“153. When considering any planning application, local planning authorities should ensure that substantial weight is given to any harm to the Green Belt, including harm to its openness. Inappropriate development is, by definition, harmful to the Green Belt and should not be approved except in very special circumstances. ‘Very special circumstances will not exist unless the potential harm to the Green Belt by reason of inappropriateness, and any other harm resulting from the proposal, is very clearly outweighed by other considerations.”
“155. The development of homes, commercial and other development in the Green Belt should also not be regarded as inappropriate where all the following apply: a. The development would utilise grey belt land and would not fundamentally undermine the purposes (taken together) of the remaining Green Belt across the area of the plan; b. There is a demonstrable unmet need for the type of development proposed; c. The development would be in a sustainable location, with particular reference to paragraphs 110 and 115 of this Framework; and d. Where applicable the development proposed meets the ‘Golden Rules’ requirements set out in paragraphs 156-157 below.”
“Grey belt: For the purposes of plan-making and decision-making, ‘grey belt’ is defined as land in the Green Belt comprising previously developed land and/or any other land that, in either case, does not strongly contribute to any of purposes (a), (b), or (d) in paragraph 143. ‘Grey belt’ excludes land where the application of the policies relating to the areas or assets in footnote 7 (other than Green Belt) would provide a strong reason for refusing or restricting development.”
“11. Plans and decisions should apply a presumption in favour of sustainable development. For plan-making this means that: a) all plans should promote a sustainable pattern of development that seeks to: meet the development needs of their area; align growth and infrastructure; improve the environment; mitigate climate change (including by making effective use of land in urban areas) and adapt to its effects; b) strategic policies should, as a minimum, provide for objectively assessed needs for housing and other uses, as well as any needs that cannot be met within neighbouring areas, unless: i. the application of policies in this Framework that protect areas or assets of particular importance provides a strong reason for restricting the overall scale, type or distribution of development in the plan area [fn7]; or ii. any adverse impacts of doing so would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits, when assessed against the policies in this Framework taken as a whole. For decision-taking this means: c) approving development proposals that accord with an up-to-date development plan without delay; or d) where there are no relevant development plan policies, or the policies which are most important for determining the application are out-of-date, granting permission unless: i. the application of policies in this Framework that protect areas or assets of particular importance [fn 7] provides a strong reason for refusing the development proposed; or ii. any adverse impacts of doing so would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits, when assessed against the policies in this Framework taken as a whole, having particular regard to key policies for directing development to sustainable locations, making effective use of land, securing well-designed places and providing affordable homes, individually or in combination.”
“Great weight should be given to conserving and enhancing landscape and scenic beauty in National Parks, the Broads and National Landscapes which have the highest status of protection in relation to these issues. The conservation and enhancement of wildlife and cultural heritage are also important considerations in these areas, and should be given great weight in National Parks and the Broads. The scale and extent of development within all these designated areas should be limited, while development within their setting should be sensitively located and designed to avoid or minimise adverse impacts on the designated areas.”
“215. Where a development proposal will lead to less than substantial harm to the significance of a designated heritage asset, this harm should be weighed against the public benefits of the proposal including, where appropriate, securing its optimum viable use.”
“Exceptional circumstances in this context include, but are not limited to, instances where an authority cannot meet its identified need for homes, commercial or other development through other means. If that is the case, authorities should review Green Belt boundaries in accordance with the policies in this Framework and propose alterations to meet these needs in full, unless the review provides clear evidence that doing so would fundamentally undermine the purposes (taken together) of the remaining Green Belt, when considered across the area of the plan.”
“Where it is necessary to release Green Belt land for development, plans should give priority to previously developed land, then consider grey belt which is not previously developed, and then other Green Belt locations. However, when drawing up or reviewing Green Belt boundaries, the need to promote sustainable patterns of development should determine whether a site’s location is appropriate with particular reference to paragraphs 110 and 115 of this Framework. Strategic policy-making authorities should consider the consequences for sustainable development of channelling development towards urban areas inside the Green Belt boundary, towards towns and villages inset within the Green Belt or towards locations beyond the outer Green Belt boundary.”
“How should the application of footnote 7 be considered when identifying land as grey belt? As defined in the NPPF, grey belt land excludes land where the application of policies relating to the areas or assets in footnote 7 to the NPPF (other than Green Belt) would provide a strong reason for refusing or restricting development. In reaching this judgment, authorities should consider where areas of grey belt would be covered by or affect other designations in footnote 7. Where this is the case, it may only be possible to provisionally identify such land as grey belt in advance of more detailed specific proposals.”
