Gabor Gajar v Pecs Regional Court, Hungary [2026] EWHC 1903 (Admin)

Neutral Citation Number: 2026] EWHC 1903 (Admin)Case No AC-2025-LON-000399
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 27/07/2026MRS JUSTICE ARBUTHNOT DBE
GABOR GAJARAppellantPECS REGIONAL COURT, HUNGARYRespondent
Ms Danielle Barden (instructed by GT Stewart) for AppellantMr Adam Squibbs (instructed by GLD) for RespondentHearing Hearing dates: 17th June 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 2pm on 27 th July 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................Mrs Justice Arbuthnot DBE:Introduction
[1]The appellant, Gabor Gajar, is sought by the Pecs Regional Court, Hungary pursuant to two arrest warrants. The first was a conviction warrant issued on 6 August 2024 and certified on 22 August 2024. This was to serve a sentence of one year’s imprisonment with 10 months and one day left to serve. He had been convicted of multiple offences of driving whilst disqualified, one offence of use of a false number plate and two offences of harassment on different dates between May and July 2021.[2]The second arrest warrant was issued on 21 October 2024 and certified on 15 November 2024. This was another conviction warrant with a sentence of one year and eight months’ imprisonment imposed for driving whilst disqualified in November 2021 and in April 2022. That sentence remains to be served. The appellant has previously served custodial sentences in Hungary, including a sentence of six years’ imprisonment.[3]On 4 February 2025, after a hearing at Westminster Magistrates’ Court, the Deputy to the Senior District Judge, District Judge Tan Ikram, ordered the appellant’s extradition.[4]Permission to appeal the decision was refused by McGowan J on 15 April 2025 and a renewed application for permission was served on 23 April 2025.[5]Following the publication of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (“CPT”) Report on Hungary of 2025 (“the 2025 CPT Report”) and the 2025 CPT Response (“the 2025 Response”) by the Hungarian authorities on 16 December 2025, an application to amend the grounds of appeal and adduce these reports as fresh evidence was served on 8 January 2026.[6]Sweeting J granted permission to amend the grounds of appeal and adduce the fresh evidence. On 26 February 2026 the judge granted permission to appeal on the Article 3 European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) ground of appeal as amended.[7]Sweeting J observed that permission was granted on the ground that it was reasonably arguable that the appellant would be subject to a breach of his Article 3 rights upon surrender to Hungary. He said:
“The Appeal raises an entirely new point which was not considered at the hearing before the District Judge or at the paper stage. It relates to the means of restraint used in prisons in Hungary which involve: 1. the practice of placing violent, agitated or recalcitrant prisoners in padded cells in their underwear with restraints on their hands and ankles (with the hands restrained behind the back) for periods of up to 8 hours without access to toilets and; 2. the practice of shackling prisoners to beds or other fixed objects. These practices are evidenced in the most recent CPT report which was not available prior to December of 2025. It is far from clear from the government response to the CPT report that these practices have ceased or relate to only one prison. It is reasonably arguable that they may involve a breach of Article 3 rights and that the fresh material would have led to the case being decided differently.” used in prisons in Hungary which involve: cells in their underwear with restraints on their hands and ankles (with the hands restrained behind the back) for periods of up to 8 hours without access to These practices are evidenced in the most recent CPT report which was not available prior to December of 2025. It is far from clear from the government response to the CPT report that these practices have ceased or relate to only one prison. It is reasonably arguable that they may involve a breach of Article 3 rights and that the fresh material would have led to the case being decided differently.”

prison. It is reasonably arguable that they may involve a breach of Article 3 rights

[8]This appeal is the lead appeal concerning Hungarian prison conditions. A number of other appeals await this decision.[9]Ms Barden appeared for the appellant Mr Gajar, and Mr Squibbs for the respondent judicial authority. I have been greatly assisted by the care and attention that they have brought to the case.

Extradition hearing in the court below

[10]The following issues were raised at the extradition hearing in the court below:(i) Article 3; and(ii) Article 8. The Article 3 challenge was put on the basis of the absence of an assurance regarding minimum space. Following the extradition hearing, DSDJ Ikram allowed the respondent further time to provide an assurance. This was duly served prior to judgment being delivered. The Article 3 argument failed. The Article 8 argument has not been pursued further.

