Faiz Siddiqui, R (on the application of) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd [2026] EWHC 1878 (Admin)

[2026] EWHC 1878 (Admin)Case No AC-2025-LON-003797
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 23 July 2026
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MCKENDRICK
Between
THE KINGClaimantFINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE LTD.DefendantARAG LEGAL EXPENSES INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITEDInterested Party
Tim Johnston (instructed by Dale Langley & Co) for ClaimantDavid Hopkins (instructed by Financial Ombudsman Service Limited) for DefendantMichael Tomlinson KC (instructed by ARAG Law) for Interested PartyConsidered On the Papers Without A Hearing
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 23 July 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................

McKendrick J :

[1]I handed down judgment in this matter on 26 June 2026. The neutral citation for the judgment is [2026] EWHC 1598 (Admin).[2]Following hand down, I was asked to deal with a number of consequential matters on the papers.[3]Mr Johnston on behalf of the Claimant made submissions on costs (and other matters) by way of written submissions filed on 1 July 2026. These submitted inter alia:
“6. … The Court is aware that the Claimant is a long-term unemployed individual with complex needs and considerable vulnerabilities. This is evident from the evidence before the Court, reflected in the Judgment itself. 7. The Claimant is also an individual of limited means. The Court is aware that he is not able to work, on account of his complex disabilities. He exists in a precarious situation with very little access to finance. Put simply, he has no means to pay the sums now sought. If an order is made, there will have to be some arrangement between the FoS and the Claimant for payment in instalments over a considerable period of time. That will expose him to considerable hardship. 8. Further, the Claimant has pursued a claim that has real merit, even though the Court has preferred the submissions of the FoS. That is reflected in: (a) the fact that the initial review by the ombudsman concluded that cover should be provided; (b) the grant of permission in relation to all four grounds of judicial review; and (c) the Court’s own observation that this was a complex case that required careful consideration (at the conclusion of the hearing). The issues raised by the case are also of general public importance, given the complexity and uncertainty attaching to the application of the relevant principles of law in relation to an ‘accident.’”
[4]I provided a ruling to the parties on 3 July 2026. I approved the terms of an order on the same date. The order said this:
“UPON the Claimant’s claim for judicial review dated 31 October 2025 AND UPON hearing Tim Johnston of counsel for the Claimant, David Hopkins of counsel for the Defendant and the Rt Hon Michael Tomlinson KC for the Interested Party at a hearing on 28 and 29 April 2026 IT IS ORDERED THAT: 1. The claim is dismissed. 2. The Claimant do pay the Defendant’s costs of the proceedings on the standard basis, such costs to be assessed if not agreed. 3. Pursuant to CPR r 44.2(8), by 4 pm on 24 July 2026, the Claimant shall pay to the Defendant the sum of £ 25, 000 on account of costs. The Claimant has liberty to apply to vary this order within 14 days. 4. The Claimant to file any application for permission to appeal with this Court by no later than 4 pm on 10 July 2026. 5. The Respondent and Interested Party, if so advised, to file any submissions in respect of any such application by 4 pm on 17 July 2026. 6. Time for any application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal shall run from the date on which any decision rejecting an application for permission to appeal is given.”

