Freedom from Torture & Anor, R (on the application of ) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWHC 1278 (Admin)

[2026] EWHC 1278 (Admin)Case No AC-2024-LON-001892
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 28/05/2026
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE SWEETING
Between
The King (on the application of (1) Freedom from Torture and (2) The Helen Bamber Foundation)ClaimantsSecretary of State for the Home DepartmentDefendant
Shu Shin Luh and Olivia Beach (instructed by Deighton Pierce Glynn) for ClaimantsAlan Payne KC and Edward Waldegrave (instructed by The Government Legal Department) for DefendantHearing Hearing dates: 18 th-19 th November 2025
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 3pm on 28.05.2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE SWEETING

Introduction

[1]The Claimants seek to challenge the Secretary of State’s amendments to the Allocation of Asylum Accommodation policy contained in Version 11, published on 12 February 2024, and repeated in Version 12, published on 27 March 2024, and Version 13, published on 4 June 2025. These amendments were made before the change of Government on 4th July 2024. The Claimants contend that they involved the removal of long‑standing protective provisions for survivors of torture, trafficking and other serious violence without consultation, without proper regard to equality duties, and without adequate inquiry into the impact on a vulnerable cohort of asylum seekers.

The Claimants

[2]The Claimants are UK registered charities who provide specialist support to survivors of torture and trafficking (who are referred to variously as “clients” or “patients” by the Claimants) and represent their interests in their policy and campaign work.

Freedom from Torture

[3]Freedom from Torture (“FfT”) is a specialist organisation providing clinical, welfare and medico‑legal services to survivors of torture who are seeking protection in the United Kingdom. It was formerly known as “the Medical Foundation”. It has operated since 1985 and delivers its services through national centres located in London, Glasgow and Manchester. Its clinical work is organised into two principal branches: a clinical rehabilitation service and an independent Medico‑Legal Report (“MLR”) service, both falling within the organisation’s Clinical Directorate.[4]FfT’s clinical rehabilitation service provides assessment and treatment for mental and physical health conditions commonly experienced by survivors of torture, including PTSD, depression, anxiety and chronic pain. Treatment is delivered by a multidisciplinary team comprising psychiatrists, psychologists, therapists, nurses, social workers, physiotherapists, and welfare advisers. The services offered also include the Legal Advice and Welfare Service (“LAWS”), which provides immigration, welfare and housing advice to clients receiving treatment. The majority of clients present with multiple and severe traumatic experiences. Treatment may last up to two years. In early 2024, 99% of clients undergoing treatment had a Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) diagnosis.[5]The MLR service prepares medico‑legal reports for use in asylum and related proceedings when instructed by legal representatives. It operates independently from the rehabilitation service but may draw on clinical assessments relevant to a client’s presentation and history. Both the clinical and medico-legal functions are regarded within the organisation as contributing to survivors’ rehabilitation needs.[6]Due to the severity of its clients’ health conditions and the importance of continuity of care, FfT’s role extends to identifying the accommodation needs of those in treatment or undergoing assessment. FfT considers secure, safe and private accommodation, in particular access to a single room and proximity to treatment centres, to be necessary to support effective therapy and to prevent deterioration in mental health. Its clinicians and welfare advisors routinely provide letters outlining clients’ accommodation‑related needs to the Home Office via Migrant Help, a charity providing independent advice and guidance to assist people seeking asylum in the UK.[7]FfT contends that alongside its clinical role, it has, for more than two decades, been regarded by the Home Office as an expert stakeholder in the development and revision of asylum support accommodation policy. The organisation has been consulted directly and through the Asylum Strategic Engagement Group (“SEG”) asylum support subgroup which the Home Office identifies as a consultative body for updated policies and operational guidance relating to asylum accommodation. Its expertise has been reflected historically in specific policy provisions relating to dispersal, room‑sharing and the handling of medical evidence. These provisions, some dating back to 2000, recognised FfT’s expertise in assessing the needs of torture survivors and were incorporated into successive versions of the Home Office’s asylum accommodation policies.[8]Thus, in summary, FfT says that it plays a dual role: it provides specialist clinical and welfare services to survivors of torture and has historically contributed technical expertise to the Home Office on matters relating to the accommodation needs of this group, informing both individual casework and the development of relevant policy.

The Helen Bamber Foundation

[9]The Helen Bamber Foundation (“HBF”) is a specialist organisation that provides clinical, therapeutic, welfare and medico‑legal support to survivors of torture, human trafficking, and other severe forms of ill‑treatment. Established in 2005, its remit is broader than that of FfT, as it supports individuals who have experienced a range of extreme abuse, including but not limited to torture. HBF works with highly vulnerable asylum seekers who frequently present with complex physical and psychological needs arising from their past experiences. It has only one treatment centre, which is in London.[10]Since its inception, HBF contends that it has operated as an expert organisation consulted by the Home Office on matters concerning the treatment and accommodation of survivors of torture and trafficking. From 2006 onwards, the Home Office expressly recognised that the same policy protections that applied to FfT’s clients, particularly regarding dispersal, room‑sharing, and reliance on clinical expertise, should apply equally to HBF’s clients, and HBF was incorporated into the relevant policy frameworks.[11]HBF has participated, alongside FfT, in the Asylum SEG support subgroup. Through this forum, HBF has provided clinical insight, raised concerns about policy operation, and contributed to the development and refinement of Home Office asylum‑support guidance over many years.[12]The HBF’s clinicians and support staff have historically supplied the Home Office with assessments of clients’ welfare and accommodation needs, including the need for single‑room accommodation or proximity to treatment services. The Home Office has previously recognised HBF’s expertise by incorporating into policy a principle that where HBF identified specific accommodation requirements, caseworkers should not seek further clinical justification or refer cases to Home Office Medical Advisers. These provisions formed part of the policy framework for more than a decade.[13]Like FfT, HBF contends that it plays a dual role: it provides specialist care and support to survivors of torture and other severe abuses, and it has supplied expert clinical and operational input into the development of Home Office accommodation policy affecting these groups. Its involvement alongside FfT reflects the Home Office’s longstanding practice of engaging with specialist organisations whose work provides insight into the needs and risks experienced by vulnerable asylum seekers.

Evidence

[14]The Claimants, relied on evidence from: i) Natasha Tsangarides: Associate Director of Advocacy at FfT, who provided a first and second witness statement detailing the history of the policy, the consultative relationship with the Home Office, and FfT’s concerns. ii) Dr Janine Bonnet: Head of FfT’s MLR Service and a qualified General Practitioner, who provided an expert report regarding the practical barriers to obtaining medical evidence and the clinical harm caused by inappropriate accommodation. iii) Dr Helen McColl: National Director of Clinical Services at FfT, who provided a witness statement explaining FfT’s clinical rehabilitation services and the barriers faced by FfT patients. iv) Professor Cornelius Katona: An expert for HBF, who provided an expert report identifying the nature of disability among HBF’s patients and the trauma-inducing impact of room-sharing arrangements. v) Kamena Dorling: Director of Policy at HBF, who provided a witness statement covering similar ground to Ms Tsangarides. vi) Kat Lorenz: From the Asylum Support Appeals Project (“ASAP”), who provided a witness statement describing occasions when subgroup members were consulted on policy changes.[15]The Defendant relied on two witness statements from Jason Büültjens (a Home Office official), principally his statement dated 8 August 2025.[16]The Defendant also provided internal Home Office emails from the period October to December 2023. This disclosure included “read outs” and notes of meetings between Home Office policy staff and ministerial teams.

Judicial Review – The Grounds

[17]Permission to apply for judicial review on all grounds was granted by an order of Deputy High Court Judge David Pittaway KC dated 10 April 2025, with a separate costs capping order made on the same date. The grounds are, in summary, as follows: i) Ground 1: this ground asserts that the Defendant has breached her duty to consult with stakeholders, including the Claimants, prior to the publication and implementation of the Allocation of Asylum Accommodation policy Version 11, and did not consult prior to the publication and implementation of Version 12 and Version 13. The duty, it is said, arises under common law from an established practice of consultation and due to the impact on the Claimants’ client groups is such that a failure to consult the Claimants specifically would lead to ‘conspicuous unfairness’. ii) Ground 2: under this ground the Claimants contend that the Defendant has acted in breach of the Public Sector Equality Duty (“PSED”) under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 (“EA 2010”) in the following ways: a) The relevant decision maker, the Minister, appears not to have had due regard to the PSED (this argument was not actively pursued at the hearing); b) The Defendant did not in any event have due regard to the equalities impact of the changes implemented under Allocation of Asylum Accommodation policy Version 11 and subsequently on those survivors of torture, trafficking and other serious forms of violence who have protected characteristics. This breach has not been remedied by the Equality Impact Assessment (“EIA”) dated 31 March 2025 (“March EIA”), disclosed to the Claimants after permission to proceed with this claim was granted on 10 April 2025 or subsequent EIAs. iii) Ground 3: this ground asserts that in formulating and implementing the amendments to the suitability criteria in Allocation of Asylum Accommodation policy Version 11, the Defendant acted unlawfully in breach of the Tameside duty by failing to take reasonable steps to inform herself of the impact of the changes on survivors of torture, trafficking and other serious forms of violence. The breach has continued under Version 12 and Version 13 of the policy in the absence of any monitoring by the Defendant of the impact of the changes on affected vulnerable groups

Issues

[18]The following issues were agreed: Ground 1: i). Did the SSHD have a duty to consult with FfT and HBF in respect of the policy changes to room-sharing and dispersal affecting their patients, prior to the publication and implementation of those changes in Version 11 of the Allocation of Asylum Accommodation policy arising as a result of: a) an established practice of consultation and/or b) because it would be conspicuously unfair not to do so? Ground 2: ii). Has the SSHD breached the EA 2010 section 149 in respect of the policy changes implemented in Version 11 of the Allocation of Asylum Accommodation? iii). Has the SSHD breached the EA 2010 section 149 by maintaining the policy changes in Versions 12 (27 March 2024) and 13 (4 June 2025)? Ground 3: iv). Did the SSHD breach her Tameside duty of inquiry to inform herself of the potential impact of the policy changes on survivors of torture, trafficking and other serious forms of violence prior to the publication and implementation of the policy changes under challenge in Version 11 of the Allocation of Asylum Accommodation policy and the decision to maintain those policy changes in Version 12 and Version 13.