Issues in the appeal

[11]The appeal is based on a single ground under section 21 of the Extradition Act and Article 3 ECHR, namely that extraditing the appellant to Hungary would expose him to a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in detention. It is argued that the district judge was only able to find no such risk because he did not have the benefit of the later evidence, the 2025 CPT Report and the 2025 Response. The appellant argues that the use of restraint in padded cells and restraint on beds described in the reports were capable of breaching Article 3.[12]The key issue on appeal is therefore whether the 2025 CPT Report and the 2025 Response recently admitted by Sweeting J, show “substantial grounds” for believing there is a real risk to Mr Gajar of Article 3 ill‑treatment if he is extradited to Hungary, applying the principles set out at paragraphs 49 to 52 below.[13]There is a secondary issue which is the appellant’s application served on 22 May 2026 to admit fresh evidence which goes to whether the presumption that Hungary will comply with Convention obligations has been rebutted. The new evidence was said by Ms Barden for Mr Gajar to support the argument that information given by Hungary is neither sufficient nor satisfactory and the Hungarian authorities should not be allowed to rely upon their failure to provide information to undermine the submission that the presumption of compliance has been rebutted. The May 2026 fresh evidence consisted of a number of documents which I consider at paragraphs 41 onwards below. Evidence The 2025 CPT Report[14]The 2025 CPT Report on Hungarian Prisons, set out its findings after an ad hoc visit which took place between 25 March and 1 April 2025. The final report was sent to the Hungarian authorities on 16 July 2025 for their response.[15]The 2025 Report was required after an earlier one in 2023 had identified credible allegations of physical ill-treatment of prisoners by staff in Tiszalok Prison. This had nothing to do with the use of padded cells or restraint beds. The follow-up visit to the prison was to re-examine the treatment of prisoners and assess the steps taken by the authorities to implement the recommendations made in the 2023 report. A second prison, Szombathely Prison was also visited in 2025. Restraint in the padded cells[16]The particular complaint made by the appellant is dealt with in Section 2 of the 2025 CPT Report at page 19, paragraph 43 and is headed “Use of padded cells, hand and ankle cuffing of prisoners to fixed objects”: “43. Both establishments visited were equipped with padded cells (so-called “raging cells”). By virtue of Section 146(6) of the Prison Act, prisoners may be placed therein, for up to eight hours, if, due to their behaviour, they are dangerous to themselves or others. During the placement, the movement of the person may be restricted”.[17]The Report then considered Szombathely Prison at paragraph 44: “44. The delegation was informed that the padded cells at Szombathely Prison were used very rarely (once in a year or two). The placement was decided either by the governor or the deputy governor, was approved by a medical doctor, and the person concerned was checked regularly (that is, at 30 minutes to one hour intervals) by healthcare staff and prison officers. The duration was, in practice, for a maximum of four hours (but reportedly shorter in most cases). However, this information was not corroborated by written records as the use of padded cells was reportedly not recorded in any register. Moreover, prisoners were placed in a padded cell in only their underwear, while being handcuffed behind their back, and ankle-cuffed. This is unacceptable (see below)”.[18]The 2025 Report then considered Tiszalok Prison at paragraph 45:
“45. The findings at Tiszalok Prison are a matter of grave concern to the CPT. The information gathered through interviews with prisoners and the examination of various registers, most notably individual reports on the use of coercive measures, clearly showed that there used to be a practice of placing violent, agitated or recalcitrant prisoners in padded cells for up to eight hours. Throughout that time, their hands were restrained behind their back with metal handcuffs attached to a belt, and they were also ankle-cuffed. They were lying in a prone position in only their underwear, with their knees bent and the hand and ankle-cuffs connected by a chain behind their back. Some of the prisoners concerned also described that they could not stand up or even move, they had had cramps in their limbs, which had become numb, and they had wet themselves. In some cases, when prison officers came to check on the prisoner placed in the padded cell, they allegedly kicked him. It was alleged that the prisoners concerned were not systematically visited by healthcare staff throughout their placement in the padded cells. Further, several prisoners interviewed during the visit alleged that the hand and ankle-cuffs had been excessively tight and had left marks and scars on their wrists and ankles. In some cases, these marks and scars were still visible when they were interviewed by the delegation several months after the incident. These consistent and credible allegations were received in several interviews carried out separately with individual prisoners.”
Throughout that time, their hands were restrained behind their back with metal handcuffs attached to a belt, and they were also ankle-cuffed. They were lying in a prone position in only their underwear, with their knees bent and the hand and ankle-cuffs connected by a chain behind their back. Some of the prisoners concerned also described that they could not stand up or even move, they had had cramps in their limbs, which had become numb, and they had wet themselves. In some cases, when prison officers came to check on the prisoner placed in the padded cell, they allegedly kicked him. It was alleged that the prisoners concerned were not systematically visited by healthcare staff throughout their placement in the padded cells. Further, several prisoners interviewed during the visit alleged that the hand and ankle-cuffs had been excessively tight and had left marks and scars on their wrists and ankles. In some cases, these marks and scars were still visible when they were interviewed by the delegation several months after the incident. These consistent and credible allegations were received in several interviews carried out separately with individual prisoners.”[19]In footnote 34 the CPT said that there were two padded cells in the segregation unit of Tiszalok Prison whilst in Szombathely Prison there were three. The delegation was told that according to “the relevant regulations, each prison establishment has to be equipped with a padded cell”. Footnote 36 said in relation to Szombathely Prison that prisoners were placed in a padded cell on their side which allowed for some limited movement.[20]In footnote 37, the 2025 Report said that the accounts received by the delegation were of treatment received between April 2023 and September 2024.[21]The Report went on to say that “The CPT considers that such use of padded cells and hand and ankle-cuffs is totally unacceptable and may amount to inhuman and degrading treatment or even torture” (paragraph 45).[22]The 2025 CPT Report said that when it was “deemed essential to hand and ankle cuff a person, the cuff should under no circumstances be excessively tight and should be applied only for as long as is strictly necessary”.[23]On a more positive note, the CPT said that it was a welcome development that the use of padded cells at Tiszalok Prison had “practically ended since November 2024” and that the prison governor had to approve any prisoner placed there.[24]At paragraph 46, the CPT outlined some “precepts” which should be implemented: Whilst the CPT accepted that there may be occasions when temporary isolation in a “suitable environment” should take place when a prisoner was agitated or violent and posed a serious risk to themselves or others, this should be a measure of last resort when other attempts to manage the situation had failed. The placement in the padded cell should not be punitive but be for the shortest possible time “usually minutes rather than hours”. Prisoners should be offered regular human contact by staff. The use of the measure should be recorded in writing in a register setting out the times the measure was resorted to, the reasons why and the name of the person who approved it and an account of any injuries caused. The CPT considered there was no justification for wrist and ankle cuffs applied even to a violent or agitated prisoner when in a padded cell nor should they be restrained in a hyper-extended position with the cuffs linked by a chain with their knees bent. Further when it was deemed essential to cuff wrists and ankles they should not be excessively tight and should be applied for only as long as necessary. When in a padded cell the prisoner’s clothing should not be removed unless justified by a risk assessment and then they should be provided with rip-proof clothing. Finally a prisoner in the padded cell should have “ready access” to a toilet.[25]Paragraph 46 of the 2025 CPT Report ended with the following, in bold typeface:
“The CPT recommends that these precepts are effectively implemented in practice. The relevant regulations should be amended accordingly and measures should be taken to ensure that the staff are duly informed of the new procedures and requirements. Further, prison officers should be trained in verbal de-escalation techniques, and proportionate manual control and restraint techniques”
. Restraint to beds Restraint to beds[26]The 2025 Report went on to consider a different type of restraint used in Szombathely Prison. At paragraph 47 it was said: “47. At Szombathely Prison, violent or agitated prisoners were hand and ankle-cuffed to a bed with metal cuffs. Such fixation was considered a less restrictive measure than the placement in a padded cell. According to the information gathered during the visit, resort to this measure was rare and was recorded in the register of the use of coercive measures and restraint. The fixation took place in a disciplinary cell in the segregation unit of the prison, was decided by the governor or the deputy governor of the prison, and lasted for two to three hours, during which time the person concerned was regularly checked upon by prison officers. The CPT acknowledges that in the event of a prisoner acting in a highly agitated or violent manner, the use of handcuffs may be justified. However, as a matter of principle, the persons concerned should never be shackled to a bed or any other fixed object. Instead they should be kept under close supervision in an appropriate setting. In the event of agitation brought about by the state of health of a prisoner, prison officers should request medical assistance and follow the instructions of the healthcare professional (including, where necessary, transfer to an appropriate healthcare setting)”.[27]The next paragraph was in bold typeface:
“The CPT recommends that the Hungarian authorities take urgent steps to ensure that these precepts are implemented in practice. The relevant regulations should be amended accordingly and measures should be taken to ensure that the staff are duly informed of the new procedures and requirements.”
[28]I noted that the two methods of restraint were considered separately by the CPT. Further, although the CPT was critical of the use of restraint on beds in Szombathely Prison, it was not suggested by the CPT that the use of restraint to beds may amount to inhuman and degrading treatment. The 2025 Response from the Hungarian authorities 29. Restraint in the padded cells

