DNG, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for The Home Department [2026] EWHC 1769 (Admin)

[2026] EWHC 1769 (Admin)Case No AC-2025-LON-004184
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Venue Royal Courts of Justice,Date 13/07/2026
Strand,
London,
WC2A 2LL
Before
MR JUSTICE COPPEL
Between
THE KINGClaimantSECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENTDefendant
Amanda Weston KC and Charles Bishop (instructed by Deighton Pierce Glynn) for ClaimantAndrew Deakin (instructed by the Government Legal Department) for DefendantHearing Hearing date: 6 May 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.00am on 13 July 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................

The Claim:

[1]The Claimant, who is a national of Eritrea, arrived in the United Kingdom by way of a small boat on 22 October 2025. He was detained and claimed asylum on the same day. On 10 November 2025, the Defendant declared his asylum claim inadmissible and also refused a claim that his removal from the UK would breach his ECHR rights. The Claimant left the United Kingdom on 27 November 2025, when the Defendant removed him to France, pursuant to the Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the French Republic on the Prevention of Dangerous Journeys (“the Treaty”). His removal followed an unsuccessful application for interim relief to restrain it ([2025] EWHC 3289 (Admin)). An anonymity order remains in force.[2]Certain of the grounds raised in this claim for judicial review have been stayed to await the outcome of lead claims which have been identified as suitable for litigating common issues raised by claims by individuals who have been returned to France pursuant to the Treaty. Judgment was given by Sheldon J on the lead claims shortly before this judgment was handed down ([2026] EWHC 1742 (Admin)). What remained for me to decide were three grounds which are specific to the facts of the present case, for which permission was granted by Fordham J on 20 February 2026: i) Ground 1: the Defendant’s decision dated 31 October 2025 that there were not reasonable grounds to believe that the Claimant is a victim of trafficking (“the NRG Decision”) was unlawful on grounds of process and/or outcome irrationality and/or procedural unfairness. ii) Ground 2(b): the Defendant’s decision dated 10 November 2025 to declare his asylum claim inadmissible under s. 80B(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“NIAA”) (“the Inadmissibility Decision”) was taken in breach of the Claimant’s common law rights of procedural fairness and access to justice in that the Claimant did not have access to adequate legal advice so as to permit him to make effective representations in relation to that decision. iii) Ground 3:(i) the Inadmissibility Decision;(ii) the Defendant’s decision, also of 10 November 2025, to certify the Claimant’s human rights claim as clearly unfounded under paragraph 5(4) of Schedule 3 to the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (“the 2004 Act”; “the Certification Decision”); and(iii) the Defendant’s decision of 25 November 2025 not to accept as a fresh claim under paragraph 353 of the Immigration Rules “further submissions” made by the Claimant and his representatives against the refusal of his human rights claim (“the Fresh Claim Decision”); were all unlawful on grounds of process and/or outcome irrationality and/or a misdirection in law.

The Inadmissibility Decision

[3]I turn first to the challenges to the Inadmissibility Decision (Grounds 2b and 3) as these have the potential to impact, if only tangentially, on the challenge to the NRG Decision (Ground 1). The decision[4]Pursuant to s. 80B(1) NIAA, the Secretary of State may declare inadmissible an asylum claim made by a person who has “a connection to a safe third State”. A safe third state (see s. 80B(4)) is one where(a) an individual’s life and liberty are not threatened for a Refugee Convention reason,(b) from which the person will not be sent to another state, save in accordance with the Refugee Convention, or in contravention of his Article 3 rights, and(c) where the individual may apply to be recognised as a refugee in that state (and thereby receive protection there in accordance with the Refugee Convention).[5]By virtue of §3 of Schedule 2 to the 2004 Act, France is deemed to be a country where an individual’s life and liberty are not threatened for a Refugee Convention reason and from which that individual will not be sent to another state, save in accordance with the Refugee Convention. There is also a rebuttable presumption that France is a country to which a person can be removed without their Article 3 ECHR rights against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment being contravened, and from which a person will not be sent to another State in contravention of their Convention rights.[6]Connection to a safe third state includes (see s. 80C(4)) where(a) the individual was previously present in, and eligible to make a relevant claim to, the state (including a claim for protection under the Refugee Convention),(b) “it would have been reasonable to expect them to make such a claim” and(c) they failed to do so.[7]The Defendant decided in the Inadmissibility Decision that the Claimant had a connection to France, which was a safe third state, and where it was reasonable for him to have claimed asylum during a period of approximately three months in which he was living in France before embarking on a small boat to the UK. That he had not done so was because his intention had always been to settle in the UK and indeed he had paid an agent to secure his passage to the UK. The Inadmissibility Decision stated, materially (§14 of the “Reasons for Decision”):
“In view of the evidence and your own account of having spent approximately four months in France, it is reasonable to assess whether you could have sought asylum there. During your time in France, you were supported by charitable organisations many of which are known to assist individuals in navigating the asylum process. These organisations typically offer guidance, referrals to relevant authorities, and support in initiating claims for international protection. This indicates that viable and accessible avenues for seeking asylum were available to you during your stay. Furthermore, your arrival in the United Kingdom was facilitated through an irregular and hazardous route, specifically by crossing the English Channel in a small boat departing from France. You have stated that you paid for this journey [Q3.4 SCR], which suggests a degree of planning and intent. This supports the conclusion that the UK was your intended destination from the outset, and that your objective was to claim asylum here rather than in France, despite the opportunities that may have existed there.”
[8]The effect of the Inadmissibility Decision was, in short, that(a) the Claimant’s claim for asylum would not be considered (meaning that there was no right of appeal against rejection of the claim), and(b) the Claimant’s associated claim for humanitarian protection (that is, that his admission to the UK was necessary to protect his ECHR rights) was also inadmissible. In the same decision, the Defendant certified that the Claimant’s claim that his removal from the UK would breach his ECHR rights was clearly unfounded, pursuant to Schedule 3 to the 2004 Act.[9]For reasons which will be explored in more detail below, the Claimant had, prior to the Inadmissibility Decision, made a series of representations to the Defendant which he says he drafted himself, with the aid of an online translation tool, and not with the assistance of a legal representative. In his first set of representations, submitted on 28 October 2025, he mentioned that his brother had died in France on 9 September 2024, “because of drug use and homelessness”. He stated that he had been threatened, could not feel safe and was terrified whilst homeless in Paris, that he had “lost hope of living in France” and that “I do not want to go back to France, nor to Eritrea, nor to any place where I will be threatened again”. In a second set of representations, dated 1 November 2025, he referred again to his brother’s death “because of drug use and homelessness” and made an additional point, that:
“If I am sent back to France now, I will suffer again from severe mental health crises because everything there reminds me of my brother's death. I still feel deep trauma, sadness, and fear from that experience. Returning to France would destroy my emotional and mental stability - I could not survive it. I would be at serious risk of mental collapse and depression”
[emphasis in original]. Subsequent representations of 3, 5 and 10 November were in similar terms to those of 1 November 2025.[10]In relation to the Claimant feeling unsafe in France, the Defendant noted that his circumstances as a person claiming asylum in France would be significantly different from what they had been as a person seeking to avoid detection in France so that he could travel to, and claim asylum in, the UK (§§16 and 21 of the Reasons for Decision). He would no longer be sleeping rough but would have access to protection from the French authorities.[11]The Claimant’s claim that he would suffer a mental health crisis if he were returned to France, because of its association with his brother’s death, was addressed later in the Inadmissibility Decision, in the context of Article 3 ECHR. The Defendant decided that treatment for the Claimant’s mental health condition was available in France (§56). Applying the relevant legal tests under Article 3, there were no substantial grounds for believing that he would face a real risk of serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his state of health resulting in intense suffering or a significant reduction in life expectancy (§55). Similarly, with reference to Article 8 ECHR, the Defendant decided that the Claimant had not provided any evidence to substantiate that he suffered from a serious mental health condition but that in the event that he did require treatment “you will be able to access appropriate treatment for your medical condition to enable you to maintain a sufficient quality of life in France meaning that your moral and physical integrity will not be threatened” (§86).[12]In addition, the Defendant has a discretion not to treat a claim as inadmissible notwithstanding that the criteria in s. 80B are satisfied. That discretion was exercised against the Claimant on the grounds that there were no particular reasons why the claim should not be declared inadmissible (§33).

