Marko Lesnik, R (on the application of) v The County Court at Medway [2026] EWHC 1616 (Admin)

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 1616 (Admin)Case No AC-2025-LON-000848
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Venue The Royal Courts of JusticeDate Tuesday, 2 June 2026
Strand
London WC2A 2LL
MARCUS PILGERSTORFER KCDEPUTY JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
THE KING(on the application of MARKO LESNIK)ClaimantTHE COUNTY COURT AT MEDWAYDefendantTHE CHIEF CONSTABLE OF KENT POLICEInterested Party
MR LESNIK appeared in person for in personMS ISABELLA CROWDY appeared for interested party Chief Constable of Kent Police,
JUDGMENT(Approved)
Digital Transcription by Epiq Europe Ltd,Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JEWeb: www.epiqglobal.com/en-gb/Email: civil@epiqglobal.co.uk(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)This Transcript is Crown Copyright.  It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority.  All rights are reserved.WARNING: reporting restrictions may apply to the contents transcribed in this document, particularly if the case concerned a sexual offence or involved a child. Reporting restrictions prohibit the publication of the applicable information to the public or any section of the public, in writing, in a broadcast or by means of the internet, including social media. Anyone who receives a copy of this transcript is responsible in law for making sure that applicable restrictions are not breached. A person who breaches a reporting restriction is liable to a fine and/or imprisonment. For guidance on whether reporting restrictions apply, and to what information, ask at the court office or take legal advice.MARCUS PILGERSTORFER KC, DEPUTY JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT:Introduction
[1]In this case, a convicted sex offender sought an injunction in the County Court to prevent the police from asking him particular questions as part of the process of managing his risk of further offending. A District Judge dismissed those applications, and the Circuit Judge refused permission to appeal. Against that background, should this Court grant permission to apply for judicial review of the District Judge’s decision on the Claimant’s renewed application? For the reasons I shall give, my answer is no. The application is totally without merit.

Background

[2]The Claimant is a convicted sex offender. He was convicted in December 2017 of three offences of making indecent photographs or pseudo-photographs of a child. On 19 January 2018, he was sentenced at the Crown Court at Wood Green to eight months’ imprisonment, suspended for 24 months. He was also made subject to a Sexual Harm Prevention Order (“SHPO”) for a period of ten years, until 19 January 2028.[3]The SHPO was made under section 103A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (“SOA”). In order to make that order, the Crown Court had to be satisfied that it was:
"… necessary to make a sexual harm prevention order for the purpose of – (i) protecting the public or any particular members of the public from sexual harm from the defendant, or (ii) protecting children or vulnerable adults generally, or any particular children or vulnerable adults, from sexual harm from the defendant outside the United Kingdom."
See section 103A(2)(b) SOA.[4]As a result of the Crown Court disposal, the Claimant was also automatically subject to relevant notification requirements for a period of ten years, known as being on the Sex Offenders Register: see section 82 SOA. As a result, the police are obliged to visit the Claimant for the purposes of management and risk assessment.[5]The Claimant is aggrieved by what he describes as "personal and truly intimate questions (DISTURBING QUESTIONS)", asked by officers during such visits about his life, health and relationships. Objection is taken to the questions set out in the Statement of Facts and Grounds. They are:
"1. How often do you watch porn? (with more detailed follow-ups) 2. Do you masturbate (and how often)? 3. Do you ejaculate (while watching porn for example)? 4. Do you use any social networks (for dating and such)? 5. When was the last time you dated someone? 6. Do you want to find a partner (or get married and such)? 7. Would it be a man or a woman? (as a follow-up to previous question) 8. Do you feel depressed? (and variations of this regarding mental health) 9. Do you take any drugs or medications? (and variations of this regarding physical health)"
[6]The Claimant accepted before me today that he is not obliged to answer questions posed by the police (except that he must provide the specific information required by the SHPO). However, he submits that were he to refuse, then the police might assess his risk in a higher category, which in turn might lead them to further investigation.

Proceedings before the County Court

[7]The Claimant decided to apply for injunctions against the Chief Constable of Kent Police, the Interested Party, under various enactments, including the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (“PHA”) and the Equality Act 2010 (“EqA”). In broad terms, he alleged that the questioning was disproportionate and a direct violation of his human rights. As I shall explain, no pleaded case was ever submitted to the County Court because the applications were made without claim forms being filed and issued.[8]The injunction he sought (and continues to seek) is set out in his judicial review claim form. It is that the police, "Be forbidden to ask the claimant (in any form) any personal questions about their social/sexual/family life, sexual fantasies/preferences/ history, past or current relationships, dating arrangements, medical history, mental/physical condition - as part of sex offender risk assessment process."

