Yasemin Ermis v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government & Anor [2026] EWHC 1734 (Admin)

[2026] EWHC 1734 (Admin)Case No AC-2025-LON-004042
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
PLANNING COURT
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 10 July 2026
Before
Jonathan Moffett KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge
Between
YASEMIN ERMISAppellant(1) SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HOUSING, COMMUNITIES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTRespondents(2) LONDON BOROUGH OF LAMBETHRespondent
Richard Harwood KC (instructed by Tees Law) for AppellantStephanie Hall (instructed by Government Legal Department) for First RespondentHearing Hearing date: 30 June 2026
[1]This is an appeal under s 289 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (“the Act”) against a decision dated 21 October 2025 (“the Decision”) of an Inspector (“the Inspector”) appointed by the First Respondent (“the Secretary of State”).[2]On 1 December 2023, the Second Respondent, the London Borough of Lambeth (“the Council”), issued an enforcement notice (“the enforcement notice”) in respect of Parade Mansions, 104 Coldharbour Lane, London SE5 9PZ (“the property”). The enforcement notice related to the conversion of the roof-space at the property into a third-floor flat (“the flat”).[3]The Appellant, Yasemin Ermis, is the owner of the property. She appealed to the Secretary of State against the enforcement notice. By the Decision, the Inspector dismissed the appeal (save in one minor respect). By this further appeal, Ms Ermis challenges the Decision.[4]Ms Ermis originally sought permission to appeal on four grounds. However, permission to appeal was granted on two grounds only by Mr Tim Smith, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, on 27 February 2026. By those remaining grounds of appeal, Ms Ermis argues that the Inspector failed to give adequate reasons for the Decision, and that the Inspector erred in law in concluding that an assured shorthold tenancy (“an AST”) in respect of the flat had not been rolled over.[5]At the hearing before me, Ms Ermis was represented by Richard Harwood KC, and the Secretary of State was represented by Stephanie Hall. I am grateful to both counsel for their helpful submissions.[6]The Council has played no part in these proceedings, and was not represented at the hearing. B. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND[7]The property is located on the north side of Coldharbour Lane, at the junction of Coldharbour Lane and Kenbury Street, in Camberwell, London.[8]The property is a three storey building which forms part of a terrace which extends from 104 to 114 Coldharbour Lane. The property has a return frontage onto Kenbury Street. The ground floor of the property is occupied by a restaurant, and there is a flat on the first floor and a flat on the second floor. The entrances to the flats are at the side of the property, on Kenbury Street.[9]Insofar as is relevant, the roof of the property is sloping, although it has a large feature gable on its Kenbury Street frontage.[10]To the northwest of the property on Kenbury Street is an adjacent building which is known as Kenbury Mansions. Kenbury Mansions has no frontage on Coldharbour Lane.[11]Until February 2023 the property was owned by Ms Ermis’s then husband, Serdal Ermis.[12]In 2019, Mr Emis converted the roof space of the property into the flat. As part of that conversion, dormer extensions were added to either side of the feature gable. There is no dispute that the addition of the dormer extensions constituted operational development for which planning permission was required, and that the use of the roof space as a residential dwelling constituted a material change of use for which planning permission was also required. There was no planning permission for either form of development.[13]In September 2019, Mr Ermis made an application to the Council for retrospective planning permission, but that application was not validated by the Council. The Council issued a planning contravention notice in July 2020, but it did not take any formal enforcement action at that time. Two further applications for planning permission were submitted by Mr Ermis in 2021 and 2022, but each was refused by the Council.[14]Ms Ermis divorced Mr Ermis in July 2022, and she acquired the property in February 2023 as part of the divorce settlement.[15]In July 2023, Ms Ermis submitted to the Council an application for a Certificate of Lawful Existing Use or Development (“a CLEUD”). The application was made on the basis that the works had been completed more than four years previously. In support of her application for a CLEUD, Ms Ermis submitted a statutory declaration dated 14 July 2023 (“the first statutory declaration”). The first statutory declaration stated that Mr Ermis had told Ms Ermis that work on the conversion had started in late 2017 and had been completed in or around March 2018. Ms Ermis exhibited two invoices which she said supported this statement, including an invoice dated 23 March 2018, which was stated to be in respect of “completion of top floor flat”.[16]Ms Ermis also exhibited to the first statutory declaration copies of four AST agreements. In the Decision, the Inspector referred to the relevant individuals by their initials, and I shall do the same; the individuals’ specific names are not material for present purposes.(1) An AST agreement dated 8 June 2018 between Mr Ermis and a Ms LB (“the first AST agreement”). The first agreement related to a dwelling identified as 3 Kenbury Mansions, 104 Coldharbour Lane. The first AST agreement was incomplete, although the pages of it which were provided are initialled “LPB”. The first AST agreement was for a period of 12 months ending on 7 June 2019, with the tenancy continuing thereafter as a monthly contractual periodic tenancy until either party gave notice.(2) A further AST agreement between Mr Ermis and Ms LB dated 8 June 2019, also in respect of 3 Kenbury Mansions, 104 Coldharbour Lane (“the second AST agreement”). Again, the second AST agreement was incomplete, and it was neither signed nor initialled. The second AST agreement was for a period of 12 months until 7 June 2020, and it had the same continuation provision as the first AST agreement.(3) An AST agreement dated 1 July 2020 between Mr Ermis and a Mr EE (“the third AST agreement”). Again, the third AST agreement related to 3 Kenbury Mansions, 104 Coldharbour Lane. The third AST agreement appears to be complete, and is signed. The third AST agreement was for a period of 6 months until 31 December 2020. Clause 1.6.1 of the third AST agreement made similar provision for its continuation as the earlier agreements: after 31 December 2020, “the tenancy continues as a monthly contractual periodic until ended following either party giving notice”. In her statutory declaration, Ms Ermis stated that Mr EE rolled over the tenancy in May 2021.(4) An AST agreement dated 13 June 2022 (“the fourth AST agreement”). The agreement does not state the name of the landlord, although it purports to be signed by an individual as the landlord. The fourth AST agreement was with a Mr AK, and it related to Flat 3, 104 Coldharbour Lane. The fourth AST agreement appears to be complete, and it has been signed. The agreement ran for 12 months until 13 June 2023. The agreement made provision for it to continue thereafter on a month-to-month basis as a monthly contractual tenancy. In the first statutory declaration, Ms Ermis stated that Mr AK had remained in occupation until the date of that declaration, i.e. 14 July 2023.[17]The application for a CLEUD was rejected by the Council on 6 November 2023. The Council stated that it was not satisfied that the operational development in the form of the dormer extensions had been substantially complete for a period of four years or more, and it was not satisfied that the flat had been in continuous use as a separate residential dwelling for a period of four years or more.[18]On 1 December 2023, the Council issued the enforcement notice in respect of the property. The enforcement notice identified the matters which were said to constitute a breach of planning control as follows: “Without planning permission: The erection of dormer roof extensions across the front and rear slopes of the existing original ridge and gable ended roof that is located in the principal roof slope of the premises that faces onto Kenbury Street (‘the unauthorised dormer roof extensions’); and The material change of use of the roof space located within the existing and now extended roof at third floor level as a self-contained residential flat (‘the unauthorised flat’).”