Access to legal advice: the facts

[13]The procedure which culminated in the Inadmissibility Decision began with the service upon the Claimant, on 24 October 2025, of a Notice of Intent which notified him that the Defendant was considering whether to declare his asylum claim inadmissible in the UK on the grounds that it was reasonable to have expected him to claim asylum in France, and invited him to make representations in respect of(i) why his claim did not fall to be declared inadmissible in the UK and(ii) why he should not be removed to France. The time limit for the making of representations was 7 days from 24 October 2025, subject to provision for applying for an extension of time. As I have indicated, the Claimant did in fact make representations to the Defendant after being served with the Notice of Intent, but he says that he prepared these by himself and that he did not speak to or meet with a lawyer until 14 November 2026 when he met with his current representatives, Messrs Deighton Pierce Glynn. This was after he had received the Inadmissibility Decision on 11 November 2026 (first witness statement, §§66-79).[14]It is common ground between the parties that the Claimant was entitled to a reasonable opportunity to take legal advice and make representations in light of that advice prior to the making of the Inadmissibility Decision. Ground 2b therefore turns on a dispute, which is primarily a factual dispute, as to whether the Claimant was afforded that opportunity.[15]The Defendant’s case, that the Claimant did have that opportunity, is set out in witness statements of Lucy Vaughan and Frances Hardy and can be summarised as follows: i) The Legal Aid Agency operates free legal advice surgeries in Immigration Removal Centres (“IRCs”) in England under the Detained Duty Advice Scheme (“DDAS”). The DDAS operates alongside privately commissioned legal advice, including legally aided advice provided outside the scheme. The DDAS is available to individuals detained in IRCs regardless of their means or the merits of their case. ii) Home Office guidance, “Detention Services Order (DSO) 06/2013 Reception and induction checklist and supplementary guidance” provides for all individuals arriving at an IRC to be advised of their right to legal representation, and how they can obtain such representation, within 24 hours of their arrival as part of their induction with the operator of the IRC. All individuals detained at an IRC in England are to be offered a slot with a legal representative under the DDAS at their induction. A detained individual who initially declines a DDAS appointment can request one at a later stage. iii) The Defendant has taken steps, through an interim instruction issued to IRCs on 27 August 2025, to ensure that individuals who are potentially subject to inadmissibility action and return to France pursuant to the Treaty have priority access to DDAS appointments (alongside those who are subject to removal directions whether under the Treaty or not). Other instructions have been issued to IRCs to ensure that records are kept to show whether a DDAS appointment has been made for an individual or has been declined and whether an appointment has been successful (in that it ran to time, without interruptions or technical or interpretation difficulties). Consolidated information is shared with the Defendant on a weekly basis so that the overall efficiency of the DDAS can be monitored. Diligent and accurate recording of DDAS appointments which are scheduled, attended or not attended in each individual’s case is important to the Defendant because whether or not an individual has had access to legal advice is a factor which, according to internal guidance, must be noted and taken into account by the Defendant’s decision-makers, in particular in cases which are potentially subject to the Treaty. iv) The Claimant was transferred to Harmondsworth IRC (“the IRC”) on 24 October 2025 at 10am. Upon his arrival at the IRC, he was provided with a mobile phone and SIM card and his induction was completed. The induction included a PowerPoint presentation delivered in his native language, Tigrinya, and was facilitated by an interpreter. The Claimant’s Induction Record states that he did not have an Immigration Advisor but was “applying for legal aid”. It also states that an explanation was given to him of the DDAS and that if he had any issues securing an appointment through the DDAS he should notify a member of staff, ideally based in the Welfare office. It is recorded that he confirmed his understanding of that explanation. The Claimant was provided with a leaflet explaining the DDAS, but in English rather than Tigrinya due to “human error” (Statement of Frances Hardy, §15). However, this error was not of great significance because the oral explanation of the DDAS given to the Claimant had been translated and he accepts that he had access to “Google translate”, which he used to prepare his representations, and could have been used to translate the leaflet explaining the DDAS. v) There are procedures at the IRC whereby detained individuals are notified of their DDAS appointments by text message (on their IRC-issued phone), followed by a confirmation phone call, and they are also sent a reminder text the day before the appointment. They are advised in their initial appointment notification that they should send any required documents to their solicitor via email straight away to ensure the solicitor has them before the appointment. A DDAS disclaimer form is offered to detained individuals before each scheduled DDAS appointment to provide their consent for their details and documents to be passed by the IRC to the duty solicitor, and consent for the firm to contact them for their case. vi) If an individual declines to attend a DDAS appointment but states they would like to rebook, then they will be added to the next available surgery or can speak to IRC staff at any point to arrange a new appointment. vii) The Defendant’s records (that is, management information kept in the form of a spreadsheet and provided by the operator of Harmondsworth IRC) show that the Claimant had five separate appointments arranged under the DDAS with different solicitors, and that he attended three of them. The records indicate: a) On 25 October 2025, an appointment with Averroes Solicitors was scheduled for 28 October 2025, however on the day of the appointment the Claimant declined or refused to attend it. b) On 31 October 2025, an appointment with Milestone Solicitors was scheduled for 4 November 2025. The Claimant also declined or refused to attend this appointment. There is a separate record created by local management which stated that he had attended this appointment, but this is accepted by the Defendant to be erroneous. c) On 6 November 2025 an appointment with Allison Wells Solicitors was scheduled for the next day, 7 November 2025, and the Claimant attended this appointment. d) On 7 November 2025, an appointment with JKR Solicitors was scheduled for 10 November 2025. The Clamant attended this appointment. e) On 12 November 2025, an appointment with Whalebone Associates was scheduled for 14 November 2025. The Claimant attended this appointment. viii) The Defendant has not been able to produce any of the text messages it is said would have been sent to the Claimant in advance of these appointments as they are not retained by the IRC operator. The Defendant has produced two DDAS disclaimer forms, written in English, which were signed by the Claimant on 24 October 2025 and on 10 November 2025. The Defendant expects there to be other signed forms but says that they are archived off-site after three months and only two had been located by the time of the hearing before me.[16]The Claimant’s case on this issue is starkly different. In his second witness statement, he alleges: i) He has never heard of the DDAS, either the abbreviation or its full title, and is “not aware” of ever being told about it or anyone explaining it to him in detention. He had not seen the leaflet explaining the DDAS (see §15.iv above) until one was sent to him by DPG. ii) He recognises the DDAS disclaimer forms and says that he filled in and signed such forms “on several occasions”. iii) He was told by other detainees that if he needed a lawyer he should ask at the Welfare office. He did this and was given a form – the DDAS disclaimer form – to fill in but he never heard anything back from them and “I certainly do not recall ever being told I had been scheduled an appointment with a lawyer after filling in the form”. iv) He would not have refused to attend an appointment as he “was desperate to find the help of a lawyer”. He is “not aware” of attending any appointment with a solicitor until he met with DPG on 14 November 2025. He does remember having a phone call with a woman and a male Tigrinya interpreter, but he thought that the woman was from the Home Office rather than being his legal advisor.[17]The Claimant’s solicitors have made enquiries with the three firms with whom it is alleged that the Claimant had appointments on 7, 10 and 14 November. Two of them have not responded to those enquiries. JKR Solicitors have responded to confirm that they had a phone call with the Claimant on 10 November and have provided a summary of what their advice to him covered. This summary is disputed by the Claimant. It is likely (although not entirely clear) that the phone call he accepts that he had, which he says he thought was with the Home Office, was the call with JKR Solicitors on 10 November.

