Daniel Adams v North Somerset Council [2026] EWHC 1883 (Admin)

[2026] EWHC 1883 (Admin)

Case No AC-2025-CDF-000205

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING'S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

PLANNING COURT

Venue Bristol Civil Justice Centre, 2 Redcliff St, Bristol, BS1 6GR

Date 23/07/2026

Before

THE HON. MRS JUSTICE STEYN DBE

Between

DANIEL ADAMSClaimant

NORTH SOMERSET COUNCILDefendant

The Claimant appeared in person for in person

Tim Baldwin (instructed by North Somerset Council Litigation Team) for Defendant

Hearing Hearing date: 26 June 2026

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 23 July 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

.............................

THE HON. MRS JUSTICE STEYN DBE

[1]The claimant seeks review of the decision of North Somerset Council, made on 9 October 2025, to make a traffic regulation order, namely, the Clevedon (Off Street Parking Places) Consolidation Order 2025 (TRO ref: OSPP/DB/2506), introducing parking charges at three car parks in Clevedon, known as Great Western Road East, Great Western Road West and Marson car parks (‘the TRO’).

[2]The claim was brought as a judicial review. By order dated 10 April 2026, HHJ Jarman KC directed that the claim shall proceed as an application for statutory review under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, for which no permission is required. North Somerset Council (‘the Council’) has raised a preliminary issue as to whether the claimant may, in fact, have been correct to bring it as a judicial review claim. The parties were agreed that, if I were to so find, I should treat the hearing as having been a rolled-up one, and determine permission and the substantive claim simultaneously.

[3]The claimant, Mr Adams, is the Manager of Stationery House, a retail stationery business based in Clevedon in North Somerset.

Statutory Review or Judicial Review?

[4]The relevant provision stipulating a statutory review procedure is paragraph 35 of Schedule 9 to the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 (‘the 1984 Act’), to which effect is given by s.124 of that Act. The order directing that this claim proceed as a statutory review referred to section 9 of the 1984 Act, but no doubt that was a slip and it was intended to refer to Schedule 9.

[5]Paragraph 35 of Schedule 9 provides:

“If any person desires to question the validity of, or of any provision contained in, an order to which this Part of this Schedule applies, on the grounds— (a) that it is not within the relevant powers, or (b) that any of the relevant requirements has not been complied with in relation to the order, he may, within 6 weeks from the date on which the order is made, make an application for the purpose to the High Court or, in Scotland, to the Court of Session.” (Emphasis added.)

[6]Paragraph 37 of Schedule 9 provides:

“Except as provided by this Part of this Schedule, an order to which this Part of this Schedule applies shall not, either before or after it has been made, be questioned in any legal proceedings whatever.”

So it is clear that if statutory review is available pursuant to paragraph 35, the TRO can only be challenged by that means and not by judicial review.

[7]The issue raised by the Council is whether the TRO is an order to which the relevant Part, Part VI of Schedule 9, applies. Paragraph 34(1) of Schedule 9 provides:

“This Part of this Schedule applies – (a) to any order made under or by virtue of any of the following provisions of this Act, namely sections 1, 6, 9, 16A, 19, 32, 37 and 38, and (b) to any designation order.”

Section 124(1)(f) is to similar effect.

[8]Paragraph 34(1)(b) does not apply. The term “designation order” means an order under s.45 of the 1984 Act, which provision concerns the designation of parking places on highways: s. 142 of the 1984 Act. The definition also refers to s.50(1) which has been repealed. So the question is whether the TRO was an order made under or by virtue of any of the provisions identified in paragraph 34(1)(a) of Schedule 9.

[9]With respect to the 1984 Act, the TRO states that it is made by the Council in exercise of its powers under ss. 32, 33, 34, 35 and 122 and Part IV of Schedule 9. Section 32, which gives local authorities the power to provide (and maintain) off-street parking places, is one of the provisions identified in paragraph 34(1)(a). However, the Council submits, and Mr Bailey asserts in his witness statement adduced in support of the Council defence of this claim, that in implementing charges on car parks, the Council was only exercising its powers under s.35.

[10]If the TRO had been made solely under s.35, then I would agree with the Council that statutory review would not be available and so any challenge would have to be by way of judicial review. However, this claim was correctly ordered to proceed as a statutory review under Schedule 9 of the 1984 Act. The TRO was, on its face, made by the Council using the power conferred by, among other provisions, s.32 of the 1984 Act. The Council cannot assert that it was not using that power at all in making the TRO, as that would be contrary to the express terms of the TRO. The TRO is, therefore, an order to which Part VI of Schedule 9 applies. That being so, statutory review is available to question the validity of any provision within the TRO, as paragraph 35 makes clear. This has the benefit that it should be clear to a potential claimant, and the court, on the face of the order whether it is one to which Part VI applies, and so the only means of challenge is by statutory review.

[11]If the Council’s submission were accepted, it would mean that the claimant and court would not be able to rely on the assertion in the TRO of the powers under which the Council acted, when determining whether the challenge should be brought by statutory review or judicial review, but would instead have to investigate precisely which powers were used to make any particular provisions that are challenged. It would also lead to cumbersome consequences if a claim encompassed a challenge to parts of an order made under a provision identified in paragraph 34(1)(a) and to other parts made under other provisions, with different review procedures being available. However, that is not the effect of the legislation. As the Council made the TRO under s.32, as well as other provisions, a challenge to the validity of any part of the TRO is properly brought, and could only be brought, by statutory review.

The Grounds

[12]The claimant relies on the following grounds:a. In making the TRO, the Council acted beyond its statutory powers as conferred by the 1984 Act by implementing parking charges for the primary and improper purpose of generating revenue, and so the TRO is ultra vires (‘Ground 1: Improper Purpose’).

b. The Council failed to discharge its duties under section 122 of the 1984 Act (‘Ground 2: Section 122 Duties’).

c. The consultation process failed to comply with the Gunning principles and so was deficient. Encompassed within this ground is an allegation of breach of regulation 13 of the Local Authorities’ Traffic Orders (Procedure) (England and Wales) Regulations 1996 (‘the 1996 Regulations’) by failing to consider the claimant’s objection. (‘Ground 3: Consultation’).

d. The Council acted irrationally and procedurally unfairly by failing to assess adequately the impact of displacement of parked vehicles on nearby residential streets (‘Ground 4: Inadequate Displacement Assessment’).

e. The Council failed to comply with its public sector equality duty (‘PSED’) under s.149 of the Equality Act 2010 in relation to disabled, vulnerable and digitally excluded groups (‘Ground 5: PSED’).

f. The Council gave insufficient weight to the risks of deterring disabled parking users, families, low income users, volunteers and charity workers from using the car parks where charges will apply, and to displacement of vehicles onto nearby residential roads, and gave too much weight to housing growth, with the consequence that the TRO is misaligned with the Council’s adopted policy framework as identified in the Local Plan (‘Ground 6: Misalignment with Local Plan and Community Objectives’).

g. The evidence contradicts the Council’s assertion that the TRO is necessary to address pressing maintenance needs (‘Ground 7: Maintenance Needs’).

[13]In his eloquent oral submissions, the claimant, Mr Adams, focused on alleged breach of regulation 13 of the 1996 Regulations, non-compliance with the Gunning principles in the context of the statutory consultation and with the PSED (Grounds 3 and 5). Although I shall address each of the grounds raised, all of which he continued to rely on, the balance of this judgment reflects the points on which he, and Counsel for the Council, Mr Baldwin, concentrated.

The Facts

[14]The context for considering the grounds of challenge includes the process followed by the Council prior to making the TRO and its statutory powers and duties.