unauthorised dormer roof extensions’); and

[19]The enforcement notice set out the reasons for issuing the notice. In summary, those reasons were as follows: the alleged breaches of planning control had occurred within the preceding four years; the dormer extensions were detrimental to the character and appearance of the property and the surrounding area; the flat constituted substandard residential accommodation which was detrimental to the amenity of current and future residents; there was no appropriate provision to restrict parking and no appropriate provision had been made for recycling and refuse storage; and the development was contrary to local plan policies and other applicable Council guidance.[20]The enforcement notice required the following action to be taken:
“a) Cease the use of the unauthorised flat at third floor level and remove all internal doors and partitions, kitchen units, kitchen appliances, and associated fixtures and fittings and disconnect and remove all associated electrical, water and gas services, plumbing and wiring from the premises that facilitate the unauthorised use; and b) Remove the unauthorised dormer roof extensions in their entirety from the premises and reinstate the slopes of the original roof as existed prior to the breach of planning control; and c) Remove all associated waste and debris resulting from compliance with the above steps, from the premises.”
[21]The enforcement notice allowed six months after it took effect on 12 January 2024 for compliance.[22]On 15 January 2024, Ms Ermis appealed against the EN. She appealed on three of the grounds provided for by s 174(2) of the Act:(1) ground (a): planning permission should be granted for the breaches of planning control which were alleged in the enforcement notice;(2) ground (d): at the time when the enforcement notice was issued, it was too late to take enforcement action against the breaches of planning control which were alleged in the enforcement notice; and(3) ground (g): the time allowed for compliance with the enforcement notice fell short of what should reasonably be allowed.[23]In support of her appeal, Ms Ermis relied on her first statutory declaration, and a further statutory declaration dated 22 December 2023 (“the second statutory declaration”).[24]In the second statutory declaration, Ms Ermis stated as follows:
“2. In reviewing the bundle of papers and documents given to me by my former husband and as a result of conversations with him, it appears as if I was provided with the wrong timeline regarding when the dormer extension works were done and also the incorrect early tenancy agreements. 3. Following a further conversation with my former husband, I have been told that he actually began the works in early 2019 and that the dormer extension was completed and ready for occupation and use by June 2019. He has provided me with a copy of a tenancy agreement for a Ms [LB] which commenced on the 8th June 2019 for a period of 12 months until the 7th June 2020. 1 attach a copy of this tenancy agreement at EXHIBIT 1.”
[25]The AST agreement to which Ms Ermis referred in paragraph 3 of the second statutory declaration appears to be the same as the second AST agreement which was exhibited to her first statutory declaration. Ms Ermis also exhibited a deposit protection certificate which referred to an AST granted to Ms LB which ran from 8 June 2019 to 7 June 2020 (i.e. which matched the period of the second AST agreement). The deposit protection certificate was unsigned.[26]Ms Ermis also exhibited to the second statutory declaration a letter from a builder who said that he had carried out the conversion work. The letter stated that the construction work had commenced in early February 2019 and was finished (in that the accommodation was watertight, insulated and decorated throughout to a good standard) by June 2019. The builder said that the flat was ready to be lived in by that date.[27]In the second statutory declaration, Ms Ermis went on to state that:
“5. When I acquired the flat as part of the divorce settlement a Mr [AK] was the tenant, and he remained the tenant when I was preparing my previous Statutory Declaration. However, he has now moved out in July 2023 and Mr [EE], who was a previous tenant has now moved back in. I attach as EXHBIT 3 a copy of his new tenancy agreement.”
[28]Ms Ermis exhibited the further tenancy agreement with Mr EE (“the fifth AST agreement”). The fifth AST agreement related to 3 Parade Mansions, 104 Coldharbour Lane, and it ran for twelve months from 1 November 2023 to 31 October 2024. Ms Ermis also exhibited a letter from Mr EE, dated 2 January 2024 which stated as follows:
“…I have been a tenant at the top floor flat of 104 Coldharbour Lane since July 2020. I had an initial tenancy for six months but the original tenancy rolled over and continued to the end of May 2022. I then ended the tenancy due to personal circumstances but then returned as a tenant in late 2023 as I moved back into the area and the accommodation was available to rent. I am the current tenant of the above said property.”
