Eunice Aisedu-Baning v Nursing and Midwifery Council [2026] EWHC 1936 (Admin)

[2026] EWHC 1936 (Admin)

Case No AC-2025-LON-004258

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING'S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date 27/07/2026

Before

HHJ KAREN WALDEN-SMITH sitting as a Judge of the High Court

Between

EUNICE ASIEDU-BANINGApplicant

NURSING AND MIDWIFERY COUNCILRespondent

Eunice Asiedu-Baning acting in person for in person

Benjamin D’Alton instructed by the Nursing and Midwifery Council

Hearing Hearing date: 14 May 2026

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 2pm on Monday 27 July 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

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HHJ Karen Walden-Smith:

[1]This is an application brought by the Applicant, Eunice Aisedu-Baning, pursuant to the provisions of Article 31(12) of the Nursing & Midwifery Order 2001seeking revocation of the interim suspension order (ISO) which was imposed by a panel of the Respondent’s Fitness to Practise Committee on 17 October 2025. The Respondent supports continuation of the ISO on the basis it was necessary, proportionate and justified.

[2]Article 31 of the 2001 Order governs interim orders and Article 31(12) gives the court jurisdiction to terminate or vary an interim order.

Background

[3]The Applicant is a registered midwife on the Respondent’s register.

[4]The Applicant was notified of the decision of the Fitness to Practise Committee to impose a striking off order together with the ISO on 30 October 2025. The Applicant filed her statutory appeal on 21 November 2025, which appeal was sealed and issued on 27 November 2025.

[5]On 23 February 2018, the Respondent had received a referral from the Milton Keynes University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust (“MK University Hospital”) raising concerns with respect to the Applicant when she was working as an agency midwife overnight from 3 to 4 November 2017. MK University Hospital notified the Respondent that it had evidence that the Applicant had documented and signed observations with respect to two patients and their newborn babies which had not been carried out. It was also alleged that an unknown medication had been administered without explanation.

[6]The allegations considered by the Respondent’s Fitness to Practise Committee were as follows: That you [the Applicant] ,whilst you were working as a registered midwife at Milton Keynes Hospital, on the night shift 03-04 November 2017 1) In relation to Baby A you i) Made an incorrect entry in Baby A’s medical records that you had taken a blood sugar reading at approximately 2415, when you had not done so ii) Made an incorrect entry in Baby A’s medical records in that you recorded that you took a blood sugar reading of 5.3 mmols at approximately 0400 which was not an accurate record of a test you had carried out. 2) Your conduct at Charge 1i) and/or Charge 1ii) was dishonest because you created a record/s providing information about the state of Baby A’s health which was not true 3) In relation to Baby B you i) Made an incorrect entry in Baby B’s medical records that you had taken a blood sugar reading at approximately 0230, when you had not done so; ii) Made an incorrect entry in Baby B’s medical records that you had taken observations at approximately 0230, when you had not don so 4) Your conduct at Charge 3i) and/or Charge 3ii) above was dishonest because you created a record/s providing information about the state of Baby B’s health which was not true 5) You administered medication to Patient B, namely a “brown tablet”, i) Which was not clinically indicated for her at that time and/or ii) Which you were later unable to identify and/or advise upon. AND in light of the above, your fitness to practise is impaired by reason of misconduct.”

[7]The Fitness to Practise Committee determined that charges 1)i), 1 ii) and 2) were proved, together with 3)ii) and 4 (with respect to 3)ii)) were proved. 3)i), 4) (with respect to 3)i)), 5)i) and 5)ii) were not proved. The charges proved were found to amount to misconduct and the Fitness to Practise Committee determined that the Applicant was impaired on both public protection and public interest grounds. These were undoubtedly serious findings. In this challenge to the imposition of the ISO, this court has to start from the position that the Committee considered the imposition of an ISO to be the right course. While in Sandler v GMC

[2010] EWHC 1029

, Nicol J agreed that the role of the court was not confined to exercising judicial review type jurisdiction, he also made clear that the court will only terminate an extant order if it thought that order was wrong.

[8]The hearing relating to the charges had opened on 23 January 2023 and concluded on 17 October 2025. I am informed that the hearing itself ran for a total of 76 days. There had been an earlier hearing in October and November 2021 when the chair of the Fitness to Practise Committee had to recuse himself after six days of hearing. No findings of fact were reached.

[9]The determination of the Fitness to Practise Committee was that the Applicant’s conduct showed serious underlying attitudinal concerns which were fundamentally incompatible with continued registration and, consequently, it was determined that the only appropriate order was a striking off order. The Applicant challenges that decision by way of an appeal.