[15]In October 2024, the Council’s Cabinet Committee (formerly the Executive) approved the Council’s Parking Management Strategy Action Plan 2024-2030 (‘Parking Management Strategy’). This document identified the Council’s aims:

“Our vision: • Well-managed, well-maintained parking facilities that meet our current and future needs, support local economies, respond to the challenges of the climate emergency, and uphold our ambitions for healthy communities, which are safe and attractive places for residents and visitors to use. • The right balance of provision to meet community and economic needs whilst not encouraging unnecessary car journeys or blighting neighbourhoods. • Parking that is self-funding where possible or which creates surplus to invest in improved transport, infrastructure and maintenance.” • Well-managed, well-maintained parking facilities that meet our current and future needs, support local economies, respond to the challenges of the climate emergency, and uphold our ambitions for healthy communities, which are safe and attractive places for residents and visitors to use. • The right balance of provision to meet community and economic needs whilst not encouraging unnecessary car journeys or blighting neighbourhoods. • Parking that is self-funding where possible or which creates surplus to invest in improved transport, infrastructure and maintenance.”

[16]The Parking Management Strategy identified among the list of actions that “could be developed” in the next 1-2 years:

“Improve the way parking is managed in places of high demand by introducing charges in some of the car parks that are currently free”

. This “intervention” was suggested in respect of the car parks in three towns, including Clevedon. Investing in the maintenance of car parks in all locations was identified as an intervention for the longer term (3-6 years).

[17]On 7 February 2024, the Cabinet Committee accepted the recommendation made in the officers’ report to commence a 6-week consultation in March 2024 on(i) the Parking Management Strategy,

(ii) “the introduction of parking charges in locations which do not currently have charges”; and

(iii) “on introducing a short-stay car park permit, as part of the recommendations, available to North Somerset residents to offer an alternative for regular users of car parks”.

[18]The report to the 7 February 2024 meeting, which was published on the Council’s website, noted that the cost of maintaining and retaining car parks was increasing and, to reduce these costs, options included transferring ownership of car parks, removing car parking where it may not be needed, or introducing charges where appropriate. Section 9 of the report was headed “Equality Implications” and it stated:

“Have you undertaken an Equality Impact Assessment? Yes 9.1 The initial Equality Impact Assessment has indicated there are users who will experience a disproportionate impact from the proposed changes: Blue badge holders will benefit from greater availability of parking spaces, both in dedicated bays and the charged bays where management of parking will increase turnover of users and availability of spaces should increase significantly. Blue badge holders are exempt from on-street P&D charges and time limits and normally benefit from additional time in short stay off-street car parks. 9.2 The introduction of parking charges is likely to disproportionately impact those on a low income. The charging levels will be subject to a formal public consultation as part of the scheme development. 9.3 The proposals to move toward cashless payments may not be welcomed by those who find it difficult to use mobile phones. Evidence suggests this tends to be older people so this proposal may disproportionately affect them.”

[19]The Initial Equality Impact Assessment (‘Initial EIA’), to which the report to the 7 February 2024 meeting referred, had been produced on 19 December 2023. It noted that there would be a recommendation to commence a 6-week consultation on proposals for new parking charges in some of the areas where the Council did not currently charge, and stated that following this consultation “this equality impact assessment will be updated”. The Initial EIA set out in a table an assessment of whether the proposal to introduce parking charges would have a high, medium or low positive or negative impact, or no impact, on various groups. The assessment was that it would have no impact on the following groups:

“Race”; “Men or Women, including those who are pregnant”; “Sexual Orientation”; “Marriage or civil partnership”; and “Gender reassignment”

. With respect to disabled people, the Initial EIA assessed there would be a low positive impact, stating:

“Disabled people with blue badges will benefit from greater availability of parking spaces, both in dedicated bays and the charged bays where management of parking will increase turnover of users and availability of spaces should increase significantly. Blue badge holders are exempt from on-street Pay & Display charges and time limits.”

[20]The Initial EIA anticipated a low negative impact on:

“People on a low income”; “Age”; “Religion or belief or none”; and “Other, for example, parents, carers or the Armed Forces”

. In particular, in relation to those on a low income, it stated:

“The implementation of new parking charges is likely to disproportionately impact those on a low income. This impact will be minimised if charging levels are at market rates and will be subject to a formal public consultation as part of scheme development. The shoppers permit will enable regular users to purchase parking at a significant discount on an annual basis. This will mitigate impacts on lower income groups and also reduces the potential displaced parking impacts.”

[21]The Council conducted a non-statutory public consultation from 18 March to 7 May 2024. The consultation included an online survey for residents, businesses and visitors (‘the Public Questionnaire’) and a separate survey for town and parish councils and ward councillors (‘the Bespoke Questionnaire’). A series of in-person public engagement sessions was held. The consultation invited comments on the proposals, including those affecting Clevedon.

[22]The Public Questionnaire asked 63 questions. These included questions relating to the Parking Management Strategy, such as whether the respondent agreed with the proposed ‘vision’, proposed objectives, and whether the respondent thought the proposed actions would help address parking issues. Some open questions were asked, such as in relation to the potential effects of introducing charges, and for businesses, as to the impact on employees, customers and the business of introducing parking charges. There were also a number of questions relating to the payment method. The claimant submitted a questionnaire, although he considered the format to be “very cumbersome” and set up “to lead respondents towards essentially accepting the introduction of charges and to simply comment on how this should work”.

[23]The Council received 4,760 responses. The Council’s Business Intelligence team analysed the responses to the consultation. A report to the Cabinet Committee on 16 October 2024, appending the analysis of the responses to the consultation, was published on the Council’s website. The report to the 16 October meeting made a series of recommendations, including:

“i. To adopt the [Parking Management Strategy]. … iii. To commence the process to implement the necessary Traffic Regulation Order(s) and Parking Orders including the formal consultation process in line with proposed parking charges as set out in Table 2, with final details to be signed off by the Executive Member for Spatial Planning, Placemaking and Economy. iv. That authority is given for officers to carry out negotiations with a view to entering into commercial leases for relevant car park sites subject to final terms being approved in accordance with financial regulations. v. Subject to consideration of the outcome of the formal TRO/Parking Order consultations and decisions following those processes to approve an increase to the capital programme of up to £527,000 to implement the proposed parking changes as set out in Table 2. …”

[24]The report noted that if the recommendations were approved the charging proposals would be taken forward to “formal engagement through the Traffic Regulation Order (TRO) and Parking Order process which includes a 3-week public consultation”. This was described as providing “an opportunity to comment on the specific details of the TRO and parking orders”.

[25]The report stated:

“The council faces a significant financial challenge due to reduced government funding and increased service demand, necessitating savings of £30m over the next 3 years. The provision of parking is a discretionary service, and the council is exploring ways to make it self-financing.”

[26]Due to “mounting pressures” on services the Council has a legal duty to provide, “budget constraints” and “rising costs”, it was said that sustaining the existing parking provision was becoming “increasingly difficult”:

“This has led to an overall decline in appearance and condition of car parks with some key maintenance issues not being addressed. Connected with this there has been criticism from the community about how the operating costs for car parks are not recovered evenly across the district and resulting lack of funding available for maintenance in some areas.”

[27]The report observed that the Council “need to achieve parking provision that is self-funding where possible or which creates surplus to invest in improved transport infrastructure and maintenance”, with the aim of providing “well-managed and well-maintained parking facilities”.

[28]The report addressed key themes emerging from the non-statutory consultation. These included affordability, to which the mitigation/response was to set parking charges “at the lowest possible rate in order to ensure they are affordable”. The report addressed the position of three protected groups: older people, disabled people, and pregnant women and new parents. It stated that the charges would help retain access to parking in key locations and observed, “Where charges already exist, these groups are not disproportionately affected by the charges.” In relation to the payment method, the Council noted that it was trialling a smart payment terminal which would enable a “tap and go” card payment as well as an app-based approach. This was a change from the pre-consultation proposal to have app-based payment only. The report addressed concerns about the impact on the economy, displacement of cars into residential areas, and other matters.