[29]Ms Ermis also relied on a statutory declaration from Mr Ermis, dated 4 January 2023, which included the following statements:
“3. I built the dormer roof extension and created a flat within it, Flat 3. 4. I started work on this dormer extension in about early February 2019. I had pretty much completed all of the works by the end of May, early June 2019. 5. The flat was finished ready for occupation, and I let the flat to a [LB] on the 8th June 2019. She had a tenancy for 1 year. 6. Some of the external finishes still remained to be done. This was mainly due to the fact that I was not able to get a license to put up the scaffolding to put up the vertical tiling, but the extension had all been felted and was weather proof and fitted out internally and, as far as I was concerned, complete. 7. I did eventually manage to get my builder to tile the extension by going across the existing roof. I think that this was about the end of 2021. 8. The Council did ask me to submit a planning application in 2019 for the dormer extension which I submitted in September 2019. I told the Council that the extension had been completed in June 2019. 9. After Ms [LB] left in June 2020, I let the flat to [Mr EE]. When his tenancy agreement ended in December 2020, he simply rolled over the agreement until May 2021. He again rolled this over until about May 2022 when he left and a Mr [AK] took up a new tenancy.”
[30]The Council submitted its representations on the appeal in February 2024. In response to Ms Ermis’ argument that the flat had been occupied continuously for more than four years before the enforcement notice was issued, the Council relied on its electoral register records, on which the flat appeared for the first time in 2024. It also relied on its council tax records, in which the flat appeared for the first time in 2022. The Council attached to its representations a copy of the delegated decision report which had led to the decision to issue the enforcement notice, and the Council relied on the contents of that report. The report drew attention to the discrepancy between the address of the property and the address stated on some of the AST agreements that had been produced by Ms Ermis. The report also drew attention to the fact that there was no AST agreement covering the period of 18 months between December 2020 and July 2022. C. THE DECISION LETTER[31]Ms Ermis’s appeal was dealt with by way of the written representations procedure, with the Inspector carrying out a site visit on 21 October 2025.[32]In the Decision, the Inspector dealt first with the ground (d) appeal, i.e. the appeal on the ground that at the time enforcement notice was issued, it was too late to take enforcement action against the breaches of planning control alleged in the notice.[33]The Inspector introduced his discussion of this ground of appeal as follows. “3. An appeal under Ground (d) is that, at the date the Notice was issued, it was too late to enforce against the breach of planning control it alleges. This is a legal ground of appeal where the onus lies with the Appellant to make her case on the balance of probability. Where the Council has no evidence of its own to refute what is claimed, the Appellant’s evidence is required to be precise and unambiguous.”[34]It appears that the Inspector’s reference to evidence being “precise and unambiguous” was derived from the Secretary of State’s Planning Practice Guidance on CLEUDs (“the PPG”), which states as follows. “In the case of applications for existing use, if a local planning authority has no evidence itself, nor any from others, to contradict or otherwise make the applicant’s version of events less than probable, there is no good reason to refuse the application, provided the applicant’s evidence alone is sufficiently precise and unambiguous to justify the grant of a certificate on the balance of probability.”[35]In paragraph 4 of the Decision, the Inspector then explained that it was necessary to consider the two elements of the alleged breach of planning control: the operational development involving the addition of the dormer extensions, and the material change of use involving the use of the flat as a residential dwelling.[36]As to the operational development, in paragraph 6 of the Decision, the Inspector identified the issue which he had to decide as that of whether Ms Ermis could show that the dormer extensions were substantially complete on 1 December 2019, i.e. the date four years before the date on which the enforcement notice was issued.[37]The Inspector referred to the fact that photographs from 2020 and 2021 showed that the dormer extensions had not been felted and had not had tiles affixed to them at the time when the photographs were taken. He also referred to Mr Emis’s statutory declaration, which referred to the dormer extensions being tiled at about the end of 2021. The Inspector considered that these works were functionally important. As a result, the Inspector concluded as follows. “15. Therefore, I find, as a matter of fact and degree, that the dormer was not substantially complete four years before the relevant date. On the balance of probability, this occurred on the date that the tiles were finally affixed, sometime between July 2021 and March 2023.”[38]There is no complaint about this part of the Decision.[39]The Inspector then turned to consider the material change of use. In paragraph 16 of the Decision, the Inspector recognised that his conclusion in relation to the operational development was not determinative of the second element that he had to consider on the ground (d) appeal because, even though the dormer extensions had not been substantially completed until some point between July 2021 and March 2023, the flat could nevertheless have been occupied during that period.[40]Because there is a challenge to the adequacy of the Inspector’s reasons on this element of the ground (d) appeal, it is necessary to set out the relevant part of the Decision in full. “17. As the Notice was issued on 1 December 2023, using the time limits in s 171B of the Act, it is for the Appellant to show that the flat has been continuously used for residential purposes for 4 years by that time, and has not thereafter been lost. Again, the test to be applied is that of the balance of probability.18. The Appellant acknowledged that her initial statutory declaration, which accompanied the application for a certificate of lawfulness, had errors in it. This led to the submission of a second statutory declaration with her appeal. In addition to the letter from the ‘sole builder’, referred to above, appended to this were two assured shorthold tenancy agreements (‘ASTA’). Further, the statutory declaration from the previous owner, referred to above, also contained information on the use of the flat.19. In her initial, erroneous, statutory declaration, the Appellant provided a copy of an ASTA for a Miss LB (I use the initials of the reported tenants, rather than their names) that purportedly related to the flat. This was dated 8 June 2018 so could