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

[5]The Ruling said the following:
“1. Following the hand down of the approved judgment the Claimant and Defendant have raised the issues of: (i) the exercise of the Barrell jurisdiction; and (ii) liability and quantum of costs. I set out brief reasons for disposal of these issues. Change of Mind? 2. The Claimant asks the court to exercise the jurisdiction purportedly found in Barrell [1973] 1 WLR 19 and submits “such a change of mind is appropriate”
. It is not clear to me what I am being asked to do when changing my mind; whether it involves providing additional reasoning or it relates to a wholesale different outcome and order. The submissions do no explain the order sought, nor are they directly related to the four grounds of challenge. 3. No directions are set out for the Defendant to respond to the Barrell jurisdiction. It gives rise to obvious issues of fairness. In any event, finality in litigation is important. I do not consider this is a case where I should change my mind between the hand down and the sealing of the order. It would amount to an unusual course. 4. Four points are raised. None have merit. First, I was asked to apply Dhak at the hearing. It is an example of events not amounting to an accident because of the aspect of deliberateness on the part of the claimant in that case. It has obvious application to these proceedings, as was accepted at the hearing. Secondly, the Ombudsman was plainly entitled to conclude neither the July 2024 letter not the injury were fortuitous events/novus actus interveniens. Thirdly, there was no elision of the legals tests and the judgment needs to be read as a whole. Fourthly, the Ombudsman gave sufficient reasons. 5. As a result there is no change to the approved judgment or the material parts of the order before it is sealed. Costs 6. The Claimant submits there should be no order as to costs because of the complexity and public importance of the case and because he has limited resources and any costs order would cause him hardship. He has filed no evidence. He has not made an application for a stay. 7. The Defendant submits the Claimant should pay its costs make an order for a payment of account and refuse the stay. 8. Costs are in the discretion of the court. The general rule is that costs follow the event. The grant of permission in judicial review proceedings is not a sufficiently material factor for there to be no order as to costs. 9. I am of the clear view the Defendant is entitled to its costs. Whilst I exercise a discretion, there are insufficiently clear reasons for that discretion to displace the presumption that costs follow the event. Many Administrative Court cases are complex and some raise issues of public importance but these issues nor the grant of permission is a sound basis to depart from the usual rule in this case. I am also unpersuaded that any issue of service of the Acknowledgment of Service on the Clamant is a good reason to vary the liability for costs. It is not said, for example, that it led the claimant to incur greater costs. 10. I am also satisfied detailed assessment is appropriate for the reasons given by the Defendant. Change of Mind? Costs 11. CPR r 44.2(8) provides (my emphasis added):
“Where the court orders a party to pay costs subject to detailed assessment, it will order that party to pay a reasonable sum on account of costs, unless there is good reason not to do so.” 12. I am satisfied that a payment on account is appropriate. No good reason has been identified by the Claimant. He says, but does not evidence, that a payment on account would cause him hardship. Mr Hopkins is correct to point out the case of Mahan Air & Anor v Blue Sky One Ltd & Ors [2011] EWCA Civ 544, per Stanley Burnton LJ (with whom Gross LJ agreed) at paragraph 38 (emphasis added): It is a truism that, in principle, the power to require security for the costs of an appeal, and even more the power to impose financial conditions on an appeal, should not be used to stifle a meritorious appeal. However, an appellant who urges the Court to conclude that its appeal will be stifled if any such conditions are imposed must put before the Court full and frank evidence as to its means. I reject the Mahan Parties' submission that the requirement for such evidence is incompatible with their Article 6 rights. A party seeking to establish its impecuniosity is in the best position to prove its financial position. To require a party to litigation to prove that an opposing party has financial means would be to impose an unreasonable and unfair burden on the first party. 13. I will therefore order a payment on account on the basis the Claimant has failed to evidence a good reason not to. There is no reason to believe an appeal will be stifled. For similar reasons I would refuse stay. No formal application is made. Applying the balance of harm, the Claimant has not evidenced the risk of injustice. He brought these proceedings and has previous experience of litigation, despite his disability. 14. The Defendant seeks a payment of account of £ 30, 916.20. There will be detailed assessment in due course. I will order the Claimant to make a payment of account within twenty one day in the sum of £ 25, 000. I have reduced the sum a little. I will give the Claimant liberty to apply to vary this lump sum to make staged payments if he files an application with evidence which provides for full and frank disclosure of his assets and income. It is a truism that, in principle, the power to require security for the costs of an appeal, and even more the power to impose financial conditions on an appeal, should not be used to stifle a meritorious appeal. However, an appellant who urges the Court to conclude that its appeal will be stifled if any such conditions are imposed must put before the Court full and frank evidence as to its means. I reject the Mahan Parties' submission that the requirement for such evidence is incompatible with their Article 6 rights. A party seeking to establish its impecuniosity is in the best position to prove its financial position. To require a party to litigation to prove that an opposing party has financial means would be to impose an unreasonable and unfair burden on the first party. 15. Those are my reasons.”

Costs

[6]The Claimant did not file his application for permission to appeal in time by 10 July 2026. Very properly, with his customary care, Mr Johnston wrote the court on 10 July 2026 stating:
“I write on behalf of the Claimant in this matter. As the Judge will be aware, the Claimant’s grounds of appeal are due to be filed today at 4pm. The purpose of this email is to ask for a short extension until midnight tonight. The need for this request arises out of my client having had a recent medical emergency, requiring treatment, that has made it more difficult for him to engage with the matters arising in this matter (as a consequence of the pain he was suffering and increased anxiety and general distress). He has a further appointment this afternoon, from which he will need to return and review the grounds before they are filed. I trust and hope that this brief extension does not cause the parties or the Court any inconvenience and respectfully ask for the Court’s indulgence in this respect.”
