Bridgemere Land Limited & Ors, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Transport [2026] EWHC 1802 (Admin)

[2026] EWHC 1802 (Admin)

Case No AC-2026-MAN-000111

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING’S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date 16/07/2026

Before

MR JUSTICE CHAMBERLAIN

Between

BRIDGEMERE LAND LIMITEDClaimants

CASTLE GREEN HOMES LIMITEDClaimant

BRIDGEMERE UK LIMITEDClaimant

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRANSPORTDefendant

HIGH SPEED TWO (HS2) LIMITEDInterested Parties

WARRINGTON BOROUGH COUNCILInterested Party

James Maurici KC (instructed by Walker Morris LLP) for Claimants

James Strachan KC and Victoria Hutton (instructed by the Government Legal Department) for Defendant and First Interested Party

Hearing Hearing date: 17 June 2026

Approved Judgment

[1]The permission stage in judicial review proceedings generally involves a relatively brief examination of the Claim Form, Statement of Facts and Grounds and evidence, the Acknowledgement of Service and accompanying documents and the parties’ short oral arguments.

[2]A judge of the Administrative Court will refuse permission to apply for judicial review unless satisfied that the claim is arguable with a realistic prospect of success and that there is no other bar to the grant of permission: see Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide, paras 9.1.3 to 9.1.6.

[3]The grant of permission means that the judge has decided, on the basis of limited written and oral submissions, that the claim is arguable with a realistic prospect of success; and it will have to be considered in more detail in the light of Detailed Grounds of Defence and evidence from the defendant, possibly reply evidence from the claimant and fuller oral submissions from both parties at a substantive hearing.

[4]This means that, when a court gives permission to apply for judicial review, it is in most circumstances not necessary to give reasons for granting permission. It may sometimes be unhelpful to do so.

[5]In the present case, the papers were referred to me for a decision on the papers, but I adjourned the question of permission to be decided after a hearing with a time estimate of three hours. In the event, the hearing lasted slightly longer than that. Having heard relatively detailed submissions, I have reached the view that the grounds of challenge are arguable. I therefore grant permission to apply for judicial review on all grounds.

[6]In the exceptional circumstances of this case, I consider that it may assist the parties, and the judge at the substantive hearing, if I make some brief observations at this stage.

The claim

[7]The claimants are part of a group of companies which build houses. In 2024, they bought land at Thelwall Heyes, about 4 km to the east of Warrington town centre. The land was allocated in the Warrington Local Plan for residential development for a minimum of 300 homes. In March 2025, the second claimant made an application to Warrington Borough Council (“the Council”) for planning permission. In its amended form this was for the construction of 330 dwellings and associated works.

[8]In June 2025, the Department for Transport (“DfT”) contacted the second claimant and one of the options discussed was purchasing the site for a Liverpool to Manchester rail link, part of the Northern Powerhouse Rail (“NPR”). DfT officials said that the Secretary of State was considering “delay options”. There followed discussions between the DfT and the claimants with a view to concluding an option agreement. This would have prevented commencement of development for 12 months, provided the Secretary of State with an option to purchase the site at an agreed valuation of £60.48 million and preserved the Secretary of State’s ability to issue a “safeguarding direction” with an expedited compensation mechanism.

[9]From the claimants’ perspective, both the planning application and the negotiations with the DfT were progressing well. They expected the planning application to be considered at a meeting on 15 January 2026. However, on 13 January 2026 and unexpectedly as far as the claimants were concerned, the Secretary of State issued a direction under Article 31 of the Town and County Planning (Development Management Procedure) (England) Order 2015 (“the 2015 Order”).

[10]The direction has the effect of preventing the grant of planning permission by the local authority for a period of six months. No reasons were given in the direction and the Secretary of State reserved the right to issue a further direction extending the prohibition on the grant of planning permission by the local authority.

[11]The direction did not prevent the Council’s Planning Committee from considering the application and, on that basis, the Committee unanimously resolved to grant planning permission, subject to the prior completion of an agreement under s. 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (“TCPA 1990”).

The statutory scheme

[12]Section 74(1) of the TCPA 1990 confers power on the Secretary of State, by a development order, to make provision “for regulating the manner in which applications for planning permission are to be dealt with by local planning authorities and, in particular, (a) for enabling the Secretary of State to give directions restricting the grant of planning permission or permission in principle by the local planning authority, either indefinitely or during such period as may be specified in the directions, in respect of any such development, or in respect of development of any such class, as may be so specified”.

[13]Article 31(1) of the 2015 Order confers power on the Secretary of State to “give directions restricting the grant of permission by a local planning authority, either indefinitely or during such a period as may be specified in the directions, in respect of any development or in respect of development of any class so specified”.

[14]Section 149 of and Sch. 13 to the TCPA 1990 make provision for blighted land. By para. 6 of Sch. 13, this includes:

“Land in respect of which a local planning authority— (a) have resolved to take action to safeguard it for development for the purposes of relevant public functions (within the meaning of paragraph 1A), or (b) have been directed by the Secretary of State to restrict the grant of planning permission in order to safeguard it for such development.”