[29]At the meeting on 16 October 2024, the Cabinet Committee adopted the recommendations, approving the Parking Management Strategy and the introduction of charges in various car parks, including the three that are the subject of this claim.

[30]A further Equality Impact Assessment was produced on 3 December 2024 (‘the final EIA’), ahead of the Cabinet Committee’s meeting the following day. The final EIA assessed whether the introduction of parking charges in off-street car parks in Clevedon, Nailsea and Portishead would have a disproportionate impact on various groups, including by reference to disability and age among other protected characteristics. The only group on which it was assessed that there would be any impact was those on a low income.

[31]On 25 June 2025, the Council published the Notice of Intent, giving notice of its proposal to make the TRO, a copy of the draft TRO, a Statement of Reasons for making the proposed TRO, and plans of the locations. These documents were published on the Council’s website on 24 June 2025 and the Notice of Intent informed members of the public that should they “wish to make any observations on this proposal (whether you support or object to the proposal)” they should make them in writing by 5pm on 18 July 2025, specifying the grounds on which they are made. Accordingly, what Mr Bailey describes as the statutory consultation ran from 25 June 2025 to 18 July 2025. The Council also directly consulted Avon and Somerset Police.

[32]The Statement of Reasons stated:

“North Somerset Council proposes to introduce parking charges to additional car park sites. The proposals aim to provide well managed and well maintained parking facilities that support local economies, responds to climate challenges and uphold health communities. The introduction of parking charges to additional sites will allow the council to continue providing parking facilities and help to mitigate cuts to essential statutory duty services. The proposed parking charges recognise the nature of local areas and the people that use the parking facilities currently. They are designed to minimise impact on local businesses and economy whilst ensuring that residents can access services and facilities at minimal cost. The proposals are designed to ensure adequate turnover in parking spaces to support local businesses as housing growth expands our communities and increases the pressure on spaces available.”

[33]In his first statement, Mr Bailey said that the Council received 21 objections, mainly consisting of “strong opposition to parking charges”, similar to the responses to the non-statutory consultation. However, that number did not include an objection from the claimant, who Mr Bailey then understood had not made an objection. As Mr Bailey has acknowledged in his second statement, that was incorrect. The claimant provided a “statutory consultation response” on 14 July 2025, and a further response on 16 July 2025. Both documents were said to be provided on behalf of the “Clevedon Business Community Group”, the claimant having, he says, “nominated himself to represent the Group in the consultation”. The Council received those objections but due to an error on their part, which Mr Bailey acknowledges, the claimant’s consultation responses were only included in the objections for the On Street Clevedon Traffic Order and not the TRO for the Off Street car parking charges in Clevedon. Consequently, these objections were not considered before the TRO was made.

[34]The responses to the statutory process were considered in the executive decision notice in September 2025. The Cabinet Member for Sustainable Places and Service Transformation in consultation with the Head of Highways, having considered the objections, decided on 25 September 2025 to proceed to seal the TRO. It was sealed on 9 October 2025 and came into operation on 17 October 2025. The Notice of Making was published on 15 October 2025. The TRO has been in effect from 1 June 2026. The Legal Framework The power to make a TRO

The Legal Framework

[35]A local authority has the power to provide and maintain off-street parking places, together with associated buildings, and the means to enter and egress: ss.32-33 of the 1984 Act. Section 35 of the 1984 Act provides: “(1) As respects any parking place—(a) provided by a local authority under section 32 of this Act, or

(b) provided under any letting or arrangements made by a local authority under section 33(4) of this Act, the local authority, subject to Parts I to III of Schedule 9 to this Act, may by order make provision as to— (i) the use of the parking place, and in particular the vehicles or class of vehicles which may be entitled to use it, (ii) the conditions on which it may be used, (iii) the charges to be paid in connection with its use (where it is an off-street one), and (iv) the removal from it of a vehicle left there in contravention of the order and the safe custody of the vehicle and the power under paragraph (iii) to make provision as to the payment of charges shall include power to make provision requiring those charges, or any part of them, to be paid by means of the hire or purchase in advance, or the use, of parking devices in accordance with the order.” (3) An order under subsection (1) above may provide for a specified apparatus or device to be used— (a) as a means to indicate— (i) the time at which a vehicle arrived at, and the time at which it ought to leave, a parking place, or one or other of those times, or (ii) the charges paid or payable in respect of a vehicle in an off-street parking place; or (b) as a means to collect any such charges, and may make provision regulating the use of any such apparatus or device. (Emphasis added.) (a) provided by a local authority under section 32 of this Act, or (b) provided under any letting or arrangements made by a local authority under section 33(4) of this Act, (i) the use of the parking place, and in particular the vehicles or class of vehicles which may be entitled to use it, (ii) the conditions on which it may be used, (iii) the charges to be paid in connection with its use (where it is an off-street one), and (iv) the removal from it of a vehicle left there in contravention of the order and the safe custody of the vehicle and the power under paragraph (iii) to make provision as to the payment of charges shall include power to make provision requiring those charges, or any part of them, to be paid by means of the hire or purchase in advance, or the use, of parking devices in accordance with the order.” (a) as a means to indicate— (i) the time at which a vehicle arrived at, and the time at which it ought to leave, a parking place, or one or other of those times, or (ii) the charges paid or payable in respect of a vehicle in an off-street parking place; or (b) as a means to collect any such charges, and may make provision regulating the use of any such apparatus or device. (Emphasis added.)

[36]Section 55 of the 1984 Act makes provision regarding any financial deficit or surplus arising in respect of parking places. Subsection (2) provides:

“At the end of each financial year any deficit in the account shall be made good out of the general fund or, in Wales, council fund, and (subject to subsection (3) below) any surplus shall be applied for all or any of the purposes specified in subsection (4) below and, in so far as it is not so applied, shall be appropriated to the carrying out of some specific project falling within those purposes and carried forward until applied to carrying it out.”

[37]The purposes identified in s.55(4), so far as relevant, are:

“(a) the making good to the general fund or, in Wales, council fund of any amount charged to that fund under subsection (2) above in the 4 years immediately preceding the financial year in question; (b) meeting all or any part of the cost of the provision and maintenance by the local authority of off-street parking accommodation, whether in the open or under cover; (c) the making to other local authorities, or to other persons of contributions towards the cost of the provision and maintenance by them, in the area of the local authority or elsewhere, of off-street parking accommodation, whether in the open or under cover; (d) if it appears to the local authority that the provision in their area of further off-street parking accommodation is unnecessary or undesirable, the following purposes— (i) meeting costs incurred, whether by the local authority or by some other person, in the provision or operation of, or of facilities for, public passenger transport services, (ii) the purposes of a highway or road improvement project in the local authority’s area; … (iv) the purposes of environmental improvement in the local authority’s area, …” (i) meeting costs incurred, whether by the local authority or by some other person, in the provision or operation of, or of facilities for, public passenger transport services, (ii) the purposes of a highway or road improvement project in the local authority’s area; … (iv) the purposes of environmental improvement in the local authority’s area, …”

[38]Section 122 of the 1984 Act imposes a general duty on local authorities exercising functions under that Act. It is the duty of every local authority upon whom functions are conferred by or under the Act:

“(1) … so to exercise the functions conferred on them by this Act (so far as practicable having regard to the matters specified in subsection (2) below) to secure the expeditious, convenient and safe movement of vehicular and other traffic (including pedestrians) and the provision of suitable and adequate parking facilities on and off the highway…”

[39]The matters specified in s.122(2), to which the local authority is to “have regard”, include “the effect on the amenities of any locality affected”, “the strategy prepared under section 80 of the Environment Act 1995 (national air quality strategy)” and “any other matters appearing to … the local authority to be relevant”.