The Decision Challenged

[9]The Claimant’s applications were dismissed by District Judge Milivojevic, sitting at the County Court at Medway, on 19 April 2024. The Claimant states on his judicial review claim form that it is this decision of the District Judge which is the target of his claim.[10]The District Judge dismissed the applications on procedural and substantive grounds. He concluded that(i) there had been a failure to file any appropriate claim form for the different injunctions sought, and(ii) the applications failed on their merits.[11]The District Judge considered that a claim seeking an injunction under the PHA should have been brought using the Part 8 procedure See CPR r65.28(1)(a) . By contrast, the claim pursuant to the EqA should have been brought under Part 7 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (“CPR”). The judge cited Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] UKSC 12; [2018] 1 WLR 1119 and considered that, despite being a litigant in person, the Claimant was required to comply with the rules See per Lord Sumption at §18:
“The rules do not in any relevant respect distinguish between represented and unrepresented parties….The rules provide a framework within which to balance the interest of both sides. That balance is inevitably disturbed if an unrepresented litigant is entitled to greater indulgence in complying with them than his represented opponent. Any advantage enjoyed by a litigant in person imposes a corresponding disadvantage on the other side, which may be significant if it affects the latter's legal rights, under the Limitation Acts for example. Unless the rules and practice directions are particularly inaccessible or obscure, it is reasonable to expect a litigant in person to familiarise himself with the rules which apply to any step which he is about to take.”
. He had not: no claim forms had been filed by him at all It does not appear to have been argued before the District Judge that the matter was so urgent as to require an interim remedy to be granted before a claim had been started: see CPR r25.2(2) and Hayes v Pack & Others [2022] EWHC 2508 §§29ff. . The District Judge declined the Claimant’s invitation to “deem” a claim as having been made. That, the Judge considered, was sufficient to dismiss the applications.[12]In the alternative, the District Judge rejected the Claimant’s claims on their merits. In relation to the PHA, the District Judge observed, at §10 of his judgment, that the prohibition of harassment contained in section 1(1) PHA does not, by section 1(3), apply to a course of conduct if the person who pursued it shows: "(a) that it was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime, (b) that it was pursued under any enactment or rule of law or to comply with any condition or requirement imposed by any person under any enactment, or (c) that in the particular circumstances the pursuit of the course of conduct was reasonable.”[13]At §§12-13, the District

Judge said this:

“12. It seems to me that when an individual is subject to the orders that Mr Lesnik is subject to, both the specific Prevention Order and the more general order, that the questions asked are clearly of a nature to assess risk for the purpose of preventing any further offending or detecting if an individual has reoffended. 13. For that reason, I am satisfied that the questions were pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime, that they were also pursued under the enactments and rules of law which were specifically applied to Mr Lesnik, and that in all of the circumstances, given the findings in the criminal proceedings, given the orders that Mr Lesnik is subject to, that the questions that he is asked are reasonable in nature.”
[14]In relation to the claims brought under the EqA, the District Judge referred to section 26(1), and the requirement within the definition of harassment that the unwanted conduct be “related to a relevant protected characteristic”. At §15, the judge said this:
"It seems to me, so far as it is required, the conduct complained of is not based on any protected characteristic under the Equality Act that Mr Lesnik holds. It is because he is a registered sex offender and subject to the Sexual Harm Prevention Order."
[15]The Judge then observed that sexual harassment is defined in section 26(2) EqA. Inter alia what is required is that a person “engages in unwanted conduct of a sexual nature”.At §16, the judge reasoned as follows:
"It also seems to me that the questions are not unwanted conduct of a sexual nature. They are questions, as I found, being reasonably and lawfully asked for the purposes of preventing and detecting crime, complying with the respondent’s duties given the very specific legal requirements imposed on Mr Lesnik, and reasonable given what the public would, no doubt, expect of the respondent in carrying out their duties in those circumstances. For those reasons, the application must also be dismissed."
[16]In relation to the claimant’s reliance on human rights arguments, the Judge rejected the submission that the questions amounted to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment for the purposes of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”): see his judgment at §21. Further, insofar as there was an interference with the Claimant’s Article 8(1) ECHR rights, the District

Judge addressed Article 8(2), which permits an interference with Article 8(1) provided it:

"… is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."
[17]The Judge considered the questioning was a proportionate and reasonable measure, in accordance with the law, and in the interests of preventing and detecting crime: see his judgment at §24.

Permission to Appeal

[18]The District Judge refused permission to appeal.[19]A renewed application for permission to appeal was made by the Claimant but was refused by HHJ Brown on the papers on 19 June 2024 on the ground that it had no real prospect of success and that the District Judge had been entitled to reach the decision that he did. HHJ Brown considered the claim was attempting to challenge and undermine the statutory regime for the management of sex offenders and that he could have sought to vary the terms of the Sexual Harm Prevention Order by pursuing procedures within the criminal jurisdiction. She considered the applications, and the proposed appeal, was an abuse of process and totally without merit.