The 2025 Response from the Hungarian authorities

[29]The 2025 Response to paragraph 46 of the 2025 CPT Report is at page 19 onwards. The Hungarian authorities made it clear that the padded cell type segregation was applied according to Hungarian legislation (set out in sections 146(6) of the Punishment Enforcement Act). Section 146(6) read as follows:
“A prisoner exhibiting behaviour that poses a danger to themselves or others shall be placed in a room designed for this purpose – for this purpose, means of restraint may be used against them – and immediate measures shall be taken to have them examined by a doctor or, in the absence of a prison doctor, by a specialist nurse. In the latter case, measures shall be taken to ensure that the prisoner is examined by the prison doctor within two hours, with the involvement of a psychologist if necessary. Isolation may last for a maximum of eight hours and its necessity must be reviewed every two hours. After eight hours, if the prisoner’s condition had not improved, arrangements must be made for a psychiatric examination.”
[30]Section 147 of the Security Regulations was also set out as relevant: “The decision on the continued detention of prisoners who exhibit behaviour that poses a danger to themselves or others shall be made by the governor of the prison or a person appointed by him during working hours, and by the security officer on duty outside working hours”.[31]According to the 2025 Response another relevant regulation is point 1 of the Technical Protocol on “the implementation of certain security measures applicable to prisoners”. This “details certain criteria relating to the design of the room under consideration and the placement of prisoners”.[32]The 2025 Response sets out the following about the use of restraint and padded cells: “The use of cells for the accommodation of prisoners exhibiting self-harming or dangerous behaviour was implemented in 138 cases between 2023 and the first quarter of 2025 in certain agglomerations. Typically, in 120 cases, handcuffs, handcuff belts, and leg irons were used together to restrain prisoners. In 10 cases, only handcuffs were used, and in 8 cases, handcuffs and leg irons were used. The use of restraints did not cause injury in any case. The restraints were ordered due to self-harming and dangerous behaviour, as well as suicidal intent, and were accompanied by a medical examination. In most cases – 126 cases – the detainees were restrained in light clothing (underwear) in order to prevent the possibility of self-strangulation. The duration of the placements mostly did not exceed the 8 hours provided for by law, which suggests that the measure was effective and achieved the goal in most cases”.[33]The Hungarian authorities set out what changes they had made since the 2025 CPT inspection. To ensure the “uniform interpretation and application of the legislation”, they had prepared a professional protocol by 30 June 2025. This was going to “provide significant assistance in the decision-making process for ordering security measures and in the homogenous implementation procedure” and included “sensitivity training” for personnel. This was being rolled out (my words) from the fourth quarter of 2025. Restraint to beds[34]The 2025 Response responded at page 20 to the CPT’s observations at paragraph 47 on the shackling of prisoners to a bed. The steps the Hungarian authorities had taken were the following:
“Following the CPT visit, the security department conducted an investigation into the subject of restraint as a preventive measure to restrict movement. In terms of justification, the investigation found that the institutions applying the security measure had restrained the detainees in accordance with their legal authority, without exceeding its provisions. In most cases, the staff used this method because of self-harming behaviour or threats of self-harm, and to a lesser extent because of violent behaviour or unpredictable and disturbed behaviour.”
[35]The 2025 Response outlined that they were going to standardize the process and a prototype bed designed for shackling had been completed with testing underway.[36]In relation to the restraint to beds, the 2025 Response said:
“In most of the cases examined, the security measure was applied to prevent self-harm, but in cases where the detainee exhibits other behaviour that violates or threatens the order of the prison, restraint may be used to stop or eliminate such behaviour, and prison staff have the option of using this measure to ensure its effective completion. Restraint for the purpose of preventing self-harm may only be carried out in a single-person isolation cell equipped with electronic surveillance devices, on a device designed for this purpose, in a supine position, with the limbs restrained and a device to protect the head in place. The duration of this measure shall not exceed two hours continuously. If the risk of self-harm persists after two hours, the restraint shall be discontinued and the detainee shall be placed in a room designed for the accommodation of detainees exhibiting self-harming or dangerous behaviour.”
[37]The 2025 Response considered restraints and said the following:
“The Security Regulations regulate restraint in points 169–175, according to which it is permissible, among other things, if it is necessary to prevent further self-harm, attack, or escape by the detainee, breaking resistance, or ensuring the effective completion of the measure cannot be ensured in any other way, and the prisoner's condition does not justify placement in a room intended for prisoners exhibiting behaviour that is dangerous to themselves or others. The opinion of a doctor or other medical personnel is also decisive in assessing the justification.”
[38]The 2025 Response continued:
“The legal provision contained in the previous paragraph includes all the guarantee elements which, if consistently and accurately complied with, enable the objective of the measure to be achieved in a manner that excludes inhuman or degrading treatment. The room equipped with electronic surveillance equipment is justified for the purpose of continuous surveillance, single-person isolation ensures that the person subject to the measure is not exposed to other detainees, the supine position excludes the possibility of suffocation, and the device protecting the head prevents further self-harming behaviour, which is the only possible behaviour during the measure. By placing prisoners who exhibit self-harming or dangerous behaviour after two hours in a cell, the regulation emphasizes graduality. Restraint may be ordered by the head of the relevant department designated by the head of the prison service, or by the security officer on duty outside office hours. Restraint to objects was used in 72 cases nationwide during the period under review.”
[39]Restraint to beds consisted of the shackling of the four limbs to the four corners of the bed but in less serious cases it could be just the wrists. In 55 cases the room had been used for up to two hours or close to that but it had never been used for longer than that. I was not able to resolve what appeared to be a discrepancy between the 72 cases where restraint was to objects and the 55 cases where restraint involved beds. In any event the number of cases was very small.[40]Towards the end of this part of the 2025 Response the Hungarian authorities said they had issued “a methodological guideline” on 4th July 2025 about the use of cells for prisoners who were self-harming or behaving dangerously. This was to ensure a uniform procedure. It was not clear whether this was in addition to the professional protocol of 30 June 2025 set out at paragraph 33 above.