The Judicial Review Hearing and Subsequent Events

[19]The hearing took place over two days on 18 and 19 of November 2025. It was not possible for the Claimants to complete their reply on all matters, and they asked to do so in writing.[20]On 21 November, the Defendant disclosed draft versions of Version 11 of its Allocation of Asylum Accommodation policy under cover of a letter explaining why these documents had not previously been disclosed. There was also a fifth supplementary witness statement from Sian Pickard, a lawyer at the Home Office, explaining why and where redactions had been made.[21]On 26 November, the Defendant replied by letter to queries which had been raised by the Claimants in respect of the further disclosure. The letter confirmed that “All the material changes affecting the Claimants’ patients appear to have been made between 11 December 2023 and 29 December 2023.” The Defendant reserved her position in relation to a right of response in the event that the Claimants raised points which were not properly the subject of a reply, whether in respect of the further disclosure or otherwise.[22]The Claimants provided a written reply dated 3 December 2025. It ran to 19 pages and prompted a response from the Defendant, on 10 December, to the effect that it went well beyond the appropriate boundaries of a reply and sought to reinforce points made in opening. The Defendant pointed out that the written reply made only passing reference to the further disclosure so that its length could not be explained by the need to deal with the additional documentation. The Defendant further observed that the Claimants had asked the court to take into account “numerous policy announcements that have been made over the last four weeks” without identifying what was referred to or how it was to be taken into account.[23]On 13 January 2026, the Defendant provided an Equality Impact Assessment of the same date. That was followed by the publication of Version 14 of the Allocation of Asylum policy on 22 January.[24]On 16 February 2026, the Claimants’ filed written submissions in relation to the most recent EIA (“January 2026 EIA”) and Allocation of Asylum Accommodation policy version observing that the Defendant had not given any indication as to whether she intended to rely on the January 2026 EIA and policy version nor what, if any, regard the court was to have to it in preparing its judgment. The Claimants asked for an extension of the relief sought to Version 14 and the January 2026 EIA.[25]On 27 February, the Defendant submitted that the matters raised by the Claimants went to remedy, if that became relevant, and that she did not propose to make further submissions unless required to do so by the court. The Claimants had reserved their position in relation to a response to further submissions from the Defendant, if they were made. Having considered the additional post-hearing material, I did not ask for further submissions from the Defendant.

The Statutory and Policy Framework

[26]The provision of support and accommodation to asylum seekers is governed principally by Part VI of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (“IAA 1999”), supported by the Asylum Support Regulations 2000 (“2000 Regulations”) and the Asylum Seekers (Reception Conditions) Regulations 2005 (“2005 Regulations”).[27]Under section 95(1) IAA 1999, the Secretary of State has a power to provide support, including accommodation, to asylum seekers who are destitute. Section 98 provides the same power pending a decision as to whether to provide support under section 95. A person is deemed destitute, pursuant to section 95(3), if they do not have adequate accommodation, the means of obtaining it, or the means of meeting their essential living needs. Where an application is made and the Secretary of State determines that the applicant is eligible, Regulation 5 of the 2005 Regulations requires that support be offered, thereby converting what is expressed as a discretionary power into a duty to provide accommodation.[28]The accommodation provided must be “adequate for the needs of the supported person and his dependants” (see section 96(1)). Accommodation is ordinarily allocated on a “no-choice” basis and in areas where there is considered to be a ready supply, typically outside London (see section 97(1)). However, the statutory scheme expressly provides that this “no‑choice” principle does not prevent consideration of an individual’s personal circumstances. That qualification appears both in section 97(1) itself and in Regulation 13(2) of the 2000 Regulations, which provide that the no‑choice rule “shall not be taken to prevent” the Secretary of State from accommodating an asylum seeker in light of their particular circumstances.[29]Special protections apply in respect of “vulnerable” asylum seekers. Regulations 4(2) and 4(3) of the 2005 Regulations impose a mandatory requirement on the Secretary of State to take into account the special needs of persons who have been subjected to torture, rape, or other serious psychological, physical or sexual violence when providing accommodation. These provisions thus identify survivors of such experiences as a category of vulnerable persons warranting specific consideration.[30]Taken together, the statutory framework provides that while the Secretary of State enjoys broad discretion in allocating no‑choice accommodation, she must ensure that accommodation is adequate, must consider personal circumstances, and must specifically consider the special needs of vulnerable asylum seekers, including survivors of torture and trafficking.[31]Alongside the statutory framework, the Secretary of State has for many years issued guidance to caseworkers on the allocation of asylum accommodation. Since the inception of the asylum support scheme in 2000, this guidance has recognised that asylum seekers may have differing accommodation needs arising from past trauma, physical or mental ill‑health, disability or other vulnerabilities. I now turn to the history of the development of that guidance and the role played by the Claimants.

Policy Bulletin 19

[32]The background to the interactions between the Claimants and the Home Office was set out in detail in the witness statements of Natasha Tsangarides, in respect of each version of the Defendant’s accommodation policy, identifying relevant changes, and the extent to which FfT and HBF were consulted. She summarised the overall purpose of the interaction with the Home Office from the Claimants’ perspective:
“...the Home Office use various terms to describe instances of consultation, including “engagement”, “discussion”, or “negotiation”
. We have always proceeded on the basis that the purpose of all of these interactions, however described, is the same, i.e. for the Home Office to obtain the Foundation’s views on potential material policy changes to asylum support policy which impact on our clients, and to inform its decision on whether to make or modify those potential changes.”[33]The relationship developed gradually, beginning in the late 1990s, during parliamentary debates on the IAA 1999, when the government acknowledged the special needs of torture survivors. The then Parliamentary-Under Secretary for the Home Office, Lord Williams of Mostyn, stated in the House of Lords:
“A small number of asylum seekers require specialist services to address conditions which result from torture. I pay tribute to the very fine work of the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture. Where it is clear that someone needs specialised services which cannot be delivered other than through a body of that sort, and the location of that body does not fit in with our normal cluster arrangements, we shall consider the possibility of finding accommodation adjacent to those services. It is a limited number of cases, but that does not make the point any less important.”
[34]Following the introduction of the National Asylum Support Service (“NASS” - the previous name of the part of the Home Office responsible for overseeing asylum support arrangements) in 2000, the Home Office issued Policy Bulletin 19, the first formal acknowledgement in Home Office guidance of the particular accommodation requirements of torture survivors. The purpose of the Bulletin was stated in its opening paragraph: “The purpose of this instruction is to assist caseworkers in dealing with requests from applicants who are/will be attending the Medical Foundation”.[35]In relation to dispersal away from London and the South East, it provided:
“Where accommodation has been requested, and the reception assistant has made a referral to the Medical Foundation for an assessment of either the main applicant or a dependant (see Annex A), NASS must give careful consideration to deferring dispersal – ie maintaining the applicant(s) in emergency accommodation or providing temporary accommodation in London - until the Medical Foundation has assessed his/her case.”
[36]Where the Medical Foundation made a decision as to whether to accept an asylum applicant for treatment then:
“NASS must consider the Medical Foundation decision as part of the assessment process.”
[37]Dr McColl’s evidence as to how FfT’s assessment operated was: “The clinical teams in each centre review all clients referred for treatment at the intake stage. They consider whether the referral is within FfT’s remit and whether we have the capacity to offer the services required. If a client is in remit and we have capacity to offer the services they need, we will offer an assessment. Unfortunately, due to capacity and practicalities with accessing our treatment centres, we are unable to assist all survivors of torture who need treatment and are referred to us. Where we do not proceed to assessment, we endeavour to signpost individuals to more appropriate services. Of the 1,020 referred in 2023, we were able to offer 222 people an assessment”.[38]Version 2 of Policy Bulletin 19 introduced a further section in relation to the special accommodation requirements of Medical Foundation patients: “Asylum seekers who are accepted for treatment by the Medical Foundation may have special needs that affect the type of accommodation they require. The MF has advised that, where such requirements come to light during the initial assessment, they will indicate them on the referral form (Annex A) under the section “Special Accommodation Needs (if any) ....as a general rule, the majority of Medical Foundation patients have significant difficulties in sleeping, and should not be placed in shared accommodation if at all possible” and “Ideally… should not be placed in full board accommodation”.[39]Dr Bonnet’s report explained that: “Common mental health conditions in asylum seekers and refugees include Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), complex PTSD, depression, and anxiety disorders. There are higher rates of psychosis than in the general population. Mental health conditions are often co-morbid (more than one mental health condition occurs at the same time). The higher rate of mental health conditions and associated suicidal behaviours, self-harm and harmful substance use increases risk of death by accident or suicide. There are higher rates of physical health conditions which negatively impact mental health and a lack of access to health care impacts prevention, early intervention and treatment of mental health conditions. A recent systematic review and meta analysis of 26 published research studies from 2003-20209 found that adult asylum seekers and refugees have high and persistent rates of PTSD and depression, which can persist for many years after displacement. The study finds that ‘PTSD and depression in refugees and asylum seekers appear to be more prevalent than in the general population. According to data from the World Mental Health Surveys, lifetime prevalence in the general population is 3.9% for PTSD and 12% for any depressive disorder, compared to our findings of 31% for PTSD and 31.5% for depression’. The UK Mental Health Foundation review of research finds that asylum seekers and refugees in the UK are ‘more likely to experience poor mental health including higher rates of depression, PTSD and other anxiety disorders’”.[40]In relation to accommodation needs she said:
“I have described above how, in order to begin to recover from a traumatic experience, a person needs to be in an environment in which they feel safe and secure. This can best be achieved by being accommodated in a single room, or in self-contained accommodation. Conversely, a lack of privacy can cause a general decline in mental health with worsening mood, anxiety, PTSD specific symptoms, including disturbed sleep, and increasing thoughts of self-harm and suicide. A torture survivor may feel the need to hide their body from others, particularly if they have visible scarring. They may fear being asked what happened to them, or how their scars were obtained. A person who has been sexually assaulted may fear being in a state of vulnerability with others, for instance partially clothed and asleep. A person with strong avoidance symptoms related to PTSD may need to avoid contact with others altogether. A survivor of torture who is LGBTQ+ may have particular concerns about being required to share a room, especially if they have been harmed in relation to their gender or sexuality. A lack of privacy can exacerbate poor sleep patterns and in turn lead to a further deterioration in mental health. A person with PTSD, depression or other mental health problems might find that their sleep worsens as a result of having to share a room with any others. This will be particularly true if they do not feel safe when sleeping and if they are unable to engage in behaviours which they previously carried out to increase their sense of safety, for instance sleeping with a light on.”
[41]Although correspondence with the Home Office from the turn of the century could not be located, the terms of Policy Bulletin 19 plainly support the Claimants’ case that it must have been drafted with input from FfT, since it broadly ensured that those referred to or treated by FfT could expect dispersal to be deferred and would not be required to share bedrooms where that was possible.[42]These early provisions in Policy Bulletin 19, which remained extant until early 2014, formed the foundations of what later became known as the Dispersal Provision and the Single Room Provision encouraging caseworkers to defer dispersal until assessment or to maintain applicants in suitable locations and a single room, recognising that many applicants suffered severe sleep disturbances and should not be placed in shared rooms. These provisions were subsequently extended to HBF’s patients.[43]In her witness statement Dr McColl explained how this worked in practice:
“With regards to the Dispersal and Single Room provisions, to ensure that the policies were correctly applied to our clients, we would write short letters to Migrant Help, explaining that the individual was a client of FfT and should not be dispersed during assessment and/or accommodated in a shared room. The letters for clients in treatment were similarly short. ...These letters would be sent by clinical administrators if a client was in assessment, and the LAWS welfare advisors if a client was receiving treatment at FfT. In some cases the information would be sent in an email rather than on letterhead. It was not necessary to include any clinical content in this correspondence; we simply needed to cite the policy protections that applied to our clients. Because the letters and emails did not contain any clinical content, they could be sent out very quickly without the need for clinician input.”