[7]I note no medical evidence was provided and no reference was made to cardiovascular concerns. I granted an extension until 12 pm 13 July 2026. Mr Johnston then sought a further extension of time by way of an email on 13 July 2026:
“I write with the deepest regret to ask if the Claimant might be allowed a further extension until 5pm today. I am mindful that the Court has already provided more time than was asked for last Friday. However, the Claimant respectfully asks for the Court's further (and final) indulgence in this respect.”
[8]It was not possible for the court to consider this request in the midst of very busy lists. The Claimant filed his grounds for permission to appeal within the amended deadline. The grounds of appeal sought permission to appeal against Grounds 1 and 2. No grounds were raised in writing on the basis there was a compelling reason for permission to appeal to be granted (although that appears to have been disputed in a later communication). No permission to appeal was sought in respect of the costs order or against the interim payment on account.[9]Mr Hopkins, on behalf of the Defendant, filed submissions in response, asking the court to refuse permission to appeal on 15 July 2026.[10]On 17 July 2026, on the standard form, I issued a decision refusing permission to appeal. It is not necessary to set out my brief reasons for concluding the grounds of appeal did not disclose a real prospect of success of the appeal.[11]On 17 July 2026, the Claimant’s solicitor filed directly with my clerk a Form N244 dated 16 July 2026. The application sought an order seeking “an immediate stay of execution of the Court’s adverse costs order made on 3 July 2026 pending determination of the appeal”. A short period later an amended application was filed with my clerk. The Claimant now relies on CPR r 83.7(4)(a), namely “there are special circumstances which render it inexpedient to enforce the judgment or order”.[12]This application relied on the witness statement of the Claimant’s solicitor, Mr Dale Langley. This witness statement said: 1. I am presently Mr. Siddiqui’s solicitor in relation to the above entitled matter. I make this witness statement to support the Claimant’s Application for a stay of execution of the recent adverse costs order, including the interim payment, made by the High Court on 3 July 2026 pending determination of the Claimant’s appeal in the Court of Appeal or at the very least until permission to appeal has been decided by the Court of Appeal. Exceptional circumstances and risk of catastrophic physical harm 2. As certified in the attached specialist forensic medical report of Consultant Psychiatrist Dr. Jonathan Beckett, active enforcement action of any kind creates an imminent, dangerous, and life-threatening risk of a major cardiovascular or cerebrovascular event - specifically a myocardial infarction (heart attack) or a stroke. This physical danger is heightened by the Applicant’s long-term physical and mental disabilities and their acute family history of fatal cardiac events. Under the balancing exercise established in Hammond Suddard Solicitors v Agrichem International Holdings Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 2065, forcing financial enforcement in the face of an explicit threat to human life constitutes an irreversible risk of injustice that completely overrides a creditor’s commercial interest in rapid debt recovery. Medical stifling and Interference with Access to Justice 3. Dr. Beckett’s expert report explicitly establishes that active enforcement will trigger a profound clinical block, rendering the Applicant medically and functionally unfit to review dense legal documentation or effectively provide instructions to their legal representatives. Consequently, allowing enforcement to proceed at this stage creates an insurmountable physical barrier that will completely stifle the Applicant’s ability to participate in and prosecute their active appeal, directly violating their constitutional right of access to justice as protected under R (on the application of UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51 and the administrative boundary principles in R (on the application of Medical Justice) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWHC 1925 (Admin). These authorities establish that a public body or Court cannot deploy mechanical deployment timescales or financial measures if the direct, systematically foreseeable consequence is to create an “unacceptable risk” of rendering it impossible for a citizen to access, participate in or prosecute a live legal appeal. Forcing enforcement at this juncture creates a direct medical barrier that completely stifles the Applicant’s access to justice. Mandatory Reasonable Adjustments under the Equality Act 2010 4. The Applicant is a vulnerable individual who suffers from severe and long-term disabilities under the Equality Act 2010 including Major Depression, Chronic Insomnia, Generalised Anxiety Disorder, type 2 diabetes and high blood cholesterol for which he takes daily sedative, hypnotic, diabetic and statin medication. Dr. Beckett has formally certified that a full stay of enforcement is a necessary and legally obligatory reasonable adjustment under Section 20 of the Equality Act 2010 to accommodate these disabilities and protect the