[40]The limitation in s.122(1) (“so far as practicable”) qualifies the duty imposed by that subparagraph by reference to the matters in s.122(2) to which the authority must have regard. In Trail Riders Fellowship v Powys Council Council

[2013] EWHC 3144 (Admin)

, Cranston J observed, having considered the obiter remarks of Carnwath J in UK Waste Management Ltd v West Lancashire District Council [1997] RTR 201, at 209, which he described as authoritative, and subsequent authorities in which Carnwath J’s approach was applied ([25]-[26]):

“27. Thus the duty imposed by section 122 of the 1984 Act is a qualified duty. Against the duty to secure the expeditious, convenient and safe movement of vehicular and other traffic (including pedestrians) is to be balanced the factors in section 122(2), such as the effect on the amenities of the area and, in the context of making a traffic regulation order, the purposes for this identified in section 1(1). As a matter of law the duty of securing the expeditious, convenient and safe movement of vehicle and other traffic (including pedestrians) is not given a primacy: Carnwath J made that clear in rejecting the assumption in Greater London Council v Secretary of State for Transport that the matters in section 122(2) were subordinate to those in section 122(1).”

[41]See, too, Sir Ross Cranston’s consideration of the law on s.122 in Trail Riders Fellowship v Hampshire County Council

[2018] EWHC 3390 (Admin)

, [31]- [36], in light of which he said at [37]:

“It seems to me that on the current state of the authorities, the position with section 122 is as follows: i) The duty in section 122(1) when exercising functions conferred by the Act to secure the expeditious, convenient and safe movement of traffic extends not only to vehicles but includes pedestrians; ii) The duty of securing the expeditious, convenient and safe movement of traffic is not given primacy but is a qualified duty which has to be read with the factors in section 122(2), such as the effect on the amenities of the area and, in the context of making a traffic regulation order, with the purposes for this identified in section 1(1) of the Act; iii) The issue is whether in substance the section 122 duty has been performed and what has been called the balancing exercise conducted, not whether section 122 is expressly mentioned or expressly considered; iv) In the particular circumstances of a case compliance with the section 122 duty may be evident from the decision itself, or an inference to this effect may be drawn since the decision has been taken by a specialist committee or officer who can be taken to have knowledge of the relevant statutory powers.”

The procedural requirements

[42]Section 124 of the 1984 Act gives effect to Schedule 9. Part III of Schedule 9 to the 1984 Act provides, at paragraph 20, that before making a TRO under s.35 (among other provisions), a local authority “shall consult with the chief officer of police of any police area in which any road or other place to which the order is to relate is situated”. Paragraph 20(1) has effect “without prejudice to any further requirements contained in any regulations made under the subsequent provisions of this Part of this Schedule”.

[43]The 1996 Regulations are made under, among other provisions, Part III of Schedule 9 to the 1984 Act. In particular, paragraph 21 of Schedule 9 provides for regulations to make “such (if any) provision as the national authority considers appropriate with respect to –(a) the publication of any proposal for the making of such an order;

(b) the making and consideration of objections to any such proposal; and

(c) the publication of notice of the making of the order and of its effect.” (a) the publication of any proposal for the making of such an order; (b) the making and consideration of objections to any such proposal; and (c) the publication of notice of the making of the order and of its effect.”

[44]The 1996 Regulations applied to the proposal to make, and to the making of, the TRO: reg. 4. Regulations 6 of the 1996 Regulations provides for “consultation” of specified person, so far as material in the following terms:

“6. — Consultation (1) An order making authority shall, before making an order in a case specified in column (2) of an item in the table below, consult the persons specified in column (3) of the item. TABLE (1) (2) (3) Item Case Consultee 1. Where the order relates to, or appears to the order making authority to be likely to affect traffic on, a road for which another authority is the highway authority or the traffic authority The other authority 2. Where the order relates to, or appears to the order making authority to be likely to affect traffic on, a Crown road The appropriate Crown authority 3. Where the order relates to, or appears to the order making authority to be likely to affect traffic on, a road subject to a concession The concessionaire 4. Where the order relates to, or appears to the order making authority to be likely to affect traffic on a road on which a tramcar or trolley vehicle service is provided The operator of the service 5. Where the order relates to, or appears to the order making authority to be likely to affect traffic on,- (a) a road outside Greater London which is included in the route of a local service; or (b) a road in Greater London which is included in the route of a London bus service 6. Where it appears to the authority that the order is likely to affect the passage on any road of- (a) ambulances; or (b) fire-fighting vehicles 7. All cases (a) The Freight Transport Association (b) The Road Haulage Association (c) Such other organisations (if any) representing persons likely to be affected by any provision in the order as the order making authority thinks it appropriate to consult … (3) The requirements of this regulation are without prejudice to the provisions of- (a) paragraph 20 of Schedule 9 to the 1984 Act (consultation with the chief officer of police);…” (a) paragraph 20 of Schedule 9 to the 1984 Act (consultation with the chief officer of police);…”

[45]Regulation 7 provides for the publication of a notice of proposals: 7. — Publication of proposals(1) An order making authority shall, before making an order,- (a) publish at least once a notice (in these Regulations called a “notice of proposals”) containing the particulars specified in Parts I and II of Schedule 1 in a newspaper circulating in the area in which any road or other place to which the order relates is situated; (b) in the case of an order under section 6 of the 1984 Act, publish a similar notice in the London Gazette; (c) take such other steps as it may consider appropriate for ensuring that adequate publicity about the order is given to persons likely to be affected by its provisions and, without prejudice to the generality of this sub-paragraph, such other steps may include- (i) in the case of an order to which sub-paragraph (b) does not apply, publication of a notice in the London Gazette; (ii) the display of notices in roads or other places affected by the order; or (iii) the delivery of notices or letters to premises, or premises occupied by persons, appearing to the authority to be likely to be affected by any provision in the order.

(2) Not later than the date on which paragraph (1) has been complied with, the order making authority shall send a copy of the notice of proposals to each body or person whom it is required to consult under regulation 6(1) or under any of the provisions referred to in regulation 6(2).

(3) The order making authority shall comply with the requirements of Schedule 2 as to the making of deposited documents available for public inspection.

(4) Deposited documents shall be made so available at the times and at the places specified in the notice of proposals throughout the period beginning with the date on which the notice of proposals is first published and ending with the last day of the period of 6 weeks which begins with the date on which the order is made or, as the case may be, the authority decides not to make the order.” (Emphasis added.) (a) publish at least once a notice (in these Regulations called a “notice of proposals”) containing the particulars specified in Parts I and II of Schedule 1 in a newspaper circulating in the area in which any road or other place to which the order relates is situated; (b) in the case of an order under section 6 of the 1984 Act, publish a similar notice in the London Gazette; (c) take such other steps as it may consider appropriate for ensuring that adequate publicity about the order is given to persons likely to be affected by its provisions and, without prejudice to the generality of this sub-paragraph, such other steps may include- (i) in the case of an order to which sub-paragraph (b) does not apply, publication of a notice in the London Gazette; (ii) the display of notices in roads or other places affected by the order; or (iii) the delivery of notices or letters to premises, or premises occupied by persons, appearing to the authority to be likely to be affected by any provision in the order.

[46]The particulars required to be included in the notice of proposals are, so far as relevant, the name of the order making authority; the title of the order; a brief statement of the general nature and effect of the order; a brief description of the off-street parking place and of its location; where the order relates to a parking place and prescribes charges for its use or restricts the times during which, or classes of vehicle for which, it may be used, a statement of those charges, times or classes; a statement that documents giving more detailed particulars of the order are available for inspection and a statement of the places at which they are so available and of the times when they may be inspected at each place; a statement that all objections and other representations relating to the order must be made in writing and that all objections must specify the grounds on which they are made; the date by which objections to the order and other representations must be made and the address to which they should be sent: Parts I and II of Schedule 1 to the 1996 Regulations.