The May 2026 fresh evidence application

[41]The fresh evidence consisted of documents some of them dating back to 2017. It included the Hungarian Helsinki Committee (HHC) submission to the CPT (March 2025). The Committee of Ministers materials in Varga and Others v Hungary, including: Notes for the 1521st meeting (March 2025), the Interim Resolution (6 March 2025), NGO communication (HHC) dated 20 January 2026, Notes of the Ministers’ Deputies 1553rd meeting (9-11 March 2026) and earlier Notes from 2024, 2021, and from a 2017 meeting.[42]Many of them concerned various bodies’ consideration of the compensatory remedies available in Hungary for prisoners after the European Court’s judgment of Varga and Others and Istvan Kovacs group v Hungary (Applications Nos. 14097/12, 15707/10). Varga concerned overcrowding in cells in Hungarian prisons which had been found likely to cause prisoners inhuman and degrading treatment.[43]The HHC is a leading human rights organisation in Hungary and Central Europe which in a letter to the Council of Europe Department for the Execution of Judgments, complained that the judgments of the ECtHR were not being implemented by Hungary. It said there was a lack of a plan to reduce the prison population and a failure to provide statistical data about the remedy process.[44]Of interest perhaps, the HHC listed a wide range of complaints made to it by prisoners. There was no mention of the restraints in padded cells or of the restraint involving the beds. The lack of reliable statistical data mentioned in the document seemed to relate to compensation and the time that a prisoner was held in overcrowded accommodation. The HHC pointed out that the data provided by the Hungarian authorities appeared to relate to the year before. Another issue considered by the HHC was the way that prisoners with disabilities were treated.[45]HHC said that the authorities continued to impose “special security regimes” without individualised assessments or effective safeguards or oversight. Unfortunately it was not clear what the “special security regimes” were. There was mention by the HHC that the Action Report submitted by the Hungarian authorities did not address these regimes despite the Committee of Ministers’ explicit requests for information.[46]Another document that asked about the Hungarian authorities approach to the compensatory remedy post Varga was the interim resolution adopted by the Committee of Ministers dated 6 March 2025 which also asked them to submit outstanding data without further delay. They were concerned about detainees with disabilities and noted with satisfaction that steps had been taken regarding the development of accessible accommodation but asked for data per prison per year regarding number of prisoners needing special accommodation.[47]The HHC Justice Programme report of March 2025 set out a number of concerns about the prison conditions including overcrowding but there was no mention of the treatment of detainees in the padded cells or on the beds.[48]Much of the fresh evidence dated to a time before the hearing in front of the Deputy to the Senior District Judge, District Judge Ikram. Of the newer material, none of it concerned the use of restraint in padded cells or the restraint beds. Legal principles Article 3

Legal principles

[49]Under Article 3 of the ECHR “no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. Inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment must be sufficiently severe to fall within the scope of Article 3 of ECHR. It is unlawful for the United Kingdom to extradite a person to a country where he or she is foreseeably at risk of being treated in a manner prohibited by Article 3 (paragraph 24 of R (Ullah) v Special Immigration Adjudicator [2004] 2 AC 323).[50]The correct approach in extradition cases where prison conditions were said to give rise to a real risk of Article 3 ill-treatment in the requesting state has been set out since, but ten years ago Aikens LJ said the following in paragraph 49 of Elashmawy v Court of Brescia, Italy [2015] EWHC 28 (Admin). “(1) The extradition of a requested person from a Contracting state to another state (whether or not a Contracting state) where that person will be held in detention (either awaiting trial or sentence or in order to serve a sentence lawfully imposed) can give rise to an Article 3 issue, which will engage the responsibility of the Contracting state from which the extradition of the requested person is sought. (2) If it is shown that there are substantial grounds for believing that the requested person would face a “real risk” of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the receiving country then Article 3 implies an obligation on the Contracting state not to extradite the requested person. (3) Article 3 imposes “absolute” rights, but in order to fall within the scope of Article 3 the ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity. In general, a very strong case is required to make good a violation of Article 3. The test is a stringent one and it is not easy to satisfy. (4) Whether the minimum level is attained in a particular case depends on all the circumstances, such as the nature of the treatment, its duration, its physical and mental effects and, possibly, the age, sex and health of the person concerned. In that sense, the test of whether there has been a breach of Article 3 in a particular case is “relative”. (5) The detention of a person in a prison as a punishment lawfully imposed inevitably involves a deprivation of liberty and brings with it certain disadvantages and a level of suffering that is unavoidable because that is inherent in detention. But lawful detention does not deprive a person of his Article 3 rights. Indeed, Article 3 imposes on the relevant authorities a positive obligation to ensure that all prisoners are held under conditions compatible with respect for human dignity, that they are not subjected to distress or testing of an intensity that exceeds the level of unavoidable suffering concomitant to detention. The health and welfare of prisoners must be adequately assured. (6) If it is alleged that the conditions of detention infringe Article 3, it is necessary to make findings about the actual conditions suffered and their cumulative effect during the relevant time and on the specific claims of the complainant. (7) Where prison overcrowding reaches a certain level, lack of space in a prison may constitute the central element to be taken into account when assessing the conformity of a given situation within Article 3. As a general rule, if the area for personal space is less than 3 metres the overcrowding must be considered to be so severe as to justify of itself a finding of a violation of Article 3: (see the ECtHR judgment of Ananyev v Russia (Applications Nos 425/07 and 60800/080910) of January 2012, referred to at [9] of Florea v Romania [2014] EWHC 3538 (Admin) (“Florea”). (8) However, if overcrowding itself is not sufficient to engage Article 3, other aspects of the conditions of detention will be taken into account to see if there has been a breach. Factors may include: the availability for use of private lavatories, available ventilation, natural light and air, heating, and other basic health requirements.”[51]In Case C-404/15 PPU Aranyosi EU:C:2016:198 [2016] QB 921, a case involving overcrowding in Hungarian prisons, the Court of Justice of the European Union decided that in European arrest warrant cases, where there was the prospect of a finding of violation of Article 3, there was an obligation on the court to request further information rather than to discharge the requested person (paragraphs 91 and 95).[52]The practical application of Aranyosi was considered by Beatson LJ and Williams J in Mohammed v Portugal [2017] EWHC 3237 (Admin), at paragraph 15:
“Stage 1 of the procedure involves determining whether there is such a risk by assessing objective, reliable, specific and properly updated evidence … A finding of such a risk cannot lead, in itself, to a refusal to execute the EAW. Where such a risk is identified, the court is required to proceed to Stage 2. Stage 2 requires the executing judicial authority to make a specific assessment of whether there are substantial grounds to believe that the individual concerned will be exposed to that risk. To that end it must request the issuing authority to provide as a matter of urgency all necessary supplementary information on the conditions in which it is envisaged that the individual concerned will be detained. Stage 3 deals with the position after the information is provided. If in light of that, and of any other available information, the executing authority finds that, for the individual concerned, there is a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, execution of the warrant must be postponed but cannot be abandoned.”
Fresh

Evidence

[53]When fresh evidence is being considered by a court, Criminal Procedure Rule 50.20(6)(b) requires the appellant to do the following:

Fresh evidence

“50.20(6) Where the appeal is against an order by the magistrates' court— (a) … (b) if the grounds of appeal are that there is an issue which was not raised at the extradition hearing, or that evidence is available which was not available at the extradition hearing, the appeal notice must— (i) identify that issue or evidence, (ii) explain why it was not then raised or available, (iii) explain why that issue or evidence would have resulted in the magistrates' court deciding a question differently at the extradition hearing, and (iv) explain why, if the court had decided that question differently, the court would have been required not to make the order it made.”
[54]The approach to be followed by this court when faced with an application to admit fresh evidence in support of an appeal against an extradition order is stated in the familiar case of Szombathely City Court v Fenyvesi [2009] EWHC 231 (Admin); [2009] 4 All ER 324 at paragraph 32.[55]There are two parts to the test. First, admissibility is restricted to evidence that did not exist when the matter was tried in the magistrates’ court or was not available to the party relying on the evidence acting with reasonable diligence. Second, the court must be satisfied that had the evidence been relied on, the result of the extradition hearing would have been different and the requested person would have been discharged.