not have related to the flat, as it had yet to be created. Save for accepting ‘that the original timeline concerning the occupancy of the flat was incorrect’ no explanation has been given by the Appellant as to why an ASTA was drafted for a flat that did not exist.20. I have further reservations about this document because, as set out by the Council, it relates to ‘3 Kenbury Mansions, 104 Coldharbour Lane’. This, as I saw, is an adjacent block of properties. The Council’s point was not specifically countered, nor explained, in the Appellant’s submissions.21. A further 12-month ASTA for the flat, again in the name of Miss LB, is provided. Whilst this is dated 8 June 2019, it is unsigned and, again refers to ‘3 Kenbury Mansions, 104 Coldharbour Lane’. The previous owner does, however, say that LB was there and left in June 2020.22. In a letter, EE says he moved into the top floor flat in July 2020. Initially, he says that this was for 6 months, and I have been provided with a signed ASTA to this effect, dated 1 July 2020. He says that this ‘rolled over and continued to the end of May 2022’. This is confirmed in the statutory declaration of the previous owner. However, no evidence of this ‘rolling over’, in the form of written agreements, has been provided. Given the potential ramifications for both parties, and that ASTAs were shown to have been required for the rest of the time that the flat was claimed to have been occupied, this strikes me as being odd.23. On EE’s leaving the flat, the previous owner’s statutory declaration says that the flat was let to a Mr K. A 12-month ASTA, dated 13 June 2022, was attached to the Appellant’s first statutory declaration. This refers to Flat 3 at No 104 and, whilst Mr AK, who I assume to be Mr K, is referred to in the document there is no named landlord. This is strange, though there is an illegible signature in the ‘Our signature’ box that is for the Landlord.24. The Appellant’s statutory declarations state that Mr AK occupied the flat until July 2023, despite his ASTA only running until 13 June 2023.25. EE said that he moved back into the flat in ‘late 2023’, and a 12-month ASTA that has the names of the Appellant and EE, is signed by them both, has been submitted. This is dated 1 November 2023.26. This means that, even when taking Mr AK’s departure as being the last day of July 2023, there are 3 months that are unaccounted for. On balance, I find that this period was insufficient to trigger the abandonment of the use, nor did it mark a significant break in the continuous use of the property.27. There is no entry for the flat on the Electoral Register until 2022 and that Council Tax was not paid on the property until that year, too. There might be a number of reasons for this, and I cannot conclude on these alone that this was because there was no occupation of the flat before those dates.28. As the Council provided very little evidence regarding the use of the flat, the Appellant’s evidence has to be precise and unambiguous. For the reasons I give above, I find that the evidence put forward does not meet the tests of precision and ambiguity.”[41]For these reasons, the Inspector dismissed the appeal on ground (d).[42]In relation to the ground (a) appeal, the Inspector concluded as follows:
“47. The proposal causes significant harm to the character and appearance of the area. The harm to the living conditions of the occupant of the flat by reasons of a lack of amenity space, waste and recycling facilities, and a lack of cycle storage provision is also significant. 48. I have found that the flat provides its occupant with a home that has adequate internal height and space and outlook and daylight, and that the Council’s case in respect of car parking has not been proven. However, neither these nor any other matter put forward outweighs the harm that I have identified. 49. The arguments put forward do not indicate that the decision should be made other than in accordance with the development plan taken as a whole. Therefore, the Ground (a) case fails.”
[43]In relation to the ground (g) appeal, in light of the fact that the flat was currently occupied, the Inspector extended time for compliance with the enforcement notice to twelve months, in order to allow Mr EE sufficient time to find alternative accommodation, and for the necessary physical works to be carried pit.[44]Inspector summarised the Decision as follows. “1. It is directed that the enforcement notice is varied by the deletion of 6 months and the substitution of 12 months as the period for compliance. Subject to the variation, the appeal is dismissed, the enforcement notice is upheld and planning permission is refused on the application deemed to have been made under section 177(5) of the 1990 Act as amended.” D. THE APPEAL TO THIS COURT[45]Ms Ermis originally sought to appeal to this Court on four grounds, as follows. “(i) The Inspector erred in law by applying a standard of proof which required the Appellant to produce ‘precise and unambiguous’ evidence; (ii) The Inspector’s reasoning on whether the time period for enforcing against the use had expired was inadequate and unintelligible; (iii) The Inspector made an error of law as to the continuation of an assured shorthold tenancy; (iv) The Inspector failed to provide adequate and intelligible reasons for his conclusion that the dormer had not been substantially completed more than four years before the enforcement notice was issued.”[46]As I have mentioned, at an oral permission hearing on 27 February 2026, Mr Tim Smith granted permission to appeal on grounds (ii) and (iii), but refused permission grounds (i) and (iv). E. THE LAW[47]Save in one respect, to which I shall come in due course, there was no material dispute between the parties as to the law.[48]Under s 57(1) of the Act, planning permission is required for the carrying out of any development of land. By virtue of s 55(1), “development” means the carrying out of building, engineering, mining or other operations in, on, over or under land, or the making of any material change in the use of any buildings or other land. Under s 55(2), works which affect only the interior of a building do not constitute development.[49]Under s 172(2) of the Act, a local planning authority may issue an enforcement notice if it appears to it that there has been a breach of planning control and that it is expedient to issue the notice, having regard to the provisions of the development plan and to any other material considerations. Under s 173(9), an enforcement notice must specify the period within which any steps required by it must be taken.[50]Insofar as is relevant, under s 171B(2), where there has been a breach of planning control consisting in the change of use of any building to use as a single dwelling house, no enforcement action may be taken after the end of the period of four years beginning with the date of the breach. By virtue of s 336(1), a reference to a building includes any part of a building, and therefore the four year time limit provided for by s 171B(2) applies to the change of use of part of a building to a flat.