Access to legal advice: decision

[18]This is one of the relatively unusual cases where a public law ground of challenge requires resolution of a dispute about primary fact. The Claimant contends that he was not offered the opportunity of taking legal advice in sufficient time to make informed representations or seek an extension of time before the inadmissibility decision. The Defendant says that he was, because he was offered DDAS appointments, appointments were booked for him, two of which he failed to attend and three of which he did attend. The Claimant denies being informed of any such appointments or attending any of them (with the possible exception of the JKR Solicitors appointment on 10 November).[19]In resolving this dispute, I adopt the approach formulated by Chamberlain J in R (F) v Surrey County Council [2023] EWHC 980 (Admin); [2023] 4 WLR 45, §50(b)-(d):
“(b) Where the resolution of a dispute of primary fact is necessary, the court usually proceeds on written evidence. The court will generally do so if - as here - no application to cross-examine has been made before the start of the substantive hearing. (c) There is no absolute rule that the court must accept in full every part of the statement of a witness who has not been cross-examined, whether the statement is adduced for the claimant or the defendant. The court can reject evidence in a witness statement if it “cannot be correct”
. That might be so if it is contradicted by “undisputed objective evidence … that cannot sensibly be explained away”. But there are also examples of courts rejecting evidence given in witness statements as, on balance, inconsistent with other written evidence. (d) In some cases, the court may be unable to resolve a conflict of written evidence on a question of primary fact. In that situation, “the court will proceed on the basis that the fact has not been proved”. This will be to the disadvantage of whichever party asserts the fact. That will generally be the claimant, because in judicial review the claimant generally bears the burden of proving all facts necessary to show that the decision challenged is unlawful. Thus, the principle that the defendant’s evidence is to be preferred, save where it “cannot be correct”, arises because of the difficulty of satisfying the burden of proof where there is a conflict in written evidence, not because evidence adduced on behalf of a defendant is inherently more likely to be true than that adduced on behalf of a claimant.” [references omitted][20]I find that the Claimant did attend an appointment with JKR Solicitors on 10 November 2025. I reject as inconsistent with JKR’s records, and as not credible, the Claimant’s allegation that he attended that appointment without understanding that he would be speaking with a DDAS advisor and that JKR and its interpreter left him with the impression that he was speaking with the Home Office. That he attended the appointment demonstrates that the system for notifying and reminding him of DDAS appointments was functioning at that time but it does not demonstrate that he had the requisite access to legal advice because it took place around 10am on 10 November which was, at most, only a few hours before the Inadmissibility Decision was taken. This was insufficient time to permit representations to be made on his behalf or even for an extension of time to be sought by JKR Solicitors and considered by the Defendant. That is not least because JKR Solicitors will have had other clinic appointments that morning and they apparently did not have the requisite legal aid contract to enable them to take cases further than initial advice. The appointment which the Defendant says that the Claimant attended on 14 November, after the Inadmissibility Decision was taken, is also largely irrelevant.[21]I reject as inconsistent with the contemporaneous documents, and as not credible, the Claimant’s contention that he was not aware of the DDAS whilst in detention. His induction record confirms his understanding of its existence and purpose, and he signed at least two, and probably more, disclaimer forms which referred to it. I accept as accurate the Defendant’s evidence that he was provided with a leaflet explaining the DDAS, albeit in English. He accepts that he spoke to other detainees about obtaining legal advice and it is inconceivable that such conversations did not include mention of the DDAS.[22]I accept the Defendant’s evidence that a DDAS appointment was made for the Claimant for 28 October. That is consistent with the spreadsheet extract disclosed in relation to that appointment and with the DDAS disclaimer form signed by the Claimant on 24 October which is most likely to have been referable to that appointment (although it has not been explained why that form was signed the day before the appointment is recorded as having been made).[23]I do not accept the Claimant’s contention that he was not made aware of the DDAS appointment scheduled for him on 28 October 2025. That contention is inconsistent with(a) the Defendant’s evidence, which I have no basis for doubting, that the making of an appointment for him indicates that he must have consented to the appointment,(b) the DDAS disclaimer form signed by the Claimant on 24 October, which indicates that he is likely to have consented to an appointment at or very shortly after his induction on 24 October (as he would not have been provided with the form to sign on that date unless he was to have a DDAS appointment), and that he was aware that the appointment was imminent and(c) the fact that the IRC’s system for notifying and reminding of DDAS appointments was working in the Claimant’s case for the purposes of the 10 November appointment with JKR Solicitors; no reason has been put forward as why it would not have been working for the earlier appointments as well. It is common ground that the Claimant did not attend the appointment on 28 October 2025.[24]That the Claimant had a DDAS appointment on 28 October, of which he was made aware, but which he did not attend, is sufficient for the Defendant’s purposes. However, I also find that further DDAS appointments were made for the Claimant to take place on 4 and 7 November and that he was aware of these appointments. That is consistent with the Defendant’s contemporaneous records – the spreadsheet extracts – which I have no basis for rejecting. I accept that having failed to attend the appointment on 28 October, another appointment would have been made for the Claimant only if he had requested it, and therefore that he did request the further appointments. I also accept that the system for notifying and reminding him of forthcoming appointments which worked for the appointment on 10 November would also have worked for these appointments. I also accept, as consistent with the contemporaneous records, which I have found to be reliable in other respects, that the Claimant attended the appointment on 7 November.[25]The Claimant has made some valid criticisms of the records relied upon by the Defendant. In particular, the full list of appointments now relied upon was not referred to in the Inadmissibility Decision, contrary to guidance to decision-makers, and was not initially pleaded by the Defendant. Disclaimer forms which, on the Defendant’s case, ought to exist, have not been produced. It is a matter of concern that the solicitors whom the Defendant maintains spoke with the Claimant on 7 November have failed to reply to the legitimate enquiries of DPG. Ultimately, however, there is no sufficient basis for disregarding the Defendant’s contemporaneous records, and the Claimant’s factual case is significantly undermined by his making of allegations which I have found to be inconsistent with contemporaneous records and not credible.[26]In summary, therefore, I reject the Claimant’s contention that the Inadmissibility Decision is vitiated by the Defendant’s failure to afford him access to legal advice in sufficient time before it was taken.

