premises were suitable.[30]Judicial review is a discretionary remedy and a remedy of last resort. In general, the courts do not permit judicial review claims to proceed where the outcome is academic. The Administrative Court Guide 2025 describes academic cases as one of the situations where it is not appropriate to bring judicial review proceedings. At paragraph 6.3.4.1 the Guide states:
“Where a claim is academic i.e. there is no longer a case to be decided which will directly affect the rights and obligations of the parties to the claim, it will generally not be appropriate to bring judicial review proceedings. An example is the situation where the defendant has agreed to reconsider the decision challenged.”
[31]I accept the Defendant’s submission that this claim is academic in two distinct ways, which are really two sides of the same coin. First, the Defendant’s legal duty to provide suitable accommodation no longer relates to the Premises. That duty pertains to the offer of permanent accommodation at Peareswood Rd and the offer of temporary accommodation at Templar Drive. Either of these properties can properly be the subject of a suitability challenge, but the Premises cannot. Any challenge to the suitability of the Premises is now academic. Although the grounds of review are PSED, Article 8 and the Children Act, these are ultimately all challenges relating to the process by which the Defendant decided that the Premises were suitable.[32]Secondly, without a suitability challenge available to her in respect of the Premises, the process grounds about the way in which the Defendant determined suitability are academic. In this respect the Defendant relies on the judgment of Dan Squires KC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge in R(AB) v Westminster City Council [2024] HLR 30, KB where he found that, absent an underlying suitability challenge, “a PSED challenge cannot succeed any more than any other challenge to the way the Defendant determined suitability”: at [78].[33]The Claimant’s response to these submissions is to say that the claim is not academic as far as she is concerned. She has lived at the Premises for the past 5 years and she regards it as their family home. She does not want to move on to other accommodation because over that period of time she has built up a support network among her neighbours. She says that she is very dependent on that network in circumstances where she is a single mother of three children, one of whom is severely disabled. She doesn’t want to have to start all over again in a new neighbourhood. Her aim throughout has been to try to get the Defendant to address the problems with the Premises so her family can go on living there. At a human level, I have real sympathy with the Claimant’s position.[34]However, as a matter of law it seems to me that the Defendant’s case that this claim has become academic is unanswerable. Furthermore, the Defendant is responsible for securing accommodation for many homeless families and has the difficult task of assessing the Claimant’s family’s needs not in isolation but alongside its duties towards other families and its need to maintain its stock of temporary accommodation to deal with emergency situations, of which the Premises is a part. There is an irreconcilable tension between the Claimant’s wish to stay where she is and the Defendant’s wish to move the Claimant and her family on and free up the Premises again as part of its stock of temporary accommodation, which it is legally entitled to do.

Alternative remedy

[35]The Defendant argues that just as the Claimant had an alternative remedy in respect of Ground 1, which directly attacked the suitability of the Premises, so she also had an alternative remedy in respect of Grounds 3-4 and 6b, on which she was granted permission. Exploring this issue at the hearing, it became clear that the Defendant in its Acknowledgment of Service had argued that the Claimant had an alternative remedy in respect of Grounds 1 and 2, but had not argued – as it did now before me – that the Claimant also had an alternative remedy in respect of the other grounds of review.[36]The basis for the wider attack is the judgment of the Court of Appeal in James v Hartsmere Borough Council [2020] EWCA Civ 489 (“James”). The focus of that case was the breadth of the County Court’s jurisdiction when hearing appeals arising from statutory reviews under s.202 HA 1996, pursuant to s.204 HA 1996. In his judgment Peter Jackson LJ held at [31] that:
“In my view, the correct interpretation of section 204 Housing Act 1996 is that a point of law arises from a decision if it concerns or relates to the lawfulness of that decision. Both normal statutory construction and the preponderance of authority point to the County Court having jurisdiction to hear appeals from section 202 review decisions that is not limited to points of law that might broadly be described as “points of housing law” but extends to the full range of issues that would otherwise be the subject of an application to the High Court for judicial review. These include challenges on grounds of procedural error, the extent of legal powers (vires), irrationality and inadequacy of reasons.”
[37]It is clear from James that the County Court’s jurisdiction embraces any challenge to the lawfulness of a decision and includes the full range of issues that would otherwise be the subject of an application for judicial review. I therefore accept the Defendant’s submission that it was open to the Claimant to make her arguments about the PSED, s.11 of the Children Act and Article 8 ECHR in the County Court as part of any appeal against a review decision concerning the suitability of the Premises. Counsel submitted, and I accept, that these kinds of arguments are routinely deployed in s.204 appeals.[38]The basic principle is set out in the Administrative Court Guide, which states at para 6.3.3.1. that:
“Judicial review is a remedy of last resort. If there is another route by which the decision can be challenged, which provides an adequate remedy for the claimant, that alternative remedy should generally be used before applying for judicial review.”
[39]The rationale for insisting on judicial review being a remedy of last resort was explained in R (Short) v Police Misconduct Tribunal [2020] EWHC 385 (Admin) at [48]: “the courts firmly police the use of judicial review when other remedies are available. Treating judicial review in ordinary circumstances as a remedy of last resort fulfils a number of objectives … First, it ensures the courts give priority to statutory procedures as laid down by Parliament, respecting Parliament's judgment about what procedures are appropriate for particular contexts. Second, it minimises the potential for judicial review to be used to disrupt the smooth operation of statutory procedures which may be adequate to meet the justice of the case. Third, it promotes proportionate allocation of judicial resources for dispute resolution and saves the High Court from undue pressure of work so that it is available to provide speedy relief in other judicial review cases in fulfilment of its role as protector of the rule of law, where its intervention is really required”.[40]Here there was a statutory right of appeal to the County Court which Parliament has expressly provided to cater for challenges to decisions about the suitability of accommodation made by local authorities pursuant to their homelessness duties under the HA 1996. Furthermore, it is clear from the judgment in James that the whole purpose of the statutory review under s.202 and the right of appeal under s.204 was to move these kinds of homelessness challenges from the High Court to the County Court, to which they are better suited, for a number of practical reasons referenced in counsel’s submissions at [29] and accepted by Peter Jackson LJ at [31]. One of these was that the right to appeal to the County Court is unconditional, while judicial review is subject to a permission requirement.[41]In this context I am completely satisfied that the Claimant did have an adequate alternative remedy to bringing judicial review proceedings, as she could have sought a statutory review of the suitability of the Premises under s.202 of the HA 1996 and then challenged that outcome by way of an appeal to the County Court under s.204.[42]It is clear to me that at the permission stage the Defendant did not argue alternative remedy in respect of these grounds and did not refer the court to s.204 HA 1996 or the important authority of James. In the circumstances the Defendant rightly concedes that there can be no possible criticism of the Judge at the permission stage not having refused permission on this basis. However, having had the benefit of the written and oral submissions of counsel I am satisfied that an alternative remedy is available in respect of all the Claimant’s grounds of challenge. This is a further reason why judicial review is refused.