Submissions for the appellant

[56]Ms Barden for the appellant argued that the district judge was wrong to find no risk that extraditing the appellant to Hungary would expose him to a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in detention in the light of the 2025 CPT Report and the 2025 Response. These describe the use of restraint in padded cells and on restraint beds and other practices capable of breaching Article 3.[57]Ms Barden argued that the 2025 CPT Report showed there were substantial grounds for believing there was a real risk to Mr Gajar of Article 3 ill‑treatment. If the court found there was, then assurances should be obtained from Hungary at Stage 2 or the appellant should be discharged. The secondary issue raised by Ms Barden was whether the presumption that Hungary would comply with Convention obligations had been rebutted by the 2025 CPT Report and 2025 Response, supported by the fresh evidence that Ms Barden contended should be admitted.[58]Ms Barden argued the fresh evidence should be admitted as it shone a light on the failure of the Hungarian authorities to provide comprehensive data that confirmed the extent to which the restraint methods were being used in Hungarian prison, in light of what she described as the shortcomings in the Hungarian State’s data and the 2025 Response.[59]Ms Barden argued that the 2025 Response showed that approximately 1% of detainees in Hungarian prisons were subjected to detention with restraint in the padded cells between 2023 and the first quarter of 2025. The treatment that had been set out in the 2025 CPT Report was prohibited by Article 3 as it amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and it had said it may amount to torture.[60]The Hungarian authorities were not going to stop this ill-treatment but in fact were testing a new sort of bed to which they could shackle a prisoner. Ms Barden argued this too was ill-treatment.[61]Ms Barden relied on paragraphs 134-5 of Saadiv Italy (2009) 49 EHRR 30 and argued that the restraint in the padded cell amounted to ill-treatment that came within Article 3 as the suffering or humiliation went “beyond that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment” (paragraph 135).[62]Ms Barden argued that the following particular elements were a breach of Article 3: The nature of the shackling (“hogtied”) when the prisoner was being held in a padded room The fact that the shackled prisoners were left in their underwear with no arguable justification The prolonged time, eight hours, during which the prisoners were treated in this way The lack of lavatory facilities was degrading to the prisoners[63]Ms Barden relied on various authorities considered by the ECtHR where she said similar ill-treatment had taken place, in particular the use of restraints in already secure cells, and had been found to breach Article 3. She relied on Vukusic v Croatia (Case No. 37522/16) where prisoners held in rubber rooms hogtied for an extensive period was found to breach Article 3.[64]I noted that the facts set out in Vukusic were far removed from the restraint used in padded cells in Hungary. In Vukusic the prisoner was placed naked for 12 days in a filthy, faeces covered cell where the light remained on 24 hours a day and there was no lavatory. Mr Vukusic was then returned to the same cell for a further five days this time held hogtied, naked again, where the light remained on at all times.[65]Another ECtHR case Ms Barden relied on was Kummer v Czech Republic [2013] ECHR 31233/1 where a man detained in a police station was assaulted by police whilst he was restrained by being handcuffed to rings on either side of the cell. The restraint then moved to him being secured with his hands behind his back and his legs tied by a leather strap. Mr Kummer had been treated this way because he had made a hole in the cell door.[66]Mr Kummer was drunk and vulnerable and the court accepted that “considerable pain” was caused to him by the use of the restraints, and the police had acted in breach of domestic law. The court considered that “using restraints on a person already in a police cell, namely a secure environment, can be justified only in exceptional circumstances” (paragraph 67). The court found a violation of Article 3 despite ill-treatment which had lasted for 50 minutes.[67]In relation to restraint to beds, Ms Barden relied on the ECtHR case of Julin v Estonia [2012] ECHR 16563/08 where Mr Julin was restrained to a bed between 10.40am and 7.30pm on 22 October 2009. His condition was monitored by prison staff about once an hour and medical staff twice, once at the beginning and once at the end of this treatment.[68]The general principles applied by the court were set out at paragraph 118 of Julin:
“Ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of art 3 of the Convention. The assessment of this minimum level of severity is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and health of the victim.”
[69]In Julin the court said at paragraph 124:
“124. The Court notes that confinement of a person to a restraint bed is a measure of restraint that does not necessarily give rise to an issue under art 3 of the Convention. However, the Court is mindful of the high risk of ill-treatment of prisoners subjected to a means of restraint of such intensity. The application of such measure calls for a thorough scrutiny of its lawfulness as well as of the grounds for and the manner of its use.”
[70]The ECtHR observed that the grounds, conditions and procedure for the use of the means of restraint needed “to be defined with the utmost precision in the domestic law” (paragraph 125). The law in Estonia was superficial, it referred to physical restraint with no detail although the maximum restraint was set at 12 hours. There was no regulation that a register was required to record the use of restraint.[71]In Julin at paragraph 127: “The court reiterates that means of restraint should never be used as a means of punishment but rather in order to avoid self-injury or serious danger to other persons or prison security”.[72]The court went on to say:
“Most importantly, even if the applicant's initial confinement in the restraint bed was justified, the Court is not persuaded that the situation remained as serious for nearly nine hours. Confinement to a restraint bed, without medical reasons – which have not been shown to have existed in the present case – should rarely need to be applied for more than a few hours”
[73]Ms Barden said that the treatment in Hungarian prisons whether it was the restraint used in padded cells or the use of restraint beds was sufficiently serious to amount to a breach of Article 3. Both of these methods of restraint were inhuman and degrading treatment and interfered with the dignity of prisoners.[74]Ms Barden went further than the 2025 CPT Report and said that this restraint was not just to prevent a prisoner from self-harming or from harming others but was chosen purposefully to degrade and punish rather than using less intrusive methods. This contention was partially supported by the CPT which said this restraint was being used in respect of recalcitrant prisoners, not only those who were a danger to themselves or to others.[75]Ms Barden said that although there was a presumption of compliance with Article 3 in all European cases, paragraph 4 of Urbonas v Lithuania [2024] EWHC 33 (Admin) held that the “presumption may be rebutted by clear, cogent and compelling evidence, amounting to something approaching an international consensus”.[76]Ms Barden argued that the 2025 CPT Report and the 2025 Response provided this clear, cogent and compelling evidence, amounting to something approaching an international consensus. This court could rely on both reports and the evidence was capable of rebutting the presumption of Hungary’s compliance with Article 3.[77]It was for the respondent to discount the existence of a real risk to the appellant by providing an assurance that he would not be treated in such a way in the prisons of Hungary.[78]For the next limb of her argument Ms Barden relied on the eight pieces of fresh evidence served on 22 May 2026. Her argument was this evidence showed that the Hungarian authorities had avoided giving data in relation to various enquiries made by the Council of Europe and she contended that they were doing this again in their 2025 Response.[79]She said the lack of detail in the 2025 Response was intentionally unsatisfactory. The fresh evidence showed the Hungarian authorities had terminated the monitoring of its prisons by NGOs in 2017. Ms Barden said they had provided skewed data in relation to its prison estate as well as data which was not detailed and was for the whole prison estate rather than for each prison.[80]Ms Barden’s argument was that the failure to provide the data in relation to the prison estate “allows the Hungarian authorities to continue to breach Article 3 rights in its prisons with impunity, due to an apparently intentional failure to provide evidence of these breaches” (paragraph 41 of the skeleton argument).[81]In relation to whether Mr Gajar posed a danger to himself or others or whether he might be a recalcitrant prisoner who was at real risk of being punished by the prison authorities, Ms Barden relied on the conviction for harassment on the appellant’s Hungarian record which recorded he had made serious threats to a cousin’s life.[82]Ms Barden concluded by arguing that it was for the respondent to discount the existence of a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3, it was not able to, and thus the appeal should be allowed.