Engagement between 2004 and 2014

[44]Between 2004 and 2014, the Home Office engaged in periodic consultations with FfT and, following its establishment in 2005, HBF, regarding proposed modifications to the Policy Bulletin. Increasing pressures on the asylum accommodation estate in London appear to have been the primary driver for the Home Office seeking changes to the Policy Bulletin’s dispersal provisions over this period.[45]In September 2004, according to Ms Tsangarides (the correspondence having been lost), the Home Office proposed a “more limited arrangement” in which FfT clients would only be accommodated in London when essential for their welfare, suggesting others could travel to London or receive treatment elsewhere. However, this change was not implemented because the Home Office opted to draft a new Asylum Instruction on dispersal, and the Policy Bulletin remained unchanged. In 2006, the Home Office formally agreed that HBF clients could also rely on the protections of the Policy Bulletin.[46]In 2009, the Policy Bulletin was unexpectedly removed from the Home Office website, prompting FfT to raise concerns. The Home Office confirmed, in response, that the policy remained in operation and provided a written assurance that FfT would be consulted before the publication of any new Asylum Instruction. Mr Hugh Ind, the then Strategic Director of Asylum, wrote to FfT’s Chief Executive, Simon Carruth, on 14 September 2009 saying: “UKBA confirmed the Policy Bulletin 19 on dispersal effectively still operates in practice. UKBA will publish a new instruction and we will consult with the Medical Foundation first. Elaine and Leanne will meet to talk about dispersal in more detail so Medical Foundation can understand how this works in practice better and UKBA can better understand the extent to which Medical Foundation presence in the regions has boosted capacity...Liaison on these issues will be in parallel with the Helen Bamber Foundation”.[47]Mr Carruth’s detailed reply of 5 November 2009 contains the following concluding paragraphs:
“Following our meeting on 4 September, a team from the Medical Foundation met with Ian Cheeseman to discuss our system for preparing medico-legal reports. Our understanding was that these discussions would continue and that at some point in the future the UKBA would share with us and the Helen Bamber Foundation (and other NGOs working on asylum law and policy) its proposals for a new Asylum Policy Instruction covering the medico-legal report services provided by these two organisations. We were therefore extremely concerned to learn that a legal representative was recently advised by a case owner that the UKBA is now operating a ‘new’ policy ‘not yet written, but being implemented anyway’ according to which, on a case by case basis, decisions may be taken on an asylum claim notwithstanding the fact that the person has been accepted for pre-assessment by the Medical Foundation. This runs completely contrary to the Asylum Policy Instruction on the Medical Foundation which provides that, except in cases where the case owner decides to grant asylum, ‘all cases that have been accepted for pre-assessment by the Medical Foundation will be placed on hold pending the outcome of the pre-assessment, as long as evidence of the appointment is provided in writing’.”
[48]Consultations on replacing the Policy Bulletin began in February 2010. The Home Office requested data on FfT’s clinical operations and proposed a “phased approach” to relocate clients receiving less frequent treatment outside of London in order to free up space for new arrivals. FfT proposed that the Dispersal Provision be triggered at the point at which a referral was accepted. By email of 8 February 2010 the Home Office requested, amongst other things, that FfT outline its “wish list” of provisions for the new instruction it was developing: “Elaine asked MF to develop a wish list for UKBA to consider. Wish list to explain what MF is ideally looking for in the new Asylum Instruction including in relation to:• What should be the trigger event for blocking dispersal• MF timeframes for responding to referral including consultation with referrer, decision on referral (including communication of this to referrer), offer of assessment appointment, undertaking of assessment• Circumstances in which we would agree it is acceptable for someone to be moved outside London (say 2 hours away) with travel to MF appointments paid for by UKBA• Spectrum of options re. type of accommodation - self-contained as well as other types of accommodation• Context of service availability in the regions where MF has a presence”.• What should be the trigger event for blocking dispersal• MF timeframes for responding to referral including consultation with referrer, decision on referral (including communication of this to referrer), offer of assessment appointment, undertaking of assessment• Circumstances in which we would agree it is acceptable for someone to be moved outside London (say 2 hours away) with travel to MF appointments paid for by UKBA• Spectrum of options re. type of accommodation - self-contained as well as other types of accommodation• Context of service availability in the regions where MF has a presence”.[49]These discussions appear to have been paused subsequently so that the parties could focus on other policies, but resumed in September 2011. The Home Office reiterated the need to alleviate pressure on London accommodation by reaching agreement on circumstances where FfT clients could be housed outside the city. It was agreed that the Home Office’s retained Medical Advisor would not assess FfT cases; a concession that was the origin of the “Medical Advisor Provision” found in later policy documents. While the Home Office committed to “redrafting the concession” (i.e. the Policy Bulletin) based on these discussions, a scheduled follow-up meeting in November 2011 did not occur, no redraft was provided, and the existing Policy Bulletin remained in force.[50]In November 2013, the Home Office announced to the Asylum SEG support subgroup its intention to revise and consolidate various asylum support documents, including the Policy Bulletin. In December 2013, a Home Office representative informed FfT that central government budgets could not accommodate the costs of London housing, indicating a desire to use the SEG subgroup to hear the voluntary sector’s case for London accommodation. By February 2014, the Home Office clarified that while it was not altering dispersal policies, it was reviewing the cases of applicants currently housed in London to ensure they were in line with existing policies.[51]By email of 2 April 2014, Zoe Harper, the then Law and Policy Officer at FfT, wrote to Ms Helen Earner, the Deputy Director responsible for Dispersal and Routing at the Home Office commenting:
“We were encouraged by your presentation at the NASF Asylum Support Group in relation to protecting the exceptional cases criteria and by your assurance that the Home Office is not seeking to redefine policy on dispersal. You will be aware that the protection against dispersal from London where the clinical services of both organisations are centred ensures that survivors of torture and other forms of serious harm are able to access the specialist treatment they require to rehabilitate the damaging physical and psychological effects of the ill-treatment they have suffered.”
[52]However, she also raised concerns that clients were increasingly being dispersed from London before their clinical assessments or during their treatment, without prior engagement with FfT regarding clinical capacity at its regional centres. A subsequent meeting took place in July 2014, during which the Home Office acknowledged the specific needs of FfT and HBF clients and the necessity of protecting their access to therapeutic support, while continuing to emphasise the ongoing pressures on London accommodation.[53]A decade of consultations and operational discussions under Policy Bulletin 19 concluded in December 2014, when the Home Office promogulated a new policy document.