“39. Prior to the publication of the 2024 Framework, it was common ground that the proposal would represent inappropriate development. However, paragraph 155 introduces the concept of grey belt land where development in the Green Belt may not be considered inappropriate, subject to a series of criteria. The definition of grey belt is set out in Annex 2. Firstly, it must be previously developed land and/or land in the Green Belt that does not strongly contribute to any of the purposes (a), (b) or (d) in paragraph 143. Secondly, grey belt excludes land where the application of policies relating to areas in footnote 7 to paragraph 11 d) i) (other than Green Belt) would provide a strong reason for refusing or restricting development.”
“41. National Landscapes are one of the protected areas referred to in footnote 7. However, it will be seen from the analysis set out earlier that I have found only limited and localised harm to the setting of the KDNL and no harm to the special characteristics of the views into or out of the Protected Landscape. Notwithstanding that the proposal will not conserve and enhance the landscape and its setting considered together, I do not consider the identified harm would provide a strong reason to refuse or restrict the development. 42. I am therefore satisfied that the site and the proposal meet the definition of grey belt set out in Annex 2 of the 2024 Framework.”
“71. For all the above reasons I conclude that the proposal would provide facilities which would accord with the Circular and would be of an appropriate type to meet the demonstrable unmet need for additional lorry parking on the SRN in Kent. The scheme would therefore accord with criteria (b) of paragraph 155.”
“6. In my judgment at first instance in Bloor Homes East Midlands Ltd. V Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government[2014] EWHC 754 (Admin) (at paragraph 19) I set out the “seven familiar principles” that will guide the court in handling a challenge under section 288 . This case, like many others now coming before the Planning Court and this court too, calls for those principles to be stated again – and reinforced. They are: “(1) Decisions of the Secretary of State and his inspectors in appeals against the refusal of planning permission are to be construed in a reasonably flexible way. Decision letters are written principally for parties who know what the issues between them are and what evidence and argument has been deployed on those issues. An inspector does not need to “rehearse every argument relating to each matter in every paragraph” (see the judgment of Forbes J. in Seddon Properties v Secretary of State for the Environment (1981) 42 P. & C.R. 26 , at p.28). (2) The reasons for an appeal decision must be intelligible and adequate, enabling one to understand why the appeal was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal important controversial issues”
“Planning policies should be interpreted objectively in accordance with the language used, read in its proper context. Planning policies should not be interpreted as if they were statutory or contractual provisions. They are not analogous in nature or purpose to a statute or contract. They are intended to guide or shape practical decision-making and should be interpreted with that purpose in mind. They have to be applied and understood by planning professionals and by the public to whom they are primarily addressed. Decision-makers are entitled to expect both national and local planning policy to be as clearly and simply stated as it can be and, however well or badly it may be expressed, the courts to provide a straightforward interpretation of such policy.”
“23. In my view in the light of the authorities the following principles emerge as to how questions of interpretation of planning policy of the kind which arise in this case are to be resolved: (i) The question of the interpretation of the planning policy is a question of law for the court, and it is solely a question of interpretation of the terms of the policy. Questions of the value or weight which is to be attached to that policy for instance in resolving the question of whether or not development is in accordance with the Development Plan for the purposes of section 38(6) of the 2004 Act are matters of judgment for the decision-maker. (ii) The task of interpretation of the meaning of the planning policy should not be undertaken as if the planning policy were a statute or a contract. The approach has to recognise that planning policies will contain broad statements of policy which may, superficially, conflict and require to be balanced in ultimately reaching a decision: see the Tesco Stores case[2012] PTSR 983 , para 19 and the Hopkins Homes case[2017] PTSR 623 , para 25. Planning policies are designed to shape practical decision-taking and should be interpreted with that practical purpose clearly in mind. It should also be taken into account in that connection that they have to be applied and understood by planning professionals and the public for whose benefit they exist, and that they are primarily addressed to that audience. (iii) For the purposes of interpreting the meaning of the policy it is necessary for the policy to be read in context: see the Tesco Stores case, at paras 18 and 21. The context of the policy will include its subject matter and also the planning objectives which it seeks to achieve and serve. The context will also be comprised by the wider policy framework within which the policy sits and to which it relates. This framework will include, for instance, the overarching strategy within which the policy sits. (iv) As set out above, policies will very often call for the exercise of judgment in considering how they apply in the particular factual circumstances of the decision to be taken: see the Tesco Stores case, at paras 19 and 21. It is of vital importance to distinguish between the interpretation of policy (which requires judicial analysis of the meaning of the words comprised in the policy) and the application of the policy which requires an exercise of judgment within the factual context of the decision by the decision-taker: see the Hopkins Homes case, at para 26.”