Submissions for the respondent

[83]Mr Squibbs opposed the appeal. He adopted the summary of the law set out in Ms Barden’s argument.[84]Mr Squibbs relied on the three stage approach set out in Mohammed at paragraph 52 above. He considered Stage 1 first. He noted that whether the use of restraint measures constituted a breach of Article 3 was fact-specific, but acknowledged that hogtying a detainee for eight hours as a form of punishment would not be compliant with Article 3.[85]He submitted that at Stage 1 Hungary had not lost its presumption of compliance with Article 3 in matters other than personal space. He submitted that the 2025 CPT Report did not assist the appellant, because it confirmed that the use of padded cells in Tiszalok Prison had “practically ended since November 2024”. He also argued that the 2025 Response also did not assist the appellant.[86]Mr Squibbs argued that there was no evidence to suggest that the use of padded cells and restraints in other Hungarian prisons had been anything like the use of padded cells and restraints in Tiszalok Prison, and that per Julin, the use of measures of restraint were not incompatible with Article 3 if they were reasonably necessary.[87]He said the statistics provided in the 2025 Response did not assist the appellant because there was no information as to how frequently the use of padded cells and restraints had been in the latter part of this period. Mr Squibbs also submitted that pages 19-21 of the 2025 Response made clear that following the CPT’s last visit to Hungary, the Hungarian authorities had undertaken an investigation into their measures of restraint, and had adopted measures that were compliant with Article 3, including the use of restraint beds.[88]Finally, Mr Squibbs argued that it was telling that the appellant had not referred the court to any decisions of the ECtHR regarding the use of restraint in Hungary, or any other cogent evidence. He submitted that the evidence adduced was far from an “international consensus” of evidence that Hungary was unable or unwilling to comply with its obligations under Article 3.[89]Mr Squibbs argued that at Stage 2, there were no substantial grounds for believing that the appellant would be at real risk of the ill-treatment by means of restraint described in the 2025 CPT Report, if he were returned to Hungary.[90]The appellant did not fall within the categories of prisoner who might be the subject of restraint to protect himself or others. There was insufficient evidence that restraints were being used to punish detainees. It was for the court to assess the risk to the appellant and whether there was a real risk to him of Article 3 ill-treatment.[91]Contrary to Ms Barden’s contention that if Stage 2 was reached the court should obtain assurances from Hungary, Mr Squibbs’ argument was that no further information was required in the particular circumstances of the appellant and Stage 3 of Mohammed was not relevant.[92]Mr Squibbs pointed out that underlying the stages was the fundamental presumption that the UK’s extradition partners act in “good faith” as per Banica v Romania [2023] EWHC 405 (Admin) from paragraph 48.[93]His final contention was that if the court rejected his submissions, the court should not dismiss the appeal at this stage but obtain further information from the Hungarian authorities.[94]In relation to the fresh evidence contained in the eight documents relied on by Ms Barden, Mr Squibbs argued that none concerned the use of restraint in the Hungarian prison estate, the contention that the Hungarian authorities were purposefully failing to provide evidence of breaches of Article 3 was “wholly unjustified” and was contrary to the presumption that requesting states act in good faith and fulfil their obligations under the ECHR.[95]Mr Squibbs argued that Ms Barden had cherry picked the fresh evidence in various ways which she said supported her argument and he relied on the CPT’s description of the excellent cooperation provided to the Committee when they visited the prisons in 2025. Overall he submitted that there was no evidence which allowed a safe inference that the Hungarian authorities were trying to disguise Article 3 ill-treatment. Discussion Fresh evidence – application of 22 May 2026

Discussion

[96]In terms of the fresh evidence, under Criminal Procedure Rule 50.20(6)(b), the appellant is required to identify the issue, explain why it was not raised or available in the court below, explain why that issue or evidence would have resulted in the magistrates’ court deciding a question differently at the extradition hearing and explain why, if the court had decided that question differently, the court would have been required not to make the order it made.[97]In Fenyvesi (above) the principle was established that the evidence had to be decisive. The fresh evidence relied on by Ms Barden did not concern restraint in padded cells nor the use of restraint beds, much of it predated the hearing before the Deputy to the Senior District Judge, District Judge Ikram or would have been available had the legal representatives considered it was evidence that should be relied upon. Furthermore, much of the fresh evidence concerned the availability of compensatory remedies after Varga and others (above).[98]The question of the provision of data, or the lack of it, did not concern the particular Article 3 issue raised by Ms Barden. The fresh evidence did not rebut the presumption of Hungarian compliance with Convention obligations generally. The fresh evidence was not decisive evidence and was of little relevance to the issue I had to decide.[99]I was satisfied that had the fresh evidence provided by Ms Barden been relied on in the court below, the result of the extradition hearing would not have been different and the requested person would not have been discharged.[100]The application to admit the fresh evidence set out at paragraphs 41 onwards is refused. Article 3 – The Mohammed Stage 1 102. Restraint in a padded cell[101]The cell space for prisoners in Hungary and Article 3 has been extensively considered by the English courts. Most recently the overcrowded cells argument dropped away in the light of the decisions of Berki v Hungary [2025] EWHC 1080 (Admin) and Szuchs v Hungary [2025] EWHC 3374 (Admin).