[51]Under s 174(1) of the Act, a person who has an interest in the land to which an enforcement notice relates may appeal to the Secretary of State against the notice. The potential grounds of appeal are provided for by s 174(2) and, as I have mentioned, the following grounds are relevant for present purposes:(a) in respect of any breach of planning control which may be constituted by the matters stated in the notice, planning permission ought to be granted; (d) at the date when the notice was issued, no enforcement action could be taken in respect of any breach of planning control which may be constituted by those matters; and (g) that any period specified in the notice in accordance with section 173(9) falls short of what should reasonably be allowed.[52]Section 289(1) provides for a right of appeal on a point of law to the High Court from a decision of the Secretary of State on an appeal under s 174. The correct approach on an appeal to the High Court was affirmed by Lindblom LJ in St Modwen Developments Ltd v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government [2017] EWCA Civ 1643, [2018] PTSR 746, paragraph 6, by reference to the “seven familiar principles” which he (as Lindblom J) had previously set out in Bloor Homes East Midlands Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2017] PTSR 1283, paragraph 19. For present purposes, the relevant principles are as follows (omitting citations). “(1) Decisions of the Secretary of State and his inspectors in appeals against the refusal of planning permission are to be construed in a reasonably flexible way. Decision letters are written principally for parties who know what the issues between them are and what evidence and argument has been deployed on those issues. An inspector does not need to ‘rehearse every argument relating to each matter in every paragraph’…. (2) The reasons for an appeal decision must be intelligible and adequate, enabling one to understand why the appeal was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the ‘principal important controversial issues’. An inspector’s reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether he went wrong in law, for example by misunderstanding a relevant policy or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But the reasons need refer only to the main issues in the dispute, not to every material consideration…. (3) The weight to be attached to any material consideration and all matters of planning judgment are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the decision-maker. They are not for the court. A local planning authority determining an application for planning permission is free, ‘provided that it does not lapse into Wednesbury irrationality’…to give material considerations ‘whatever weight [it] thinks fit or no weight at all’…. And, essentially for that reason, an application under section 288 of the 1990 Act does not afford an opportunity for a review of the planning merits of an inspector’s decision….”[53]To this list of principles, Lindblom LJ added the following comment (again omitting citations). “7. Both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal have, in recent cases, emphasised the limits to the court’s role in construing planning policy…. More broadly, though in the same vein, this court has cautioned against the dangers of excessive legalism infecting the planning system…. There is no place in challenges to planning decisions for the kind of hypercritical scrutiny that this court has always rejected – whether of decision letters of the Secretary of State and his inspectors or of planning officers’ reports to committee. The conclusions in an inspector’s report or decision letter, or in an officer’s report, should not be laboriously dissected in an effort to find fault….”[54]In support of his second principle, Lindbom LJ cited the familiar passage from the speech of Lord Brown in South Bucks District Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33, [2004] 1 WLR 1953. “36. The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the ‘principal important controversial issues’, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in the dispute, not to every material consideration. They should enable disappointed developers to assess their prospects of obtaining some alternative development permission, or, as the case may be, their unsuccessful opponents to understand how the policy or approach underlying the grant of permission may impact upon future such applications. Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising that they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision.” F. THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS[55]On behalf of Ms Ermis, Mr Harwood primarily focuses on ground of appeal (ii), in respect of which he argues that the Inspector failed to give adequate reasons for the conclusion, set out in paragraph 29 of the Decision, that Ms Ermis had not proved on the balance of probabilities that the flat had been continuously used for residential purposes for the requisite four year period prior to 1 December 2023 (i.e. the date on which the enforcement notice had been issued).[56]Mr Harwood accepts that, in paragraph 17 of the Decision, the Inspector had correctly directed himself as to the applicable legal test. However, Mr Harwood argues that the Inspector had misstated the guidance set out in the PPG in both paragraph 3 and paragraph 28. In particular, Mr Harwood argues that those paragraphs give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the Inspector asked himself whether the evidence relied on by Ms Ermis met an objective standard of precision and ambiguity, rather than whether (as explained in the PPG) the evidence was sufficiently precise and unambiguous to demonstrate that, on the balance of probabilities, the flat had been used continuously for residential purposes during the relevant period. Mr Harwood points out that the use of the adverb “sufficiently” in the PPG recognises the reality that it may be possible to discharge the burden of proving a continuous use even in a case in which the evidence is not free from imprecision and ambiguity.[57]Mr Harwood submits that this substantial doubt continues when one looks at the way in which the Inspector dealt with the evidence. He argues that it was implicit in paragraphs 23 to 26 of the Decision that the Inspector accepted that the flat had been continuously used for residential purposes during the period June 2022 until at least 1 December 2023; first by Mr AK and then by Mr EE, with only a short immaterial break in occupation for three months in late 2023. On that basis, Mr Harwood argues that the only periods in respect of which the Inspector was not satisfied that the flat had been continuously used for residential purposes were the period June 2019 to June 2020, when Ms LB was said to be in residence, and the period July 2020 to May 2022, when Mr EE was said to be in residence.