ERD v London Borough of Hounslow [2026] EWHC 1398 (Admin)
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 1398 (Admin)Case No AC-2025-LON-004488
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Venue The Royal Courts of JusticeDate Tuesday, 12 May 2026
Strand
London WC2A 2LL
Before
MR HUGO KEITH KC(Sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court)
Between
ERDClaimantLONDON BOROUGH OF HOUNSLOWDefendantMR M ARMITAGE appeared for ClaimantMR M PADGET (instructed by the local council) appeared for DefendantJUDGMENTDigital Transcription by Epiq Europe Ltd,Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JEWeb: www.epiqglobal.com/en-gb/Email: civil@epiqglobal.co.uk(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)This Transcript is Crown Copyright. It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority. All rights are reserved.WARNING: reporting restrictions may apply to the contents transcribed in this document, particularly if the case concerned a sexual offence or involved a child. Reporting restrictions prohibit the publication of the applicable information to the public or any section of the public, in writing, in a broadcast or by means of the internet, including social media. Anyone who receives a copy of this transcript is responsible in law for making sure that applicable restrictions are not breached. A person who breaches a reporting restriction is liable to a fine and/or imprisonment. For guidance on whether reporting restrictions apply, and to what information, ask at the court office or take legal advice.
[1]THE DEPUTY JUDGE: By an application dated 15 April 2026, the Claimant makes an application for permission to amend her pleadings. The application was made by her ahead of today’s rolled-up hearing, and on an urgent basis, and it is regrettable that the court was not in a position to resolve that application before today.[2]Mr Armitage, who appears for the Claimant, argues that the application is necessary and should be granted for a number of reasons. Firstly, he says it is necessary to update the factual position. He notes that the pleadings had already been subject to amendment reflective of new facts which had occurred since the claim was first lodged on 11 December 2025. Mr Armitage observes that the factual scenario had moved on considerably since that date, the date on which the claim was filed, because at the conclusion or towards the end of the hearing conducted by Mr John Halford, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, between the 16 and 19 December, a new personalised housing plan was produced by the defendant dated 19 December 2025.[3]Secondly, Mr Armitage argues that no prejudice would be done to the Defendant Council were this application to be granted. The Defendant has been in position to respond to the application evidentially since the date that the application was filed on 15 April 2026. He further argues that the issue of the suitability of the property at [No 33] has been under consideration in fact since the date on which the claimant moved into that property on 18 January 2026. He therefore says that his application is an instance of a permissible change to a claim envisaged by Sales LJ, as he then was, in The Queen on the application of Tanvir Hussain v The Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWCA Civ 1111.[4]Mr Michael Paget on behalf of the Council opposes the application. In essence, he says that this is an impermissible instance of a ‘rolling review’. He makes the point that the decision which is now sought to be challenged, namely the decision of 12 March 2026 to the effect that the property at [No 33] is a suitable accommodation for the discharge of the Council's section 193 full housing duty, is not merely an iteration of an earlier decision, which has been set to one side by virtue of a superseding decision on the same issue, but is in fact an instance of an entirely new decision, because it relates to the Council's duties under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996 as opposed to the duties which hitherto arose under section 189B(2).[5]In my judgment the application should be granted. Such an outcome is consistent with the overriding objective of enabling the court to deal with the case justly and at proportionate cost. Granting the application allows the court to have the complete picture before it. It enables it to deal with the entirety of the Claimant’s position in so far as her accommodation is concerned and will bring about the finality of which Mr Matthew Butt KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, spoke when he directed this rolled-up hearing. It would not be a good use of the court's resources, or of the party's resources, in fact, for the Claimant to be, in effect, directed to commence a new judicial review against the 12 March 2026 decision. Such a course would defeat, indeed, the intent behind the order that this be a rolled-up hearing.[6]The proposed amendments to the pleadings are largely concerned, in my judgment, with updating the factual position and ensuring that the factual developments since the claim was issued are made clear. The most significant developments are of course the letter of 10 March from the Defendant acknowledging that its relief duty had come to an end, and that the full housing duty under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996 was engaged. Secondly, the letter of 11 March confirming it had carried out an assessment of the Claimant’s family’s housing needs, and attaching a PHP. Third, the letter of 12 March asserting that the interim relief property was suitable to discharge its full housing duty under section 193.[7]True it is that the re-re-amended Statement of Facts and Grounds, at paragraph 63c, challenges the suitability of that property and the lawfulness of the council's purported discharge on 12 March of its section 193 Housing Act 1996 duty. This amounts to an obvious extension to the original claim. However, the Claimant was always challenging the perceived failure of the Defendant to make suitable property available and even in its original emanation the claim form challenged generally the discharge of the Council's duties under the Housing Act 1996 to make suitable accommodation available.[8]Moreover, these are not complex changes, and the Defendant is able to respond to them. Obviously, my ruling in no way bars the Defendant from advancing the same arguments that it has put up in its response to the application to amend the pleadings, namely that the material introduced by the second witness statement of the Claimant and the application to amend ignore the alternative remedy available under sections 202 and 204 of the Housing Act 1996.[9]Moreover, the Defendant is in no way debarred from advancing the same points which were set out very clearly in the letters from Paul Olusegun on behalf of the London Borough of Hounslow, dated 10 and 11 March, where he sets out in detail the severe shortage of available housing in the London Borough of Hounslow. He provides some information concerning the average waiting times for properties of three bedrooms being four or more years.[10]And the Council is further able to rely upon the general evidence from Mr Nally set out in his witness statement of 24 December 2025, in which he provided detailed information, as at 23 December 2025, concerning the number of Hounslow properties that were ready for nomination and, in particular, showing that there were no four-bedroom properties available. That evidence is consistent with the letter, which I was shown today for the first time, dated 8 May 2026, from the London Borough of Hounslow in which the Claimant was offered alternative accommodation at a different address. It is an address which is notably a three-bedroom house, and it came about because there are no fourth-bedroom houses available.[11]For all those reasons, as I say, I will grant the application. 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