Ferdi Colak v Government of the Republic of Turkiye [2026] EWHC 1839 (Admin)

[2026] EWHC 1839 (Admin)

Case No AC-2021-LON-001459

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING’S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date 22 July 2026

Before

MR JUSTICE JOHNSON

Between

FERDI COLAKAppellant

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF TÜRKIYERespondent

Ben Cooper KC and James Stansfeld (instructed by Lansbury Worthington) for Appellant

Richard Evans (instructed by CPS) for Respondent

Hearing Hearing date: 11 June 2026

Further written submissions: 2 July 2026 (Respondent) and 16 July 2026 (Appellant)

This judgment was handed down by release to The National Archives on 22 July 2026

Approved Judgment

[1]The appellant appeals against an order to send to the Secretary of State a request for his extradition to Türkiye. Leave to appeal was granted by Fordham J, limited to the following question:

“Is it legally necessary in the present case for the Yalvaç Assurances to address the Appellant’s guaranteed retrial, whether by (a) including the Uckac Assurance… or (b) amending “because of security or disciplinary issues” to add “or in order to secure any in-person attendance at trial” or (c) otherwise?”

[2]The context for the grant of leave to appeal was that it was common ground that extradition would be incompatible with the prohibition on inhuman and degrading treatment under

article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights

, unless Türkiye provided a sufficient assurance about prison conditions. Assurances had previously been given, but they did not meet the assurance that the Divisional Court required in Türkiye v Demir, Uckak and Sahin

[2024] EWHC 2351 (Admin)

. The respondent maintains that the existing assurances are sufficient. The appellant says that they are not. Legal framework Extradition to category 2 territories

Legal framework

[3]Türkiye is a category 2 territory for the purposes of part 2 of the Extradition Act 2003: Extradition Act 2003 (Designation of Part 2 Territories) Order 2003. Part 2 of the 2003 Act makes provision for extradition requests from category 2 territories: section 69.

[4]A judge considering such a request must (where the request is made following a conviction, and there is no bar to extradition under the 2003 Act) decide whether extradition would be compatible with Convention rights within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998. If so, she must send the case to the Secretary of State, but, otherwise, she must order the requested person’s discharge: section 87.

[5]Section 103 gives a right of appeal against a decision to send a case to the Secretary of State.

[6]On appeal, the role of the appellate court is prescribed by section 104. Section 104(3) permits an appeal to be allowed only if the judge ought to have decided a question before her differently with the result that the applicant would have had to be discharged. Section 104 provides as follows: “Court’s powers on appeal under section 103(1) On an appeal under section 103 the High Court may- (a) allow the appeal; (b) direct the judge to decide again a question (or questions) which he decided at the extradition hearing; (c) dismiss the appeal.

(2) The court may allow the appeal only if the conditions in subsection (3) or the conditions in subsection (4) are satisfied.

(3) The conditions are that- (a) the judge ought to have decided a question before him at the extradition hearing differently; (b) if he had decided the question in the way he ought to have done, he would have been required to order the person's discharge.

(4) The conditions are that- (a) an issue is raised that was not raised at the extradition hearing or evidence is available that was not available at the extradition hearing; (b) the issue or evidence would have resulted in the judge deciding a question before him at the extradition hearing differently; (c) if he had decided the question in that way, he would have been required to order the person's discharge. …” (a) allow the appeal; (b) direct the judge to decide again a question (or questions) which he decided at the extradition hearing; (c) dismiss the appeal. (a) the judge ought to have decided a question before him at the extradition hearing differently; (b) if he had decided the question in the way he ought to have done, he would have been required to order the person's discharge. (a) an issue is raised that was not raised at the extradition hearing or evidence is available that was not available at the extradition hearing; (b) the issue or evidence would have resulted in the judge deciding a question before him at the extradition hearing differently; (c) if he had decided the question in that way, he would have been required to order the person's discharge.

Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and prison conditions in Türkiye

[7]

Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights

is a Convention right within the meaning of the 1998 Act. It prohibits inhuman and degrading treatment. Prison conditions may be incompatible with the prohibition on inhuman and degrading treatment if there is insufficient in-cell personal space: Mursic v Croatia

(2017) 65 EHRR 1

[8]In Türkiye v Demir

[2024] EWHC 2351 (Admin)

, the Divisional Court (Dingemans LJ and Stacey J) considered three appeals in Turkish extradition cases where the issue concerned whether, in the light of prison conditions in Türkiye, extradition would be compatible with

article 3 of the Convention

. The court explained that, since 2019, it had been usual for Türkiye to provide what was known as the “Yalvaç assurance” when making an extradition request: [14]. The “Yalvaç assurance” is an assurance that the extradited person will, if detained, be held in Yalvaç T Type Closed Prison with at least 4 square metres of personal space: [1].