[58]Mr Harwood argues that, in relation to each of those periods, the Inspector merely summarised those aspects of the evidence which pointed against a finding that the flat had been used for residential purposes during the relevant period, and those aspects which pointed in favour of such a finding, but he did not in respect of either period express any conclusion. Mr Harwood argues that it is therefore not possible for Ms Ermis to understand whether, in respect of either period, the Inspector had concluded that she had not proved on the balance of probabilities that the flat had been used for residential purposes.[59]In addition, Mr Harwood argues that the Inspector fell into error by not addressing the issue of whether the conversion of the roof space into the flat itself gave rise to a material change of use at the point at which the flat became capable of habitation, and whether, because the flat remained in its converted state, that use continued thereafter regardless of whether anyone was in fact in residence in the flat. In support of his argument that the physical conversion of the property might give rise to a material change of use, Mr Harwood relies primarily on Impey v Secretary of State for the Environment (1980) 47 P&CR 157, 161-162 per Donaldson LJ, and the approval of that decision in Welwyn Hatfield Borough Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2011] UKSC 15, [2011] 2 AC 304, paragraphs 27-29 per Lord Mance. Mr Harwood argues that, in this respect, the decisions in Swale Borough Council v First Secretary of State [2005] EWCA Civ 1568 (see, in particular, paragraph 25 per Keene LJ) and Bansal v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government [2021] EWHC 1604 (Admin) (see, in particular, paragraphs 54-61 per Lang J) are distinguishable. Mr Harwood submits that this issue was an obviously material matter that the Inspector should have addressed, but there is no reference to it in the Decision.[60]In relation to ground of appeal (iii), Mr Harwood argues that paragraph 22 of the Decision reveals an error on the part of the Inspector which infected the entire decision. Mr Harwood submits that, insofar as the Inspector concluded that Mr EE had not been in residence at the flat during the period July 2020 until May 2022, the only matter to which the Inspector referred was his doubt as to whether the third AST agreement had been “rolled-over” from December 2020 until May 2022, a doubt which was based solely on the absence of any written agreements rolling over the third AST agreement. Mr Harwood points out that no such written agreement was required in order to roll over the third AST agreement: not only did clause 1.6.1 of the third AST agreement itself provide for such a rolling-over without the need for any further agreement, that was also the effect of s 5 of the Housing Act 1988.[61]Mr Harwood argues that this error on the part of the Inspector infected any conclusion that he had reached in relation to the period June 2019 to June 2020. He submits that paragraph 22 of the Decision appears to reveal that the only reason why the Inspector rejected the evidence set out in Mr Ermis’s statutory declaration was because of his erroneous conclusion in relation to the rolling-over of the third AST agreement. Mr Harwood argues that the Inspector’s error caused the Inspector to doubt the credibility of Mr Ermis’s evidence. Mr Harwood submits that this erroneous approach to Mr Ermis’s credibility must have infected what appears to be a similar rejection of Mr Ermis’s evidence in paragraph 21 of the Decision, in relation to the period June 2019 to June 2020.[62]For the Secretary of State, on ground (ii), Ms Hall emphasises the fact that the exercise in which the Inspector was engaged involved an exercise of judgement on his part; in particular, it was for the Inspector, and the Inspector alone, to decide whether Ms Ermis had discharged the burden of showing that the flat had been in continuous use for residential purposes for the requisite four year period. Ms Hall argues that the Inspector was not required to express a conclusion on each piece of evidence, and he was not required to identify any particular periods in respect of which he was not satisfied that the flat had been used for residential purposes; such a requirement would be tantamount to a requirement to provide reasons for reasons. Ms Hall submits that it was sufficient for the Inspector to consider the four year period as a whole, and for him to express a conclusion that, overall, the evidence had failed to satisfy him in respect of the entirety of that four year period. This, argues Ms Hall, is what the Inspector did in paragraph 28 of the Decision letter, and that was sufficient in terms of reasons. In this respect, Ms Hall argues that, on a fair reading of the Decision, the Inspector had doubts in relation to two periods: the period June 2019 to June 2020 and the period July 2020 to May 2022.[63]In response to Mr Harwood’s argument based on Impey, Ms Hall’s first answer is that this argument was a thinly-veiled attempt to advance a challenge to the effect that the Inspector had applied the wrong test as a matter of law, or that the Inspector had failed to have regard to a relevant consideration, challenges which went beyond the boundaries of Mr Smith’s grant of permission to appeal. Ms Hall points out that the Inspector had not made any findings as to when the flat was ready to be lived in, and that he had not been asked to do so; Ms Ermis’s case before the Inspector had been based entirely on a claimed continuous actual use of the flat. Ms Hall argues that, in any event, there is no basis on which Swale and Bansal (or the earlier case of Secretary of State for the Environment v Thurrock Borough Council [2002] EWCA Civ 226) could properly be distinguished.[64]On ground (ii), Ms Hall argues that the Inspector’s statement that there was no evidence, in the form of written agreements, of the rolling over of the third AST agreement was factually correct. However, she accepts that it is not clear whether the Inspector realised that the third AST agreement itself made provision for rolling over, without the need for any further written agreement. In this respect, Ms Hall accepts that the Inspector did not in paragraph 22 of the Decision set out a finding, and that that paragraph could be “read either way”. Nevertheless, Ms Hall argues that any error in this respect was immaterial, in view of what she says was the Inspector’s conclusion in paragraph 21 that it had not been demonstrated that there had been residential use of the flat during the period June 2019 to June 2020. G. ANALYSIS AND DECISION[65]As I have explained, it is important not to adopt an overly-critical approach to the Decision. It is common ground that, in paragraph 17, the Inspector correctly directed himself as to the test that he had to apply, and in paragraph 3 he correctly directed himself that Ms Ermis bore the burden of proof. It is also common ground that the Inspector’s conclusion that Ms Ermis had not proved on the balance of probabilities that the flat had been continuously used for residential purposes for the requisite four year period was a conclusion which was reasonably open to him on the evidence. In those circumstances, I should be very slow to conclude that the Decision gives rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the Inspector fell into error in his application of the test which he had identified to the evidence before him.