Case No AC-2026-LON-001218[2026] EWHC 1706 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Venue The Royal Courts of JusticeDate Thursday, 23 June 2026
Strand
London WC2A 2LL
Before
MR JUSTICE SWEETING(Subject to Anonymity Orders)
Between
AApplicantB and OthersRespondentMR A SUTCLIFFE KC and MR F OSMAN (instructed by the Director of Public Prosecutions) appeared for Applicant.MR N YEO KC (instructed by Ghersons LLP) appeared for Respondents.JUDGMENTApproved JudgmentDigital Transcription by Epiq Europe Ltd,Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JEWeb: www.epiqglobal.com/en-gb/Email: civil@epiqglobal.co.uk(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)This Transcript is Crown Copyright. It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority. All rights are reserved.WARNING: reporting restrictions may apply to the contents transcribed in this document, particularly if the case concerned a sexual offence or involved a child. Reporting restrictions prohibit the publication of the applicable information to the public or any section of the public, in writing, in a broadcast or by means of the internet, including social media. Anyone who receives a copy of this transcript is responsible in law for making sure that applicable restrictions are not breached. A person who breaches a reporting restriction is liable to a fine and/or imprisonment. For guidance on whether reporting restrictions apply, and to what information, ask at the court office or take legal advice.
[1]Mr Justice Sweeting: This matter arises out of an application by the Director of Public Prosecutions (the DPP) under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA). On 18 March 2026, on a without-notice basis, Sheldon J made an unexplained wealth order (UWO) under section 362A of POCA, together with an interim freezing order (IFO) under section 362J, against the first respondent, B, and 13 associated corporate respondents.[2]The order concerns a substantial portfolio of residential property in London. In summary, the material before the judge indicated that, between July 2023 and August 2025, some 85 properties were acquired for a total purchase price exceeding £81 million, generating rental income in excess of £870,000. The first respondent is said to be the ultimate beneficial owner and controller of the corporate respondents through a holding structure.[3]The application for the UWO and IFO was supported by a witness statement from Mr Joseph Ryan, an accredited financial investigator. That statement relied extensively upon material obtained pursuant to production orders granted in the Crown Court in 2025, under section 345 of POCA.[4]Four production orders were obtained from HHJ Karu, sitting at Southwark Crown Court: three orders dated 6 July 2025, directed to various law firms, and a further order, dated 26 September 2025, directed to another law firm. Those orders sought material in connection with conveyancing transactions. The law firms had not themselves sought to challenge the production orders. Material obtained pursuant to those orders formed part of the evidential basis for the UWO application.[5]On 1 May 2026, the respondents issued an application to discharge both the UWO and the IFO. The grounds advanced include alleged failures of full-and-frank disclosure and challenges to whether the statutory requirements for the making of the orders were satisfied.[6]The procedural history thereafter has been somewhat protracted. The respondents sought, amongst other things, a stay of the obligation to comply with the UWO, directions for the service of evidence and disclosure of the material underpinning the production-order applications.[7]The DPP initially resisted those directions but subsequently agreed both to a stay and to a timetable for the service of further evidence, subject to minor disagreement.[8]On 15 June 2026, the respondents served extensive evidence, including material from overseas. The substantive discharge application is presently listed for hearing on 8 July 2026.[9]Against that background, the principal issue now arising at the present directions stage concerns disclosure. In substance, the respondents seek disclosure of the information and material relied upon by the Metropolitan Police when applying for the production orders in 2025. The DPP resists that request on procedural and substantive grounds, including that any challenge to the lawfulness of those orders falls properly within the jurisdiction of the Crown Court and that no proper application for disclosure has been made in these proceedings.[10]The present hearing is a directions hearing in advance of the respondent's application to discharge the UWO and IFO. Although a number of matters were initially in dispute between the parties, most have now been resolved. In particular, agreement has been reached in relation to the stay of the obligation to comply with the UWO and, subject to limited differences, the timetable for the service of evidence.[11]The sole issue is, therefore, the determination of whether and in what circumstances the respondents are entitled to disclosure of the material relied upon by the Metropolitan Police in obtaining the production orders. That gives rise to three linked questions: first, whether there is any proper application for disclosure before this court at all; secondly, whether, as a matter of jurisdiction and case management, this court should determine any such request or whether questions as to the lawfulness of and material underlying the production orders are matters for the Crown Court which made them; thirdly. if, contrary to the DPP's primary case, the issue is properly before this court, whether the respondents are entitled, as a matter of common law fairness or pursuant to CPR 31.14, to inspect the material relied upon in obtaining those production orders.[12]I turn then to those questions in the order I have set them out. First, is there a proper application for disclosure? The DPP submits that there is no properly- constituted application for disclosure before the Court, no application notice having been filed pursuant to CPR part 23. There is, in my view, force in that submission. The ordinary route to obtain disclosure under CPR part 31 is by application notice supported, where appropriate, by evidence. However, the absence of a formal application is not, in my judgment, necessarily determinative at this directions stage.[13]The court is concerned at this hearing with case management in the lead up to the discharge application. If a disclosure issue is squarely raised on the material before the court and is capable of affecting the fairness or efficient disposal of that application, the court is not, in my view, precluded from addressing it, merely because it has been advanced as part of case management.[14]In the present case, the respondents' request for disclosure has been clearly articulated in correspondence, in draft directions and in their skeleton argument. The scope of the material sought is defined and the basis upon which it is said to be required is identified. In the circumstances, I proceed on the footing that there is at least a live issue as to disclosure which it is appropriate to resolve, insofar as necessary, for the proper management of the case.