[15]In broad terms, the owner of such land can force the Secretary of State to acquire the land and there are provisions for determination of its value in the event of a dispute.

The claimants’ grounds of challenge and the Secretary of State’s response

[16]The claimants challenge the Article 31 direction on the grounds that the decision to make it was:(a) made for an improper purpose (ground 1);

(b) irrational and/or made without having regard to certain mandatorily relevant considerations (ground 2); and

[17]The Secretary of State submits that none of these grounds is arguable and, indeed, that the claim is totally without merit. All that was being done here was to pause consideration of the planning application by the local planning authority.

The hearing

[18]At the hearing, James Maurici KC for the claimants submitted that the use of an Article 31 direction in present circumstances is unprecedented. Part of his argument involved consideration of the ministerial submissions which preceded the challenged decision and which have now been disclosed. These, Mr Maurici submitted, showed that the real intention was to safeguard the land for possible use for NPR and that in those circumstances, the only lawful course was to issue a safeguarding direction, which would have triggered the statutory blight provisions. What was done here was an attempt to secure the benefit of such a direction (so far as the Secretary of State was concerned) while circumventing the operation of the blight provisions.

[19]I asked counsel to consider whether, if the intention was as Mr Maurici submitted, it might be said that blight provisions had been triggered because, although the direction did not say so on its face, the purpose of giving it was—in fact—to safeguard it for development for relevant public purposes.

[20]James Strachan KC for the defendant fairly responded that this point was not pleaded and would have to be. I accordingly asked Mr Maurici to consider over the short adjournment whether he wished to apply to amend his pleadings to take this point. Having considered the matter, he told me that he had no application to make.

Discussion

[21]It is not obvious to me that the operation of the statutory blight provisions depends on whether the Secretary of State chooses to say, on the face of his unreasoned direction, that he is making the direction for the purpose identified in para. 6 of Sch. 13 to the TCPA 1990. That, however, appears to be the agreed position of the parties in this case.

[22]On that footing, it may be that—as Mr Strachan argued—the Secretary of State has a broad discretion to determine whether the NPR plans were sufficiently advanced to justify the making of a safeguarding direction. However, at this stage, the test is simply whether the grounds (or any of them) are arguable.

[23]The starting point for consideration of arguability is that it is at least unusual—and possibly unprecedented, as Mr Maurici suggested—to use the Article 31 power without triggering the statutory blight provisions in circumstances where the land is, to use Mr Strachan’s phrase, “potentially required” for development by the Secretary of State for public purposes.

[24]More specifically, it seems to me to be at least arguable, with a reasonable prospect of success, that:(a) an Article 31 direction which is in fact made for the purposes identified in para. 6 of Sch. 13, but which is expressed so as not to trigger the statutory blight provisions, is unlawful; and

(b) on the facts of this case (where a “spot” safeguarding direction was one of the options said on the face of the ministerial submissions to be open to the Secretary of State), the Secretary of State was in fact acting to “safeguard” the land for the purposes identified in para. 6 of Sch. 13.

[25]This was the kernel of ground 1, as argued by Mr Maurici at the hearing. I therefore grant permission to apply for judicial review on that ground.

[26]Ground 2 alleges that, in various respects, the direction was given without adequate consideration of the impacts on the claimants. Although there is no doubt scope for debate about whether some of the references in the documents amount to recognitions of the extent of the impact on the claimants, I consider this ground too to be arguable.

[27]The arguability of ground 3 seems to me to be much more marginal. The making of the Article 31 direction certainly did not involve any deprivation of the claimants’ property. It did not preclude the grant of planning permission; it merely delayed for a six-month period the grant of planning permission by the local planning authority. I would not, however, shut out completely the argument that what happened here involved an interference or control on the use of property, if the matter is viewed as one of substance rather than form, as explained by the European Court of Human Rights in Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden

(1983) 5 EHRR 25

. The point is sufficiently arguable to justify the grant of permission.

[28]As usual in litigation of this kind, some of the arguments advanced in respect of the three grounds of challenge were stronger than others, but I do not think it would be helpful, or would save much time, to cut down the scope of the grant of permission. The grant of permission to apply for judicial review will therefore extend to all grounds, without restriction.

The renewal of the direction

[29]Shortly before I circulated this judgment in draft, I was informed by the parties that the Secretary of State had issued a further Article 31 direction dated 8 July 2026, preventing the Council from granting planning permission until after 30 October 2026. Again, the Secretary of State reserved the right to extend the period of restriction further, “as needed”. Whilst not technically relevant to the strength of the claimants’ challenge, this shows that the present challenge is, at this stage, far from academic.

[30]In my judgment, this development underlines the need for the substantive hearing in this case to come on quickly. I shall invite the parties to agree procedural directions to enable this to happen.