This Judicial Review

[20]The Claimant attempted to bring judicial review proceedings in September 2024. However, his attempts were unsuccessful and the claim was rejected on numerous occasions because of various procedural irregularities. It was not until 18 March 2025 that a claim form was validly filed, some 11 months after the District Judge’s decision. It was issued and sealed on 19 March 2025. The sealed claim form was not, however, then served on the Defendant and Interested Party “within seven days after the date of issue” as required by CPR r54.7.[21]The substantive grounds advanced are as follows: a) Ground 1: The District Judge wrongly found that the conduct complained of was not harassment under section 26 EqA. b) Ground 2: The District Judge wrongly found that the conduct was not harassment under section 1 PHA. c) Grounds 3 to 5: The District Judge’s decision violated the Claimant’s human rights under Articles 3 and 8 ECHR and failed to provide a remedy under Article 13 ECHR. d) Ground 6: The District Judge failed to recognise the conduct as a disproportionate interference with privacy, dignity and sexual integrity and thereby breached Articles 17 to 18 ECHR. e) Ground 7: The District Judge’s decision was procedurally unfair in that the application was dismissed due to an absence of a claim form. f) Ground 8: The District Judge was biased. g) Grounds 9 to 11: The decision was irrational in so far that the District Judge found that(i) the purpose of the questioning was to prevent or detect crime;(ii) the SOA permitted the questioning; and(iii) the police conduct was reasonable.

The Paper Decision

[22]Mrs Justice Lang considered the question of permission to apply for judicial review on the papers and refused it by her order of 4 March 2026. She dealt first with the issue of the time limit for claiming judicial review and said this at §6 of her reasons:
"The Claimant’s application for permission to apply for judicial review was not validly filed until 18 March 2025, about 11 months after the District Judge’s decision. It should have been filed promptly and in any event no later than 3 months after the decision (CPR 54.5(1)). Although it was first received by the Administrative Court Office in September 2024 (the precise date is disputed), it was rejected on numerous occasions because of various irregularities. The Claimant relies on the fact that he is a litigant in person, and unfamiliar with Court procedures. Litigants in person are bound to comply with Court procedures, like all other litigants, and the Claimant was given advice by Court staff and referred to the Citizens Advice Bureau and the Support through Court Unit at the Royal Courts of Justice. In my judgment, the Claimant has not been able to establish grounds upon which such a lengthy extension of time can be justified."
[23]The learned Judge next considered the Claimant’s failure to serve the sealed claim form in accordance with CPR 54.7, and referred to R (Good Law Project) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2022] EWCA Civ 355; [2022] 1 WLR 2339. In that case, the Court of Appeal held that the principles in CPR r7.6 should be applied to any application to extend time for service of a judicial review claim form made under CPR r3.1(2)(a).[24]Mrs Justice Lang set out CPR r7.6(3) which reads as follows: "If the claimant applies for an order to extend the time for compliance after the end of the period specified by rule 7.5 or by an order made under this rule, the court may make such an order only if –(a) the court has failed to serve the claim form; or(b) the claimant has taken all reasonable steps to comply with rule 7.5 but has been unable to do so; and(c) in either case, the claimant has acted promptly in making the application.”[25]The learned Judge took the view that the requirements of CPR r7.6(3) had not been met in this case. At §8 of her reasons, she explained:
"…Once the claim was issued, on 19 March 2025, the Claimant failed to serve it on the [interested party] and only served the County Court. This was a critical omission, given the Defendant is a court and therefore not participating in the proceedings. The [interested party] eventually obtained a copy from the Court."
[26]In addition to these procedural grounds, the learned Judge also refused permission on substantive grounds set out between §§10-12 of her reasons, as follows:
“10. As to the substantive grounds, the scope for judicial review of a decision of the County Court is restricted. Traditionally it has been limited to exceptional cases where the County Court has acted in complete disregard of its duties (see R (Sivasubramaniam) v Wandsworth County Council [2001] EWHC (Admin) 1078, R (Strickson) v Preston County Court [2007] EWCA Civ 1132, approved in R (Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2019] UKSC 22, per Lord Carnwath at [125 and 126]). 11. In R (Cart) v Upper Tribunal [2012] 1 AC 663, the Sivasubramaniam line of cases was disapproved in the context of a judicial review of a refusal to grant permission to appeal by the Upper Tribunal and the second appeals test was applied so that permission should only be granted where the claimant establishes an arguable case with a reasonable prospect of success that the lower court or tribunal was wrong in law and that either the claim raises an important point of principle or practice or there is some other compelling reason to hear it. 12. In my judgment, the Claimant’s grounds do not come close to satisfying either of these tests. I agree with the assessment of the District Judge, which was upheld by the Circuit Judge. I consider that the police questioning was legitimate, reasonable and proportionate. No arguable error of law has been established.”
[27]Aggrieved by that decision, the Claimant renewed his application for permission to apply for judicial review. My conclusions on that application are as follows.