Claimant from a life-threatening physiological collapse. Irrelevance of financial means and asset disclosure 5. Dr. Beckett’s clinical opinion establishes that the primary physiological trigger for a catastrophic cardiovascular emergency is the mere knowledge that financial enforcement or asset transfers are taking place, irrespective of who executes the transaction. Since the harm is physiological rather than commercial, a detailed statement of financial means is entirely irrelevant to the clinical necessity of the stay. Strong underlying merits of the Appeal 6. Having taken advice from Counsel and without waiving privilege, we believe the underlying appeal is very meritorious and has, on any view, has a realistic prospect of success under CPR 52.6. As already set out in our Grounds of Appeal which were submitted to the Court, the judgment contains errors of law. The learned Judge explicitly recorded the factual finding that the Applicant’s psychiatric injury was entirely unintended and unexpected from their perspective but then misapplied the “calculated risk” test from Dhak to deny coverage. This directly contradicts the binding Supreme Court precedent of Burnett or Grant v. International Insurance Company of Hanover Limited [2021] UKSC 12 which dictates that an injury must be viewed strictly from the perspective of the Insured. Conclusion 7. To preserve human life, prevent an irreversible medical emergency and maintain the constitutional integrity of a live appeal, the Claimant respectfully requests that the status quo be maintained and a temporary stay of execution be granted until such time as the Claimant’s appeal has been determined by the Court of Appeal or at the very least until permission to appeal has been determined by the Court of Appeal.”[13]Dr Jonathan Beckett, a psychiatrist, set out the following in a letter filed with the Claimant’s application: 1. Clinical history and diagnosis I am a Consultant Psychiatrist who works at South London & Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust and with a private practice at Nightingale Hospital in Marylebone, London. I am a Member of the Royal College of Psychiatrists. I have been treating the above named patient since May 2012. Mr. Siddiqui suffers from serious and long-term disabilities under the Equality Act 2010 including Major Depression, Chronic Insomnia, Generalised Anxiety Disorder, Type 2 Diabetes and Hypercholesterolaemia for which he takes daily antidepressant, hypnotic, diabetic and statin medication. 2. Dangerous risk of cardiovascular emergency and irremediable physical harm I understand that a High court costs order has been made against the patient and they are currently seeking a stay of execution pending an application for permission to the Court of Appeal. It is my professional medical opinion that any active enforcement action including but not limited to the instruction of High Court enforcement officers (Bailiffs), asset freezing, or property freezing creates a dangerous risk of triggering a significant psychiatric regression. Furthermore, due to the extreme physiological toll of this acute psychiatric trauma, enforcement action creates an imminent and dangerous risk of a major cardiovascular or cerebrovascular event, specifically a heart attack or stroke. The risk is particularly acute because of Mr. Siddiqui’s mental and physical disabilities and the medical history of his family. In particular, his grandfather died of a heart attack in 2004 and his own father suffered a near fatal heart attack in 2014. 3. The medical impossibility of “third-party” processing I am aware that in standard financial matters, the Court may suggest that a patient’s legal representatives or third parties handle financial transfers to reduce patient stress. I must specifically advise that in this patient’s case, third-party handling will not neutralise the medical danger. The mere knowledge that financial enforcement or asset transfers are actively taking place, regardless of who executes the transaction – is the primary psychological trigger. It creates the same severe and dangerous risk of an acute clinical crisis and cardiovascular emergency. 4. Medical stifling of the active appeal The acute psychological trauma associated with active enforcement at this juncture presents an unacceptable risk of compromising the patient’s cognitive function. It is my professional medical opinion that if enforcement proceeds, the patient will experience a profound clinical block. This state will render them medically and functionally unfit to sustain focus, review dense legal documentation and effectively provide instructions to their legal representatives. Consequently, forcing payment at this stage creates a direct medical barrier that will completely stifle the patient’s abilty [sic] to participate in and prosecute their active appeal. 5. Conclusion To prevent a severe, life-threatening, psychiatric or cardiovascular collapse and to ensure that the patient retains the baseline cognitive stability required to engage with the justice system, the status quo must be maintained. On that basis, I strongly recommend that a full and unconditional stay of enforcement is granted until the final determination of the patient’s appeal by the Court of Appeal. I also consider that this would be a necessary and legally obligatory reasonable adjustment under section 20 of the Equality Act 2010 to accommodate Mr. Siddiqui’s severe, long-term mental and physical disabilities within these judicial proceedings.”