[47]The documents to be deposited in accordance with Schedule 2 to the 1996 Regulations include, so far as relevant, a copy of the notice of proposals, a copy of the order as proposed, a map which clearly shows the location and effect of the order as proposed to be made, and a statement setting out the reasons why the authority proposes to make the order.

[48]A right to object is given by regulation 8 which provides:

“8. — Objections (1) Any person may object to the making of an order by the date specified in the notice of proposals or, if later, the end of the period of 21 days beginning with the date on which the order making authority has complied with all the requirements of regulation 7(1) to (3). (2) Without prejudice to its right to object to under paragraph (1), an authority required to be consulted under paragraph 6(3)(c) of Part II of Schedule 5 to the 1985 Act may object to the making of an order by the end of the period of 21 days beginning with the date on which the notice of proposals was sent to that authority. (3) An objection under paragraph (1) or (2) shall- (a) be made in writing; (b) state the grounds on which it is made; and (c) be sent to the address specified in the notice of proposals, and an objection under paragraph (2) shall in addition state whether or not it is alleged that the order would have any direct effect on traffic on any road, other than a trunk road, in the area of the authority making the objection.” (Emphasis added.)

(a) be made in writing; (b) state the grounds on which it is made; and (c) be sent to the address specified in the notice of proposals, and an objection under paragraph (2) shall in addition state whether or not it is alleged that the order would have any direct effect on traffic on any road, other than a trunk road, in the area of the authority making the objection.” (Emphasis added.)

[49]Regulation 13(a) of the 1996 Regulations requires the order making authority, before making an order, to “consider … all objections duly made under regulation 8 and not withdrawn”. Consistent with the requirement to consider all duly made objections, the authority may not make an order until after the expiry of the 21-day period during which objections may be made: reg.16(1). Subject to regulation 14, the authority “may modify an order, whether in consequence of any objections or otherwise, before it is made”.

[50]After making an order an authority must publish a “notice of making” and must write to any person whose objection has not been acceded to setting out the reasons why that is the case: reg.17. In addition, in the case of a delegated decision, the authority has to comply with regulations 7 and 8 of the Openness of Local Government Bodies Regulations 2014 (SI 2014/2095) (‘the 2014 Regulations’).

The Court’s Powers on Statutory Review

[51]Part VI of Schedule 9 to the 1984 Act (paragraphs 34 to 37) bears the title “Validity of Certain Orders”. I have cited paragraphs 34 and 37 above, when determining that this claim should proceed as a statutory review. The grounds on which the TRO may be challenged by statutory review are found in paragraph 35 of Schedule 9 of the 1984 Act which provides: “If any person desires to question the validity of or of any provision contained in, an order to which this Part of this Schedule applies, on the grounds –(a) that it is not within the relevant powers, or

(b) that any of the relevant requirements has not been complied with in relation to that order, he may, within 6 weeks from the date on which the order is made, make an application for the purpose to the High Court or, in Scotland, to the Court of Session.” (a) that it is not within the relevant powers, or (b) that any of the relevant requirements has not been complied with in relation to that order,

[52]The circumstances in which the court may grant relief on such an application for statutory review are specified in paragraph 36 of Schedule 9, which states:

“(1) On any application under this Part of this Schedule the court – (a) may, by interim order, suspend the operation of the order to which the application relates, or of any provision of that order, until the final determination of the proceedings; and (b) if satisfied that the order, or any provision of the order, is not within the relevant powers, or that the interests of the applicant have been substantially prejudiced by failure to comply with any of the relevant requirements, may quash the order or any provision of the order. (2) An order to which this Part of this Schedule applies, or a provision of any such order, may be suspended or quashed under sub-paragraph (1) above either generally or so far as may be necessary for the protection of the interests of the applicant.” (Emphasis added.)

(a) may, by interim order, suspend the operation of the order to which the application relates, or of any provision of that order, until the final determination of the proceedings; and (b) if satisfied that the order, or any provision of the order, is not within the relevant powers, or that the interests of the applicant have been substantially prejudiced by failure to comply with any of the relevant requirements, may quash the order or any provision of the order.

[53]In this case, no application was made for interim relief. The parking charges have been in effect, pursuant to the TRO, since 1 June 2026.

Ground 1: Improper Purpose

[54]It is a general principle of administrative law that a public body must exercise a statutory power for the purpose for which the power was conferred by Parliament, and not for any other purpose.

[55]The Council has a statutory power to introduce charges for off-street parking: s.35(1)(b)(iii) of the 1984 Act. Although parking charges generate revenue for the Council, the 1984 Act is not a taxing statute: R (Attfield) v London Borough of Barnet

[2013] EWHC 2089 (Admin)

[2014] 1 All ER 304

, [44]. A local authority should not misuse a power invested in it by an Act that is not a fiscal measure for the purpose of raising revenue. As Lord Wilberforce said in Vestey v Inland Revenue Commissioners

[1980] AC 1148

at 1172D-E:

“Taxes are imposed upon subjects by Parliament. A citizen cannot be taxed unless he is designated in clear terms by a taxing Act as a taxpayer and the amount of his liability is clearly defined.”

[56]In R v Manchester City Council ex p. King

(1991) 89 LGR 696

, the Divisional Court held that a statutory scheme permitting the local authority to charge “reasonable” fees for street trading licences did not enable a local authority to raise general revenue by way of fees. In Attfield, Lang J held that the local authority’s power to charge for the issue of parking permits under s.45(2)(b) of the 1984 Act did not empower it to use that power to generate surplus revenue to defray the cost of other transport expenditure.

[57]As Lang J observed in Attfield at [38], if a statutory power is exercised both for the purpose for which it was conferred and for some other purpose, the public body will have acted unlawfully unless the authorised purpose was its dominant purpose.

[58]There was no substantial dispute about any of these principles. The Council’s response to the pre-action protocol letter emphasised that the purpose of introducing parking charges was for maintenance and management of the car parks, not to raise revenue. However, there was a faint echo of the unsuccessful submissions on behalf of the local authority in Attfield ([48]) in the Council’s submissions that while the powers it was exercising were not “general revenue raising powers”, s.55 specifically contemplates the generation of a surplus from charges levied on parking and sets out the uses that any surplus can be put to. If the Council was seeking to suggest that it could intentionally introduce and set parking charges at a level designed to generate a surplus, after expenditure on maintenance and management of the car parks, with a view to defraying such surplus on other transport expenditure, that would clearly be inconsistent with Lang J’s contrary conclusion (Attfield, [49]).

[59]The focus of the disagreement was on the question whether, as a matter of fact, the Council’s dominant purpose was to raise funds to ensure that the car parks are well managed and well maintained, or whether its dominant purpose was to raise funds to be defrayed for other purposes.

[60]In support of the contention that the parking charges were introduced for an improper purpose, the claimant referred to several statements made by individual councillors. The minutes of the Special Transport & Highways Committee meeting on 30 April 2024 record:

“Cllr Young confirmed that Portishead pays £55,000.00 each year for parking enforcement in their Town. Cllr Young also stated the increasing costs for adult social services and statutory duties for children’s services and the £50 million gap with £9 million to find which is a real challenge to resolve. If parking charges are not brought in, then it will need to be something else to support the constraints that the District Council are facing.”

[61]On 10 October 2024, the BBC reported that Councillor Mark Canniford said: “the council’s financial pressures have ‘only worsened’ since the parking proposals went to consultation in February 2024 and the new charges would allow the council ‘to deliver an improved parking service, whilst freeing up crucial funds that can go back into the council’s overall budget’.

[62]Councillor Canniford was reported, by the North Somerset Times on 8 October 2024, to have made a similar statement, referring to the growing financial pressures on the Council, and suggesting:

“This is vital if we are to balance our books and safeguard essential council services.”