Ground 3: other grounds of challenge to the Inadmissibility Decision

[27]The Claimant pursues a number of challenges to the reasoning adopted by the Defendant for declaring his asylum claim inadmissible (the essence of which I have set out in §7 above). These challenges were prefaced by submissions as to the correct approach to be adopted to the application of ss. 80B-80C of the NIAA (the relevant provisions of which I have summarised in §§4-6 above).[28]It was submitted, first, that whether or not it would have been reasonable to expect a claimant to make a claim for asylum to the safe third state is a hard-edged question for the Court, which admits of only one correct answer. It is therefore incumbent upon the Court to take its own decision on the question of reasonableness. The Claimant pointed out that s. 80C(4)(b) was not phrased in terms of whether the Secretary of State considers, believes or concludes that it would have been reasonable etc., formulations which would have imported a rationality standard for review of the Defendant’s decision. I reject that submission. Whether or not it would have been reasonable to make a claim for asylum to France is not a factual question, which might be characterised as an issue of precedent fact, for the Court to determine. Rather, it is a matter of assessment, which requires an exercise of judgment on the part of the Defendant. In the usual way, such assessments and judgments are reviewable only on conventional public law grounds, including rationality.[29]Alternatively, if the Court was conducting a rationality review, the Claimant submitted that the Court should apply an “anxious scrutiny” standard, a high intensity of review, as recently summarised by Fordham J in R (Alnoor) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWHC 922 (Admin), [2025] 4 WLR 57, §28(iii):
““Anxious scrutiny” means an adjusted reasonableness review. It retains all the virtues of secondary review. It is particularly concerned with rigour in the decisionmaker’s reasoning process. It is generally triggered by considerations relating to the nature and impact of the decision under review. It means the reviewing court has to do more; and also, the reviewing court needs more. The idea of the reviewing court doing more has been expressed in this way: “the court … must consider the decision with particular care”
. The court will “adopt a heightened or more rigorous level of scrutiny”. The idea of the reviewing court needing more recognises that “the starting point must be in the standard of reasoning required in the decision itself”, where “a high quality of reasoning” and “a high standard of reasoning”.” [with references omitted][30]The anxious scrutiny standard is commonly applied in the asylum context, because the Defendant’s decisions engage claimants’ fundamental rights. I have some doubts as to whether it should be applied to a decision under s. 80C of the NIAA that it would have been reasonable to expect a claimant to have made a claim for asylum in France, which is designated in statute to be a safe third country. The question, ultimately, is whether the claimant should have made his claim for asylum in the UK or in another safe country (France), with the consequence that he may be returned to France, where his fundamental rights are not in danger. However, I am prepared to proceed on the assumption that the “anxious scrutiny” standard should be applied to this question in the present case. Given his strongly-held ambitions to live in the UK, and his strong objections to remaining in France, including on grounds of his mental health (see §37 below), there is no doubt that important interests of the Claimant are at stake, which would tend in favour of a greater intensity of rationality review, even if this is not a decision which potentially put at risk Claimant’s fundamental rights. Also, the Inadmissibility Decision falls to be considered alongside the Defendant’s decision to certify the Claimant’s human rights claim, where there is no doubt that the anxious scrutiny standard should apply, and there is at least some overlap between the reasoning in respect of the two decisions. To apply anxious scrutiny to the Certification Decision and a standard of review which is heightened but not as high as anxious scrutiny to the Inadmissibility Decision would be artificial and very difficult to implement with rigour.[31]Next, the Claimant submitted that a public law challenge to a decision under s. 80C(4)(b) should be considered with reference to a list of relevant factors which appeared in rule 345D of the Immigration Rules prior to its amendment upon the UK leaving the European Union, and the EU Dublin Regulation regime with which that rule was concerned. Those factors, which included the time which the claimant had spent in the third country and their personal relationships with anyone residing in the third country, were concerned with whether the country was a “safe third country”, the definition of which (in rule 345C) included consideration of whether there was sufficient connection between the person claiming asylum and a third country, such that it would be reasonable for them to go there. The Claimant also relied upon case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union which indicated that, for the purposes of defining a safe third country where a claimant’s claim for asylum could have been made, it was not permissible for national law to provide for there to be a sufficient connection merely on account of a claimant having transited through the third country (see, for example, LH v Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal, C‑564/18, judgment of 19 March 2020, §47).[32]I do not accept that either of these EU law sources represents a yardstick against which a decision of the Defendant made pursuant to s. 80C(4)(b) should be judged. The EU law regime with which those sources are concerned is a different regime, which posits different legal tests, albeit that their subject matter overlaps with that of s. 80C. Further, UK legislation implementing the EU law regime was amended upon Brexit precisely because the Dublin Regulation regime would no longer apply and domestic law would be different going forward. I see no basis for calling into question the correctness of the more general and non-prescriptive approach adopted in the Defendant’s guidance entitled “Inadmissibility: safe third country cases”, whereby (see pp. 30-31) “the ‘reasonable to expect the person to have made a relevant claim’ criteria must be considered according to a two-stage test, taking full account of the person’s evidence and the wider evidence in the case, addressing(1) credibility and(2) reasonableness” and including “any explanation provided by the claimant why they did not claim asylum in any of the safe countries to which they have been linked”. I would also point out that the relevant legal test in s. 80C does not stipulate that it was reasonable for a person to have claimed asylum in a safe third country merely on account of having transited through that country, and that was not the approach which the Defendant’s decision-maker took in this case.[33]The Claimant then criticises the reasoning in the Inadmissibility Decision on four grounds. First, it is said that the Defendant erroneously proceeded from the premise that if a person can claim asylum in France, then they ought to do so. The Defendant had failed to consider the Claimant’s reasons for not claiming asylum in France. It was not sufficient that the Claimant had stated that he had wanted to come to the UK – the Defendant was required to consider the reasonableness of the Claimant’s reasons for wanting to come to the UK.[34]In my judgment, however, the Defendant’s decision-maker correctly applied the two-stage test in the relevant guidance (see §32 above) and rationally considered whether it was reasonable to expect the Claimant to have claimed asylum in France. The Claimant is recorded as having stated during his asylum screening interview that he had “no reason for not asking” for asylum on his way to the UK “but I want to come to England”. In circumstances where the Claimant had been in France for some months, had been supported by persons who could have helped him to claim asylum there and he had instead chosen to pay for passage to the UK, and had stated that there was no particular reason for him not having claimed asylum in France, it was rational, even applying an anxious scrutiny standard, for the Defendant to conclude that “the UK was your intended destination from the outset” (§14 of the Reasons for the Inadmissibility Decision) and “it was always your intention to come to the UK to claim asylum” (§21 of the Reasons). Applying the two-stage test, the decision-maker was entitled to accept as true the Claimant’s initial response that there was no reason why he could not have applied for asylum in France and to conclude that a longstanding intention to claim asylum in the UK did not constitute reasonable grounds for not applying in France.[35]In any event, consideration was given to the particular reasons now relied upon by the Claimant as to why it was reasonable for him not to have claimed asylum in France. His second criticism of the reasons for the Inadmissibility Decision is that insufficient account was taken of the trauma he has suffered as a result of his brother’s suicide in France, and the consequent impact upon his own mental health if he were to be required to stay in France. The Claimant did not mention his brother at all in his asylum screening interview, including in relation to why he had not sought asylum in France. In §60 of his first witness statement, he says this was “because at the time, I could not think about what happened to Keven or speak about it, especially on the phone to a stranger. At that time, I was not speaking about my brother at all. It is only more recently that I have felt able to talk about it”. In fact, he was able to speak about his brother’s death and the effect which it had upon him in his representations of 28 October 2025, less than a week after the asylum screening interview, and again in more detail in his representations of 1 November 2025. In that and subsequent representations, he stated that his brother had died “because of drug use and homelessness”. However, he appears to have told DPG that his brother had died by suicide - they referred to this in their pre-action letter of 18 November 2025 - and also Dr Heke in one or more interviews on 10, 11 and 15 December 2025. She concluded that “he is struggling with the immense guilt that he was not there to help his brother before he died by suicide” (Brief Assessment dated 15 January 2026). Dr Heke’s full Psychological Assessment Report dated 9 February 2026 places considerable reliance on the effect on the Claimant of his brother’s suicide.[36]The Defendant relies upon the absence of any mention, prior to the Inadmissibility Decision, of the Claimant’s brother’s suicide and of any trauma or guilt which the Claimant was suffering as a result of that, and upon the absence of any independent evidence that that was indeed what happened. The Claimant has produced a death certificate of a man, said to be his brother, which does not record any cause of death. In those circumstances, the decision-maker cannot be criticised for failing to address the consequences for the Claimant of his brother having died by suicide.[37]The decision-maker did, however, address the Claimant’s assertion that he would suffer mental health consequences if he were to have to live in France, due to his brother having died there. It was pointed out, correctly, that there was no medical evidence to support that assertion but that if he did require treatment then that would be available to him in France. As I have mentioned, these points appear in the section of the Defendant’s reasons addressing his human rights claim, a few pages after the treatment of s. 80C(4)(b). That is not surprising as the Claimant’s mental health was raised in his representations as a reason why he should not be returned to France rather than in response to the issue of whether it is reasonable to have expected him to have claimed protection in another country (both issues having been raised in the Notice of Intent served upon him on 24 October 2025). Nevertheless, the reasons given by the Defendant in respect of the Claimant’s mental health in the context of Article 8 ECHR read across more or less directly to the question of reasonableness under s. 80C(4)(b). There was no medical evidence before the decision-maker of the Claimant having suffered whilst in France, or continuing to suffer, from “mental health crises”. Even if that were assumed to be true, it is difficult to see how an individual having suffered from a mental health condition when previously in a safe third country would make it not reasonable to expect them claim asylum in that country when – as in the case of France - that country has a sophisticated healthcare system and treatment is available to migrants, including for mental health conditions. On any view, it would not be irrational to conclude otherwise.[38]Dr Heke’s report dated 9 February 2026 goes into some detail regarding the Claimant’s mental health condition, which has deteriorated since he was returned to France. The Claimant argues that the report demonstrates that he had a good justification for not wishing to stay in France and so for not claiming asylum there. The Defendant’s short response to the Claimant’s reliance upon Dr Heke’s report is that the report significantly post-dated the Inadmissibility Decision and so cannot assist the Claimant in establishing that that decision was unlawful. I agree. I would also point out that it is not straightforward to apply Dr Heke’s conclusions to the facts of the Claimant’s case as they had been presented to the decision-maker. Her conclusions, including a diagnosis of Complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, were based on an account given to her by the Claimant of his journey to the UK, and in particular of mistreatment whilst in Libya (see §3.1.1), which went far beyond what he had disclosed to the Defendant in interviews and written representations and also far beyond what he had told a doctor, Dr Shyandgan, who examined him for evidence of torture on 11 November 2025 (the day after the Inadmissibility Decision). Dr Heke found that the onset of the Claimant’s symptoms had been caused by the stress of being detained in the UK and that his condition had rapidly deteriorated due to him being removed to France (§§1.5-1.7), all of which post-dated the relevant period for the purposes of s. 80C(4)(b), which was when the Claimant was in France prior to travelling to the UK.[39]Third, the Claimant relied on him having a strong connection to the UK, through his uncle who lives here. Witness evidence from the Claimant and from his uncle in these proceedings attest to the strength of their relationship, and the Claimant complains that that relationship was not considered as part of the s. 80C(4)(b) reasonableness assessment but only in the context of an Article 8 ECHR family life claim. Again, however, the Claimant’s case has undergone considerable development and now goes significantly beyond what he had told the Defendant prior to the Inadmissibility Decision. In his asylum screening interview, the Claimant was asked “Do you have any close family in the UK or any other European country?” and answered “No” to that question. But when asked about close family in other countries he had not yet mentioned, he referred to having two aunts in Germany and one in Canada, but not to his uncle. However, in his induction interview at the IRC he gave his uncle as next of kin and as a person in the UK he was in contact with. Only his uncle’s name, and no contact details or any other information about their relationship, was provided. His uncle is not mentioned in any of the Claimant’s representations in response to the Notice of Intent. There was no rational basis on which the decision-maker could have decided that the Claimant’s relationship with his uncle made it unreasonable to have expected him to claim asylum in France.[40]Fourth, the Claimant complains that the Defendant failed, in the Inadmissibility Decision, to exercise her discretion, which arises under s. 80B(1) of the NIAA, not to declare his asylum claim inadmissible, and her discretion under s. 80B(7) of the NIAA to consider the Claimant’s claim notwithstanding that it had been declared inadmissible, on grounds of exceptional circumstances that mean the claim should be considered (s. 80B(7)(b)). The former is said in the Defendant’s guidance to be appropriate where there are “unique issues which are not addressed elsewhere” or where there are “wider considerations around policy, practicalities or in related decisions” (p. 22). The Inadmissibility Decision stated (§33) that there were no particular reasons for not declaring the Claimant’s claim inadmissible. The reasons relied upon by the Claimant (which are those canvassed in §§33-39 above) do not fall into either of the categories of relevant reason stated in the Guidance and – to the limited extent that they were before the decision-maker - it was far from irrational for the decision-maker to consider that they are not unusual or exceptional in any way.[41]The s. 80B(7)(b) power is explained in the Guidance as potentially applicable where there is a change of circumstances after an inadmissibility decision has been made (p. 40). I agree that that is the correct construction of the provision, not least as exceptional circumstances apparent at the time of an inadmissibility decision are to be taken into account as a reason not to declare a claim inadmissible at all, pursuant to s. 80B(1). It follows that s. 80B(7)(b) cannot be relied upon as a basis for challenging the Inadmissibility Decision as having been unlawful when it was taken.[42]Accordingly, applying an anxious scrutiny standard of review, I dismiss the challenge to the Inadmissibility Decision.