[15]Secondly, should this court determine the request or is that a matter for the Crown Court? The DPP's primary objection is that any question as to the lawfulness of the production orders and the material upon which they were obtained falls within the jurisdiction of the Crown Court which made those orders. It is said that the respondents have already invoked that jurisdiction and that this court should not trespass upon it. I accept that the Crown Court is the proper forum for any direct challenge to the validity of the production orders. POCA provides a statutory mechanism by which a person affected may seek to vary or discharge such an order and questions as to its lawfulness are in the first instance for that court.[16]That, however, is not the end of the matter. The present application does not, in form, a challenge to the production orders themselves. It is an application to discharge a UWO and IFO granted by this court. The material obtained pursuant to the production orders is said to form a significant part of the evidential foundation for those orders. In those circumstances, the question for this court is a narrower one, whether, in order fairly to determine the discharge application, the respondent should have access to the material placed before the Crown Court when the production orders were obtained. That is a matter going to the fairness of the proceedings before this court not the validity of the production orders as such. There is, therefore, in my view, a distinction between, first, determining whether the production orders were lawfully made, which is for the Crown Court and secondly, determining what disclosure is required to enable the respondents fairly to advance their case in these proceedings. The existence of a procedure in the Crown Court does not of itself deprive this court of the ability to control its own process in the latter respect.[17]Nonetheless, the availability of relief in the Crown Court, and the fact that it has already been invoked, are relevant case management considerations. They may bear upon the scope and timing of any disclosure ordered in these proceedings and upon the risk of duplication or inconsistent determinations.[18]Thirdly, are the respondents entitled to the material sought? The respondents advance two bases for disclosure. First, a common law entitlement grounded in fairness drawing on authorities concerning search warrants and analogous investigative orders. Secondly, the right of inspection under CPR 31.14 in respect of documents "mentioned in a witness statement or alluded to".[19]As to CPR 31.14, I accept the DPP's submission that the rule is not engaged in relation to the underlying applications for the production orders here. Mr Ryan's statement plainly refers to the existence of the production orders and relies upon material obtained pursuant to them. However, it does not, in terms, refer to or directly allude to the application material placed before the Crown Court nor to any reasons given for granting those orders. The rule, even on a liberal construction, in my view, does not extend so far as to encompass documents not in that sense “mentioned”.[20]It does not follow that disclosure, however, must be refused. The authorities relied upon by the respondents arguably emphasise a broader principle of fairness: where an investigative order is obtained without notice a person affected is ordinarily entitled to sufficient information to enable them to understand the basis upon which it was granted and to test its legality. Those authorities arise in the context of judicial review of warrants and similar orders. They do not, in my view, establish any freestanding right to disclosure in civil proceedings. However, they are reflective of a more general requirement of procedural fairness, the content of which is fact sensitive.[21]In the present case, two considerations were urged upon me and are of some importance. First, the extent to which the production order material was material to the grant of the UWO. On the material before the court, the product of those orders formed a part of the evidential basis of the without-notice application. That may tend to support the respondents' contention that they should have a proper opportunity to understand and, if necessary, challenge the provenance of that material.[22]Secondly, the nature of the respondents' case on discharge. One of the grounds advanced is an alleged failure of full-and frank disclosure: the manner in which the investigation was conducted, including the obtaining of the production orders, might be said to bear upon that issue, but it would require an investigation by this court into a matter which should properly be considered by the Crown Court.[23]Against those potential considerations must be weighed the countervailing considerations relied upon by the DPP, including proportionality, the risk of the exercise becoming a wide-ranging enquiry into collateral matters, and the fact that the respondents already have access to the material pursuant to the orders themselves. I note that: 1. At the hearing before Sheldon J, he did not in fact rely on the suggested connection between the respondents and an organised crime network. 2. The question of whether there was an error or any deliberate misleading is capable of being resolved on the material already before the court, since it is said to be demonstrable on the face of the World-Check documents. In contrast, the DPP's submission is that there was no question of any misleading impression or fact being placed before the court, and that this was a careful exercise by Mr Ryan in making a connection, which he was entitled to do, albeit that it was properly rejected by Sheldon J as a foundation for the conclusion that there was any connection with organised crime. 3. It would not be open to this Court to discharge the Crown Court production order, and the approach suggested runs, it would appear to me, the clear risk of inconsistent findings being reached in relation to applications which are on foot in both courts, which were made in different jurisdictions and for different purposes.[24]In all the circumstances, I am not persuaded that fairness requires disclosure at this stage and in this forum of the entirety of the material placed before the Crown Court in support of production-order applications. That would risk duplicating the function of the Crown Court in invigilating its own processes and extending these proceedings beyond their proper scope.[25]In my judgment, the appropriate course is to confine disclosure to what is necessary for the fair disposal of the discharge application. For the reasons already discussed, this application has been brought within the context of case management shortly before the discharge applications are to be heard.[26]On the present material, the respondents have not demonstrated that inspection of the underlying application material is necessary for that purpose, as opposed to desirable in order to explore a potential collateral challenge to the production orders.[27]The respondents remain at liberty, of course, to pursue disclosure in the Crown Court with expedition. They have already made such an application on 2 June. Should material emerge from that process which bears upon the issues in these proceedings, it will be open to them to seek to rely on it. But, for all those reasons, I decline to make the disclosure order sought at this stage. END ---------- Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. 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