[9]In some cases, persons extradited to Türkiye with the Yalvaç assurance had, in breach of that assurance, been held in prisons other than Yalvaç for substantial periods of time: [20] – [32]. This was not due to bad faith on the part of the Turkish authorities. It was because of a culpable failure to co-ordinate the respective branches of the state that were involved in giving effect to the assurance: [84] – [92].

[10]In the light of the breaches of the assurances in other cases, there was a real risk that extradited persons would be held in impermissible conditions: [94]. However, the court considered that the issue could be addressed by a further assurance that would ensure that one body was responsible for compliance with the assurances: [96]. In respect of one of the appellants, Mr Uckak, it was necessary for an assurance that he could attend his trial by video-link, or that if he was to be held in another prison, then he would be provided with personal space of at least 4 square metres: [97]. The assurance sought was set out at paragraph 3 of the annex to the judgment:

“The Government of Türkiye guarantees that Mr Uckac may appear at his trial by video-link from Yalvac, and that if he is to be held in another prison closer to the court for the purposes of the trial during any part of the trial (for example when he is giving evidence), that he will be detained in an institution with personal space of 4 square metres.”

The facts

[11]The appellant’s extradition is sought to serve a sentence following his conviction for offences that took place in August 2013. The offences are equivalent to false imprisonment and sexual assault.

[12]The appellant says that he was physically abused and ill-treated during police custody and imprisonment. The Turkish authorities dispute those allegations and say there is no record of any complaint of ill-treatment.

[13]The appellant says that in 2014 he travelled to northern Syria to express solidarity with the local population during fighting in the region. He took photographs which were later uploaded to social media. He says that his workplace and home came under increased scrutiny from the authorities and that police searches were conducted.

[14]On 7 July 2015, the appellant was convicted in his absence and sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment for the deprivation of liberty allegation, and to additional sentences for sexual assaults. At that point, the order for his imprisonment was not final. He left Türkiye and came to the United Kingdom.

[15]On 17 January 2017, an appellate court upheld the conviction and nine-year sentence for deprivation of liberty but quashed the convictions for sexual assault and remitted those matters to the trial court. At that point, the nine-year sentence of imprisonment became final under Turkish law.

[16]Following the remittal, further proceedings took place in the appellant’s absence, although he was represented by lawyers. He was convicted of sexual assault and blackmail-related offences. He received a further sentence of nine years’ imprisonment for sexual assault, a sentence of two years’ imprisonment for blackmail, and a monetary fine. Those convictions were subsequently upheld on appeal.

[17]On 7 August 2017, the respondent issued an extradition request to the United Kingdom. The request sought the appellant’s return to serve the nine-year sentence that had been imposed and upheld for deprivation of liberty.

[18]On 20 February 2018, the request was certified by the Secretary of State under the Extradition Act 2003.

[19]On 11 June 2018, Mr Colak was arrested in the United Kingdom pursuant to the extradition proceedings. He first appeared before Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 12 June 2018. There were then substantial delays, in large part because the appellant was also pursuing a claim for asylum in parallel with his opposition to extradition.

[20]During the extradition proceedings, a substantial amount of evidence was assembled concerning prison conditions in Türkiye. During 2020 and early 2021, the respondent supplied further information about the appellant’s convictions, imprisonment arrangements, prison conditions and retrial rights. It said that the appellant would be detained at Yalvaç T-Type Closed Prison following extradition. Information was provided concerning the prison’s capacity, occupancy levels, accommodation arrangements, healthcare facilities, mental health services and covid measures.

[21]A substantive extradition hearing took place before District Judge Tempia between 14 and 16 April 2021. She gave judgment on 30 April 2021. The appellant contended that extradition was barred by reason of extraneous considerations (section 81(b) of the 2003 Act), that he had been convicted in his absence (section 85), that extradition was oppressive due to his mental health (section 91), that the proceedings were an abuse of the court’s process and that extradition was incompatible with the right to a fair trial under

article 6 of the Convention

. The judge rejected the appellant’s case on each of these points.

[22]The appellant also contended that extradition was incompatible with the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to

article 3 of the Convention

. He relied on evidence as to prison conditions in Türkiye and the absence of sufficient and reliable assurances as to how the appellant would be treated. On that issue, the judge considered that the evidence showed that the appellant would be detained at Yalvaç where he would have at least four square metres of personal space. She found that extradition was compatible with

article 3 of the Convention

[23]The judge therefore sent the case to the Secretary of State. On 5 July 2021, Mr Colak lodged an appeal. The appeal was stayed because of parallel asylum and human rights proceedings. On 4 October 2023, the stay was lifted. Leave to appeal was refused on the papers. The appellant renewed his application.