The Certification Decision

[43]The upshot of the Inadmissibility Decision was that the Defendant proposed to remove the Claimant to France, a country of which he is not a national, and which is listed in the list of safe third countries in §2 of Part 2 of Schedule 3 to the 2004 Act. That decision met the criteria for certification under §5(1) of Part 2 of Schedule 3 to the 2004 Act, with the result (inter alia) that §5(4) of Part 2 of Schedule 3 required any human rights claims raised by the Claimant to be treated as clearly unfounded, unless the decision-maker was satisfied that a claim is not clearly unfounded. The decision-maker identified possible claims by the Claimant under Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (prohibition of against inhuman and degrading treatment) and 8 (right to respect for private and family life) ECHR but decided that these claims should be rejected and were “so wholly lacking in substance that an appeal would be bound to fail” and so should be certified as clearly unfounded. The consequence of that certification was that the Claimant could not bring an appeal which asserts that his removal to France would breach the UK's obligations under the ECHR.[44]There are only limited grounds of challenge to the Certification Decision. They fall to be considered against a well-established, restrictive test as to the circumstances in which a human rights claim may properly be certified as manifestly unfounded.The claim “must be one which is so manifestly unfounded that it is bound to fail, or, to put it another way, one which cannot, on any legitimate view of fact and law, succeed. It is an objective test, not one which depends on the opinion of the Home Secretary and accordingly certification is, if challenged, to be subjected to the most anxious scrutiny; the court substitutes its own conclusion for that of the Secretary of State”: R (Brown) v SSHD [2015] 1 WLR 1060, §31 (in the context of the materially identical provision under s. 94 NIAA).[45]The first ground of challenge is that the Certification Decision “does not consider, and therefore does not refuse, the Claimant’s submissions under Article 4 ECHR” (§153 of the “Stripped Back” Statement of Facts and Grounds”). In fact, no such submissions were made (and none have been identified by the Claimant). Nor is this an issue which the decision-maker was required to consider of their own motion. This is not a case where any serious issue arose under Article 4.[46]The duties imposed by Article 4 ECHR were classified by the Court of Appeal in R (TDT) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 1395, [2018] 1 WLR 4922, §17, as follows:
“(a) a general duty to implement measures to combat trafficking – "the systems duty"; (b) a duty to take steps to protect individual victims of trafficking – "the protection duty" (sometimes called "the operational duty"); (c) a duty to investigate situations of potential trafficking – "the investigation duty" (sometimes called "the procedural duty").”
[47]The protection or operational duty did not arise in this case. There was no suggestion that the Claimant would be exposed to forced labour in France. As I shall explain further below, the Claimant had claimed to be a victim of modern slavery/forced labour over a four-day period in Libya in December 2023. That claim fell to be considered under the regime in Part 5 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (“MSA”), Part 5 of the NIAA and associated guidance. However, there was and is no prospect of the Claimant being returned to Libya and falling back into the hands of his alleged exploiters in that country. He had also claimed that he had fled Eritrea in order to avoid conscription into the Eritrean armed forces, which may constitute forced labour (see further below). But again, if that were the case, France would not return him to Eritrea as it would contravene France’s Article 4 protection duty to do so, and there is no basis for thinking that France would breach its ECHR obligations in this regard.[48]As to the investigation or procedural duty, a Contracting State can only come under a duty to investigate alleged trafficking and forced labour offences where those offences take place, in whole or in part, within their geographical jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR (Secretary of State for the Home Department v AM (Vietnam) [2016] EWCA Civ 565, [2016] Imm AR 1272, §§27-29). The forced labour of which the Claimant complained was alleged to have occurred outside the geographical jurisdiction of the UK for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR, that is, in Libya. The UK had no obligation under Article 4 ECHR to investigate it, or to treat the Claimant in any particular way pending the outcome of such investigation. Had the Libyan Government been investigating the incident, the UK Government could have had an obligation under Article 4 to cooperate with that investigation. However, there has been no suggestion that any such investigation is on foot.[49]The other ground of challenge to the Certification Decision is that the Defendant should have recognised that the Claimant would suffer unjustifiably harsh consequences if he were removed to France, where his brother had killed himself. I refer to my analysis in §§36-37 above. The claim that the Claimant’s brother had taken his own life was not before the decision-maker, nor was there any medical evidence that the Claimant would suffer a deterioration in his mental health as a result of being in France and even if there had been, the Claimant could not satisfy the high bar for such medical claims under Article 8 ECHR in circumstances where France has a sophisticated healthcare system which he would be entitled to access. This is a claim which could not succeed on any legitimate of the facts or of the law.

The Fresh Claim Decision

[50]§353 of the Immigration Rules provides as follows:
“When a human rights or protection claim has been refused or withdrawn or treated as withdrawn under paragraph 333C of these Rules and any appeal relating to that claim is no longer pending, the decision maker will consider any further submissions and, if rejected, will then determine whether they amount to a fresh claim. The submissions will amount to a fresh claim if they are significantly different from the material that has previously been considered. The submissions will only be significantly different if the content: (i) had not already been considered; and (ii) taken together with the previously considered material, created a realistic prospect of success, notwithstanding its rejection. This paragraph does not apply to claims made overseas.”

The submissions will only be significantly different if the content:

[51]A decision that further submissions do not amount to a fresh claim which, by definition, will not be certified (because it has a realistic prospect of success) is – it was common ground – reviewable on grounds of rationality, on the anxious scrutiny standard (see, for example, In the matter of an application by ‘JR300’ for judicial review [2024] NIKB 94, §29). For the avoidance of doubt, §353 does not require the consideration of further submissions made in relation to a protection claim which has been declared inadmissible, as was the Claimant’s, because the claim has not, in those circumstances, been refused (see s. 80B(3) NIAA). As previously noted, s. 80B(7) is the route by which fresh submissions in relation to a protection claim already declared inadmissible may be considered.[52]The Claimant challenges the Defendant’s decision dated 25 November 2025 that further human rights-related submissions made by the Claimant fell to be rejected and did not amount to a fresh claim pursuant to §353. The pleaded claim is that that decision “failed to take into account the submissions identified above in respect of the Inadmissibility Decision” (“Stripped Back” Statement of Facts and Grounds, §160) which are the submissions that(a) the asylum screening interview was an inadequate means of information gathering given in particular the Claimant’s state of physical and mental health and that the importance of his answers was not explained, such that he did not realise the significance of failing to explain that his brother's suicide was why he did not claim asylum in France,(b) his brother’s suicide in France had had a significant effect on his mental health and(c) he also wanted to remain in the UK because of his relationship with his uncle (ASFG, §148).[53]It is unsurprising that the Fresh Claim Decision rejected the Claimant’s further submissions. It stated that it was intended to address (only) representations made by the Claimant on 10 November 2025. These were, in fact, materially identical to representations which he made on 3 November 2025, which are listed in the Inadmissibility Decision as having been taken into account by the decision-maker. However, that does not give rise to any legal error. Other matters were drawn to the attention of the Defendant thereafter, in particular in the pre-action letter dated 18 November 2025, but these were not directed at the certification of the Claimant’s human rights claim. The only human rights point made in the pre-action letter was under Article 4 ECHR, as a ground of the challenge to the NRG Decision. No points were made with reference to Article 8 ECHR, which would have been the correct rubric for the points now relied upon by the Claimant.[54]As to those points, neither the allegation that the Claimant had not appreciated the importance of failing to mention his brother’s suicide in France nor the allegation that he had a close relationship with his uncle were made in the pre-action letter nor at any other time prior to the Fresh Claim Decision. The allegation that his brother had died by suicide, rather than, as the Claimant had previously said, as a result of homelessness and drug use, was made in the pre-action letter (although not as a submission on his human rights claim). Even assuming that that additional allegation amounted to a “further submission” in relation to a human rights claim, it could not conceivably have amounted to a fresh claim within §353. The decision-maker had already considered the Claimant’s contention that he would suffer a mental health crisis if he were returned to France, in part as a result of his brother’s death there. The additional allegation that his brother had died by suicide did not affect the principal points made by the decision-maker in response to that contention, namely that there was no medical evidence of the Claimant’s alleged mental health condition but even assuming that he did require treatment, such treatment was available to him in France. The new allegation plainly did not create a realistic prospect of success on an Article 8 claim where none existed before.[55]Accordingly, I reject the challenge to the Fresh Claim Decision. The NRG Decision Factual background

The NRG Decision

[56]In his asylum screening interview (22 October 2025), the Claimant answered “no” to the following question:
“By exploitation we mean things like being forced into prostitution or other forms of sexual exploitation, being forced to carry out work, or forced to commit a crime. Have you ever been exploited or had reason to believe you were going to be exploited?”
. In his evidence in these proceedings (first witness statement, §59), the Claimant explains that he gave this answer because the translator asked him if he had “ever been a slave” which he understood to mean “being sold and taken to other countries to be slaves. I was thinking about the more historic type of "slavery" like you see in old movies”. He says that if the translator had asked him, “have you been forced to work?" or something similar, then he would have said “yes” because of his experiences in Libya.[57]In his Detention Engagement Team (“DET”) induction interview, on 24 October 2025, the Claimant answered “yes” to the following question:
“In your country of origin, on the way to the UK, or in the UK have you ever been subject to exploitation, for example being forced into prostitution, forced labour, or did you have reason to believe you were going to be exploited?”
. He then gave the following details:
“When I was in Libya, I did not work that much but they did try to force me to. I tried to escape and was stabbed while attempting to do so”
. This led to him being referred to the NRM process, and to a further interview the following day.[58]In that interview (“the NRM referral interview”), the Claimant is recorded as having stated that he had been forced to work on a construction site in Libya for 4 days in December 2023. He is recorded as having given the following details of that experience:
“In Libya he was exploited for 4 days in a place which was a [construction] work where the renovation work was required for the house which was in a capital city of Libya. Resident was approached by his exploiters where he was living in Libya for [9 months] and took him to work for them by force and took them to a construction Site. He was taken by Foot walking to the [construction] Site, the Journey was [around] an hour long. There was no pay promised by his exploiters. There was no one there to stop them no police or any one. PV [potential victim] was living in [accommodation in Libya with his Friend and they both were taken by force. PV was working for 7 am to 7 PM with no breaks were given. He was required to hand over the cement from the Ground to the construction worker carrying it on his head after mixing the cement and he was taking to the construction worker. Resident was allowed to go back to their house at the end of the day. House has all the facilities like kitchen, bathroom and beds. He was taken by force from their house for 4 days and initially PV did not think that it would last long that is why he did not run away for the first 4 days. PV was getting beaten with a stick which his exploiters were coming with to their house, and taking them beating all the way, the [neighbours] [observed] what was happening with PV but no one wanted to involve in this the reason they were [chosen] to be taken because his exploiters see them as refugees living in that area.”
[59]In answer to a question as to how and why he left this situation, the Clamant is recorded as having stated:
“Run away from his house to his Friend house after working there for 4 days but they only stayed there for few days and than went back to their house in a hope that his exploiters will not come back but when they gone back exploiters found them. PV was beaten badly by his exploiter that he started bleeding and when his exploiters see this they left the house and PV change the house to another state and they never had contact with exploiters again.”
[60]The interview record notes a response to the question “Who exploited them?” as “PV said he does not have any idea about them he recognise their faces. They were [Libyan] it was 4 of them who were taking them from the house and different people were supervising in construction [site]”. Also, the Claimant answered “no” to the question:
“Have they been in more than one exploitative situation?”
[61]A referral was made to the NRM Single Competent Authority (“SCA”) on the same day by the immigration enforcement officer who conducted the interview, a Mr Kausar, and was registered by the NRM on 27 October.