Article 3 – The Mohammed Stage 1

[102]An assurance from the Hungarian authorities that the prisoner would be guaranteed a minimum of 3m 2 of personal space was deemed to be sufficient to ensure there would be no violation of Article 3.[103]An assurance has been given in this case that Mr Gajar, if extradited, would be held in compliant prison cells (with a space of a minimum of 3m2) whilst detained in Hungary. The court below had accepted that assurance, as do I.[104]The argument in this case was a new one and arose from the information provided in the 2025 CPT Report and the 2025 Response where in two prisons it was found that in certain circumstances, particularly in Tiszalok Prison, prisoners could be held in conditions which might amount to inhuman and degrading treatment or even torture. As is commonly the case, there was no information provided by the Hungarian authorities about which prison Mr Gajar would be held at, if extradited.[105]Although there was not an international consensus in the sense of findings having been made by the ECtHR against Hungary on this point, the 2025 CPT Report was detailed and clear. As was set out in paragraph 18 above, the evidence was that at Tiszalok Prison “there used to be a practice of placing violent, agitated or “recalcitrant” prisoners in padded cells for up to eight hours. What was meant by “recalcitrant prisoners” was not explained by the CPT.[106]In the 2025 Response the practice of restraint in a padded cell was said by the Hungarian authorities to have been reserved for prisoners who were a danger to themselves or others. There was no mention of the restraint being used for recalcitrant prisoners.[107]The 2025 Response went further in relation to restraint to beds where it was said that in most cases they were used to prevent self-harm but they could also be used to “stop or eliminate” behaviour that “violates or threatens the order of the prison” (paragraphs 34 and 36 above). It may well be that this was a reference to the “recalcitrant” behaviour set out in the 2025 CPT Report although the 2025 Response referred to the restraint to beds being used for that behaviour and not the restraint in padded cells.[108]The prisoners in the padded cells in Tiszalok Prison were hogtied, in other words their ankle cuffs and wrist cuffs were joined to each other at the back via a belt. They were restrained in their underwear in this manner for up to eight hours. The prisoners were not allowed to go to the lavatory so on occasion they had urinated on themselves. This was degrading treatment. This unacceptable treatment of some prisoners was not denied by the Hungarian authorities in the 2025 Response.[109]I noted that whereas the Hungarian authorities in their 2025 Response point out that no injuries were caused, this was contradicted by the 2025 CPT Report which said that they had seen scars on the wrists of more than one prisoner which they were told were caused by this treatment.[110]Mr Squibbs relied on the fact that the use of padded cells in Tiszalok Prison was in the past as their use was said in the 2025 CPT Report to have “practically ended since November 2024” (paragraph 23 above). As against that, the CPT delegation was told that according to the regulations each prison had to be equipped with padded cells. From that, it would appear that the use of restraint in padded cells was not reserved to the two prisons visited.[111]Mr Squibbs also relied on the 2025 Response where it was said that the Hungarian authorities had prepared a professional protocol by 30 June 2025 to help with the decision-making process for ordering security measures. My concern about the 2025 Response was that despite the CPT saying that the precepts set out in the 2025 CPT Report (paragraph 24 above) should be implemented there was no evidence that they had been or would be. Nor was there any evidence of the implementation of the CPT’s recommendation at paragraph 25 above, that the relevant regulations be amended and the training of prison officers take place.[112]Another concern I had was that I was not referred to a domestic law which set out in detail the type of restraint that could be used in a padded cell. This was noted in Julin (above) where the ECtHR observed that the restraint used in Estonia was not regulated precisely in domestic law. The 2025 Response pointed out that the restraint was according to law but no details of the relevant law in Hungary were provided.[113]I accept that there were some safeguards for the prisoners in that the restraint in the padded cells was ordered by the prison governor and that a doctor in the prison was also involved in some way. Even with those safeguards, in my judgment that did not reduce the real risk to the small number of prisoners who would be restrained in the padded cells.[114]On a more positive note, I accepted the evidence set out in the 2025 Response that only a very small number of prisoners nationally were restrained in the padded cells.[115]In view of the clear findings in the 2025 CPT Report, I accepted that although padded cells were being used mostly for prisoners who were a danger to themselves or others, they were also being used to punish some recalcitrant prisoners. I did not find, however, any evidence in the 2025 CPT Report that such punishment was designed to degrade prisoners (Ms Barden’s skeleton argument at paragraph 74 above).[116]So far as Stage 1 is concerned (Mohammed above), Mr Squibbs for the requesting judicial authority accepted that ‘hogtying’ a detainee for eight hours as a form of punishment would not be compliant with Article 3 but his position was that the use of restraint in padded cells for prisoners who were a danger to themselves or to others was not ill-treatment in breach of Article 3. His contention was that the Stage 2 was not reached. He argued there was insufficient evidence of a breach of Article 3.[117]I found, relying on the evidence found in the 2025 CPT Report, that even if the restraint in the padded cells was being used for prisoners who were a danger to themselves or others, their treatment of being hogtied for up to eight hours in their underwear with no access to lavatories was inhuman and degrading treatment in breach of Article 3.[118]The CPT is a respected specialist Council of Europe body and I found the evidence in the 2025 CPT Report to be objective, the findings detailed and specific and they were recent. In my judgment, the 2025 Report displaced the presumption of the compliance of the Hungarian prisons with Article 3.[119]So far as the Mohammed Stage 1 is concerned, and applying the principles set out above, I found that there were substantial grounds for believing that a certain category of prisoner would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment by being restrained in padded cells in Hungarian prisons. The treatment described by the CPT crossed the Stage 1 threshold.

Restraint to beds

[120]The Hungarian authorities in their 2025 Response described work on standardising the process for restraint to a bed, including the development and testing of a prototype bed. I noted too that when the CPT observed the use of restraint beds in Szombathely Prison, it did not make the same concerning comments about the restraint used as it had for the restraint in the padded cells.[121]The CPT acknowledged too that in certain circumstances if a prisoner was highly agitated or violent, the use of handcuffs might be justified. It said however, that prisoners should never be shackled to a bed or to another fixed object rather they should be closely watched. Medical assistance should be provided if there was a health problem.[122]In Julin (above), it was said by the ECtHR that confinement of a person to a restraint bed did not necessarily give rise to an issue under Article 3 of the Convention. It would depend on a number of factors including whether it was being applied to protect someone from self-injury or from being a serious danger to other persons. It could not, however, be applied to punish a prisoner.[123]On the evidence before me, and in the light of the way the CPT dealt with this topic, I was not satisfied that the use of restraint beds, as described, was shown to cross the Article 3 threshold.