[14]Dr Beckett’s letter is dated 16 July 2026. He does not provide a statement of truth, no doubt as it is only a letter. It does not purport to be a CPR Part 35 compliant report. Plainly Dr Beckett is not a court appointed expert.[15]Whilst Dr Beckett offers his opinion, the reliability of his “evidence” results in little weight being attached to his evidence for the following reasons:a. He does not provide a letter of instructions.b. He does not explain when he last met with the Claimant and whether he assessed him. If his letter is based on the self-reporting of the Claimant, he offers no account of what the Claimant told him. He offers no information regarding any form of cardiological or other physiological testing.c. He does not explain how, as a psychiatrist, he is qualified to comment upon the Claimant’s cardiovascular health.d. He offers no understanding or context of the fact the Claimant was sufficiently well to:(i) ask the court to exercise its Barrell jurisdiction; and(ii) seek permission to appeal.e. He does not explain the evolution in the Claimant’s health from 1 July 2026 when his counsel made submissions opposing the costs order, making no reference whatsoever on behalf of his client, to the health issues raised on 16 July 2026.f. Nor does he explain the issues which led to the 12 July 2026 request for time because of purported further medical issues.g. Nor does he explain why the Claimant failed, as my costs order provided, to provide a witness statement with full and frank disclosure in respect of assets and income such that the costs order could be varied to ensure it was affordable and not oppressive to the Claimant and why this option would not have prevented the alleged risks of ill-health.[16]Accordingly, I do not find Dr Beckett’s information reliable.[17]Furthermore, the Claimant’s reliance on the evidence of Dr Beckett must be seen in the context of his underlying claim for judicial review. Ultimately the claim seeks legal expenses insurance coverage to bring a further claim against the Claimant’s father. It does seem a little ‘Alice in Wonderland’ that the Claimant seeks to appeal the orders made to pursue an appeal to obtain legal expenses insurance, when on his own case, he asserts he is not well enough to manage the natural terrain of these proceedings.[18]Mr Langley’s evidence adds little or nothing to the application for a stay. I note that Dr Beckett did not provide a “specialist forensic medical report”. I also note that the case of Burnett v International Insurance Co of Hanover Ltd [2021] UKSC 12 which now features prominently in the appeal was mentioned once in a footnote in the Claimant’s skeleton argument and found in an authorities bundles that ran to over 1,200 pages.[19]Mr Hopkins’ submissions in response to this application conclude that:
“In any event, C notably no longer relies on his previously asserted inability to pay. C does not provide any evidence as to his means, let alone full and frank disclosure of his assets and income. There is no evidence before the court C is unable to pay. C, a qualified solicitor, represented by solicitors and counsel, brought his claim fully aware of the costs risk. He should not be permitted to evade paying the successful party’s costs. His conditions do not make him above the law. If C pays £25,000.00 by 4 pm on Friday, there will be no need for any enforcement action. D invites the court to dismiss C’s application and certify it as TWM.”
[20]The Claimant has not sought permission to appeal the costs award or the interim payment.[21]There is no evidence of enforcement action on the part of the Defendant.[22]The Claimant has experience of litigation. This is not new territory for him.[23]The reference to section 20 of the Equality Act 2010 is thrown in without any attempt to explain what adjustment should be made. Mr Langley’s evidence does not explain why a judicial decision is subject to the 2010 Act (I have not heard argument on this but note the terms of paragraph 3, Schedule 3, Equality Act 2010 – exemptions for judicial functions from section 29 duties).[24]Applying the balance of harm for a stay and/or the CPR r 83.7(4)(a) test, there is an insufficient evidential basis to permit the court to grant a stay or apply CPR r 83.7(4)(a) in circumstances where the Claimant has not sought permission to appeal the costs order or the interim payment on account. I do not accept any appeal would be stifled. It remains open to the Claimant to:(i) seek an extension of time in respect of paragraph 3 of the order 3 July 2026 to file a witness statement with full and frank disclosure to explain his assets and income to seek staged payment of the interim costs; or(ii) renew his application for a stay to the Court of Appeal, with proper evidence.[25]In all the circumstances, whilst sympathetic to the Defendant’s submission that I should certify this application as “Totally Without Merit”, in the context of the Claimant’s purported ill-health, I will not do so.[26]Open justice requirements dictate this judgment should be published notwithstanding the personal information contained herein.