“I’ll have your chocolate babies.”
“Right, well look that was not meant in any way in a sexual way but it was probably me being tactile and me grabbing the girl’s wrist was not like meant with any menace…I think that the whole thing, like shocked me to say sexual harassment because me grabbing a girl’s wrist would me probably be more me trying to have fun with her rather than … a sexual way” [Emphasis added]
“58. …we found Ms Gordon to be a credible witness who gave a clear and cogent account to the court. She, unlike Mr Ryan, was sober and had a good recollection of the events that afternoon. She did not… seek to exaggerate and she remained materially consistent in cross examination. 59. Mr Ryan on the other hand was by his own admission drunk and at time of his interview stated he had no real recollection of what occurred on that flight and was accepting of what was put to him. 60. Significantly, at no point in that interview did he advance the defence that he now relies upon. When it was put to him in interview that he grabbed Ms Gordon’s wrists he didn’t deny that nor did he say he only touched her wrist with his palm to apologise. Instead he said he was disturbed by his own behaviour and sorry for his actions. 61. We completely reject Mr Ryan’s account for the inconsistencies between his evidence and his interview. The suggestion that the police had deliberately misled him is without any foundation. Notably the defence did not seek to call the interviewing officer or the solicitor who was with him before and during that interview in order to put that serious allegation to them. … 63. In our judgment the case against him was a strong one and he could reasonably have been expected to have mention the account he has now given to the court, namely that he didn’t assault Ms Gordon at all. In our judgment he did not do so because he had not at that stage thought up the account he has now given to this court. To that end, his failure to mention that account lends some support to the prosecution case.”
“72. …We are quite satisfied that Mr Ryan used the words alleged by Ms Gordon. We need not rehearse the fact he did not deny doing so in his interview or that he admitted to being drunk and having little recollection of what he had done and said. 73. That he was voluntarily intoxicated is of course no defence. 74. His evidence in the appeal, that he was not using the word chocolate to denote her skin colour but rather comparing her to sweet confectionary, is quite frankly absurd and again something he failed to mention in his interview. 75. The use of the word chocolate was plainly a reference to the colour of her skin. It was offensive, derogatory and demeaning and it had just that effect upon Ms Gordon.”
“Was the court correct to draw an adverse inference against Mr Ryan for undersection 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 , for failing to advance his defence during his police interview [X/2/21/§60-63]?”
“His oral evidence was therefore in materially identical terms to the answer he had given in police interview” and therefore, no adverse inference should have been drawn. Paragraph 22 of the application said simply “Further adverse references are made to Mr Ryan’s interview at paragraphs 72 and 74.”
“35. Complaint is made that there was no material difference between the Applicant’s account in interview and in his evidence in the appeal. It is asserted that he accepted, in terms, having touched Ms Gordon’s wrist in his interview and that this was “materially identical” to his evidence in the appeal. In the circumstances an adverse inference should not have been drawn. 36. This does not reflect the evidence in the appeal. The alleged assault was the “grabbing” of both Ms Gordon’s wrists. 37. The applicant’s evidence in the appeal was that he had never done this. It was his evidence that he only touched her wrist with an open palm in order to convey an apology. This was central to his defence in the appeal, namely that there was no assault because the touching in those circumstances amounted to implied consent. 38. His account in his interview was materially different. He accepted in that interview that he had grabbed her wrists albeit he said he did so because he was tactile and trying to have fun. At no point did he say he only touched her wrist with an open palm to apologise. To the contrary, he said he found the description of his own behaviour disturbing. 39. The whole thrust of his defence advanced in the appeal was that there had been no assault. As the tap on the wrist, by way of apology, amounted to implied consent.”
“there were inconsistencies between the Claimant’s account in his police interview and his evidence before the Defendant. The Defendant was entitled to assess those inconsistencies and to draw an adverse inference against the Claimant, having directed itself properly in relation to its ability to do so and the extent to which it might do so.”
“examination of the evidence of Mr Ryan and his police interview demonstrates that the inconsistency relied upon by the Defendant Court is simply not supported by a proper reading of his answers. Paragraph 30 of the Statement of Facts and Grounds states that “[Mr Ryan’s] oral evidence was therefore in materially identical terms to the answer he had given in his police interview”
“An arguable point arises on the construction ofsection 34(1)(a) Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 , in circumstances where the offence(s) in respect of which the Claimant was interviewed is not the offence for which he was ultimately charged and convicted.”
“In sections 34(2)… references to an offence charged include references to any other offence of which the accused could lawfully be convicted on that charge.”
“As the law now stands, although it may appear obvious to the jury in the exercise of their common sense that an innocent man would speak and not be silent, they must be told that they must not draw the inference of guilt from his silence. … It is in our opinion now clearly established by decisions of the Court of Appeal and of the Court of Criminal Appeal that to invite a jury to form an adverse opinion against an accused on account of his exercise of his right to silence is a misdirection.”