The Accommodation Policies

[54]On 4 December 2014, the Home Office published Version 1 of the “Dispersal – Accommodation Requests Policy,” which officially replaced Policy Bulletin 19. The new policy stipulated that while dispersal away from London and the South East remained the standard procedure, caseworkers were to give “careful consideration” to deferring the dispersal of individuals who had an appointment or warranted an assessment by FfT and HBF. It also maintained a Single Room Provision, indicating that as a general rule, FfT and HBF patients should not be placed in shared rooms, female patients should not be placed in mixed-sex accommodation, and full-board accommodation should ideally be avoided to prevent triggering institutional trauma.[55]However, the policy formalised a process requiring asylum seekers in Home Office accommodation who wished to receive FfT and HBF treatment to first consult a General Practitioner (“GP”). It tasked the GP with considering the asylum seekers needs, determining if local NHS services were sufficient, and arranging a referral to FfT and HBF only if specialist treatment was deemed strictly necessary. Significantly, the Home Office published Version 1 without consulting FfT and HBF, which remained completely unaware of the new policy until a slightly amended Version 2 was published on 21 January 2015.[56]The discovery of Version 2 triggered an immediate response from FfT. On 29 January 2015, Andrew Keefe, FfT’s National Director of Clinical Services, wrote to Alison Samedi, the Head of Asylum Policy, expressing “serious consternation” that a policy directly affecting their therapeutic services had been developed and published without any engagement or formal communication. Under the subheading “Lack of consultation” Mr Keefe observed that:
“We are concerned by the lack of formal communication or consultation with Freedom from Torture with regard to proposed changes to support arrangements that directly affect the provision of our therapeutic services to survivors of torture. The Home Office provided an assurance to Freedom from Torture that the organisation would be consulted before any proposed amendments to Policy Bulletin 19. That agreement is set out in a letter from Hugh Ind (then Strategic Director of Asylum at UKBA) to the Foundation dated 14 September 2009 following verbal confirmation of the same at a meeting of 04 September 2009. [...] As a separate matter, we would also draw your attention to the fact that access to specialist treatment services provided by the Helen Bamber Foundation, to which Policy Bulletin 19 also applies, are given no consideration in the above document. We therefore urgently request that the Home Office withdraw this document from circulation and consult appropriately with Freedom from Torture on its dispersal and accommodation policy, reinstating Policy Bulletin 19 in the interim, so that any policy may operate effectively to ensure that survivors of torture are able to access the specialist therapeutic and rehabilitative care that they need.”
[57]Mr Keefe criticised the GP referral requirement, arguing it was based on a flawed understanding of healthcare access which would actively prevent survivors from receiving care. He explained that forcing survivors to be assessed by a GP undermined FfT’s own self-referral process and failed to account for the fact that GPs often struggled to readily identify the complex physical and psychological sequelae of torture.[58]For the purpose of the present proceedings Dr Bonnet’s report gave a detailed explanation of the limitations on what could, realistically, be expected from GPs operating within the National Health Service (“NHS”) when dealing with traumatised victims of torture.[59]As Mr Keefe had observed the HBF had been entirely omitted from the new policy, despite the longstanding agreement that the provisions applied equally to their clients.[60]On 19 February 2015, Ms Samedi responded, stating that the lack of consultation was not deliberate but the result of a broader initiative to simplify asylum support guidance following an inspectorate report. She stated:
“In most material aspects the text in these sections is identical or very similar to the text in Policy Bulletin 19, which as you say Hugh Ind previously agreed would remain in place pending consultation on any change in the policy.”
[61]She suggested that the only significant change was the removal of an instruction requiring FfT patients to be housed in London, which the Home Office felt was outdated given FfT’s expansion into regional treatment centres.[62]Notwithstanding these observations, Ms Samedi offered a temporary concession, agreeing that the Home Office would continue seeking London accommodation for FfT clients being treated in London “pending further consultation”. She also agreed to arrange an urgent meeting with FfT and HBF to resolve the issues raised, suggesting that “It would be ideal if a completely re-written document could be agreed quickly” or the Home Office could make immediate, quick changes, such as removing the problematic language regarding GP assessments.[63]Following the immediate fallout from Version 2 of the policy, on 20 March 2015, Ms Samedi and Simon Bentley, representing the Home Office, met with FfT to consult on policy revisions. HBF was unable to join the meeting due to short notice.[64]The Home Office agreed to a number of policy provisions that FfT had been advocating for, including: i) Triggering the Dispersal Provision at the point FfT or HBF accepted a client referral. ii) Implementing a “Medical Adviser Provision” to ensure the Home Office’s Independent Medical Adviser would not have a role in assessing FfT or HBF cases. iii) Clarifying the “Single Room Provision” so that it was understood that FfT and HBF clients should not be required to share bedrooms. iv) Removing the paragraph that required survivors to be assessed by a GP before being referred to FfT. v) Expressly applying the policy to HBF clients and agreeing to create a system for FfT and HBF to request self-contained accommodation for their clients.[65]On 1 May 2015, Sonya Sceats, then Director of Policy for FfT, submitted a combined markup of proposed changes on behalf of both FfT and HBF saying:
“Thanks very much for the helpful discussion about dispersal issues on 20 March and for sending through a Word version of the policy for us to work from. We have fed back our discussion to colleagues at the Helen Bamber Foundation and worked with them to develop a consolidated set of proposed changes for you and Simon to consider (see attached).”
[66]These proposed changes included explicit wording that clients “should never be required to share bedrooms with strangers” and that it was “not appropriate” to refer their cases to the Home Office Medical Advisor regarding accommodation suitability.[67]Following this submission, there was then silence from the Home Office. FfT’s records show no further correspondence regarding the policy revisions for over a year.[68]The consultation process resumed on 7 June 2016, when Mr Bentley provided FfT and HBF with a new redraft of the policy by email attachment, internally identified as “version 3”. Mr Bentley apologised for the long delay and noted that while the text and structure had changed, the essence remained substantially the same as the drafts they had previously discussed. He said:
“Section 4 looks at requests made on the basis that the person is being treated or being considered for treatment by FFT or HB. You’ll see that the text and structure is different to the various draft versions we’ve circulated between us – but I think the essence is substantially the same. But let me know what you think. You’ll note also, that I’ve cut down some of the text that outlined the history/background/services your organisations deliver. I think some of that is important, as a way of giving some context to the decision maker, but I’d prefer the document to be focussed on what caseworkers should do in the given circumstances. Feel free to amend/change this part of the text as you feel appropriate, but I’d rather the overall length remains about the same.”
[69]Section 4 of the Policy draft is headed “Accommodation requests from those who are being assessed for treatment or receiving treatment from Freedom from Torture or the Helen Bamber Foundation”. This Version 3 draft in fact incorporated many of the Claimants’ suggestions from 2015, including language stating that FfT and HBF clients should not share bedrooms with strangers “as a general rule, and wherever possible,” and adopting the Medical Adviser Provision.[70]On 17 June 2016, Ms Sceats responded to the Home Office with further suggested revisions, noting that the Claimants were “really pleased to see many of the improvements we discussed last year reflected in the draft”. A few days later, on 22 June 2016, the Home Office circulated this revised policy to the other non-governmental members of the Asylum SEG support subgroup, inviting their wider feedback and proposals by early July. The letter stated: “The updated draft does not include the text at section 4 because the Home Office is still consulting FFT/HB separately on that part” (my emphasis).[71]It does not appear that Version 3 was ever promulgated, but on 24 August 2016, the Home Office published Version 4 of the policy. With this release, the document was officially renamed from the “Dispersal – Accommodation Requests Policy” to the “Allocation of Accommodation Policy”.[72]Version 4 introduced a protective “Room Sharing Provision,” stipulating that “[a]s a general rule, and wherever possible, persons receiving treatment by either organisation should not be required to share bedrooms with strangers”. It also contained the “Medical Adviser Provision,” stating that if the Claimants requested self-contained or special accommodation for clinical reasons, caseworkers should generally accommodate those needs without asking for detailed justifications or referring the case to the Home Office Medical Adviser. In addition, the policy required that any requests to move individuals from accommodation deemed unsafe or unsuitable by the Claimants should be handled on an urgent basis.