[24]In February 2024, the renewed leave application was itself stayed pending the outcome of other extradition appeals concerning prison conditions in Türkiye. In September 2024, the Divisional Court (Dingemans LJ and Stacey J) gave judgment in Demir. Following that judgment, the respondent provided updated assurances concerning the appellant’s detention.

[25]On 7 March 2025, the respondent gave an assurance in these terms:

“The Government of the Republic of Türkiye guarantees that no later than 48 hours after the Requested Person’s arrival in Türkiye and throughout his time in detention for service of his sentence being approved and, if appropriate the sentence being finalised by the Court of Cassation in Türkiye, the Requested Person will be detained in Yalvaç T Type Closed Prison or Yalvaç Open Prison.”

[26]This was the “Yalvaç assurance” to which Fordham J referred when granting leave.

[27]On 23 February 2026, an assurance was granted in these terms:

“If, at any stage of the trial process, the person in question needs to be held in another prison closer to the court, it is not known at this stage in which court the trial will be held, which institution will be required to house them based on the articles and paragraphs under which they will be tried and within the framework of the relevant legislation, and whether the relevant court will require them to be physically present at the hearings. On the other hand, pursuant to the Regulation on the Use of the Audio and Visual Information System in Criminal Procedure and the Circular of the Department of Information Technologies dated 14.12.2011 and No. 150 regarding the Audio and Visual Information System (SEGBiS), it is possible for convicted or detained persons held in penal institutions to participate in hearings via video conference and to have their statements taken accordingly. … In cases where the court orders the physical presence of the convicted/detained person before the court, pursuant to the written instruction of Directorate General for Prisons and Detention Houses., such persons are brought before the competent court, and following the hearing they are immediately returned to the institution in which they are accommodated. In the event that the hearing is prolonged, temporary accommodation in the province where the hearing is held may be arranged, after which the person is promptly returned to the institution of origin. Within this scope, following his extradition to our country, the individual concerned may participate in the hearings to be held in Iskenderun via SEGBiS from Yalvaç Type-T Closed Penal Institution, and in cases where his physical presence is required, he shall be returned to the aforementioned institution immediately after the hearing, without being temporarily accommodated in another institution, subject to the duration of the hearing, travel, and seasonal conditions.”

[28]On 29 April 2026 an assurance was granted in these terms:

“If it is necessary to keep the aforementioned in a different penal institution close to the court during any phase of his proceedings, it is not known at this stage whether in which court his proceedings will be carried out, whether in which penal institution it is necessary to house him within the framework of articles and paragraphs in accordance with which he will be tried and relevant provisions of the legislation, whether the court will request him to be present personally during the hearings. In the event that the court orders the convict/detainee to be present before the court, the convict/detainees are made present at the court where the hearing is held based on the written instruction of, Directorate General for Prisons and Detention Houses they are sent back to the institution where they are hosted immediately after the hearing, if the hearing is prolonged, accommodation can be provided in the province where the hearing is held for a short period of time, and they are sent back to the institution where they are hosted immediately after the hearing.”

[29]Further communications from the Turkish authorities stated that, if a retrial took place, Mr Colak could in principle participate by video link from Yalvaç and, if attendance at court were required, he would ordinarily be returned to Yalvaç after the hearing.

The hearing on 11 June 2026

[30]At the hearing on 11 June 2026, Ben Cooper KC, for the appellant, contended that the existing assurances were insufficient because they contemplated that the appellant might be detained at a prison other than Yalvaç, and there was no guarantee that he would have sufficient personal space at such a prison. Richard Evans, for the respondent, argued that the existing assurance was sufficient. There was no clear reason for the appellant to be moved from Yalvaç prison. He could attend any trial by video-link. If he attended the trial in person then it was unlikely that the trial would last for many days, and detention in a cramped cell for a short period time would not amount to inhuman or degrading treatment.

[31]At the conclusion of the hearing, I ruled that the assurances that had been provided were insufficient to extinguish a real risk that the appellant would be subject to treatment contrary to

article 3 ECHR

if he were extradited to Türkiye. The reason is that in the event that the appellant seeks a retrial (as seems to be a real likelihood), the retrial appears likely to take place at a court many hours travel from Yalvaç prison. Although there is reference to the possibility of a video-link from Yalvaç prison, there was no guarantee that the appellant would attend by video link. It appeared to be contemplated that he might be detained at another prison for the duration of any trial. There was no guarantee as to the length of any re-trial, and there was no guarantee as to the cell space that would be available to the appellant. The case was not materially distinguishable from that of Mr Uckak in Demir. I therefore indicated that the appeal would be allowed unless the assurance that was required in Mr Uckak’s case was provided in this case.