[66]Nevertheless, in my judgement the Decision does not adequately explain the Inspector’s conclusion on a principal important controversial issue, in that it does not disclose how the Inspector resolved a key issue of fact, and it gives rise to a substantial doubt that the Inspector erred in his approach.[67]The difficulty with Ms Hall’s submission that, on the ground (d) appeal, the Inspector was not required to identify any specific period or periods in respect of which he was not satisfied that the flat had been used for residential purposes, is that it does not reflect the way in which Ms Ermis’s case was put. Ms Ermis submitted that there had been continuous residential use over the requisite four year period by reference to the discrete periods to which each of the AST agreements related. In those circumstances, I consider that, in the particular circumstances of this case, it was incumbent on the Inspector to identify at least one of those periods as one in which he was not satisfied that Ms Ermis had proved her case, and to explain why. Indeed, as Ms Hall’s argument developed, it became clear that the ultimate landing point for her submissions was that the Inspector had in fact identified at least one such period, i.e. the period June 2019 to June 2020, when Ms LB was said to have been in residence pursuant to the second AST agreement.[68]Ms Hall was driven to focus on the period June 2019 to June 2020 because of the difficulty in relation to the Inspector’s conclusions, in paragraph 22 of the Decision, as to the period June 2020 to July 2022. There, the Inspector sets out two factors which told in favour of Mr EE having been in residence in that period (the statements to that effect in Mr EE’s letter and Mr Ermis’s statutory declaration). The Inspector does not expressly state that he rejects this evidence, or that he has otherwise reached a conclusion that Ms Ermis had not proved her case in relation to this period. Rather, the Inspector merely referred to what he saw as an absence of supporting contemporaneous documentary evidence, i.e. the absence of any written agreements evidencing the rolling over of the third AST agreement.[69]In my judgement, and as I think Ms Hall came to accept, it is not possible to read paragraph 22 of the Decision as expressing a conclusion that Ms Ermis had failed to prove that Mr EE had been in residence during the period June 2020 to July 2022. In paragraph 22, the Inspector simply refers to the supporting evidence and to what he saw as a material absence of contemporaneous documentary evidence, and he does not express any conclusion at all (other than his use of the epithet “odd”).[70]In any event, even if paragraph 22 were to be read as expressing a conclusion, I accept Mr Harwood’s submission that the paragraph discloses an error on the part of the Inspector. In my view, it is clearly implicit in paragraph 22 that the Inspector considered that, in order to roll over the third AST agreement, some form of further written agreement was required. However, as Ms Hall recognises, that was not correct. I do not think it matters precisely what label one attaches to the Inspector’s error in this respect, but I accept Mr Harwood’s characterisation of it as an error of law, in that the Inspector misunderstood the effect of clause 1.6.1 of the third AST agreement. In any event, for present purposes the important point is that, as Ms Hall also accepts, the Inspector’s overall decision cannot be sustained by reference to paragraph 22 of the Decision, and the focus must therefore shift to the Inspector’s consideration of the period June 2019 to June 2020.[71]The Inspector dealt with that period in paragraph 21 of the Decision. There, his approach was very similar to that which he adopted in paragraph 22, save that he does not even go so far as to describe the position as “odd”. The Inspector set out two factors which potentially undermined the documentary evidence (the fact that the second AST agreement was not signed, and the fact that it stated an incorrect address), and one factor which told in favour of Ms LB having been in residence (Mr Ermis’s statement in his statutory declaration that Ms LB was in residence during the relevant period). However, as was the case in paragraph 22, in paragraph 21 the Inspector did not express any conclusion as to whether he was satisfied that Ms LB had been in residence during the relevant period.[72]Ms Hall argues that such a conclusion in implicit in paragraph 21. She submits that the only sensible reading of that paragraph is that the Inspector did conclude that he was not satisfied that Ms LB had been in residence in the period June 2019 to June 2022. Ms Hall supports this argument by reference to the Inspector’s statement in paragraph 29 that the Appellant had not proved her case on the balance of probabilities. I am not able to accept this argument.[73]I do not consider that it is implicit in paragraph 22 of the Decision itself that the Inspector regarded the two points which potentially undermined the documentary evidence as determinative. The points to which the Inspector referred are capable of supporting a conclusion that Ms LB did not reside at the flat during the relevant period, but they do not make such a conclusion inevitable. In particular, they were not points which positively pointed against Ms LB having been in residence; they were points which potentially undermined the evidence in support of her having been in residence. Bearing in mind the fact that the Inspector referred to other evidence in support of Ms LB having been in residence, I do not consider that one can infer from paragraph 22 a conclusion that Ms Ermis had not proved that Ms LB was in residence in the period June 2019 to June 2022.[74]Of course, paragraph 22 should not be read in isolation; the Decision must be read fairly, and as a whole. However, even taking the Decision in the round, I do not consider that it is implicit that the Inspector concluded that Ms Ermis had not proved on the balance of probabilities that Ms LB had been in residence in the period June 2019 to June 2020.[75]In my view, paragraphs 21 to 24 of the Decision, in which the Inspector dealt with the various periods up until November 2023, exhibit a consistent type of approach on his part. That approach involved referring to, on the one hand, statements made by Mr Ermis and Ms Ermis in their statutory declarations which, on the face of them, would support a conclusion that the flat had been used for residential purposes; and, on the other hand, what the Inspector saw as inconsistencies and ambiguities in the documentary evidence which had been relied on. At no point in those paragraphs does the Inspector express any conclusion of his own as to whether the evidence proved that the flat had been in residential use during any of the periods which he discussed, or why.