[73]Version 5 of the Allocation of Accommodation policy was published on 7 March 2017, with no substantive changes to the provisions protecting FfT and HBF clients.[74]Between 2017 and 2020, FfT made complaints to the Home Office that torture survivors were being wrongfully dispersed outside of London and forced into shared bedrooms. These were essentially complaints that the policy was not being followed (on some occasions) and individual cases and example case studies, to make good this contention, feature in the correspondence over the entire period.[75]A meeting took place on 14 July 2020 between the Home Office, FfT, HBF, and other NGOs. During this meeting, the Home Office stated that the policy breaches were occurring because accommodation providers were misinterpreting or misunderstanding the information regarding individuals’ specific needs. The Home Office indicated that it was drafting new guidance for asylum caseworkers and accommodation providers to resolve communication and allocation issues.[76]On 27 May 2021, the Home Office published Version 6 of the Allocation of Asylum Accommodation policy, which introduced a new chapter setting out criteria to identify individuals unsuitable for accommodation at the former military barracks at Napier. The addition of this guidance followed litigation (NB and Ors v SSHD [2021] EWHC1489 (Admin)), concerning the use of Napier barracks, which had resulted in the disclosure of previously unpublished suitability criteria for such sites.[77]Because the sleeping arrangements at Napier consisted of communal dormitory-style rooms, clients being assessed or treated by FfT and the HBF were already protected from placement there by the policy’s existing Single Room Provision. This provision remained unchanged in Version 6. The Claimants were not consulted on the new version, and their evidence was that they would not have expected to be consulted on specific changes which were inapplicable to their clients.[78]For other survivors of torture or trafficking who were not FfT or HBF clients, Version 6 established suitability criteria explicitly identifying categories of people who were “not suitable” for Napier. These included individuals awaiting decisions on modern slavery or trafficking claims, those with complex health needs, and those defined as vulnerable under the 2005 Regulations, such as disabled people and survivors of torture, rape, or serious violence, who had an individual evaluation confirming their special needs. Because Napier dormitories typically housed 14 people, the Claimants viewed the criteria as an implied acceptance by the Home Office that the identified vulnerable categories were generally unsuitable for room-sharing.[79]Version 6 also introduced a minor geographical amendment regarding the dispersal of FfT and HBF clients, changing the designated area from “zones 1-6 in London” to “travel zones in London”. However, FfT’s evidence was that in practice, clients continued to be accommodated within zones 1 to 6, as very few common dispersal locations fell outside of zone 6.[80]Later that year, in November 2021, the Home Office responded to ongoing concerns from NGOs by establishing the “G7 Escalations Inbox”. This provided a direct email channel for legal representatives and NGO stakeholders to escalate urgent accommodation issues that remained unresolved after exhausting the standard routes through the Home Office’s main asylum support contractor, Migrant Help.[81]On 28 October 2022, the Home Office published Version 7 of the policy, renaming the document to the “Allocation of Asylum Accommodation Policy”.[82]The most notable change in this version was the strengthening of the Single Room Provision, offering greater protection to clients of FfT and HBF. Previous iterations of the policy contained caveats, stating that these clients should not share bedrooms with strangers “as a general rule, and wherever possible”. Version 7 removed these caveats entirely, establishing a more directive rule that individuals receiving treatment from either organisation “should not be required to share bedrooms with unrelated adults”. This amendment brought the Room Sharing Provision closer to the specific language FfT had proposed during the consultations in May 2015.[83]Additionally, Version 7 expanded the scope of the policy’s suitability criteria so that it applied to all communal dormitory forms of accommodation, rather than limiting it solely to the Napier barracks. Because of the newly reinforced Room Sharing Provision, clients being assessed or treated by FfT and HBF remained fully exempt, as a matter of policy, from being placed in any of these communal dormitories.[84]On 23 December 2022, the Home Office published Version 8 of the Allocation of Asylum Accommodation policy. This version primarily added guidance regarding support for individuals living in private accommodation. The specific provisions protecting individuals being assessed or treated by FfT and HBF were unchanged. The Claimants were not consulted on this update; again, their position was that they would not have expected to be consulted given the nature of the changes.[85]The following summer brought significant operational shifts across the asylum accommodation estate. On 12 July 2023, the Home Office began using RAF Wethersfield, a former military barracks, with the intention to house 1,700 single adult male asylum seekers there. Around this time, the Home Office also announced “Operation Maximise,” a broader initiative which aimed to increase the use of shared rooms.[86]Coinciding with the opening of RAF Wethersfield on 12 July 2023, the Home Office published Version 9 of the policy. This update explicitly stated that the policy’s “suitability criteria” applied to accommodation at ex-Ministry of Defence (MoD) sites, vessels, Napier barracks, and room-sharing arrangements at other accommodation sites.[87]Version 9 acknowledged that, due to the Home Office’s legal obligation to provide accommodation to prevent destitution, there might be occasions where individuals were placed in shared rooms before a screening interview had been conducted. However, the policy directed that when information was available, Home Office Accommodation Providers were required to consider the suitability criteria to determine if room sharing was appropriate.[88]The specific guidance regarding FfT and HBF clients remained unchanged in Version 9, so that they continued to be exempt from room-sharing and large-site placements under the Single Room Provision. Nevertheless, the rollout of “Operation Maximise” led to several operational breaches requiring the Claimants’ clinicians and caseworkers to intervene and request that the Home Office apply the Single Room Provision to protect their clients.[89]Version 10 of the Allocation of Asylum Accommodation policy was published on 9 October 2023. This update clarified the guidance regarding the suitability criteria for accommodation at ex-Ministry of Defence sites, vessels, Napier barracks, and room-sharing arrangements at other accommodation sites. For clients of FfT and HBF, the critical safeguards, the Single Room Provision, Medical Adviser Provision, and Dispersal Provision remained unchanged. Because these protections remained intact, FfT and HBF clients continued to be explicitly exempt from room-sharing and large-site placements, and again the Claimants did not expect to be and were not consulted on this update.[90]Notwithstanding the policy position the period surrounding the introduction of Version 10 was characterised by complaints to the Home Office over operational and implementation failures.[91]Issues of this sort were initially raised during a September 2023 meeting of the SEG support subgroup. NGO stakeholders warned the Home Office that its own “FAQs” document distributed to asylum seekers about room-sharing failed to explain any of the policy’s exemptions, leaving vulnerable individuals unaware that they might be protected from sharing. Stakeholders also criticised the Home Office for allowing private accommodation providers to act as the primary decision-makers regarding an individual’s suitability for room-sharing. The minutes of the meeting record specific reference to the Allocation of Asylum Accommodation policy in answers to questions about which individuals were unsuitable for room sharing. The focus of the exchanges were about categories of vulnerable asylum applicants not covered by the single room concession afforded to the Claimants’ clients.[92]These systemic concerns escalated significantly at a subsequent SEG support subgroup meeting in December 2023. NGOs presented reports of desperate asylum seekers queuing to plead with hotel staff not to force them into shared rooms due to their individual circumstances. FfT presented specific examples of cases where their protected clients were forced into shared rooms, requiring FfT caseworkers to spend hours on the phone with Migrant Help. NGOs also highlighted that the primary assessment form (the ASF1) was inadequate, containing only a tick-box for suitability criteria that failed to capture the necessary information to protect vulnerable individuals.[93]In response to these operational complaints and NGO feedback, the Home Office defended its processes. It maintained that accommodation providers were the correct “first point of call” for managing allocations and that service users were “encouraged to make sharing room choices themselves,” while any refusals to move individuals out of shared rooms should simply be escalated via Migrant Help. The Home Office requested that the NGOs provide case studies to help identify what was going wrong in a “collaborative approach”.[94]The Claimants’ evidence was that there was a marked reduction in the Home Office’s overall engagement with the SEG support subgroup, noting that they were frequently not being consulted on changes in advance and that their queries were increasingly going unanswered. This breakdown in the operational application of Version 10 culminated on 8 February 2024, when subgroup members sent a formal letter to the Home Office reiterating their concerns, in the event just days before the Home Office introduced changes in Version 11.