Jurisdiction: the requirement to serve the sealed claim form

[28]It is clearly set out in CPR r54.7, 54PD.6 and the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide 2025 at §7.9.1 that the Claimant must serve a sealed copy of the claim form, together with a copy of the bundle of documentation filed with it, on the Defendant and any Interested Party within seven days of the claim being issued. If the claim form has not been served within seven days an application must be made for an extension of time. Without compliance with this requirement, or receipt of an extension, the claim form must be set aside and the Court has no jurisdiction to hear the claim.[29]In R (on the application of Reverend Bernard Charles Randall) v Clergy Discipline Commission and others[2024] EWHC 2924, Mrs

Justice Lang succinctly distilled the applicable principles at §§6-10 of her judgment:

“6. In Ideal Shopping Direct Limited v Mastercard Incorporated [2022] EWCA Civ 14, per Sir Julian Flaux C, at [137], [145] and [146], the Court of Appeal held that service of an unsealed claim form is not valid service and a claimant could not rely on CPR 3.10 to rectify the defect. 7. In R (Good Law Project) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2022] EWCA Civ 355, the Court of Appeal held that the principles in CPR 7.6 should be applied to any application to extend time for service of a judicial review claim form made under CPR 3.1(2)(a) ... 8. The Court of Appeal in Good Law held that the approach to an application for relief from sanctions set out in Denton v TH White [2014] EWCA Civ 906, and applied in public law claims in R (Hysaj) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 1633, should not be applied to failures in service of originating process. This is because valid service of a claim form founds the jurisdiction of the court over the defendant. Parties who failed to take reasonable steps to effect valid service expose themselves to the very real risk of losing the right to bring the claim, per Carr LJ at [83]. 9. The Court of Appeal considered that matters such as to the lack of prejudice to the defendant by the invalid service, because a claim form had been served by other means, the public interest in the claim and the merits of the claim were not relevant to determining whether the claimant met the requirements of CPR 7.6(3) . There will be detriment to the defendant by reason of the loss of an accrued limitation defence, per Carr J at [36], [58], [64] and [65]. 10. By CPR 54.7 , the claim form must be served on the defendant and any interested party "within seven days after the date of issue". The claim form must be sealed. Here the claim form was issued by the court on 14 May 2024 and so the time for service expired on 21 May 2024.”
[30]In that case, the judge found that no valid claim form had been served; a finding sufficient to bring the claim to an end. At §§27-28 the Judge put it this way:
“27. In my judgment, the consequence of the failure to serve a valid claim form on the defendants in time and a failure to obtain an extension of time to effect valid service is that the claim form has to be set aside and the Court has no jurisdiction to hear the claim. 28. This conclusion brings the claim to an end. However, I consider that it will be helpful to the parties and any appeal court for me to set out my conclusions on the other issues.”
[31]In the present case, the sealed claim form was sent to the Claimant on 19 March 2025, along with the standard issue letter. The issue letter explained clearly that it was now necessary for him to serve all documents on the Defendant and the Interested Party. The letter explained that failure to comply may result in the file being closed. The Claimant’s attention was further drawn to CPR Part 54 and the accompanying Practice Directions. The Claimant failed to serve the sealed claim form on the Defendant and Interested Party within seven days, as required by the rule.[32]The Court chased the Claimant for a certificate of service on 3 April 2025. The Claimant filed a certificate of service in respect of the Defendant on 9 April 2025, suggesting that the Defendant had been served on that day. On 8 May 2025, the Interested Party wrote to the Court to say that it had not been served with the sealed claim form. The Court responded, enclosing a copy of the claim form by email, on 23 June 2025. On 4 July 2025, the Interested Party set out summary grounds for contesting the claim, including the submission that no sealed claim form had been served on it by the Claimant.[33]It follows from the above that the Claimant failed to comply with CPR r54.7 and failed to serve a sealed copy of the claim form on the Interested Party at all. Further, service on the Defendant was late.[34]I respectfully agree with Mrs Justice Lang’s decision on the papers. The failure to serve on the Interested Party, in circumstances where the Defendant is a court, is a critical omission. More generally, it is well established that the failure to serve the sealed claim form will deprive the Court of jurisdiction.[35]No formal application to extend time for service of the sealed claim form was made by the Claimant. I nonetheless considered whether grounds for an extension could be made out. The correct approach is set out in the extracts from Randall that I have cited, which itself cites the Court of Appeal’s Good Law Project decision. Where the obligation is on the Claimant to serve the claim form, the relevant test is that in CPR r7.6(3)(b) and (c): has the Claimant taken all reasonable steps to serve the sealed claim form but been unable to do so? Has the Claimant acted promptly in making an application for an extension?[36]In my judgment, the answer to both of these questions is in the negative. The issue letter set out the requirement to serve and drew the Claimant’s attention to the relevant rules, giving an internet link where they can be found. Notwithstanding the Claimant is a litigant in person, in my judgment he can be expected to have absorbed the information and to have recognised his obligations in this respect.[37]I am accordingly not satisfied that the Claimant took all reasonable steps to comply with CPR r54.7. He could reasonably have served the sealed claim form in time as required by the rules on both the Defendant and the Interested Party had he taken the reasonable steps of reading and absorbing the Court’s issue letter and following the link to CPR Part 54. That would have taken him to the requirements of CPR r54.7. Further, the position is set out very clearly in the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide 2025, which is publicly and freely available on the internet. At §7.9 the Guide reads as follows (omitting footnotes):
“The claimant must serve a sealed copy of the Claim Form together with a copy of the bundle of the documentation filed with it, on the defendant(s) and any interested parties within 7 days of the claim being issued. This must be actual, not deemed, service. In the event that the claim form has not been served within 7 days, an application must be made for an extension of time for service (see para 13.7 of this guide). If the claimant fails to serve a valid claim form on the defendants in time and fails to obtain an extension of time to effect valid service, the claim form has to be set aside and the Court has no jurisdiction to hear the claim.”
[38]The Claimant has also not acted promptly by making an application for an extension. No formal application is before the Court, and raising the matter for the first time today is far from prompt.[39]For all of these reasons, I would refuse an extension of time to serve the claim form on the Defendant and Interested Party. It follows that the position remains that the sealed claim form has not properly been served as required by CPR r54.7. It falls to be set aside with the result that the Court has no jurisdiction to determine the claim.