“35. The distinction between policy interpretation and policy application is important (see the judgment of Lord Carnwath in Hopkins Homes Ltd. v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government[2017] UKSC 37 ; [2017] 1 W.L.R. 1865, at paragraph 26). Interpretation of policy is an activity for judges. Policy-making obviously is not. Nor, of course, is the application of policy in the making of planning decisions. The meaning of the words in a policy produced by the Secretary of State or by a local planning authority is for the court to establish, as a matter of law (see the judgment of Lord Reed in Tesco v Dundee City Council, at paragraphs 18 to 20, and the judgment of Lord Carnwath in Hopkins Homes, at paragraph 23). But the use of the policy in determining applications for planning permission and appeals is for the decision-maker, subject only to review by the court on public law grounds. 36. Interpreting a planning policy ought not to be a difficult task, but straightforward (see the leading judgment in R. (on the application of Corbett) v Cornwall Council[2022] EWCA Civ 1069 , at paragraph 19). It should not generally involve the kind of linguistic precision the court would bring to the interpretation of a statute or contract. Construing the language in the policy should not require it to be dismantled and reconstructed, or a gloss imposed upon it, or resort to paraphrase. One can expect the purpose of the policy to be clear from its own provisions, given their ordinary meaning and read in their context. Policies should be stated in plain terms, easy to understand for those affected by decisions made in accordance with them, and capable of being applied with realism and common sense. Mostly they are. 37. The court should respect the policy-maker's choice of words in formulating the policy as it stands. As a general rule, the temptation to infer terms the policy-maker has not actually used should be resisted. The court will sometimes be able to conclude that the words of the policy mean exactly what they say, nothing more and nothing less. It should not hesitate to do this if it can. 38. A more sophisticated approach has obvious risks. By going further than it needs in volunteering views of its own upon the meaning of a policy, the court may find itself drawn, unintentionally, towards the role of policy-maker. If a policy is ambiguous or incomplete, it is for the policy-maker to put that right, either by reformulating the policy when it can or by issuing guidance on its application. That is not a job for judges. Another risk is that the court – again without intending it – may obscure the true meaning of the words the policy-maker has used. This is liable to weaken the policy as a means of improving consistency in planning decisions. Many planning policies – including those in the NPPF – cover a wide range of circumstances. Many are framed in broad terms (see the judgment of Lord Carnwath in Hopkins Homes, at paragraph 24). Many require the exercise of planning judgment in their application. An interpretation tailored too closely to the facts of a particular case may not fit the facts of another (see the judgment of Holgate J., as he then was, in Gladman Developments Ltd. v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government[2020] EWHC 518 (Admin) , at paragraph 99, upheld in this court[2021] EWCA Civ 104 ). The policy itself could then be compromised and its use unduly constrained.”
“37. The “tilted balance”, or positive presumption, under paragraph 11(d)(ii) is not available in every case where there are “no relevant policies” of the development plan or the “most important policies” in the plan are “out-of-date”
“Location 84. On-line (between junctions) service areas are more accessible to users of the SRN [Strategic Road Network] and as a result more conducive to encouraging drivers to stop and take a break. They also help to avoid an increase in traffic demand at junctions with all-purpose roads. 85. Therefore, in circumstances where competing sites are under consideration and on the assumption that all other factors are equal, new facilities must be provided at on-line locations. 86. However, where an on-line service area cannot be delivered due to planning, safety, operational or environmental constraints, the development of a site that shares a common boundary with the highway at a junction with the SRN, and which provides the mandatory requirements to be eligible for signing as set out in table 1 of Annex A, is to be preferred to the continued absence of facilities. 87. The company will not support proposals for roadside facilities adjacent to a junction with a motorway that would not meet the minimum requirements for signing as shown in Table 1, as these can prevent or reduce the provision of more appropriate facilities. 88. An exception to these location requirements is permitted for truckstops [footnote 27] that would be within 2 miles of a junction on the SRN, where these would meet the minimum requirements for signing and would not direct traffic through an established residential area.”
“89. The minimum requirements for roadside facilities to be eligible for signing from the SRN are set out in table 1. For the purpose of managing traffic anywhere in the United Kingdom, the requirements set out in table 1 may be temporarily waived by the company at any roadside facility. 90. The signing of roadside facilities and signing arrangements within sites must comply with the TSRGD or its replacement, while further guidance on the authorisation, funding, installation and maintenance of signs is available from the company. Only in exceptional circumstances will nonprescribed signs be appropriate, and these must be authorised by the Department for Transport.”