[76]In my judgement, it is in this context that the Inspector’s references to precise and unambiguous evidence assume significance. I agree with Mr Harwood that, in paragraphs 3 and 28 of the Decision, the Inspector materially misstated the guidance set out in the PPG. The point made in the PPG is that, in a case in which there is no evidence from the local planning authority to contradict the evidence which has been submitted by the person seeking to prove continuous use, the latter’s evidence should generally be accepted, provided it is sufficiently precise and unambiguous to make out the claimed use on the balance of probabilities. However, that is not how the Inspector put the matter in the Decision. In my judgement, the wording of paragraphs 3 and 28 gives rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the Inspector elevated the references to precision and unambiguity into free-standing tests, which required him to ask himself simply whether Ms Ermis’s evidence met some objective standard of precision and unambiguity.[77]That approach would have been incorrect. The Inspector was perfectly entitled to consider the extent to which the evidence provided by Ms Ermis was precise and unambiguous; but, having done so, he needed to go on to consider whether it demonstrated on the balance of probabilities that the flat had been used for residential purposes throughout the relevant four year period. In particular, as Ms Hall implicitly accepts, the Inspector needed to consider whether Ms Ermis had proved on the balance of probabilities that Ms LB had resided in the flat during the period June 2019 to June 2020.[78]In my judgement, there is a substantial doubt as to whether the Inspector carried out the second stage of the analysis to which I have referred in the preceding paragraph, and as a result there is a substantial doubt as to whether he adopted a correct or an incorrect approach. This substantial doubt arises out of a combination of the fact that paragraphs 3 and 28 of the Decision suggest that the Inspector might have misunderstood the approach that he was required to adopt, and the fact that the approach which the Inspector in fact adopted in paragraphs 21 to 24 is consistent with him having adopted an incorrect approach.[79]In these circumstances, I am unable to accept Ms Hall’s argument that the only sensible reading of paragraph 21 of the Decision is that it implicitly expresses a conclusion that Ms Ermis had not proved on the balance of probabilities that Ms LB had resided in the flat between June 2019 and June 2020, or at least that such a conclusion had been reached on an application of the correct test. In my judgement, paragraph 21 of the Decision can also sensibly be read as the Inspector simply considering whether the evidence to which he referred met some objective standard of precision and unambiguity. As I have explained, that would not have been the correct approach.[80]On Ms Hall’s analysis of the Decision, the question whether Ms Ermis had proved on the balance of probabilities that Ms LB had resided in the flat between June 2019 and June 2020 was the, or at the very least a, key issue on the ground (d) appeal. Because the Decision does not expressly or implicitly set out the Inspector’s conclusion on that issue (or any explanation of such a conclusion), I consider that the Inspector has not provided adequate reasons for the Decision.[81]For these reasons, I consider that the Inspector did not provide adequate reasons for the Decision. Further, for the reasons set out in paragraph 70 above, I consider that he made an error of law in paragraph 22 of the Decision.[82]As a result, I do not need to consider Ms Hall’s argument that, had Ms Ermis succeeded only on her argument in relation to paragraph 22 of the Decision, the appeal should nevertheless be dismissed on the ground that, had the relevant error not been made, the Decision would inevitably have been the same (see Simplex GE (Holdings) Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [2017] PTSR 1041, 1060 per Purchas LJ, 1061-1062 per Staughton LJ). Nevertheless, had it been necessary to consider that argument, I would not have accepted it, essentially for the reason given by Mr Harwood. I accept Mr Harwood’s submission that it is at least possible that the Inspector’s error in relation to the rolling-over of the third AST agreement caused him to doubt the evidence given in Mr Ermis’s statutory declaration, and that those doubts may have affected his approach to Mr Ermis’s evidence in relation to the period June 2019 to June 2020 (referred to in paragraph 21 of the Decision).[83]Similarly, I do not need to address Mr Harwood’s argument in reliance on Impey, and I do not need to address the interesting issue of law as to whether Mr Harwood was correct as to the interaction between Impey and Welwyn Hatfield on the one hand, and Swale and Bansal on the other. Indeed, had it been necessary to consider Mr Harwood’s argument based on Impey, I would in any event have rejected it for a much more prosaic reason. Mr Harwood’s argument based on Impey formed part of his submissions on ground (ii), and therefore part of his submissions on the reasons challenge. As I have explained above, the Inspector was in the Decision required to explain what conclusions he reached only on the “principal important controversial issues”, and how any issue of law or fact was resolved. I asked Mr Harwood to refer me to any evidence which indicated that a case along the lines of his Impey argument had been advanced before the Inspector and, in particular, that Ms Ermis had argued before the Inspector that the physical conversion of the roof space into the flat itself gave rise to a material change of use at the point at which the flat became capable of habitation, and that, because the flat remained in is converted state, the use continued thereafter regardless of whether from time to time anyone was in residence in the flat. However, Mr Harwood was unable to do so, for the simple reason that the argument was not advanced to the Inspector. In those circumstances, I do not consider that the argument constituted one of the principal important controversial issues that the Inspector was required to address in his Decision, and I do not consider that, by not addressing it, he failed to give adequate reasons. H. CONCLUSION AND ORDER[84]In conclusion, the appeal succeeds on both ground (ii) and ground (iii). The parties were able to agree an order giving effect to my decision, which I am content to approve. Accordingly, I shall order that Ms Ermis’s appeal against the enforcement notice is remitted to the Secretary of State for redetermination, and that the Secretary of State is to pay Ms Ermis’s costs of the appeal to this Court, summarily assessed in the sum of £35,000.