Time limit

[40]I next turn to the time limit for claiming judicial review. As I have explained, in this case the decision which is identified as the target for judicial review is the decision of the District Judge of 19 April 2024.[41]The judicial review claim form is dated 17 September 2024. However, it was not filed compliantly with the rules until 18 March 2025, when the clock stopped for limitation purposes. That is some 11 months after the decision challenged. However, even by the date on the claim form, some 5 months had passed since the District Judge’s decision.[42]A claim for judicial review must be filed promptly and in any event not later than 3 months after the grounds to make the claim first arose: see CPR r54.5(1). In Randall at §§30-35, Lang J summarised the applicable principles as follows: “30. Promptness is the primary requirement, the three-month period is a longstop (see Mauritius Shipping Corp Ltd v The Employment Relations Tribunal [2019] UKPC 42 at 8. So a claim may be out of time if it is not filed promptly even if it was filed within three months after the grounds to make the claim first arose. 31. Section 31(6) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 provides: "(6) Where the High Court considers that there has been undue delay in making an application for judicial review, the court may refuse to grant—(a) leave for the making of the application; or(b) any relief sought on the application, if it considers that the granting of the relief sought would be likely to cause substantial hardship to, or substantially prejudice the rights of, any person or would be detrimental to good administration". 32. The authorities, which are helpfully summarised in paragraph 26.1(7) of the Judicial Review Handbook , Fordham (7th Ed.), indicate that the rationale of the strict time limits in judicial review claims is that "the public interest in good administration requires that public authorities and third parties should not be kept in suspense as to the legal validity of a decision the authority has reached in purported exercise of decision-making powers for any longer period than is absolutely necessary in fairness to the person affected by the decision", per Lord Diplock in O'Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237, at 280H to 281A. 33. In R v Hammersmith v Fulham LBC, ex parte Burkett [2002] 1WLR 1593 at 44, the House of Lords observed, per Lord Steyn at [44], that "there is a need for public bodies to have certainty as to the legal validity of their action". Furthermore, in A v Essex County Council [2010] UKSC 33 [2011] 1 AC 280 at 116 , Lady Hale endorsed the proposition that there was a significant public interest in public law claims against public bodies being brought expeditiously since judicial review remedies are normally prospective aiming not only to quash the past but also to put right the future. 34. Despite judicial doubts about the lack of certainty in the promptness requirement, it remains a valid procedural requirement in CPR. 35. In this case the decision under challenge was made on 15 February 2024 and the claimant did not file his claim until 14 May 2024, which was the final day before the expiry of the three-month period. In my view, the claim was clearly not filed promptly as required. It is surprising and concerning that the claimant has not given any explanation for the delay in filing the claim.” "(6) Where the High Court considers that there has been undue delay in making an application for judicial review, the court may refuse to grant— (a) leave for the making of the application; or (b) any relief sought on the application, if it considers that the granting of the relief sought would be likely to cause substantial hardship to, or substantially prejudice the rights of, any person or would be detrimental to good administration".[43]There is little doubt that this claim is out of time: a challenge to the District Judge’s decision beyond the three-month ‘long stop’ is clearly not prompt and “in any event” is not within CPR r54.5(1)(b). A fortiori the challenge validly filed on 18 March 2025.[44]No formal application has been made by the Claimant for an extension of time. I have nonetheless considered whether one is justified. Like Mrs Justice Lang, I have reached the firm conclusion that it is not. The delay here is extensive. There is a public interest in the finality of litigation. It underscores the need for a strict application of time limits. No good reason has been advanced for the delay.[45]The Claimant refers to the date on his claim form, 17 September 2024, as being within three months of HHJ Brown’s refusal of permission to appeal on 19 June 2024, and that he considered it reasonable to try to appeal first. However:a. HHJ Brown’s decision is not the decision being challenged here. The challenge is to the District Judge’s decision, so time properly runs from then. Further, and assuming it is appropriate to seek judicial review (see below), I do not accept Mr Lesnik’s submission that it was reasonable for him to wait for the appeal process to conclude before challenging the District Judge’s decision by way of judicial review.b. In any event, the time limit that applies is not three months. It is to bring the claim promptly and in any event within three months. The Court is not obliged to treat a claim as having been made promptly just because it is brought within three months. Here I would not have treated a challenge to HHJ Brown’s decision, had it been brought on 17 September, as a prompt. In any event, as I have explained, the claim was not properly brought until 18 March 2025.[46]In respect of the period between September 2024 and March 2025, I agree with Mrs Justice Lang that, despite being a litigant in person, the Claimant can be expected to have found out about and complied with the rules of the Administrative Court, which apply just as much to him as to represented parties. Considering the relevant factors in the round, including the prospects of success to which I shall return, the balance clearly falls against an extension of time.