The decision

[62]In the NRG Decision, promulgated on 31 October 2025, the Defendant, in the form of the Immigration Enforcement Competent Authority (“IECA”), part of the SCA, decided that there were not currently reasonable grounds to conclude that the Claimant was a victim of modern slavery.[63]The IECA considered two different incidents of possible exploitation, notwithstanding that only one had been referred to it. The first incident arose out of the Claimant’s account of his experiences in Eritrea, where he said he had been beaten by a soldier, suffering a broken arm, and his decision to leave that country when he was called up to serve in the army. In relation to that incident: i) The decision recited findings of a US State Department that the Eritrean Government does not demobilise most individuals after their mandatory period of National Service but rather forces them to carry out National Service indefinitely, in a wide variety of jobs, under threats of detention, torture or familial reprisal. Some National Service members experience normal workplace conditions albeit with low pay and, in many cases, lack of freedom to pursue alternative employment opportunities. ii) It was said that “there are not considered to be any significant credibility concerns with” the Claimant’s account of his experience in Eritrea. iii) However, the Claimant did not serve in the Eritrean military as he left the country instead. He had therefore not been forced to work under menace of penalty, and his account fell outside the definition of modern slavery for that reason. iv) The decision concluded (p. 9): “It is, therefore, considered that you were not subjected to forced labour/forced criminality/domestic servitude/sexual exploitation/organ harvesting/other, nor was there an intention to subject you to this”.[64]In relation to the Claimant’s account of his experiences in Libya: i) The decision noted that there was widespread exploitation by human traffickers of domestic and foreign victims in Libya. ii) The decision accepted that, based on his account, the Claimant’s report of being forced to work in Libya met all three elements of the definition of forced labour. That is, he had, on his account,(a) been subject to an act of transportation/recruitment/transfer/harbouring/receipt,(b) which had been by means of threat or use of force or other form of coercion or abduction, and(c) which had been for the purpose of exploitation. However, on each limb of the definition, it was said that the definition was “indicated” but that “this is not considered to satisfy the RG [reasonable grounds] threshold when taking into account all other available information”. iii) What was meant by “all other available information” was not identified at that point in the decision. However, earlier in the decision, three difficulties with the Claimant’s account had been identified. First, he had “provided a limited level of detail” and “it would be reasonable to expect a greater level of detail considering that you lived in the community in Libya before you were forced to work and that you left the situation less than two years ago”. Second, his account contained “some minor inconsistencies”. In his DET induction interview, he stated that he had been stabbed by his exploiters when he tried to escape from them whereas in his NRM referral interview the following day he stated that he had been beaten by his exploiters (in his own house). Third, he had not raised his claim of exploitation at the earliest opportunity as he had not mentioned it in his asylum screening interview but only in his DET induction interview two days later. Consideration had been given to whether there were any “mitigating circumstances” as to why he had “provided a lack of detail”. It was recognised that he had “an added layer of vulnerability”, as defined in statutory guidance, but there was no evidence from external sources as to concerns around his mental health and no confirmed medical diagnoses. Therefore, the “added layer of vulnerability … does not mitigate for the lack of informative detail within your account”. iv) The decision concluded: “in your case, the limited level of detail held within your NRM Referral Form, the inconsistencies within your account and the lack of supporting evidence need to be assessed against any potential mitigating factors that may explain the lack of detail. It is noted that there is no evidence of any mitigating factors that could explain the lack of detail in your account. Therefore, it is considered reasonable to expect a higher level of detail within your account. Having taken all the information available on your case in the round. It is considered that the information provided has not met the required threshold”.[65]Each of the two incidents was considered against the definition of “human trafficking” in Article 4(a) of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (“ECAT”) and found not to meet that definition to the requisite standard. It was then briefly stated that, because the definition of human trafficking was not satisfied, the incidents also did not meet the definition of slavery, servitude or forced or compulsory labour (p. 9). Events subsequent to

The decision

[66]On 11 November 2025, Dr Shyandgan examined the Claimant and compiled a Rule 35(3) report (that is a report pursuant to rule 35(3) of the Detention Centre Rules 2001, investigating concerns that the Claimant may have been the victim of torture). The Claimant is recorded as having told the doctor that he had been subjected to mental and physical torture in Eritrea, where “militants had tried to kill him on at least four occasions. He recalled being kidnapped and beaten repeatedly” and on one of those occasions his right arm was broken. He had no choice but to leave Eritrea given the continued threat to his life. This was a very different account of his treatment in Eritrea and his reasons for leaving Eritrea than he had previously given. The Claimant says in §76 of his first witness statement that he in fact gave the same account as previously, of one beating by a soldier, and the different version given in the Rule 35(3) report “must have been due to miscommunication caused by the Google translate voice function”. The Claimant also gave a very different account of his experiences in Libya. He is recorded as having told the doctor that he was forced to work in construction, that he tried to escape on multiple occasions but was unsuccessful, that he had been subjected to physical and mental torture on multiple occasions and that he had been forcibly held for more than two years.[67]Dr Shyandgan noted that the Claimant had a metal implant in his right arm and “a scar on his left lower abdomen, which he attributes to being stabbed with a sharp instrument” and that the Claimant “presented with features of anxiety, depression and trauma which appears to have worsened due to detention”. Given the consistency between the Claimant’s account and his physical examination, the doctor concluded that “I am concerned that he may have been a victim of torture in Eritrea and Libya”.[68]DPG’s pre-action letter of 18 November 2025 contains an expanded account of the Claimant’s experience being forced to undertake construction work in Libya, which is expanded slightly again in his first witness statement (§§28-30). In this account, he was forced to work on a site which was nearby/close to where he was living in Tripoli. He had said in his NRM referral interview that the site was around an hour’s walk away from where he was living. Also, he was found by the men from the construction site at the house where he was living with friends having fled from his own house and was stabbed there during an altercation. In his NRM referral interview he had stated that he been discovered, and attacked, when he had returned to his own house after staying with friends for a few days.[69]The pre-action letter also alleges that after the construction work experience, the Claimant was detained multiple times in Libya, sold from one group of people traffickers to another and imprisoned and held for ransom for over a month, during which time he was forced to work at gunpoint. That account, which had first been hinted at to Dr Shyandgan a week earlier, is expanded upon in the Claimant’s first witness statement, which alleges that he was held for ransom and forced to work over a three-month period.[70]The Claimant had a mental health triage on 25 November and was prescribed sertraline, an anti-depressant, and placed on a waiting list for trauma-based therapy.

The legal framework

[71]The Negative Reasonable Grounds decision was taken pursuant to a regime which is split between the MSA and the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (“NBA”). Under s. 61 NBA, where a competent authority decides that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person is a victim of slavery or human trafficking then they must not be removed from the UK during a “recovery period”. The recovery period lasts for 30 days or, if later, until a competent authority has made a “conclusive grounds” decision in relation to the person (being a decision as to whether a person is a victim of slavery or human trafficking). The Defendant must also ensure that “any necessary assistance or support” is available to them during the recovery period (see s. 50A(1) MSA). Detailed guidance (“the MSA Guidance”) has been issued by the Defendant pursuant to s. 49 MSA which governs, inter alia, the process of assessing claims to be a victim of slavery or human trafficking and the taking of Reasonable Grounds and Conclusive Grounds decisions in relation to such claims.[72]Under both the MSA and NBA regimes for identifying and supporting victims, the terms “victim of slavery” and “victim of human trafficking” have the meanings given in regulations made under s. 69 NBA (see s. 56(A1) MSA and s. 69(1) NBA). The regulations are the Slavery and Human Trafficking (Definition of Victim) Regulations 2022 (SI 2022/877, “the Definition Regulations”).[73]The Definition Regulations define “victim of slavery” as “a person who has been subjected to slavery, servitude or forced or compulsory labour”, which terms are to have to same meaning as they have for the purposes of Article 4 ECHR (see regs. 2(1) and 1(3)). There is no comprehensive definition of these terms in Article 4. However, ECtHR has drawn on International Labour Organisation Convention No. 29 concerning Forced and Compulsory Labour for its working definition of forced labour, which is “work or service which is 'exacted under the menace of any penalty which is performed against the will of the person concerned, that is, for which the person has not offered themselves voluntarily” (Siliadin v France (2006) 43 EHRR 16, §§116-117).[74]The Definition Regulations define “victim of human trafficking” in reg. 3 as, so far as material to the present case, as follows:
“(1) For the purposes of Part 5 of the 2022 Act, “victim of human trafficking” means a person (“V”) whose travel is arranged or facilitated by another person (“P”) - (a) using any of the methods mentioned in paragraph (5), and (b) with a view to V being exploited. (2) P may in particular arrange or facilitate V’s travel by recruiting V, transporting or transferring V, harbouring or receiving V, or transferring or exchanging control over V.