[32]In other words, the answer to the question posed by Fordham J when granting leave was “yes”: it was necessary to address the appellant’s guaranteed retrial by including the Uckac Assurance.

[33]I therefore adjourned the appeal to enable the respondent to indicate whether it would be prepared:

“to guarantee that the Appellant may appear at his trial by video-link from Yalvaç, and that if he is to be held in another prison closer to the court for the purposes of the trial during any part of the trial (for example when he is giving evidence), that he will be detained in an institution with personal space of 4 square metres”

The Uckak assurance

[34]On 26 June 2026, the respondent provided an assurance in the following terms:

“In the event that Ferdi Colak exercises his right to a retrial, the Government of Türkiye guarantees that Ferdi Colak may appear at his trial by video-link from Yalvaç, and that if he is to be held in another prison closer to the court for the purposes of the trial during any part of the trial (for example when they are giving evidence), that he will be detained in an institution with personal space of 4 square metres.”

Submissions

[35]Mr Evans submits that the assurance that has now been provided is in exactly the terms requested by the court and is materially identical to the assurance required by the Divisional Court in Demir. Given the terms of the court’s direction and the limited ambit of the grant of leave to appeal, there is no remaining scope to advance the appeal.

[36]Mr Cooper submits that the court should not rely on the new assurance because it merely repeats the wording of the court’s order and contains no case-specific information, particularly as to where the appellant would be detained if transferred from Yalvaç. This prevents any proper assessment of compliance, monitoring, prison conditions and other article 3 risks. Particular concern is expressed that he may be detained in Iskenderun, where the appellant says he was previously ill-treated, and where reports have alleged further mistreatment of prisoners. Mr Cooper also emphasises the appellant’s post-traumatic stress disorder and suicide risk, arguing that a return to the same prison environment could exacerbate his mental illness and that no information has been provided about healthcare arrangements outside Yalvaç. Accordingly, he says that the assurance does not remove the established article 3 risk and the appeal should be allowed. Should the judge have decided that extradition would be incompatible with the prohibition on inhuman and degrading treatment?

[37]Leave to appeal was granted on the narrow and focussed basis identified by Fordham J. The assurances that were available at the time of the grant of leave went a long way towards addressing the risk of ill-treatment. There was, however, a potential residual risk if(a) the appellant elected to pursue a re-trial, and

(b) he attended the re-trial, and

(d) the re-trial lasted for a sufficiently long time that he would need to be detained at a prison other than Yalvaç. Mr Evans submitted at the hearing that the combination of these contingent risks could be discounted. I disagreed and said that the appeal would be allowed unless a further assurance was granted to address those contingent risks.

[38]The assurance that has now been provided is the same as that which was contemplated by Fordham J and is the same as the assurance that was sought by the Divisional Court in Demir and is the same as the assurance that I sought.

[39]If (as Mr Evans suggests is overwhelmingly likely) the appellant remains at Yalvaç (either because he does not seek a re-trial, or because he does not attend a re-trial, or because he attends a re-trial remotely, or because he can be transported to and from Yalvaç for the retrial), then there is no need to have to rely on the new assurance.

[40]If, however, it transpires that the appellant does have to be relocated during the retrial then the new assurance guarantees that he will be provided with sufficient in-cell personal space. That being the case, there are no longer substantial grounds to believe that there is a real risk that he will be held in conditions that amount to inhuman and degrading treatment. It is not therefore the case that, on the basis of the material that is now available, the judge should have decided that extradition would be incompatible with the prohibition on inhuman and degrading treatment.

[41]It is immaterial that the respondent has not identified the prison(s) at which the appellant would be detained. It is sufficient that it has guaranteed a minimum provision of in-cell personal space, in whichever prison he is detained.

[42]The points that are now made about the appellant’s mental health and the risks of ill-treatment fall outside the scope of the grant of leave to appeal. Moreover, given that the appellant will only be detained at any prison other than Yalvaç for the period of the re-trial, during which time he will be under the court’s jurisdiction, he has not shown that there are any substantial grounds to believe that he would be at a real risk of ill-treatment.

[43]It follows that the ground on which Fordham J gave leave falls away, because the assurance that Fordham J contemplated might be required has now been given. Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed.

Outcome

[44]The appeal is therefore dismissed.