Alternative Remedy

[47]Judicial review is a remedy of last resort. Lady Hale explained, at §19 of R (Cart) v Upper Tribunal [2012] 1 AC 663,that:
“Where there was a right of appeal, of course, an aggrieved party would be expected to use that rather than judicial review. Judicial review was always a remedy of last resort.”
[48]Only narrow exceptions to that principle are permitted as explained in R (Sivasubramaniam) v Wandsworth County Court [2003] 1WLR 475. At §47, Lord Phillips MR explained:
“…judicial review is customarily refused as an exercise of judicial discretion where an alternative remedy is available. Where Parliament has provided a statutory appeal procedure, it will rarely be appropriate to grant permission for judicial review. The exceptional case may arise because the statutory procedure is less satisfactory than the procedure of judicial review. Usually, however, the alternative procedure is more convenient and judicial review is refused.”
[49]See further the discussion and authorities cited in R (Kopec) v London Central Employment Tribunal [2025] EWHC 1161 (Admin) at §§31ff.[50]In this case, the Claimant had an alternative way of challenging the District Judge’s decision by way of appeal to the Circuit Judge. It was not suggested before me that the ability to appeal was less satisfactory than the procedure of judicial review. Indeed, in my judgment, it was obviously the better and more convenient way for the Claimant to challenge the decision of the District Judge. All aspects of his challenge could be considered on that appeal.[51]The Claimant did in fact use that procedure. That it did not produce the result he wanted does not mean that proceeding by way of an appeal was unsatisfactory in some way. It simply means that he had no arguable basis to appeal. HHJ Brown considered the Claimant’s arguments and declared them totally without merit. The fact HHJ Brown refused permission to appeal does not open the door to the Claimant then challenging the District Judge’s prior decision by way of judicial review.[52]I would therefore refuse permission to apply for judicial review on this further basis.[53]The Claimant does not target HHJ Brown’s decision on permission to appeal in this claim. However, had he done so, I do not consider the Claimant’s case on its merits comes close to satisfying the requirements identified in Cart which might justify permission for a judicial review against refusal to grant permission to appeal. As I shall explain below, he cannot establish an arguable case with a reasonable prospect of success that the District Judge was wrong and that either the claim raises an important point of principle or practice or there is some other compelling reason to hear it.