(i) the threat or use of force or other coercive behaviour; …”

The circumstances in which a person is exploited, within reg. 3(1)(b) include where that person is subjected to slavery, servitude or forced or compulsory labour (reg. 3(6)). (a) using any of the methods mentioned in paragraph (5), and (b) with a view to V being exploited.

(i) the threat or use of force or other coercive behaviour; …”

[75]The domestic definition of “victim of trafficking” is similar to, but not the same as, the definition of “trafficking in human beings” in art.

(a) of ECAT:

“"Trafficking in human beings" shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs”
The domestic definition places emphasis on the victim having travelled, or at least travel having been intended, for the purposes of exploitation, which is not essential to the ECAT definition. The definition of “victim of slavery” will cover most situations where the victim is exploited without an element of travel.[76]The question for the decision-maker at the “reasonable grounds” stage of the NRM is whether there are “reasonable grounds to believe that a person is a victim of modern slavery (human trafficking or slavery, servitude, or forced or compulsory labour)” (MSA Guidance, §14.52). The MSA Guidance instructs decision-makers that they “need to assess whether a potential victim’s account of modern slavery is credible when making a Reasonable Grounds and Conclusive Grounds decision” (§14.76).[77]In R (HAM) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWHC 1725 (Admin), the reasonable grounds threshold was explained as follows (§70):
“It is worth noting that at this preliminary stage of enquiry, there could be both reasonable grounds upon which a reasonable person could believe that a person could be a victim of trafficking and reasonable grounds for belief that they might not be … In such circumstances, the question of whether there are ‘reasonable grounds’ for suspecting that a person is a victim of trafficking must be answered in the affirmative. Provided there are reasonable grounds for belief, then the question of whether there are also reasonable grounds for disbelief is irrelevant. The further question of whether the grounds for disbelief outweigh the grounds for belief is not one for determination at that stage: it is a matter which will fall for determination by a decision-maker making a Conclusive Grounds decision at a later date.”
Although HAM was successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal (see §45 above), this aspect of the judgment was not challenged on appeal and is not founded upon wording of the MSA Guidance which has since been updated. It remains good law (see, recently, its citation in Alnoor, §44).[78]In reviewing a reasonable grounds decision, the Court should adopt the approach summarised in R (SM) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWHC 1683 (Admin), §§29-31 (and more recently approved in R (AAM) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWHC 447 (Admin), [2025] 1 WLR 3297, §42):
"29. [B]oth sides agree that a decision that a person is not the victim of trafficking requires the Administrative Court to adopt a heightened or more rigorous level of scrutiny (also described as "anxious scrutiny") (see R(HAM) v SSHD [2015] EWHC 1725 (Admin), §§2-5; R (FM) v SSHD [2015] EWHC 844 (Admin), §24; R (TVN) v SSHD [2021] EWHC 3019 (Admin), §§4-5 and R(MN) v Home Secretary [2021] 1WLR 1956, §§240-246. The general principles are: i) The starting point is that a high quality of reasoning is required in a Reasonable Grounds Decision …, which engages fully with the case advanced by the person concerned due to the importance of the decision as a potential gateway to important rights including the right to a Conclusive Grounds Decision. ii) A Reasonable Grounds Decision needs to demonstrate a careful and conscientious analysis of all relevant factors and that every factor that might tell in favour of the person concerned has been properly taken into account. iii) The requirement for a high standard of reasoning is all the more important given that a Reasonable Grounds Decision is a largely paper exercise, albeit conducted by a trained and qualified SCA decision maker. iv) The provision of proper reasons is an essential part of a lawful decision and thus a Reasonable Grounds Decision which contains insufficient or inadequate reasons will be unlawful and will generally be quashed, (subject to the "highly likely" test in section 31 of the Senior Courts Act 1981). v) The [MSA] Guidance must be carefully applied, weighing the strength of the indicators or evidence presented and a comprehensive written assessment must be prepared, based on the circumstances of each case. "
The Guidance requires decision-makers to include in their decision letters a full and detailed consideration explaining the reason for the decision in every case." (MN at §243). 30. However, the Court must not lose sight of the fact that its task is one of review for error of law, not correctness. Furthermore, anxious scrutiny is concerned with substance not semantics, "what matters is the substance of the analysis, reasoning and conclusions, rather than matters of wording or form" (MN at §245), anxious scrutiny "does not mean that the court should strive by tortuous mental gymnastics to find error in the decision when in truth there has been none. The concern of the court ought to be substance not semantics" (HAM, §5, applying FM, §32, quoting R (Sarkisian) v IAT [2001] EWHC Admin 486, §18). 31. Lastly, "…particular care is necessary to ensure that the criticism is as to the fundamental approach of the [decision-maker], and does not merely reflect a feeling on the part of the appellate tribunal that it might itself have taken a different view of the matter from that that appealed to the [decision-maker]" (MN, §245 applying Mibanga v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] INLR 377, §29)."

The grounds of challenge to the NRG Decision

(a) Incident 1

[79]In his Skeleton Argument for the hearing of the claim, the Claimant pursued seven grounds of challenge to the NRG Decision. The first was that the IECA’s decision-maker started with a criticism of the finding in the decision regarding “Incident 1”, the Claimant’s experience in Eritrea. No challenge to that finding had been pleaded, but no objection to this was taken by the Defendant and it is convenient to deal with the challenge because it highlights a feature of the NRG Decision, which is potentially of wider significance.[80]The Claimant argued that the decision-maker was wrong to dismiss Incident 1 on the basis that the Claimant had not actually performed any work in the Eritrean armed forces because he left Eritrea after receiving notice of his conscription. The conscription was, it is said, an act of recruitment within the first limb of the ECAT definition of trafficking, which was for the purposes of exploitation, within the third limb, whether or not any work had actually been carried out.[81]The statutory task of the Competent Authority was to decide whether there were reasonable grounds to believe that the Claimant was a victim of slavery or a victim of human trafficking, as those terms are defined in the Definition Regulations (see, for example, s. 61 NIAA). Yet the only definition applied in the NRG Decision is the ECAT, art. 4(a) definition of “trafficking in human beings”, which differs in material respects from the individual definitions in the Definition Regulations and is not part of domestic law. That approach was consistent with the MSA Guidance (see, for example, §2.3), which focuses upon the ECAT definition.[82]In many cases, particularly those which involve clear allegations of trafficking, applying the ECAT definition will produce the same result as applying the statutory definitions. Here, however, had the definitions in the Definition Regulations been applied, it would have been obvious that the allegation relating to conscription in Eritrea did not fall within the definition of “victim of human trafficking” because it contained no element of P arranging or facilitating V’s travel (see §74 above). The relevant definition was therefore that of “victim of slavery”. That definition requires the victim to be subjected to forced labour, or for such labour to be exacted, rather than being ordered to do it and not doing so, as is alleged to have happened in this case. It follows that, in my judgment, the reasoning in the NRG Decision on this point was correct, albeit that the decision-maker reached it having applied the wrong legal definition.

(b) Incident 2: the correct legal test

[83]That analysis also raises the question whether it was material that the allegation regarding the Claimant’s treatment in Libya was considered as an allegation of trafficking within the ECAT definition rather than by applying the statutory definitions of “victim of slavery” and “victim of human trafficking”. It is at least arguable that being escorted on foot to a construction site did not amount to anyone arranging or facilitating the Claimant’s travel so the definition of “victim of human trafficking” was irrelevant, and the only question for the decision-maker was whether there were reasonable grounds to believe that the Claimant was a “victim of slavery” because he had been required to work against his will. However, it seems likely that that question would in any event have been decided against the Claimant, as the decision-maker found separately that the Claimant did not meet the definition of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour, albeit on the basis of reasoning adopted when applying the (inapplicable) ECAT definition of trafficking in human beings (p. 10 of the decision).[84]However, where an allegation is made that an individual was subject to slavery, servitude or forced or compulsory labour, the first and primary question for the decision-maker is whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that that is the case and, accordingly, reasonable grounds to believe that the individual has been a “victim of slavery”. If so, that will be sufficient for the individual to be granted a recovery period and to progress to the next stage of the NRM, a Conclusive Grounds decision. It may well be necessary to consider whether the individual is also a “victim of trafficking”, as that may affect the support which is provided to them and whether there is any possibility of a police investigation (that is, if the jurisdictional provisions of s. 2(6)-(7) MSA are satisfied). However, it is conceivable that a decision-maker may find an account of forced labour to be persuasive, taking into account external and corroborating information, whilst doubting the force of allegations of trafficking made by the same individual, which must be assessed against a different and more complex statutory definition. To that extent, applying the definitions in the Definition Regulations in their logical order may make a substantive difference, at least in cases where slavery, servitude or forced or compulsory labour is alleged.