[63]In my judgement, the evidence demonstrates that the Council’s dominant purpose was to make maintenance of its car parks self-financing. That was a proper purpose in accordance with the legislation. It is true that the Council had spent very little in recent years on maintenance of car parks, but it is clear that had caused complaints from local residents and the Council was conscious of the need to undertake maintenance work. If the Council were to use general funds for maintenance of car parks, that would be at the expense of other services which the Council had a statutory duty to provide. Realistically, given the financial pressures on the Council, it was clearly considered that funding for maintenance could only be found if parking charges were imposed.

[64]The references to balancing the Council’s books and freeing up vital funds, properly understood, merely reflect the fact that making car parks self-financing would mean that no costs of maintaining car parks would deplete the Council’s general budget. Reference was properly made to the limited uses that could be made of any surplus that arose. The contemporaneous evidence does not indicate that it was the Council’s purpose to generate a surplus with a view to funding other transport costs. On the contrary, the evidence indicates that the Council intended to set the charges as low as possible, and that one of the three car parks would continue to run at a deficit.

[65]In conclusion, although there was a shadow of a suggestion in the Council’s submissions that, in the context of these proceedings, it may have misunderstood Attfield, there was no such misunderstanding apparent in the contemporaneous documents. On the contrary, it is clear, in my view, that the Council’s dominant purpose in making the TRO was to make the car parks self-funding and so ensure that they were not another drain on the Council’s resources, and were well maintained. Accordingly, I dismiss Ground 1.

Ground 2: Section 122 Duties

[66]The claimants submits that the Council failed to discharge its duties under section 122 of the 1984 Act in making the TRO. He acknowledges that s.122 involves evaluative balancing by the decision-maker, and that it does not mandate any particular policy outcome. Nonetheless, the claimant contends that the Council insufficiently evaluated concerns regarding displacement of cars into surrounding residential streets, air quality and accessibility impacts upon disabled and elderly users. In addition, in his written and oral submissions, the claimant emphasised the impact of parking charges on town centre users, and safety and amenity concerns given the absence of any lighting in Marson Road car park.

[67]In making the TRO, the Council clearly had in mind the qualified duty to secure the expeditious, convenient and safe movement of vehicular and other traffic (including pedestrians) so far as practicable, had regard to the factors in s.122(2), and balanced the various considerations. The Council’s express aims were to provide well managed and well-maintained parking facilities, and to ensure adequate turnover in parking spaces, bearing in mind increasing pressure on spaces. I have addressed the specific points regarding the evaluation of displacement of cars and the impact on those with protected characteristics in the context of Grounds 4 and 5 below. The Council also assessed air quality, publishing a report in July 2024. Its assessment was that there was no evidence that parking charges would have a negative impact on air quality. Matters such as the lack of lighting in Marson Road car park may underline the need for maintenance work to be undertaken, but the Council has not even arguably made any public law error in complying with s.122.

Ground 3: Consultation

[68]At the heart of the claimant’s case is the contention that the statutory consultation was unlawful. The primary allegation is that the Council failed to comply with the Gunning principles. In R (Moseley) v Haringey London Borough Council

[2014] UKSC 56

[2014] 1 WLR 3947

, the Supreme Court endorsed the basic requirements of a consultation process, as accepted by Hodgson J in R v Brent London Borough Council, ex p Gunning

(1985) 84 LGR 168

, 189:

“Mr Sedley submits that these basic requirements are essential if the consultation process is to have a sensible content. First, that consultation must be a time when proposals are still at a formative stage. Second, that the proposer must give sufficient reasons for any proposal to permit of intelligent consideration and response. Third, … that adequate time must be given for consideration and response and, finally, fourth, that the product of consultation must be conscientiously taken into account in finalising any statutory proposals.”

[69]The claimant submits that the Council breached the first, second and fourth Gunning principles. He does not take issue with the length of the consultation, the Council having complied with the statutory requirement in that regard.

[70]In relation to the requirement to consult at a formative stage, the claimant submits that by October 2024 the Council had adopted the Parking Management Strategy, authorised implementation measures, considered and rejected alternative approaches, and substantially committed itself to implementing charging measures at the three Clevedon car parks. A response to a freedom of information request made by the claimant shows that the Council had ordered ticket machines for those three car parks on 20 May and 17 June 2025, that is before the statutory consultation began. This shows the Council had effectively committed itself to its preferred outcome before the statutory consultation began. It did not occur at a genuinely formative stage. Rather, consultees were presented with implementation detail rather than a genuine policy choice, realistic alternatives already have been rejected.

[71]As regards the second requirement, the claimant criticises the fragmented presentation of key documents on the Council’s website, and an administrative error in publishing an incorrect TRO reference within the consultation material. In particular, the Informal Consultation Analysis and the Enumeration Summary had been published more than a year before the statutory consultation. The Council did not compile a consolidated evidence base, or signpost where these documents were located, when undertaking the statutory consultation. The claimant submits this denied consultees the ability to respond intelligently.

[72]The claimant submits that the admitted failure to consider the two objections he submitted, on behalf of the Clevedon Business Community Group goes directly to the fourth Gunning principle, as well as breaching reg.13 of the 1996 Regulations. His right to object was rendered illusory by the failure to consider his objection at all, depriving him of the assurance that his representations would form part of the decision-making process.

[73]The Council denies that the statutory consultation was not at a formative stage. Mr Bailey’s evidence is that the purchase of ticket machines in advance of the decision to introduce parking charges is “common practice” and it did not “commit the Council to introducing parking charges since the ticket machines can be used in other carparks”, where charges are already made for parking. Diverting the machines for use in other car parks would have been part of the general maintenance and upgrade plans for those other car parks. Further, the Council relies on the fact that it had undertaken the six-week non-statutory consultation, and made changes in response, such as to the type of machines to be installed (enabling mixed methods of payment), and by implementing tariffs at the lowest level possible.

[74]The Council submits there was no breach of the second Gunning principle in circumstances where the Council fully complied with the requirements of the 1996 Regulations as to the material required to be published. The Council was not under any duty to compile or summarise documents which had been published earlier, and which remained readily and easily accessible on the Council’s website.

[75]The Council contends that it conscientiously reviewed the product of the non-statutory and statutory consultations, and did not breach the fourth Gunning principle. The Council accepts that it breached reg.13, as a result of an administrative error, in failing to consider the two objections filed by the claimant. But it contends that the claimant has failed to establish that his interests have been “substantially prejudiced” by that failure, within the meaning of paragraph 36 of Schedule 9 to the 1984 Act, and so it is not a basis on which the TRO could be quashed. I address the parties’ submissions as to relief further below.

Decision

[76]An issue which was only addressed to a limited extent during the hearing, in response to my questions, is whether the statutory process engaged the Gunning principles. As Simler J observed in R (FDA) v Minister for the Cabinet Office

[2018] EWHC 2746 (Admin)

, “consultation in the Gunning sense is a term of art”.

[77]This case is concerned with the Council’s compliance with the duties imposed by the 1996 Regulations. In R (Moseley) v Haringey London Borough Council

[2014] UKSC 56

[2014] 1 WLR 3947

, [36], Lord Reed observed that statutory duties of consultation:

“vary greatly depending on the particular provision in question, the particular context, and the purpose for which the consultation is to be carried out. The duty may, for example, arise before or after a proposal has been decided upon; it may be obligatory or may be at the discretion of the public authority; it may be restricted to particular consultees or may involve the general public; the identity of the consultees may be prescribed or may be left to the discretion of the public authority; the consultation may take the form of seeking views in writing, or holding public meetings; and so on and so forth. The content of a duty to consult can therefore vary greatly from one statutory context to another: “the nature and the object of consultation must be related to the circumstances which call for it” (Port Louis Corpn v Attorney General of Mauritius [1965] AC 1111, 1124). A mechanistic approach to the requirements of consultation should therefore be avoided.”