Merits

[54]I finally turn to the merits. Given the decisions I have already made, I can state my conclusions relatively briefly.[55]I do not consider the District Judge’s decision can arguably be criticised on any of the 11 grounds which the Claimant sets out in his judicial review claim.[56]First, the Judge unimpeachably found that the alleged course of conduct could not amount to harassment under the PHA because it fell within the exceptions set out in section 1(3). He found the questions were asked for the purpose of preventing or detecting further criminal offending by the Claimant (s1(3)(a) PHA) and further that the questions were, in all the circumstances, reasonable in nature (s1(3)(c) PHA). In my judgment, there can be no realistic challenge to those findings. They also chime in harmony with the fact that the Sexual Harm Prevention Order was imposed after the Crown Court found it was necessary to protect the public, or particular members of the public, from future sexual harm from the Claimant.[57]Mr Lesnik argued that it was the particular questions I have outlined which were objectionable. He submitted he did not object to other questions, such as whether contact with children had taken place. He argued nothing about the impugned questions could be linked to a specific crime. I do not consider that is an arguable point. For section 1(3)(a) PHA to apply, it is not necessary for the conduct (the impugned questions) to refer to, or engage with, the elements of a specific sexual or other offence. In the context of managing sexual offences and offenders, the questions in my judgment help to build up a holistic profile of risk posed by an offender. They seem to me to be entirely legitimate for the purposes of preventing or detecting further criminal acts. The questions therefore constitute conduct falling within section 1(3)(a), even if they do not directly ask about facts which would make out an element of a particular criminal offence. In any event, Mr Lesnik’s argument does not surmount the District Judge’s alternative finding in relation to reasonableness: see s1(3)(c) PHA.[58]Secondly, I consider the Judge was unarguably right to conclude that the unwanted conduct was not “related to a relevant protected characteristic” for the purposes of section 26(1)(a) EqA. Nor was it “conduct of a sexual nature” for the purposes of section 26(2)(a) EqA.a. The requirement that conduct be “related to” a protected characteristic allows for a looser connection to a protected characteristic than where conduct must be “because of a protected characteristic”: see the definition of direct discrimination in s13(1) EqA and Bakkali v Greater Manchester Buses (South) Ltd (t/a Stagecoach Manchester) [2018] ICR 1481 per Slade J at §31. Here, the questions were asked, as the District Judge explained, because the Claimant is a registered sex offender subject to a SHPO. Notwithstanding that harassment permits of a looser permissible connection to a protected characteristic, given the context, there was nothing whatsoever to suggest that the conduct of asking the questions was related to anything other than the Claimant’s status as a sex offender subject to a SHPO.b. Whether conduct is “of a sexual nature” for the purposes of section 26(2)(a) EqA must be considered carefully on a case-by-case basis and in a common sense way. Some conduct will self-evidently fall within that description. Other conduct may or may not depending on the context. The Equality and Human Rights Commission (“EHRC”) publication ‘Equality Act 2010 Code of Practice for Employment’ provides, at §7.13, that:
“[c]onduct ‘of a sexual nature’ can cover verbal, non-verbal or physical conduct including unwelcome sexual advances, touching, forms of sexual assault, sexual jokes, displaying pornographic photographs or drawings or sending emails with material of a sexual nature.”
. See also the ‘Code of Practice for Services, public functions and associations’ at §8.16. The EHRC has also published ‘Sexual harassment and harassment at work: technical guidance’ which provides a non-exhaustive list of conduct which might qualify as being “of a sexual nature” at work. The list includes behaviour such as asking “intrusive questions about a person’s private or sex life or a person discussing their own sex life”. It is easy to see how such conduct might qualify as conduct of a sexual nature if an employee were asking intrusive questions about a co-worker’s sex life. However, the conclusion is highly dependent upon and sensitive to the precise context. A manager investigating a grievance at work might have cause to ask questions to a complainant or alleged perpetrator about the subject matter of a complaint or defence. Just because the subject matter may be sexual, it does not follow that the conduct of asking the questions about that subject matter is conduct “of a sexual nature”. In this example, the conduct is unlikely to be The answer may be different where a manager takes the opportunity to go beyond what is necessary to investigate the grievance. : the context is of a genuine managerial investigation. The present case does not concern conduct occurring in a workplace. Rather, the context is the assessment by the police of the risk posed by a convicted sex offender subject to a SHPO. The police asking even intrusive questions about the Claimant’s sex life, sexual activity and preferences is not remotely conduct “of a sexual nature”. Even if the subject matter of the questions concern the Claimant’s sex life, the conduct of asking them, in context, is not arguably sexual.[59]I would add that in my judgment it cannot be argued that the conduct complained of had the proscribed effect set out in section 26(1)(b) EqA. Whilst that might have been the Claimant’s perception (and that falls to be taken into account: s26(4)(a) EqA), that perception is unarguably outweighed by the other circumstances of this particular case and the objective consideration of whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have the proscribed effect: see s26(4)(b) and (c) EqA. The circumstances of the case include the Claimant’s criminal history and specific sexual offending, the presence of the SHPO, the fact the Claimant is subject to reporting, the need for the police to carry out inquiries necessary to evaluate the risk posed by the Claimant, the fact the questioning was done in private, and the fact that the Claimant may choose whether or not to answer the questions.[60]Third, in respect of the Claimant’s human rights arguments, I consider the judge was unarguably right to conclude that there was no infringement of Article 3 ECHR arising as a result of the police visiting the Claimant at home and asking, in private, the questions complained of. I do not accept that in the context I have described above that the questioning could arguably amount to psychological torture, as the Claimant suggested in his submissions.[61]Any infringement of Article 8(1) ECHR that is involved by the police asking the questions objected to is in my judgment unarguably in accordance with the law within the meaning of Article 8(2) ECHR. The police are authorised by statute to make inquiries for the purposes of preventing and detecting crime. In addition, in the Claimant’s case, judicial decisions taken pursuant to the SOA made him subject to the reporting requirements and a SHPO. The conduct of the police asking the Claimant questions for the purposes of risk assessment is plainly necessary and proportionate in this democratic society for the prevention of further crime by the Claimant and indeed for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The questioning is in my assessment unarguably proportionate and appropriate in the circumstances of the Claimant’s prior offending behaviour. It follows that no breach of Article 8 or other human rights standards can, in my view, arguably be maintained.[62]I do not regard the Claimant’s other human rights submissions to be arguable. Articles 17 to 18 of the ECHR only arise in the event there is an arguable claim of breach of the substantive right, and I have concluded there is none. There is no arguable procedural defect in the District Judge’s decision arising from the dismissal of the claim due to the absence of a claim form. It is incumbent on all litigants to comply with the rules of the Court and the judge’s decision in respect of the absence of the claim forms seems to me correct. In respect of the dangers of seeking an injunctive remedy without procedural rigour, see, for example, Hayes v Pack and another [2022] EWHC 2508.[63]Fourth, there is no arguable basis to suggest that the District Judge was biased in the sense outlined in Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357. Nothing appears from the papers before me to suggest that the hypothetical informed and fair-minded observer, knowing the facts, would think there was a real possibility that the District Judge was biased or had predetermined any of the issues before him.[64]Finally, I do not consider that the District Judge’s decision was arguably irrational. To the contrary, it seems to me obviously right for the reasons he gave.