The Interim Suspension Order

[10]The Fitness to Practise Panel determined that it was necessary to impose an ISO Suspension Order to cover the period prior to the striking-off order coming into effect, based upon the reasoning for making the striking off order. It was determined that the imposition of conditions was not appropriate, proportionate or workable. The Applicant contends that it is wrong for the Respondent to rely upon the striking-off order to support the ISO as it is a measure imposed for the protection of the public, not as a punishment and there have been 7 years between the complaints (relating to one night) where there had been no further concerns raised and the most serious of the allegations, the administration of an unknown medication, were not proved.

[11]The Applicant further contends that:(i) The ISO is causing immediate and severe financial hardship which could not be remedied at a later date given the consequences of that financial hardship, including the possibility of homelessness caused by the build-up of rent arrears, the inability to meet essential living costs, including utilities, food and medication; and the loss of work opportunities;

(ii) The ISO is having an adverse impact upon the Applicant’s health: the Applicant says that it is causing her financial distress and professional uncertainty and isolation which is having a serious impact on her well-being;

(iii) The imposition of the ISO is inconsistent with earlier determinations during a seven year period together with the lengthy Fitness to Practise proceedings when it was repeatedly determined that there was no risk – the ISO not being imposed until after the determination of the Fitness to Practise Committee in 2025, when the allegations had been made about her behaviour in 2017, there had been no ISO imposed and no further complaint made about the Applicant during that 8 year period;

(iv) The online notification of the Applicant’s registration status caused uncertainty and prejudice;

(v) The substantive hearing itself was unfair, the Appellant alleging that she was not given a fair opportunity to participate.

[12]The Respondent rejects the Applicant’s challenge to the decision to impose an ISO on the grounds that it was necessary, proportionate and justified for the appeal period on the grounds of public protection and public interest in the context of the findings made at the substantive hearing and that the findings at the hearing of the Fitness to Practise Committee are crucial in determining that the ISO is needed.

The lack of an earlier ISO

[13]The Respondent had not imposed an ISO before the findings of the Fitness to Practise Committee. It was the findings of the Committee that the Applicant was guilty of misconduct and dishonesty that led to the determination that the striking off order was appropriate and justified the making of an ISO pending the hearing of the appeal.

[14]While the Applicant contends that argument is entirely circular, it does justify the imposition of the ISO. The Fitness to Practice Committee judged the matters that were proven to have occurred in 2017 to be of such a level of seriousness that a striking off order was the only appropriate sanction. While that determination is being appealed, the imposition of the ISO is justified while that appeal has not been determined. It cannot be said that it was wrong to impose the ISO in the circumstances of making the striking off order.

The Allegation that the Substantive Proceedings were unfair

[15]The Applicant contends that that substantive hearing was unfair and that undermines the granting of the ISO which was for the purpose of covering the period to appeal the substantive order.

[16]A Court will terminate an ISO in circumstances where the order itself is wrong (see Sandler) and where there is a challenge to an ISO at a time when there is an outstanding appeal against a substantive striking-off order, as in this matter, the court must be “strongly of the view that the substantive appeal is bound to succeed”. This is because the court should be “slow to categorise as wrong a decision which has at its heart the protection of the public.” The requirement that the court is to be strongly of view that the substantive appeal is bound to succeed is a high hurdle to overcome.

[17]In this matter, the Applicant has already sought permission to judicially review the determination of the Fitness to Practise Committee but failed both on the papers before Mr CMG Ockelton sitting as a Judge of the High Court and at a renewed oral hearing before Lang J. Mr Ockelton found on 5 September 2025 that the application for judicial review, based upon the defendant being wrong to continue disciplinary proceedings against her given the passage of time since the relevant events allegedly occurred and the alleged paucity of evidence against her, could not properly be granted permission as it was an application made out of time and, even if time had been extended, not a matter for the court to intervene. He found that it was a matter for the body assessing the evidence and submissions to determine whether the passage of time made it unfair to make a decision as that determination needed to be made by the decision-making body on the particular facts of the case.

[18]The Applicant renewed her application for permission to bring judicial review on 6 September 2025 and the panel resumed its hearing on 8 September 2025. The renewed application for judicial review proceedings failed at an oral hearing before Lang J on 11 December 2025.

[19]While the Applicant contends that these decisions to refuse permission to bring judicial review proceedings were made without having an opportunity to assess the full picture of the proceedings, they are a determination that the Applicant could not succeed on the judicial review proceedings that she was endeavouring to bring.