Article 3 – Mohammed Stage 2

[124]I turn to Stage 2. Ms Barden argued that, if the Stage 1 threshold was crossed then I should obtain further information from the Hungarian authorities. Mr Squibbs contended that at Stage 2 I should consider Mr Gajar’s circumstances to see if there were substantial grounds to find he was at real risk of the Article 3 ill-treatment found in Stage 1.[125]Ms Barden and Mr Squibbs were agreed that from the data provided by the Hungarian authorities, there was a risk of restraint in padded cells to approximately 1% of prisoners.[126]With a prison population of about 19,000, the 2025 Response said there were 138 recorded cases between 2023 and the first quarter of 2025 in which this measure had been implemented for dangerous or self-harming behaviour. I have assumed the ‘recalcitrant’ prisoners would be described as exhibiting dangerous behaviour and are therefore within the 138. From the 2025 Response it was not clear whether 138 cases meant 138 prisoners or fewer so I have used the same expression “cases” used in the 2025 Response. The breakdown of the figures is set out above in paragraph 32.[127]Although the CPT recorded that the relevant regulations required each prison establishment to have a padded cell, it was not clear on the evidence before me whether in practice every prison establishment was so equipped. I noted that of the two prisons visited by the CPT in 2025, Szombathely Prison had three padded cells which were used once in a year or two, whilst Tiszalok Prison had two.[128]The concept of a “real risk” of a breach of Article 3 is well established. It requires the court to determine whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the individual concerned, here Mr Gajar, would face such treatment if returned. This is a strict and fact-specific test, reflecting the high threshold required for the engagement of Article 3.[129]‘Real risk’ was considered in France v A [2022] EWHC 841 (Admin) and Anthony Rae v USA [2022] EWHC 3095 (Admin).[130]In Rae, the argument was in relation to a 13% risk of a requested person being placed in a non-conforming cell in the USA. The submission on behalf of the requesting state that a 13% risk was not a “real risk” was firmly rejected by Chamberlain J. The judge said the following at paragraph 76: “…Assessing whether the “real risk” test is met involves looking at both the risk of being subjected to the treatment and the extent to which the treatment would fall below the Article 3 minimum: see e.g. A v France (No. 2), where Divisional Court regarded as relevant both the low risk of the treatment eventuating (under 5% on an arithmetic basis) and the fact that if it did eventuate the breach of the Muršić minimum space requirement would be likely to be marginal. In this case, however, the non-conforming cells had substantially less space than the Muršić minimum. There was no evidence that they meet any other international standard, as the Divisional Court in Serra speculated might be the case in a non-ECHR country. Moreover, there was no information about the length of time for which a prisoner might be held in such a cell. In that context, a risk which may be as high as one in eight is, on any view, “real”.[131]At Stage 2, the critical question is whether there are substantial grounds for believing that this particular appellant would face a real risk of being exposed to such treatment. The assessment is fact-specific and evaluative, taking into account both the nature of the treatment identified and the likelihood of its occurrence in the individual case, in line with the approach in Rae. A real risk would not be established by the mere existence of Article 3 ill-treatment by means of restraint in padded cells within the prison system; it must be shown that the appellant would be liable to be subjected to them.[132]In my judgment, the evidence shows that the use of the restraint measures in padded cells, is rare and is mostly confined to cases where the prisoner presents a danger to themselves or others. In Tiszalok Prison at least, the evidence was that the use of padded cells had mostly ended.[133]On the figures provided, assuming one case equated to one prisoner and not repeated visits by a smaller number of detainees to the padded cells, I find that fewer than 1% of prisoners were subjected to such measures over the relevant period. While the nature of the treatment, if it was applied to the appellant, would plainly engage Article 3, I have to assess whether there is a “real risk” in Mr Gajar’s case.[134]Mr Gajar is in his early forties. I have no evidence that he is not fit. He has been to prison before not least after being sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. There was no evidence that during that lengthy sentence he had been restrained in a padded cell in the way described by the 2025 CPT Report or indeed restrained to a fixed object such as a bed.[135]There was no evidence that he was recalcitrant when in prison. This was not mentioned in his statement. I would have expected him to rely on ill-treatment, if it had taken place, when he was arguing Article 3 prison conditions in the court below.[136]Ms Barden argued he was or might be a danger to others and relied on the conviction he had for harassment. The allegations were set out in one of the Hungarian arrest warrants.[137]On 20 July 2021, it was said that the appellant was on home curfew when he sent his wife to his cousin’s house to discuss them moving back to live with him. Whilst there she put the appellant on the telephone and he and his cousin argued and the appellant said he would send people to hurt his cousin or go there himself to assault him. The cousin who was a wheelchair user was frightened.[138]Two days later, on 23 July 2021, the appellant and his wife sent threatening voice messages to the cousin including very unpleasant threats to hurt him and another cousin and to assault sexually the former. Both cousins were very frightened.[139]In his statement Mr Gajar explained his side of the story, he said he was on home curfew for other offences at the time when his wife had travelled to a cousin’s home to “discuss a property which we felt he wasn’t entitled to”. It developed into a heated argument.[140]I noted that the appellant’s involvement was by telephone and via messages. It was a clearly frightening experience for the cousins but the appellant was not physically involved in an assault on them. There are no other offences of violence or harassment amongst the appellant’s 14 other convictions, they were mostly for fraud, counterfeiting and driving offences. The offence did not put others in danger nor was he a danger to himself. He did not breach the home curfew, he was obeying the court or the police requirement, and so was not behaving in a recalcitrant manner. In prison he is not likely to have a telephone to carry out this sort of offence.[141]There is no evidence that Mr Gajar would present a danger to himself or to others (the expression used by the Hungarian authorities). Mr Gajar does not have mental health difficulties of any sort let alone of a severity which might require restraint, and as I have said there is no evidence that he has previously been subjected to restraint in custody.[142]On the present evidence, the possibility that the appellant would be subjected to the objectionable practices set out above is very remote and contingent upon behaviour of a kind for which there is no evidential basis. The risk of the appellant being restrained in a padded cell can be discounted in his case.[143]The staged approach set out in Mohammed above is in relation to conditions which might affect an entire prison population; whereas in this case, a very different context, it is a very small category of prisoners who might be affected by the conditions set out above.[144]I do not consider in a case where the real risk is so small that the court needs to go on to consider the extent to which the treatment of restraint in a padded cell would be a breach of Article 3. I have found above that it would be, but the risks to Mr Gajar are very low.[145]In a case such as this where the inhumane and degrading conditions affect a very small subset of the prisoner population, I do not consider that the Hungarian authorities should have to provide an assurance.[146]In those circumstances, and applying the rigorous threshold required by Article 3, I am satisfied that the risk to this appellant is not established as a real risk but is, at most, a theoretical or speculative possibility. A suggested approach to the issue of restraint in padded cells in prisons in Hungary[147]Where a requested person is arrested and brought before Westminster Magistrates’ Court, and the extradition hearing is opened, it is usual practice for the proceedings to be adjourned to a further hearing if extradition is not consented to. The requested person is required then to identify, by way of a Statement of Issues, the matters relied upon in resisting extradition.[148]Where the requested person contends in the Statement of Issues that there are substantial grounds to believe that there is a real risk that he is, or may be, a danger to himself, or to others or that he might be a recalcitrant prisoner, that contention should ordinarily be supported by evidence.[149]Evidence of a danger to himself, must include a witness statement from the requested person, together with relevant GP or other medical records.[150]Evidence of a danger to others or of his recalcitrance must include a witness statement from the requested person, as well as previous convictions or other material capable of substantiating that assertion.[151]Where credible evidence is adduced in support of such a claim, an assurance should be sought from the Hungarian judicial authorities that the requested person will not be subjected to the hogtying described above.[152]What I have set out above is quite apart from any assurance relating to the space afforded to the prisoner in the cells.

Conclusion

[153]There are no substantial grounds for believing that Mr Gajar is at real risk of being held in conditions which violate Article 3.[154]The appeal is dismissed.