Rosina Davis, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWHC 1709 (Admin)

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 1709 (Admin)

Case No AC-2023-LON-003441

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING'S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date 07/07/2026

Before

MR JUSTICE CAVANAGH

Between

The King (on the application of ROSINA DAVIS)Claimant

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENTDefendant

Dan Squires KC and Shu Shin Luh (instructed by Bhatt Murphy) for Claimant

Samantha Broadfoot KC and Richard Evans (instructed by Government Legal Department) for Defendant

RULING ON COSTS

Mr Justice Cavanagh

Introduction

[1]I handed down judgment in this case on 3 June 2026, and set out a timetable for the parties to make further submissions on consequential matters. In the event, the only consequential matter that has arisen for determination is the question of costs. Even in relation to costs, the parties are not very far apart. Both the Claimant and the Defendant agree that the Defendant should be ordered to pay a proportion of the Claimant’s costs. They disagree as to the amount. The Claimant contends that the Defendant should pay 75% of the Claimant’s costs, and the Defendant contends that the Defendant should pay 40% of the Claimant’s costs (in each case, other than those already dealt with in the Order of Dove J of 16 May 2026).

[2]The starting point, therefore, is that the parties are agreed that this is a case in which the Defendant should pay some, but not all, of the Claimant’s costs. I agree that this is the appropriate course of action in this case. The Claimant was successful in obtaining an order that she had been detained unlawfully for 30 minutes at Heathrow Airport on 20 August 2023. As a result of this order, and by agreement, the Defendant has paid her the sum of £2,250 in damages for false imprisonment. In addition, she was successful in obtaining an order that the Defendant remains in breach of the public sector equality duty in relation to the policy, practices and processes relating to the exercise of her powers under paragraphs 2 and/or 2A and paragraph 16(1) of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971.

[3]However, this was far from being a total victory. So far as the two grounds upon which the Claimant was successful was concerned, the Defendant did not seriously dispute that the Claimant’s arguments were right. The main battleground in these proceedings was concerned with other issues that were of much broader significance, and, potentially, of much greater public importance. These were(1) whether the policy then in force for the short-term detention at the UK border of a certain category of those who have extant limited leave to remain was unlawful;

(2) whether the policy was unlawful because it was unpublished; and

(3) whether Article 5 and/or 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the ECHR”) was engaged, and, if so, whether the policy breached the relevant article or articles. On all of these points, the Claimant was unsuccessful.

[4]There is no significant disagreement between the parties on the law relating to costs, or on the legal principles that the court should apply. CPR 44(1)(a) and (b) provide that the court has discretion as to whether costs are payable by one party to another and the amount of those costs. CPR 44(2) provides that the general rule is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party, but the court may make a different order. CPR 44.2(4)(b) provides that in deciding what order to make about costs, the court will have regard to all of the circumstances, including whether a party has succeeded on part of its case, even if the party has not been wholly successful. (I should add that it is not being suggested in this case, nor could it be, that the Claimant was unreasonable to rely upon the arguments upon which she was unsuccessful: see CPR 44.2(5)(b)). CPR 44.2(6)(a) provides that a court may order that a party must pay a proportion of another party’s costs. The court’s task is necessarily broad-brush. Guidance is to be found in many authorities, including Multiplex Constructions (UK) Ltd v Cleveland Bridge UK Ltd

[2008] EWHC 2280 (TCC)

and Hospira UK Ltd v Novartis AG [2013] EWCH 886 (Pat).

[5]As the Claimant, though successful in her claim, was unsuccessful on the main issues in the claim, and those that took up much of the court time, this is an appropriate case in which to award her some but not all of her costs. Having decided this (which is not in dispute), the determination of exactly how much of her costs to award to the Claimant is a matter of judicial discretion, driven by the desire to award such amount as is just. This is not a mathematical calculation, but a broad-brush judgment based on the court’s view as regards what is fair and just in all of the circumstances.

[6]I have taken into account all of the points made in the parties’ helpful submissions. It would not be proportionate to recite them in this ruling. Doing the best I can, I take the view that the amount of costs that should be awarded to the Claimant falls between the amount claimed by her and the amount suggested by the Defendant. I have decided that the Claimant should be awarded 50% of her costs (not including the costs that are already the subject of a ruling by Dove J).

[7]I do not consider that the 75% suggested by the Claimant adequately reflects the fact that she was unsuccessful in her challenge to the lawfulness of the policy itself, and was unsuccessful in her challenge on Human Rights grounds. These were essentially discrete issues, separate from the issues on which the Claimant succeeded. Whilst it is true that some of the evidence that was relied upon by both parties would have been advanced even if the central issue had been whether the Claimant’s detention on 20 August 2023 was in breach of Home Office policy, a considerable amount of it would have been unnecessary, and the complex and lengthy (though interesting) legal argument which took up much of the court time would not have been required. So far as the public sector equality duty point was concerned, a ruling had already been made, in R (MXK and SSB) v SSHD

[2023] EWHC 1272 (Admin)

, to the effect that the Defendant was in breach of the public sector equality duty, and the Defendant did not dispute that she had failed since then to remedy the breach. This issue did not, therefore, take up much time at the hearing.

[8]It is true that the Defendant changed her position during the course of the proceedings. Having first taken the position that there was no policy pursuant to which the Claimant had been detained at Heathrow on 20 August 2023, the Defendant then changed tack and relied upon the policy which was relied upon at the hearing. However, the Claimant had already been awarded its costs thrown away as a result of this change of position, in the order of Dove J.

[9]I accept the point made on behalf of the Claimant that the court should take account of the consequences of costs orders for solicitors in cases such as this who do publicly funded work (see In re appeals by Governing Body of JFS and others

[2009] UKSC 1

;

[2009] 1 WLR 2353

, at paragraphs 24-25). I have done so in deciding to set the level of costs awarded to the Claimant at 50%, rather than the lower figure contended for by the Defendant. Standing back, however, I do not consider that it can be said that the Claimant was largely successful in these proceedings.

[10]Accordingly, I order that the Defendant should pay 50% of the Claimant’s costs, not including those already dealt with in the Order of Dove J of 16 May 2026. In order to ensure that the order is drafted appropriately to take account of the Claimant’s legally aided status, and that any order makes provision for any legal aid taxation that might be required, I invite the parties to agree a suitable form of order, which I will then make.