Conclusion

[65]I set aside the claim form. The sealed claim form was not served in accordance with the rules and the Court has no jurisdiction to hear this claim. Further, the claim is out of time, there was an alternative route of challenge by way of appealing the District Judge’s decision, and the case is unarguable on the merits. For all of these reasons, I would refuse permission to apply for judicial review.

Totally without merit

[66]I am asked to declare that the Claimant's renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review is totally without merit. As set out in §9.3.2 of the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide 2025, the term “totally without merit” applies to a case that is bound to fail, even if the case is not abusive or vexatious. In R (Wasif) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 82; [2016] 1 WLR 2793, the Court of Appeal considered that in one sense it might be thought there was no real difference between saying that a claim that is not arguable (applying the test for permission) and that a claim was bound to fail. As Underhill LJ put it at §13:
“if a case is unarguable is it not bound to fail?”
. However, his Lordship went on to explain that this plainly was not the intention behind the relevant rules. At §15 he said:
“In our view the key to the conundrum is to recognise that the conventional criterion for the grant of permission does not always in practice set quite as low a threshold as the language of “arguability” or “realistic prospect of success” might suggest. There are indeed cases in which the judge considering an application for permission to apply for judicial review can see no rational basis on which the claim could succeed: these are in our view the cases referred to in the Grace case as “bound to fail” (or “hopeless”). In such cases permission is of course refused. But there are also cases in which the claimant or applicant (we will henceforth say “claimant” for short) has identified a rational argument in support of his claim but where the judge is confident that, even taking the case at its highest, it is wrong. In such a case also it is in our view right to refuse permission; and in our experience this is the approach that most judges take. On this approach, even though the claim might be said to be “arguable” in one sense of the word, it ceases to be so, and the prospect of it succeeding ceases to be “realistic”, if the judge feels able confidently to reject the claimant's arguments. The distinction between such cases and those which are “bound to fail” is not black-and-white, but we believe that it is nevertheless real; and it avoids the apparent anomaly identified at para 13 above.”
[67]In my judgment, for the reasons that I have given, this is a case in which the Claimant's application for permission to apply for judicial review was hopeless and bound to fail in the sense identified in Wasif. Not only is it clear that the Court has no jurisdiction (the Claimant failed to serve the sealed claim form in accordance with the rules, has made no application to extend time to serve, and there is no basis to grant any such extension), the claim is also out of time, is improper because of the availability of a right of appeal to the Circuit Judge, and is entirely without substantive merit.. For those reasons, I do consider that this is an application which is totally without merit and will so declare.

Costs

[68]I turn to the issue of costs. The Chief Constable, as Interested Party, previously made an application for its costs of preparing the acknowledgement of service. The Claimant was ordered to pay those costs by Mrs Justice Lang, summarily assessed in the sum of £500. Her order contained a process for challenging that sum. The Claimant has sought to challenge the amount of costs. He says it is excessive, particularly bearing in mind the costs that he had been ordered to pay, and has paid, in the County Court.[69]I disagree. I consider that the sum of £500 is an entirely reasonable and proportionate sum in respect of the preparation of the acknowledgement of service that the Interested Party was obliged to put in on service of the claim form by the Court. For those reasons, the sum of £500 is maintained.[70]In respect of attendance today, the Interested Party seeks its costs of preparing for and attending today’s hearing. In accordance with CPR 54A PD §8.5, the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide 2025 provides at §25.4.5.2:
“A defendant or other party who attends and successfully resists the grant of permission at a renewed hearing will not usually recover from the claimant the costs of attending the hearing.”
[71]That is the general rule. The Court nonetheless has a discretion and may depart from it if it is considered that there are exceptional circumstances for doing so. A non-exhaustive list of such circumstances appears at §25.4.5.5 of the Guide, and includes the hopelessness of the claim, or persistence in the claim by the Claimant after having been alerted to facts and/or the law demonstrating its hopelessness.[72]In my judgment, those two features are present here. As I have explained, in my view this application for permission was totally without merit. Further, Mrs Justice Lang's order on the papers, with which I have substantially agreed, set out the reasons why this Claimant's claim was hopeless. The Claimant nonetheless persisted in it. In my judgment, it was reasonable for there to be some attendance at today's hearing on behalf of the Interested Party and the Court should depart from the general rule in relation to costs.[73]The sum of £1,774.70 is sought by the Interested Party. I have considered the work required to put in a short skeleton argument to amplify the arguments set out in the acknowledgement of service, and the costs of attendance. I have also kept in mind the other costs order made by Lang J, which I have confirmed, and that I am departing from the general rule. Given all these considerations, I consider it reasonable, fair and appropriate for me to award the sum of £750 in respect of attendance today, giving a total costs award of £1,250. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Email: civil@epiqglobal.co.uk