[78]The focus should be on the legislative requirements. First, prior to making the TRO, the Council was under an express duty to “consult” the chief officer of police for the relevant area (pursuant to paragraph 20 of Sch.9 to the 1984 Act) and the “consultees” identified for “All cases” (item 7) in reg.6 of the 1996 Regulations. There is no allegation of inadequate consultation of those statutory consultees. In marked contrast, the procedure for giving notice of proposals to the public, and enabling any person to object, is not described as a “consultation”, or a requirement to “consult”, and nor are members of the public identified as “consultees”. Whether the opportunity to object is a consultation in the Gunning sense is a matter of substance, nonetheless, there has clearly been a legislative decision to draw a distinction between consultation under regulation 6 and the publication and objection procedure under regulations 7 and 8.

[79]Secondly, the 1996 Regulations clearly contemplate that the authority will have made a decision, in principle, to adopt the proposed order. That is evident from the fact that the authority is required to publish a notice of its proposals, a copy of the proposed order, a statement setting out the reasons why the authority proposes to make the order, and, in a case such as this, a statement of the proposed parking charges and times during which restrictions on parking will apply. The authority is, of course, required conscientiously to consider any objections, and must be prepared to modify its proposal if appropriate. It would be inconsistent with the requirement to consider all objections duly made if the authority were to close its mind and predetermine that it will make the TRO in the proposed form, without modification, irrespective of the content of any objections. But any contention that the applicable legislation imposed a duty on the Council to undertake statutory consultation at a time when the proposals were being developed, and more than one option was under consideration, is inconsistent with the 1996 Regulations.

[80]Thirdly, the legislative regime is highly prescriptive as to what the authority must publish, where it must be published, and for how long. It is not suggested that the Council has failed to publish any of the documents, or detail to be included within those documents, as required by the 1996 Regulations. Procedural fairness does not require this prescriptive regime to be supplemented by imposing a duty on the Council to draw the public’s attention to other documents, not specified in the 1996 Regulations, which were available on the Council’s website.

[81]Fourthly, the obligation to consider objections before taking a decision is not peculiar to TROs. Similar provisions are to be found, for example, in respect of Tree Preservation Orders and throughout the planning code: Hobbs v Horsham Borough Council

[2006] EWHC 1605 (Admin)

, Sullivan J, [16]. In R (Greenfields (IOW) Ltd v Isle of Wight Council

[2025] EWCA Civ 488

[2025] PTSR 2013

, the Court of Appeal rejected the submissions that article 40(3)(b) of the Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure) (England) Order 2015 (SI 2015/595) was properly to be regarded as a statutory obligation to consult (Lewis LJ, [59]). That was not the nature of the duty imposed. It was a duty to include certain information on a publicly available planning register with the purpose of enabling members of the public to know the terms of a proposed or agreed planning obligation, and to enable them to comment on it if they wished.

[82]It is important to focus on the specific legislation. In my judgement, the duty to publish a notice and other materials under reg.7, together with the right of any person to object under reg.8, does not amount in substance to consultation in the Gunning sense. In any event, ultimately, subject to compliance with any statutory requirements, the question is whether assessed overall the statutory consultation exercise – if that is the right label – was so unfair as to be unlawful.

[83]For the reasons I have given, I consider that it was not unlawful for the statutory process to be undertaken at a stage when the Council had made a decision, in principle, to introduce parking charges at the three Clevedon car parks, indeed, that is precisely what the 1996 Regulations envisage. The non-statutory consultation had taken place when proposals were at a formative stage. The proposals had, in my view, progressed beyond the formative stage by the time the notice of proposals was published, but that was consistent with the legislative scheme and not unlawful. The Council’s purchase of ticket machines for the three Clevedon car parks was consistent with the fact that it had made an in principle decision, following a full consultation on the principle of introducing parking charges, to make the TRO. However, that does not mean that the Council had closed its mind to the possibility of modifying the TRO in response to the objections, if appropriate.

[84]Nor has there been any failure to comply with the second Gunning requirement. The Council duly published each of the documents it was required to publish for the purposes of the statutory process. Its statement of reasons was adequate. The Council was not required to publish the Informal Consultation Analysis or the Enumeration Summary as part of the statutory process, although in fact those documents remained accessible on its website, still less was it under any duty to summarise or direct attention to those documents.

[85]In general, the Council complied with the obligation to consider objections which had been duly filed. However, as the Council acknowledged, due to an administrative filing error, it breached reg.13 by failing to consider the objections filed by the claimant. I shall consider the remaining grounds before addressing the question whether relief should be granted, having regard to the terms of paragraph 36 of Schedule 9 to the 1984 Act.

Ground 4: Inadequate Displacement Assessment

[86]The claimant contends that the Council failed to undertake an adequate assessment of the displacement of vehicles from the car parks onto nearby residential streets, or into private car parks, as a result of the introduction of charges for the Clevedon car parks.

[87]I can take this point shortly. The Council conducted traffic monitoring across two days, looking at turnover and capacity in the car parks. Duration of stay information was derived from separate analysis of registration plate data. In addition, a desk analysis of previous surveys and data provided in support of planning applications was carried out to check the consistency of the data collected. There is no evidence that the Council assessed the likelihood of displacement into private car parks but private operators would have the means to control use of such car parks.

[88]The report prepared for the 16 October 2024 meeting noted:

“3.15 To date, the majority of on-street and off-street car parking charges are in Weston-super-Mare. On-street charges were introduced there in 2012 and despite significant opposition a report to the Council on progress after 6 months operations showed that the two main fears of reduced footfall and displacement impacts were not realised.”

[89]The Council committed to a 6 month/1 year review, to enable modification of the scheme if required, and indicated in the Parking Management Strategy that flexible tariffs (designed to promote less used car parks) and/or residential permitting could be implemented if needed to avoid displacement of vehicles onto a residential roads.

[90]In these circumstances, it cannot sensibly be said that the displacement assessment was so inadequate as to render the decision irrational or procedurally unfair.

Ground 5: Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED)

[91]The claimant contends the Council failed to comply with its duty under s.149 of the Equality Act 2010 in relation to disabled, vulnerable and digitally excluded groups. He also stressed the impact of the charges on those on low incomes.

[92]There is ample authority on the meaning and effect of s.149, including Brown v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions and R (Bracking) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions

[2013] EWCA Civ 1345

[2014] Eq LR 60

, [26], to which the parties referred. There was no dispute on the law and it is unnecessary to set it out in detail. The key features relevant here are that the Council was under a duty to have due regard to the need to achieve the statutory equality objectives. Section 149 implies a duty of reasonable inquiry akin to the Tameside duty. The PSED is a process duty, not a duty to achieve a substantive outcome. It does not prescribe a particular procedure (e.g. it does not mandate the production of an EIA at any particular moment in the decision-making process, or at all). See R (K) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions

[2023] EWHC 233 (Admin)

[2023] PTSR 729

(and the cases cited therein).

[93]The “protected characteristics” are “age; disability; gender reassignment; pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; sex; sexual orientation”: s.149(7). Being vulnerable or digitally excluded does not, per se, mean a person has a protected characteristic, although being vulnerable or digitally excluded may flow from a characteristic, such as age or disability, that is protected. Equally, being a person on a low income is not a protected characteristic. In his oral submissions, the claimant focused on disability.

[94]The claimant submits that the initial and final EIAs the Council undertook does not amount to site-specific, targeted reviews of the accessibility for persons with disabilities of each of the three affected car parks. He states that there is no dropped kerb at Marson Road car park, no dropped kerb adjacent to disabled bays at Great Western Road West car park, and the dropped kerb at Great Western Road East is on the opposite side of the carriageway to the disabled parking provision. He submits the layout has an impact on the practical accessibility of the car parks.