(c) Failure to apply correct threshold/irrationality

[85]The nub of the Claimant’s challenge to the NRG Decision was that the decision-maker failed to apply the appropriate, low threshold to the question where there were reasonable grounds to believe that he was a victim of trafficking as a result of forced labour in Libya. As it was put in HAM (§80):
“In the reasonable grounds context, the decision for the Competent Authority is not whether the grounds for claiming to be a victim of trafficking are necessarily true, but only whether they and all the information available to the Competent Authority are sufficient to constitute reasonable grounds to trigger a requirement of further enquiry before the state can be rationally satisfied that it does not have any protective obligations towards a putative victim of trafficking.”
[86]The Claimant submitted that the fact that the decision-maker recognised that each of the elements of trafficking, was “indicated”, in that the Claimant’s account met the elements of the ECAT definition, should have been sufficient in and of itself to give rise to “reasonable grounds”, particularly when combined with country information to the effect that exploitation of migrants was commonplace in Libya. The decision stated that the reasonable grounds threshold was not met “taking into account all other available information”. The other available information was not specifically identified but, whatever it was, it should not have been enough to disprove reasonable grounds but only – given that each element was “indicated” – to raise issues for consideration at the next, Conclusive Grounds stage. The position could only have been different if the decision-maker had found the Claimant’s account, although meeting the definition, not to be credible. Yet there was no adverse finding in the decision as to the Claimant’s credibility (and indeed his account of Incident 1 was found not to raise any credibility concerns). Absent an adverse finding on credibility regarding Incident 2, an essential stage of the reasoning was missing such that the decision was irrational, as in R (CGW) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWHC 858 (Admin), §§24-25.[87]I do not accept the premise of the Claimant’s challenge to the NRG Decision, which is that the Authority’s decision-maker did not assess or make negative findings as to the credibility of his account of Incident 2. The decision-maker correctly set out the test which the MSA Guidance required them to apply: whether there were reasonable grounds to believe that the Claimant was a victim of human trafficking or of slavery (p. 7). That test requires a decision-maker to assess whether there are reasonable grounds to consider that an individual’s account, if accepted, would fall within one of the relevant definitions. Critically, it also requires the decision-maker to assess whether there are reasonable grounds to believe the individual’s account (or, put another way, reasonable grounds to consider that the individual’s account is a credible one). As I have noted, the MSA Guidance instructs decision-makers to make findings as to credibility. Absent clear evidence in the decision itself, I must proceed on the basis that the IECA’s trained decision-maker has correctly understood and performed important aspects of the relevant legal test, and of the Guidance.[88]In fact, it appears from the face of the NRG Decision that the decision-maker did assess, and make findings which undermined, the credibility of the Claimant’s account of Incident 2. The credibility of the Claimant’s account of Incident 1 was accepted but there was no such acceptance on Incident 2. Rather, the three points taken against the Claimant on pp. 5-6 of the decision (see §64 above) can only sensibly be read as points undermining the credibility of his account of Incident 2. Although each was criticised by the Claimant, they were, in my judgment, factors which could rationally be regarded as undermining his credibility. First, his account of alleged forced labour in Libya was fairly described by the decision-maker as lacking in detail. It was, moreover, fair comment for the decision-maker to note that it was reasonable to expect a greater level of detail from an individual who, on his own account, had lived in Tripoli for some time before the four day period in which he had allegedly been forced to work and where the incident in question had taken place less than two years previously.[89]The MSA Guidance notes (Annex E, §14.65) that regard will be had to the degree of detail provided about, in particular, “the nature of the exploitation, events, locations, and perpetrators of the described exploitation”. No locations were given for where the Claimant was living, where the construction site was located or where his friends lived whom he said he escaped to after his four days of work. Nor was there any description of any of his alleged exploiters despite the Claimant spending considerable time with some of them (an hour’s walk there and (possibly) back each day) and saying that he would recognise them. His description of the working conditions at the construction site was also very brief. As I have already noted, his evidence in these proceedings, prepared with the assistance of expert solicitors, added little further detail, but did contain two significant inconsistencies with his previous account on matters which one might have expected the Claimant to have been able to recall without difficulty (see §68 above). It is, in light of that evidence, very doubtful that the lack of detail he originally provided can be attributed to the circumstances of the Defendant’s interviews with the Claimant, a failure to request further information from him during those interviews or subsequently or to an inability to describe at that stage what had happened to him because of the effects of trauma (as was submitted on his behalf, supported by an addendum report of Dr Heke, which I admitted into evidence).[90]The Claimant submitted, as the second ground of challenge to the NRG Decision, that the finding of lack of detail in his account was analogous to that found to be unlawful in Alnoor. In Alnoor, Fordham J criticised, as a “demonstrable flaw in the reasoning process”, an adverse finding in a negative reasonable grounds decision that the claimant had provided a limited level of detail, when it was unclear what further detail it was being said should have been provided (§37). However, there are significant factual differences between Alnoor and the present case, including that the account given by the claimant in Alnoor was already significantly more detailed than that given by the Claimant in the present case. In the present case, it is not difficult to understand what it was being said had not been provided. The decision stated that, apart from when the exploitation had taken place (December 2023) and what the Claimant had been forced to do, “all other” aspects of the alleged exploitation were lacking in significant detail. It is clear from all the circumstances, including the MSA Guidance, that those other aspects included the location of the relevant events and descriptions of the alleged exploiters.[91]Second, there was undoubtedly an inconsistency, described in the decision as a “minor inconsistency”, between the Claimant saying that, after he had escaped to his friends’ flat, he was beaten by his exploiters and saying that he was stabbed by them. It was argued on behalf of the Claimant that he was “more likely to be describing two different incidents” (ASFG, §127(a)) but the Claimant’s evidence in these proceedings, which describes only one incident, strongly suggests that he was describing the same incident but in different terms.[92]Third, it is correct that the Claimant did not raise his claim of having been exploited at the earliest opportunity, at his asylum screening interview. His explanation for not having done so - a substantial mistranslation of the question which was supposed to have been asked of him - is not compelling. However, there is obviously some room for mistakes and misunderstandings in an interview of this nature, particularly where assisted by an interpreter who is not physically present (see JA (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 450, [2014] 1 WLR 4291, §24), and the Claimant did make the allegation two days after that interview. Only limited weight could rationally be attached to this factor but it does not appear from the NRG Decision that the decision-maker placed undue weight upon it.[93]Correctly understood, the NRG Decision accepted that there were reasonable grounds for considering that the Claimant’s account of four days of forced labour in Libya in December 2023 met the ECAT definition of “trafficking in human beings” but did not accept that there were reasonable grounds for considering that account to be credible. That was a rational approach in the circumstances, which did not involve any legal error as to the reasonable grounds threshold. This was not a case, like HAM, where there were considered to be reasonable grounds to disbelieve the Claimant’s account but also reasonable grounds to believe it.

(d) Corroborating evidence

[94]The Claimant’s third ground of challenge to the NRG Decision complained of the treatment in that decision of the absence of supporting evidence to corroborate his account. I do not agree, as was alleged, that the decision-maker found that it was reasonable to expect supporting evidence and held the Claimant responsible for not providing any. The decision outlines the types of supporting evidence which might be available in a case such as this and states that where it is not reasonable to expect evidence other than the individual’s account, the decision-maker may conclude that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person is a victim on the basis of their account alone (p. 5). It then sets out various types of external evidence, including statements from independent witnesses and prosecutorial evidence, and explains why they had not been provided, without criticism of the Claimant. It then states:
“It is reasonable to expect further information in relation to your case for the reasons mentioned earlier”
. That is a reference to further detail from the Claimant himself rather than to external evidence.[95]I recognise that certain evidence which may have been regarded as corroborating evidence did emerge not long after the decision (dated 31 October 2025), in Dr Shyangdan’s rule 35(3) report (11 November 2025). That report noted scarring consistent with the Claimant’s account of having been stabbed and also symptoms of recognisable mental health conditions which might have been regarded as relevant to explaining the lack of detail in his account of Incident 2. However, that evidence was not before the decision-maker and the NRG Decision cannot be criticised for failing to have regard to it.

(e) Other grounds of challenge to the NRG Decision

[96]The fourth and fifth grounds of challenge to the NRG Decision focused on the findings as to minor inconsistency in the Claimant’s account and his not raising an allegation of exploitation at his asylum screening interview. These are addressed in §§91-92 above.[97]The sixth ground of challenge alleges that the decision-maker incorrectly relied upon grounds for disbelieving the Claimant when this should have been relevant only at the Conclusive Grounds stage. That is the point I have addressed in §§85-93 above. It was argued that the decision-maker had wrongly ignored the uncontroverted physical injuries on the Claimant’s body, but the evidence regarding his scar, which was said to corroborate his evidence of an attack on him in Tripoli, only emerged subsequent to the NRG Decision (see §95 above). The seventh and final ground of challenge, which is that summarised in §86 above, has also been addressed in §§85-93 above.[98]I therefore dismiss ground 1, the challenge to the NRG Decision.

Conclusion

[99]Accordingly, grounds 1, 2(b) and 3 of the claim are dismissed.