[20]The proper course for the Applicant is to proceed, as she is, with her substantive appeal against the determination of the Fitness to Practise Committee to strike her off. If she is successful with respect to her appeal then the ISO will fall away

The Allegation that the Applicant was unable to Participate

[21]I cannot find that this allegation is made out. The hearing took place between 23 January 2023 and 17 October 2025 for a total of 76 days. The record of the hearing sets out that the Applicant was present and represented on numerous days, not present but represented on other days, present and unrepresented on others, and was unrepresented and not present for days in April, September and October 2025 – which appears to amount to 16 days out of the 76. The Applicant sets out that her absences were due either to ill-health or engagement with other court proceedings. The Fitness to Practise Committee came to factual conclusions with regard to her absences and that she had “voluntarily absented herself” and that her “engagement had diminished.” While these are findings that are disputed by the Applicant, that are not irrational conclusions that could not have been reached by the Fitness to Practise Committee.

[22]The Applicant had been given the opportunity to provide supporting medical evidence in support of her absence. The Applicant says that she was suffering from stress, and that the Respondent’s case presenter had indicated that the Applicant had refused to allow the Fitness to Practise Committee an opportunity “to see any medical evidence.” It is not clear to me whether that indicates that there was medical evidence available and that the NMC knew it existed, but it does seem clear that the Applicant accepts that she was not allowing the Fitness to Practise Committee the opportunity to see any evidence, she says on the basis of data protection grounds. That is not the same as providing medical evidence supporting absence. In Brabazon-Drenning v UKCC HRLR 6 (referred to in General Medical Council v Hayat

[2018] EWCA Civ 2796

), Elias J (as he then was) said “… save in very exceptional cases where the public interest points strongly to the contrary, it must be wrong for a committee which has the livelihood and reputation of a professional individual in the palm of its hands, to go on with a hearing where is unchallenged medical evidence that the individual is simply not fit to withstand the rigours of disciplinary process.” However, in Hayat, it was pointed out that earlier decisions such as Tait v Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons

[2003] UKPC 34

and Norton v Bar Standards Board

[2014] EWHC 2681 (Admin)

have to be treated with considerable caution in light of the decision of Sir Brian Leveson as President of the Queen’s Bench Division, in General Medical Council v Adeogba

[2016] EWCA Civ 162

, that hearings in the absence of the practitioner are relatively common and that there needs to be fairness on both sides, not just for the practitioner but also for the tribunal that is seeking to promote and protect the health and safety of the public.

[23]In order to deal with an adjournment based on ill health, there must be evidence that the individual is unfit to participate in the hearing and that evidence must identify with proper particularity the individual’s condition and explain why that condition prevents participation in the hearing Levis v Ellis Carr

[2012] EWHC 63

. The Applicant did not provide medical evidence to establish an inability to take part in the proceedings and, for the purposes of this determination, it cannot properly be said that the proceedings were unfair because the hearing proceeded in her absence.

The Judicial Review Proceedings

[24]The Applicant informed the Respondent that she was bringing judicial review proceedings on 8 April 2025 (day 61), and on 8 September 2025 (day 65) the Applicant contended that the proceedings should not proceed. The Administrative Court refused the application for permission to bring judicial proceedings on the papers before the proceedings resumed and, although the Applicant applied for reconsideration of the application, the Fitness to Practise Committee were entitled to continue with the hearing.

Financial and Health Implications of the ISO

[25]The Applicant has raised her concerns about the ISO and the fact that it is causing her health and financial hardship. There is, of course, natural sympathy for the Applicant suffering from that hardship but, in light of the findings of the Fitness to Practise Committee and the decision that the striking-off order was the only sufficient order to protect the interests of the public, the Committee were justified in imposing the ISO. The fact that the Applicant had not been accused of any breaches while working between the allegations and the findings does not undermine the decision to impose an ISO

The Register

[26]The Applicant’s sealed notice of appeal against the decision of the Fitness to Practise Committee to make a striking off order was not received by the Respondent until after the appeal deadline. It is not suggested that the Applicant was responsible for that delay but the consequence of the delay meant that the register had been updated with the striking off order which was then updated again to note the ISO pending the outcome of the appeal.

[27]There was nothing illegitimate in that process of updating the register.

[28]The Applicant had filed her statutory appeal against the decision to make a striking off order was made on 21 November 2025 (the statutory deadline was 27 November 025), the appeal was sealed and issued by the court on 27 November 2025 which was the same day it was received by the Respondent. There is no suggestion that the Applicant is out of time with respect to the statutory appeal

Conclusion and Costs

[29]For the reasons set out, this application for revocation of the ISO cannot succeed.

[30]As the successful party, the Respondent seeks its costs of resisting the application. I accept the Applicant’s contentions that, in light of what she says have been considerable delays by the Respondent in dealing with her substantive appeal, she may have good arguments that those costs should not be awarded in favour of the Respondent or should be proportionately reduced. In the circumstances, I will adjourn the determination on the costs of this application to be determined at the conclusion of the substantive appeal. Subsequent to a draft of this judgment being circulated, the Applicant has raised issues with respect to non or partial compliance with the orders made on 14 May 2026. These are issues that the Applicant can explore further at the substantive appeal hearing.