[95]The Council contends that it demonstrated the due regard required by s.149 through the EIAs it carried out, and the measures it introduced. In the initial EIA, the Council assessed that the introduction of parking charges would be likely to increase the turnover of parking spaces which would benefit disabled people with blue badges. In the final EIA the Council assessed that the introduction of parking charges would not have any negative impact on disabled users. The Council took into account the needs of disabled persons by permitting those displaying a disabled persons badge in their vehicle an additional hour of permitted parking time in each of the three Clevedon car parks. This measure is identified in Schedule 2 to the Notice of Intent. The ordinary rates for parking are £1 for 1 hour, £1.50 for 2 hours and £2.50 for 3 hours. The additional hour of parking time means, for example, that a disabled person who wishes to park for 2 hours would need to pay for 1 hour.

[96]The Council submits that it had regard to the needs of those on low income and those who are digitally excluded, albeit those are not protected characteristics, by setting the tariffs as low as possible, offering to introduce annual parking permits at discounted rates, and deciding to install ticketing machines that would allow multiple payment methods. Mr Bailey asserts in his statement that the three Clevedon car parks do have dropped kerb access, although this is disputed by the claimant who took me to photographs of the car parks.

[97]In my judgement, it is manifest that the Council undertook a reasonable inquiry and had due regard to the impact of the proposed parking charges on disabled persons. The Council did so by means of undertaking EIAs in 2023 and 2024 in which they assessed the impact of the proposals on disabled persons, among others, and by tailoring the charges in recognition of the need disabled persons may have for a longer permitted parking time. The issue that the claimant raises regarding the absence or location of dropped kerbs, assuming that his evidence on this issue rather than Mr Bailey’s is correct, goes only to support the Council’s position that the car parks need to be self-financing so that the required funds can be made available to manage and maintain the car parks. It does not demonstrate a failure to investigate or have due regard to a detrimental impact on disabled persons of the proposal.

[98]I also accept the Council’s submissions as to the ways in which they demonstrably had due regard to the needs of those who are digitally excluded or on low incomes, albeit those are not protected characteristics in themselves.

Ground 6: Misalignment with Local Plan and Community Objectives

[99]The claimant contends that the Council gave too much or too little weight to certain factors with the consequence the TRO is misaligned with the Local Plan. On a statutory review, as on a judicial review, so long as it is not beyond the range of reasonable decisions open to the decision-maker, the weight to be attached to relevant or permissible considerations is for the decision-maker.

[100]The weight given by the Council to the risks of deterring those with disabilities, families, low income users, volunteers and charity workers from using the Clevedon car parks, by introducing charges, was not irrationally low. I have addressed the Council’s consideration of displacement impact in the context of Ground 4: it did not even arguably act irrationally or unfairly in the weight it gave to this factor.

[101]The Council made no public law error in citing housing growth as a pressure point potentially increasing parking demand, and in particular the weight it gave to housing growth was not irrational. While the Council’s Local Plan has not earmarked Clevedon for significant expansion, it was not irrational or unfair for the Council to give weight to potential housing growth in view of the central government requirement for 9,000 additional houses to be constructed in North Somerset.

[102]Accordingly, I reject this ground of challenge.

Ground 7: Maintenance Needs

[103]The essential points made by the claimant under this ground are, first, that the evidence shows that in recent years the Council has spent a minimal amount addressing the maintenance of car parks, and that the proposal will not result in one of the three Clevedon car parks being self-financing, as on the Council’s evidence, even with charging, the Great Western Road car park will make a financial loss. The claimant contends that this evidence undermines the Council’s assertion that the TRO is necessary to address pressing maintenance needs.

[104]This ground, too, must fail. The historic figures as to the Council’s expenditure on managing and maintaining these car parks are not a reliable guide to the level of funding needed to ensure they are well-managed and well-maintained. On the contrary, the very low expenditure in recent years supports the Council’s case that there has been chronic underinvestment in the maintenance of these car parks due to the financial pressure on the Council. Nor is the fact that one of the three car parks is anticipated to make a loss inconsistent with the Council’s assessment that it was necessary for the Clevedon car parks, overall, to be self-financing.

Relief/Substantial Prejudice

[105]For the reasons that I have given, all of the grounds are dismissed save that Ground 3 succeeds to the limited extent that in failing to consider the objections duly submitted by the claimant, on behalf of the Clevedon Business Community Group, the Council failed to comply with a relevant requirement within the meaning of paragraph 36 of Schedule 9 to the 1984 Act, namely reg.13(a).

[106]I have rejected the contention that the TRO was “not within the relevant powers” by dismissing the allegation that it was made for an improper purpose. For the court to have power to quash the TRO, the claimant would have to show that his interests have been substantially prejudiced by the failure to consider those objections (para 36 of Sch.9).

[107]The claimant is the manager of a retail stationery business. He identifies the possibility that introducing charges may “ultimately drive a reduction in footfall”, together with extrinsic factors such as the rising costs of running the business and the persistent threat from online retailers, as factors that could make the business unviable, putting at risk the “jobs of three employees”. He states that, as a commuter, he parks almost daily at Marson Road car park, which is a short distance from the shop. He has expressed concern that, being a salaried employee on a moderate wage, parking five days a week would become unaffordable for him. At the time he did not live within a realistic walking distance and had no other means of transport, although I infer that is no longer the position. His concerns were exacerbated by a cancer diagnosis received in January 2025 which has made him more reliant on his vehicle for short journeys and effectively ruled out walking or cycling.

[108]The claimant submits that the prejudice lay in the loss of meaningful opportunity for him to participate in the consultation process. He was deprived not merely of his preferred outcome but of the procedural assurance that his representations would form part of the decision-making process. The Council’s own conduct in relation to contemporaneous parking charge proposals for on-street parking in Clevedon demonstrates that consultation responses were capable of influencing the scope and content of proposed parking restrictions. The claimant contends that while an individual issue viewed in isolation may not independently justify relief, the combined effect of the defects he identified under each of his grounds caused substantial prejudice.

[109]The Council submits that there is no evidence that the claimant has been substantially prejudiced by any failure to comply with any relevant requirements. He brings this claim in his personal capacity, not in the name of the organisation on whose behalf he made representations. He identifies no clear financial impact on himself or, in any event, the business of which he is an employee. As regards his diagnosis, there is little detail, but subject to that the Council indicates that he would be likely to benefit from the blue badge scheme, under which he would be entitled to on street parking. The claimant’s focus is on the procedural failure, which is not what is meant by substantial prejudice, rather than any actual prejudice that it has caused him personally.

[110]In his second witness statement, Mr Bailey has detailed the officer responses that he would have offered to the objections submitted on behalf of Clevedon Business Community Group if they had been considered as part of this TRO. He states that the officer advice would have been to “Implement the TRO as advertised”.

[111]In my judgement, the claimant has not shown that his interests have been substantially prejudiced by the limited procedural defect that has been established. It is not enough to show that the objections he submitted were not considered. That establishes the failure to comply with a relevant requirement, it does not show that failure has caused substantial prejudice to the claimant’s interests. The claimant had made representations in the context of the non-statutory consultation, by completing the questionnaire, which had been duly considered. As I have explained, the Council had adopted the Parking Management Strategy, and made the decision, in principle, to introduce parking charges at the Clevedon car parks, following the non-statutory consultation. The focus of the subsequent statutory process was on the detail of the TRO. The Council’s conduct shows it was open to making modifications in response to objections, nonetheless I conclude that the Council would have implemented the TRO without modification if the two objections submitted by the claimant had been correctly allocated and considered by the Council. The procedural failure has caused no substantial prejudice to his interests.

Conclusion

[112]The Council has succeeded in defending all the grounds of claim, save to the limited extent that I find that the failure to consider the two objections filed by the claimant was in breach of regulation 13 of the 1996 Regulations. Accordingly, the claim for statutory review is dismissed save in part in respect of Ground 3. However, that failure has not caused substantial prejudice to the interests of the claimant, and so I refuse the claim for an order quashing the TRO. The TRO is valid and shall stand.