The merits

[43]Having decided both that these claims are academic and that the Claimant had an adequate alternative remedy, I propose to say relatively little about the substance of the Claimant’s complaints. However, as I heard a day of argument and have considered the issues I will record my main conclusions on these points.

Alterations to the premises

[44]The Claimant’s first criticism of the Defendant is that it failed to take the needs of her disabled son properly into consideration because it would not agree to make certain alternations to the Premises. The first issue concerned the Defendant’s refusal to replace the carpets in the Premises with hard flooring. The Claimant became very concerned about the effect of the carpets on her son after he was diagnosed with a mild house mite allergy. The Claimant was also concerned that her son was ripping up the carpet in places and eating part of the underlay, in the process exposing nails which could potentially cause injury. I accept that the Claimant’s concerns in this regard were genuine and that she was convinced that replacing the carpet with hard flooring would be beneficial for her son.[45]The Defendant, however, was willing to replace the carpet with another more securely fastened carpet but was not willing to replace it with hard flooring. The Defendant’s evidence on this is that it was not a financial issue, as the cost of carpet or hard flooring was similar. The Defendant’s concern was that the Claimant’s son, who has a climbing frame and a swing inside the house and is prone to jumping about, could much more easily injure himself if he fell on hard flooring instead of carpet. Far from ignoring the needs of her disabled son, the Defendant says that it had his interests at heart. The Defendant simply took a different view from the Claimant as to where those interests lay. Unfortunately, there has been a stand-off on this issue as the Claimant would not allow the Defendant access to the Premises to replace the damaged carpets.[46]A similar divergence of view emerged in relation to the front garden. By way of background, at the Claimant’s request the Defendant had taken measures to level the back garden so that her son could play in it and the family had installed a trampoline there. In relation to the front garden, the Claimant wanted the Defendant to install a high wooden fence to enable her son to play there without the risk that he would get out into the road. The Defendant looked into this but concluded that this was not a good idea. The location of the Premises is close to a main road and the Defendant was concerned that, even with a high fence, there was a significant risk that the Claimant’s son would have a meltdown and run into the road. Accordingly, the Defendant was not willing to accede to the Claimant’s request as they felt it was safer for the Claimant’s son to play in the rear garden, which is surrounded by other gardens.[47]The Defendant’s position on both the carpet and the front garden was not irrational and I am not persuaded that the Defendant failed to have regard to her son’s disability or failed to take his interests into account. On the contrary, on the basis of the evidence I have seen, the Defendant conscientiously looked into the Claimant’s requests and made decisions with her disabled son’s interests in mind. It is unfortunate for the Claimant that she has some rigid views about where her son’s interests lie and seems to be incapable of recognising that other people might have her son’s interests at heart, but reach a different view from her own.

Damp and mould

[48]The third area of complaint is around damp and mould. The Claimant submitted that that the Premises has had repeated problems with damp and mould and contends that the Defendant’s inaction in addressing this has exacerbated her son’s developmental delays. Looking at the evidence of visits by the Defendant’s officers, it appears that in September 2024 there was evidence of surface mould in the corners of the living room and bedroom which the officer believed were the result of poor ventilation by the occupiers, not building defects. A visit in January 2025 could find no evidence of damp and mould apart from the silicone around the bath which needed wiping with a damp cloth. A further inspection in September 2025 “did not identify any active form of damp and mould within the building”. In October 2025 some water leakage from the bathroom into the kitchen ceiling below was noticed on an inspection (which the Defendant addressed) but there was no report of damp or mould generally in the Premises.[49]The evidence I have seen shows that the Defendant took seriously the damp and mould issues which arose in the Premises, which appear primarily to have been the result of poor ventilation, not building defects. The Defendant carried out regular inspections, provided suitable advice and took remedial action to address specific problems. It appears that by September 2025 there were no significant damp or mould issues in the Premises. There is no evidence at all that the damp and mould issues in the Premises have had any detrimental impact on the Son’s development.

Conclusion

[50]The Defendant’s evidence says that, in relation to the decisions it took about the flooring and the garden and complaints about damp and mould, it did have regard to the desirability of promoting equality of opportunity for the Son, it did seek to discharge its functions in a way that safeguarded and promoted the welfare of the Son and it did respect the Claimant’s and her family’s right to a private and family life. I accept the Defendant’s evidence about its decision-making in this case, which is detailed, credible and rational. It follows that, even if the preliminary issues had not operated as a bar to this claim, I would have dismissed this claim for judicial review.