Version 11

[95]On 12 February 2024, the Home Office published Version 11 of the Allocation of Asylum Accommodation policy. The Home Office introduced what were, on any view, significant changes (and were described as such within its own EIA) without giving any advance notice or consulting FfT, HBF, or the Asylum SEG subgroup. The covering announcement said:
“A further update to the guidance has now been made to remove the strict criteria preventing certain categories of individuals in receipt of asylum support from being accommodated at large sites and/or room sharing in the wider accommodation estate. It has been replaced with a discretion to consider exceptional circumstances, and to ensure the suitability of individuals is assessed on a case-by-case basis and that accommodation meets individuals’ needs.”
[96]The Claimants’ case is that this amounted to a fundamental departure from over 20 years of established consultative practice between the Home Office and specialist NGOs.[97]Version 11 changed, and on the Claimants’ case, drastically reduced protections for survivors of torture by removing the long-standing Single Room Provision and the Medical Adviser Provision. Instead of FfT and HBF clients being exempt from room-sharing and large accommodation sites, caseworkers were instructed to assess their suitability on a “case-by-case basis”. The policy also allowed the Home Office to seek second opinions from its own Medical Advisers rather than accepting the Claimants’ clinical expertise. The Dispersal Provision was weakened, with the guidance stating that deferring an individual’s dispersal to keep them near a treatment centre was “expected to be rare”.[98]In addition, Version 11 shifted the evidential burden onto the individual asylum seeker. The revised suitability criteria stated that vulnerable people “may not be” (rather than “are not”) suitable for room-sharing, requiring individuals to provide “verifiable expert or professional evidence” of an “individual evaluation” to avoid being placed in shared rooms. FfT heavily criticised this change, arguing that the required evidence, such as comprehensive healthcare records or letters from GPs, was, for all practical purposes, impossible for most asylum seekers to obtain quickly due to NHS waiting lists, digital literacy barriers, and the profound difficulties survivors face in disclosing trauma during short primary care appointments.[99]The fallout was immediate. During a SEG support subgroup meeting on 11 March 2024, stakeholders confronted the Home Office about the lack of consultation and the detrimental impacts of the new policy, asking to see an equality impact assessment which the Home Office confirmed had been carried out but which it had not shared or published. The Home Office defended the changes, arguing that not all victims of torture have the same needs and a case-by-case assessment was necessary. When challenged on why they had bypassed consultation, the Home Office representatives suggested that such consultative processes were “not collaborative or supportive,” relying on the pace of work and the need to take ministerial instructions as further reasons for not consulting. The exchanges in which these reasons are recorded in the minutes are illuminating as to whether the Claimants had an expectation of prior consultation. FfT’s representative was Sile Reynolds, identified as “SR”, the Home Office representatives included Miv Elimelech, referred to as “ME”, whilst Kat Lorenz (see above) was also present as co-chair and is referred to as “KL”:
“SR, returning to the issue of getting a second opinion on the medical evidence, pointed out that caseworkers were not clinical experts so unless extensive support and guidance was provided to them, she anticipated that poor decisions would be made. This had already happened with the adults at risk procedures and with asylum casework. The foundations could help provide support to caseworkers. She explained that voluntary sector organisations could have helped with all of these points had the Home Office come to them before creating the policy. Now organisations would have to monitor the implementation and feed that back. This was why consultation was so important. She expressed surprise that such a fundamental change was made to policy without consultation or even the courtesy of letting the foundations know about the change. Whilst the policy might help the Home Office achieve a certain policy objective, it would increase the administrative burden on everyone. This was a significant, intentional change that would increase the risk that people would fall through the cracks because people won’t be able to provide evidence. It also increases the workload of the foundation. Previously, being a foundation client meant that the person was identified as being vulnerable without having to disclose that they were suicidal etc. Seeing an equalities impact assessment would enable an understanding of the Home Office’s thinking and to explain the justification for shifting away from a preventative approach to a risk approach. ME thought the Home Office was being told off. SR explained that what she said was merely reflecting the level of surprise on the part of her organisation that this change was introduced with no consultation. ME explained that the Home Office had not wanted to consult because these processes were not collaborative or supportive. She asked that SR see things from the Home Office perspective: they take instructions from ministers and need to work fast. SR responded that this was exactly why voluntary sector organisations wanted to see the equality impact assessment. It would allow organisations to understand the Home Office’s perspective better. KL interjected that in the past, these meetings were co-operative. But in the last year there has been a shift. Everyone in this meeting understood that the Home Office was responding to ministerial directions but talking in advance of significant changes would be a better way of working together. She thought SR was only expressing disappointment and alarm at the shift away for the preventative model. Now it feels like the voluntary sector needs to identify people falling through the gaps. There has also been a concerning dip in the quality of decisions made by the Home Office recently. This change was worrying because it would generate a lot more work and put individuals are risk of harm. That is was what SR was explaining.”
[100]Following this meeting, FfT’s CEO, Ms Sceats, contacted Daniel Hobbs, the Home Office’s Director General for the Migration and Borders Group, expressing the view that the voluntary sector felt “let down” and requesting a collaborative resolution. However, on 27 March 2024, the Home Office published Version 12 of the policy, retaining the changes introduced in Version 11 as did Version 13 in June 2025 notwithstanding judicial findings in R (TG & Ors) v SSHD [2025] EWHC 596, that elements of the suitability criteria were unlawful due to failures under the PSED.[101]By mid-April 2024, FfT reported that their clients were already suffering the real-world consequences, with traumatised individuals being moved without adequate notice and forced into shared rooms. FfT and HBF initiated legal action, sending a Letter Before Claim to the Home Office on 18 April 2024, and issuing a protective claim for judicial review on 10 May 2024.[102]The Home Office has disclosed internal emails from October to December 2023. These shed very little light on the rationale for the absence of consultation with the Claimants on Version 11. In fact, they suggest that there was an intention to consult stakeholders and do not explain why that approach was reversed.[103]In mid-October 2023, the Home Office’s Accommodation and Transformation Policy team set out their intention to engage with external stakeholders and NGOs to help review accommodation sites and inform any upcoming changes to the guidance. Several Home Office staff members specifically suggested consultation with FfT and HBF on proposed changes.[104]On 31 October 2023, a member of the Home Office policy team, Shahida Ilahi, wrote an email in the following terms: “I don’t think there is a risk of individuals ‘shoehorning’ themselves into the process or abusing the system. I have spoken to Matt Nestling and he has confirmed what I already knew about these organisations. Both organisations are medical experts for torture and highly recognised experts in that field. Any individual referred to them has to undergo a threshold test – it’s not just everyone referred to them who is accepted. There is a triage process which is followed and some level of evidence is provided to them during the referral process. There is quite a detailed form which is completed by the referring representative which is considered by the organisations carefully. HB provide a bespoke training package for medical professionals who work with them and the specialism of both organisations is not one which is found within the NHS – for example, they look at the cause of the scars and don’t really consider credibility – although if an account is so far-fetched and incredible then this would be raised. The reports provided by these organisations can be distinguished from others. […] HB and Freedom from Torture are considered to be on a par with the Salvation Army and their reports need to be given sufficient scrutiny - they are definitely respected NGO’s and making any changes to the guidance without any prior consultation with them could be reputationally risky. This is particularly relevant if we are depriving individuals of the specialism of these organisations which is funded by legal aid (access to justice argument). Not only do they provide medico legal reports but they provide support and recovery services in line with their areas of speciality. They are 2 of the very few organisations who comply with the Istanbul Protocol which you don’t find on a national basis” [my emphasis].[105]The internal discussions and early policy drafts appear to have focused largely on ministers’ desires to “tighten” suitability criteria for large “pathfinder sites” (like former military barracks) and potential changes to the Dispersal Provision. The disclosed documents contain no mention of any plans to amend or remove the vital Single Room Provision or the Medical Adviser Provision, which were unexpectedly stripped from Version 11.[106]As Ms Tsangarides noted in her witness statement, these internal exchanges make the Home Office’s later justifications difficult to understand and lie uneasily with the assertion in March 2024, that there was insufficient time and that consultation was too “adversarial”. The disclosed emails show the Home Office had been discussing internally the possibility of consulting the Claimants a full four months before Version 11 was published. The Defendant’s response to this is to argue that it was well known that the Home Office was under intense pressure at the time.[107]The Ministerial Submission seeking approval to implement Version 11 of the Allocation of Asylum Accommodation policy articulated the reason for change as:
“To mitigate against the risk of individuals abusing the system by making unsubstantiated claims of unsuitability, increase the number of individuals suitable for large sites, and reduce reliance on hotels.”
[108]As Ms Ilahi had indicated in her October email (above) there was, in her view at least, little risk of those accepted by the Claimants abusing the system in this way. Notwithstanding this, Version 11 did not differentiate between the wider cohort of asylum seekers and those being treated by the Claimants as previous iterations of the policy had done.[109]When Version 11 of the Allocation of Asylum Accommodation policy was introduced, the Secretary of State relied on an Equality Impact Assessment dated 10 January 2024 (“the January 2024 EIA”). That assessment was prepared to accompany the proposed changes implemented under Version 11, including amendments to the suitability criteria and the shift from category‑based presumptions to a case‑by‑case assessment of accommodation suitability. The January 2024 EIA stated that:
“The Public Sector Equality Duty is being reviewed following the introduction of large accommodation sites and the policy changes to be introduced for the accommodation of potential victims of modern slavery.”
[110]The January 2024 EIA was then provided to Ministers in advance of the publication of Version 11 on 12 February 2024. Under the heading “Allocation of Accommodation Policy” it states:
“Reasons for accommodating people in a particular location may include where that is necessary to maintain continuity of medical treatment or treatment being undertaken with Freedom from Torture and the Helen Bamber Foundation.”
[111]In relation to disability it states:
“Under the policy, large accommodation sites will not be used to accommodate those who have serious mobility problems or for those who have complex health needs including mental disabilities and within the meaning given by the Healthcare Needs and Pregnancy Dispersal Policy at paragraph 4.16. Information on the numbers of such cases is currently not recorded.”
[112]In subsequent litigation in TG v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWHC 296 (Admin), the High Court considered whether the PSED had been complied with when Version 11 was introduced. The Court concluded that the January 2024 EIA did not adequately assess the equalities impacts of the changes made by Version 11, in particular the impact of the amended suitability criteria on disabled asylum seekers. That judgment therefore involved a judicial determination that the January 2024 EIA was insufficient for the purposes of compliance with the PSED at the point when Version 11 was promulgated.[113]In reaching that conclusion Mould J held [316-319]:
“316. ...the claimants’ contention under ground 3(c) is that the change of policy in version 11 of the Allocation Policy, that asylum seekers with special needs resulting from being disabled, serious mental health problems or otherwise being vulnerable may now be considered suitable for accommodation at Wethersfield, was one that required an assessment of its equalities implications. As I have said, in her evidence on behalf of the defendant, Ms Stratton expresses the same view. She relies upon the Policy EIA for that assessment, which she also says was considered by ministers in deciding to bring in that change to the Allocation Policy published under version 11 on 12 February 2024. 317. The claimants’ case in the consolidated claim is straightforward. They say that the defendant has not discharged the PSED in respect of that change of policy. She has not made a lawful or rational assessment of the equalities impacts of that new policy. 318. In my judgment, the claimants’ case is plainly well-founded. The Policy EIA, which is said to have been conducted to assess the impact of the proposed policy changes later given effect in version 11 of the Allocation Policy, simply did not make that assessment. I have set out above the relevant extracts from the Policy EIA. The focus of the assessment carried out in the Policy EIA was evidently on the policy change made by version 10 of the Allocation Policy, in relation to the change in approach to the suitability of potential victims of modern slavery to be accommodated at Wethersfield. Insofar as that assessment considered the impact on disabled persons, it did so on the basis that under the Allocation Policy, large accommodation sites (including Wethersfield) would not be used to accommodate those who have complex health needs including mental disabilities; and that individuals with mental impairments were not considered suitable for such accommodation and “will not be housed at these sites”
. The assessment stated that the suitability criteria in the Allocation Policy “will ensure” that asylum seekers who are considered as “not suitable” for such sites will not be moved to them. 319. The Policy EIA makes no attempt to assess the equalities implications of the change in policy which was then proposed, the effect of which was that asylum seekers who were disabled or had serious mental health issues may henceforth be judged to be suitable for accommodation at Wethersfield provided that their special needs were able to be met at the site. That is a most serious and inexplicable omission, particularly in the light of Ms Stratton’s evidence that the Policy EIA was prepared and submitted for ministers’ consideration precisely to enable the equalities impacts of that significant change in policy to be considered. It amounts to the clearest failure on the part of the defendant to fulfil the PSED. This is not a case in which the question is whether the Policy EIA properly fulfils the defendant’s duty to have due regard to the statutory objectives in section 149 of EA 2010. In this case, the only conclusion I am able to reach on evidence is that the defendant did not attempt to assess the equalities impacts of the proposed policy change later promulgated under version 11. That remains the factual position, since there was no subsequent assessment of the policy change when it was carried forward into the current version 12 of the Allocation Policy.”[114]Following the judgment in TG, the Secretary of State undertook a further Equality Impact Assessment dated 31 March 2025 (“the March 2025 EIA”). This later assessment examined the equalities implications of maintaining the amended suitability criteria and the case‑by‑case approach, including their potential impact on disabled persons and the mitigations said to be in place. The March 2025 EIA was submitted to Ministers before the publication of Version 13 of the Policy on 4 June 2025, which retained the Amendments introduced in Version 11. The Claimants’ Submissions in Summary Duty to Consult

The Claimants’ Submissions in Summary

[115]The Claimants contend that the SSHD was under a common law duty to consult them before making material changes affecting their patient groups. They advance two bases: i) Established Practice: They say the evidence demonstrates a consistent and well‑recognised practice of consultation with FfT and HBF on accommodation policy affecting their clients/patients before and after implementation, extending over more than two decades. They point to repeated express assurances from Home Office officials, the sharing of draft policies, and the use of the Asylum Support Sub‑Group as a consultation forum. ii) Conspicuous Unfairness: They argue that the abrupt removal of long‑standing protections, on which their patients reasonably relied, without consultation was so unfair as to amount to an abuse of power.[116]The Claimants rely on authorities including R (Plantagenet Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Justice [2015] 3 All ER 261, R (BAPIO Action Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 1139, R (Medical Justice) v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 251, and R (Bhatt Murphy) v Independent Assessor [2008] EWCA Civ 755, to support the existence and enforceability of a common law consultation duty.

Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED)

[117]The Claimants assert that the SSHD failed to comply with the PSED in section 149 EA 2010. They argue: i) Survivors of torture and trafficking commonly suffer from PTSD, complex PTSD and other long‑term mental impairments amounting to disabilities under EA 2010. ii) The policy changes directly affect this group by requiring them to share rooms unless they can prove unsuitability. iii) The January 2024 Equality Impact Assessment did not address the equality implications of these changes, focusing only on “large accommodation sites”. iv) The subsequent March 2025 EIA, produced before Version 13, is said to repeat the same deficiencies, lacking any assessment of the likely impact on disabled asylum seekers and relying on no clinical or operational evidence.[118]The Claimants argue that the omissions mirror the failings identified in TG & Ors, and that the SSHD therefore failed to have proper regard to the need to eliminate discrimination and advance equality of opportunity.

Tameside Duty of Inquiry

[119]The Claimants submit that the SSHD failed to make the necessary inquiries before deciding to introduce and maintain the policy changes. They say: i) No clinical evidence was sought from FfT or HBF, despite their acknowledged expertise. ii) No alternative expert evidence was obtained. iii) The SSHD did not consider available research or casework data concerning the impacts of room‑sharing on survivors of torture and trafficking.[120]They contend that the decision‑making was therefore not based on a proper evidential foundation and was unlawful under the principles set out in R v Secretary of State for Education, ex p Tameside [1977] AC 1014.

The Defendant’s Submissions in Summary

[121]The SSHD maintains that the policy changes were within her lawful discretion, were informed by appropriate considerations, and were designed to ensure a consistent, efficient approach to allocation of asylum accommodation, including the operation of large sites. She denies that the changes represent an abuse of power or a frustration of any legitimate expectation and contends that the claim should be dismissed.

Duty to Consult

[122]The SSHD denies that any common law duty to consult arose prior to introducing the changes in Version 11 because: i) No statutory duty to consult exists in this area. ii) There was no clear, unambiguous and consistent practice of consultation capable of giving rise to a legitimate expectation. iii) Any engagement with FfT/HBF prior to 2022 does not establish an ongoing duty, and the absence of engagement after that point, including in relation to Versions 9 and 10, indicates that no such practice was continuing. iv) The SSHD denies that any express promise to consult was made. v) She further denies that the circumstances give rise to conspicuous unfairness, submitting that policy may be changed without consultation in the absence of a legal obligation to consult.

The Public Sector Equality Duty

[123]The SSHD argues that she did not act unlawfully under section 149 EA 2010 as: i) The protected characteristic relevant to PSED is disability, not the status of being an FfT/HBF patient; therefore, changes specific to that cohort do not in themselves trigger the duty. ii) The equality impacts of the wider suitability criteria were considered, and any failings identified in TG & Ors relate specifically to accommodation at Wethersfield rather than the provisions applicable to FfT/HBF patients. iii) A further Equality Impact Assessment (“EIA”) was produced prior to Version 13, which the SSHD says demonstrates renewed and adequate compliance with the PSED. The Tameside Duty[124]The SSHD’s position in relation to the alleged breach of the Tameside duty is that: i) Reasonable inquiries were made before the adoption of Version 11 and subsequently. ii) The SSHD was entitled to rely on the Ministerial Submissions and the information contained within the relevant EIAs. iii) She was not required to seek specialist input from FfT or HBF before determining whether to amend the policy, and the absence of such engagement does not constitute a breach of the Tameside duty. The Legal Framework Consultation

The Legal Framework

[125]Lord Wilson in R (Moseley) v Haringey LBC [2014] 1 WLR 3947, identified the rationale behind consultation [24]: i) it tends to ensure better decision‑making, by exposing the decision‑maker to relevant information and arguments; ii) it avoids a sense of injustice among those affected; and iii) it reflects a democratic principle, ensuring that those affected are given an opportunity to be heard.[126]The circumstances in which the common law requires a public authority to consult those affected by a proposed decision have been considered in the case law. Although the duty is not free‑standing, it may arise in a number of distinct situations, each grounded in the overarching principle of procedural fairness. If not imposed by statute it is, in Lord Wilson’s words in Moseley, “...generated by the duty cast by the common law upon a public authority to act fairly.”[127]In Plantagenet (above), the Court of Appeal identified four principal circumstances in which a duty to consult may arise [97-98]: i) where there is a statutory duty to consult; ii) where a promise or assurance of consultation has been given; iii) where there exists a settled practice of consultation, which is sufficiently clear and unambiguous to create a legitimate expectation; and iv) where a failure to consult would give rise to conspicuous unfairness.[128]In the present case there is no statutory duty to consult. However, the fact that Parliament has not expressly mandated consultation does not preclude a common‑law duty from arising. As Sedley LJ explained [35-36] in BAPIO, the common law steps in to ensure fairness where Parliament has been silent. As Sedley LJ observed, to treat the absence of statutory prescription as precluding a common‑law duty would invert the rationale of procedural fairness and would risk bringing down “the entire body of adjectival common law constraints on the use of statutory powers.”[129]Thus, even in the absence of a statutory obligation, the common law may require consultation where fairness demands it in the circumstances set out in Plantagenet.[130]A duty to consult may therefore arise where an authority has, through its own conduct, created a legitimate expectation that consultation will take place before a material change is made. In Medical

Justice (above), Linden J held that the bar was a high one and that an established practice must be:

“sufficiently clear and well established to be tantamount to a promise or assurance that there will be consultation”; and, citing Newey LJ in R (MP) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2020] EWCA Civ 1634, [2021] PTSR 1122; “so consistent as to imply clearly, unambiguously and without relevant qualification that it will be followed in future.”
[131]In that case, Linden J accepted that a 15‑year pattern of consultations with an NGO established such an expectation. Even though the documentary evidence was limited the account of the practice operating was uncontradicted by evidence from the SSHD and justified the conclusion that consultation was required to meet the expectation. The Court of Appeal subsequently approved that approach.[132]In short, where the conduct of the authority conveys, by repetition and consistent practice, that those affected will be consulted, fairness requires the authority to adhere to that practice absent good reason.[133]Even if no statutory duty, promise, or settled practice exists, a duty to consult may arise where it would be conspicuously unfair not to consult before introducing a significant policy change; see Plantagenet Alliance Ltd (above). In Bhatt Murphy (above), Laws LJ explained [49-50] this as the “secondary case” of procedural expectation. “49. Accordingly for this secondary case of procedural expectation to run, the impact of the authority’s past conduct on potentially affected persons must, again, be pressing and focussed. One would expect at least to find an individual or group who in reason have substantial grounds to expect that the substance of the relevant policy will continue to enure for their particular benefit: not necessarily for ever, but at least for a reasonable period, to provide a cushion against the change. In such a case the change cannot lawfully be made, certainly not made abruptly, unless the authority notify and consult. 50. A very broad summary of the place of legitimate expectations in public law might be expressed as follows. The power of public authorities to change policy is constrained by the legal duty to be fair (and other constraints which the law imposes). A change of policy which would otherwise be legally unexceptionable may be held unfair by reason of prior action, or inaction, by the authority. If it has distinctly promised to consult those affected or potentially affected, then ordinarily it must consult (the paradigm case of procedural expectation). If it has distinctly promised to preserve existing policy for a specific person or group who would be substantially affected by the change, then ordinarily it must keep its promise (substantive expectation). If, without any promise, it has established a policy distinctly and substantially affecting a specific person or group who in the circumstances was in reason entitled to rely on its continuance and did so, then ordinarily it must consult before effecting any change (the secondary case of procedural expectation). To do otherwise, in any of these instances, would be to act so unfairly as to perpetrate an abuse of power.”[134]Whilst the Defendant accepts that Plantagenet contains language suggesting that, in an exceptional case, a failure to consult might give rise to unfairness even without a legitimate expectation it was submitted that there was substantial judicial doubt about whether this constitutes a distinct doctrine. The Defendant drew attention to the observations of Linden J in Medical Justice [165] where he doubted whether Hallett LJ in Plantagenet intended to recognise any principle over and above legitimate expectation (although I note that he did not reach a concluded view).[135]Further it was pointed out that in R (on the application of Gallaher Group Limited) v. Competition and Markets Authority [2018] UKSC 25; [2019] AC 96, Lord Carnwath stated that substantive unfairness is not a distinct legal criterion, and that calling something “conspicuously unfair” adds nothing to orthodox judicial review principles. That case did not however involve consultation and the argument centred on whether judicial review could be granted on the basis of “unfairness”.[136]For myself, I would accept that there is, conceptually, a residual category of cases, as identified in Plantagenet where consultation will be required even in the absence of any practice of prior consultation. Bhatt Murphy establishes that the duty to consult in such cases arises not from expectation alone, but from the “pressing and focused” impact of the authority’s past conduct on the affected class. In most cases it is unlikely to be unfair, let alone conspicuously unfair, not to consult where there is no expectation from past engagement that prior consultation will take place but in some cases it may be, where, as Laws LJ observed in Bhatt Murphy [49], there is “an individual or group who in reason have substantial grounds to expect” that they will be consulted. As Linden J observed this may also be viewed as another route to identifying circumstances which may give rise to a legitimate expectation.[137]Whilst the Defendant further submitted that there would be no unfairness to the Claimants’ clients as a result of the amendments to Version 11 if “properly understood”, I consider that the question of unfairness relates to whether or not it was necessary to consult given the nature of the changes not whether, in the Defendant’s view, changes which were accepted as significant would not be unfair in their operation. That may have been the result of consultation, but it does not in principle obviate the need for it.[138]It is nevertheless necessary to have in mind that the common law starting position is that there is no duty to consult as such and that the mere fact that a person or class of persons will be affected by a decision cannot give rise to an obligation to consult them; as Lane J observed in R (Better Streets for Kensington and Chelsea) v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea [2023] EWHC 536 (Admin) (at [36-38]:
“In R (Plantagenet Alliance Ltd) v The Secretary of State for Justice and others [2014] EWHC 1662 Admin, the Divisional Court, at paragraph 98 of its judgment, summarised the general principles concerning the duty to consult, as derived from the authorities. The Divisional Court noted, first, that there is no general duty to consult at common law and that the government of the country would grind to a halt if every decision maker were required in every case to consult everyone who might be affected by his decision. I would add here that, in the case of a democratically-elected public authority, such as the defendant, the courts will be particularly cautious about inferring that a duty to consult has arisen. As Laws LJ held in R (Bhatt Murphy) and others v the Independent Assessor [2008] EWCA Civ 755 at paragraph 41, “Public authorities typically, and central government par excellence, enjoy wide discretions which it is their duty to exercise in the public interest… Often they must balance different, indeed opposing interests across a wide spectrum. Generally, they must be the masters of procedure as well as substance…”
. As held in Plantagenet Alliance, a duty to consult may arise where there has been an established practice of consultation or where, in exceptional cases, a failure to consult would lead to conspicuous unfairness. Here again Bhatt Murphy is relevant. At paragraph 49, Laws LJ held that where there has been no assurance either of consultation or as to the continuation of the policy in question, “there will generally be nothing in the case save a decision by the authority in question to effect a change in its approach to one or more of its functions. And generally, there can be no objection to that, for it involves no abuse of power”.[139]It will also be necessary for any consultation required under common law to be capable of meeting the “Gunning” criteria (derived from the decision in R v Brent London Borough Council ex parte Gunning (1985) 84 LGR 168) for a consultation process which is specific enough to have a sensible structure and content. Given the status of the Claimants as expert NGOs in their field who had previously contributed to policy development, it does not seem to me that there can be any real argument about whether policy consultation here could have been conducted in an effective way with realistic outcomes.[140]In summary a common‑law duty to consult arises not only where it is imposed by statute, but wherever the authority’s promises, established practice, or where the requirement to avoid unfairness make consultation necessary. The case law identifies four categories, but the unifying theme is whether the circumstances are such that it would be unfair for a public authority to proceed to change policy without first hearing from those whom the change will affect. The PSED[141]The PSED is contained in section 149 of the EA 2010. The duty requires a public authority to have “due regard” to specified equality needs whenever it exercises its functions, including when formulating or revising policy. The content of the duty was considered by the Court of Appeal in R v Bracking v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2013] EWCA Civ 1345.[142]The PSED is engaged at the point when the Secretary of State is contemplating a change in policy, not merely when the policy is implemented operationally. The duty therefore arises before adopting a policy that may adversely affect people with protected characteristics. This is reflected in the criticism made in TG, where Mould J found that the SSHD failed to assess the equality implications of the change in policy which was proposed.[143]The PSED is triggered where a policy affects or is likely to affect people with protected characteristics, including those whose disabilities arise from mental impairments such as PTSD, depression or anxiety disorders. Accordingly, the duty arises whenever a decision may have an impact, adverse or otherwise, on such individuals.[144]In relation to the amendments specifically affecting individuals treated or assessed by FfT and HBF, neither the January 2024 EIA nor the March 2025 EIA carried out a separate analysis focused solely on those organisations or their patients. The Defendant’s position is that the relevant amendments formed part of the wider changes brought about by the move to a case‑by‑case approach, and that treatment by those organisations is not itself a protected characteristic requiring a distinct equality assessment.[145]The Claimants reject the proposition that the duty only arises where a policy change affects individuals precisely because they fall within a protected class (e.g. being an “FfT patient”). Instead, the duty is engaged when the impact of the decision falls disproportionately on persons who have protected characteristics, even if the policy is not formally targeted at them. The vast majority of survivors of torture and trafficking, it is argued, are “disabled within the meaning of s.6 EA 2010” and the Defendant ought to, or can be taken, to have known this by reason of the exemptions granted to them from the Policy Bulletin onwards.[146]The Claimants rely on the relevant case law to show that the PSED is non‑delegable, must be exercised with rigour and must be applied afresh whenever the policy is materially altered. In TG, Mould J found that there was “no attempt” to assess the equality impact of a proposed change and that this omission constituted a clear breach of the PSED.[147]The PSED does not mandate a particular form of investigation (such as an EIA), but effective compliance often depends on having sufficient information about equality impacts. If a decision‑maker lacks information about how a policy affects protected groups, two consequences may follow: i) They may fail to comply with the PSED (because they have not had “due regard”). ii) They may also breach the Tameside duty (because the decision was taken on an insufficient evidential basis).[148]Since equality considerations must be taken into account before the relevant decision is made, an equality impact assessment produced after the adoption of a revised policy cannot retrospectively cure a failure to have due regard at the appropriate time. This point is underscored in the Claimants’ criticism of the March 2025 EIA, which they say failed to address the equality impacts of Version 11 and therefore could not remedy the earlier omission.[149]The Defendant’s case is that, following the completion of the March 2025 EIA, any deficiencies identified in the January 2024 EIA had been addressed, such that the continued operation of the Amendments under Version 13 was then supported by a compliant equality assessment.

The Tameside Duty

[150]The Tameside duty arises from the principle articulated in Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside MBC [1977] AC 1014. It requires a public authority, before taking a decision, to make such inquiries as are reasonable in all the circumstances. The duty is directed not to the outcome of the decision but to the lawfulness of the decision‑making process. A decision will be unlawful if it is taken without the authority having sufficiently informed itself of the relevant material necessary to reach a rational conclusion.[151]The obligation is one of reasonable inquiry: the decision‑maker must take reasonable steps to acquaint herself with the information needed to make a properly informed decision. The duty is breached where she fails to obtain evidence that is obviously relevant, particularly where the potential impacts are significant and the information is readily available.[152]The duty arises at the point of deciding whether to adopt or maintain a policy and requires the Secretary of State to assess the potential impacts of the proposed policy on those affected; it cannot be satisfied retrospectively. Where a decision engages equality impacts, the PSED gives content to what information must be before the decision‑maker. In that sense, the PSED can be seen as informing the scope of the enquiries that may be required under Tameside.[153]The Claimants emphasised that they do not allege a failure in the implementation of the policy, but rather a failure to make the necessary inquiries before deciding to introduce the changes in Allocation of Asylum Accommodation Policy Version 11 and to maintain them in Versions 12 and 13. They argued that the Secretary of State failed to obtain clinical or expert evidence about the likely effects of room‑sharing on survivors of torture, trafficking and serious violence, including failing to seek evidence from FfT and HBF, despite the Secretary of State’s own officials recognising their expertise.[154]The Claimants’ argument proceeds on the basis that the amendments to the policy materially altered the position of a highly vulnerable cohort by removing automatic protections and replacing them with an evidence‑based, case‑by‑case assessment. They contend that, given the known vulnerability of survivors of torture and similar trauma, together with the difficulties they were likely to encounter in complying with the requirements imposed under Version 11, the decision‑maker was required to inform herself more fully about the likely impact of the changes, either by drawing on existing specialist evidence or by seeking input from expert organisations such as the Claimants.[155]The Claimants submitted that reliance on Ministerial Submissions and the later EIAs could not satisfy the Tameside duty where the evidence base consisted only of asylum statistics and did not include information about disabled asylum seekers or any assessment of the clinical impact of room‑sharing.[156]The Defendant characterised the case advanced as resting on a misunderstanding of both the nature of the amendments and the scope of the Tameside duty, emphasising that Version 11 did not introduce a policy requiring survivors of torture, or other vulnerable individuals, to share rooms. Rather, the change was that such individuals were no longer automatically excluded from consideration for shared accommodation. Whether shared accommodation would in fact be allocated depended on an individualised assessment of suitability under the revised criteria.[157]The Defendant drew attention to the fact that Version 11 expressly directs caseworkers to take “all evidence” into account when assessing suitability, including medical and other professional material, and permits referral to specialist medical advisers where appropriate. The Defendant argued that this evidential framework was specifically designed to identify cases where shared accommodation would be unsuitable and to prevent allocation in those circumstances. Viewed in this way, the policy itself incorporates a mechanism for addressing the risks relied upon by the Claimants.[158]Against that background, the Defendant submitted that no additional enquiry into the general consequences of room‑sharing for survivors of torture was required at the policy‑formation stage. Because Version 11 did not mandate room‑sharing for that group but instead relied on evidence‑based decision‑making to avoid harmful outcomes in individual cases, the Secretary of State was not obliged to conduct further investigations into impacts that the policy was structured to avoid. The Defendant frames the changes introduced by Version 11 not as a reassessment of the effects of room‑sharing on vulnerable individuals, but as a change to the method of identifying who should be protected from room‑sharing.[159]While not disputing the Claimants’ expertise, the Defendant maintains that the Tameside duty does not require a decision‑maker to consult experts or seek their views in every case where specialist knowledge exists. The question, it was argued, was whether the decision‑maker lacked information necessary to take a rational decision. The Defendant’s position is that sufficient material was already available, and that the policy’s safeguards meant that further enquiries of the kind proposed by the Claimants were not required as a matter of law.[160]The Defendant further points to the fact that the amendments introduced in Version 11 were maintained through later versions of the Policy, during which there was an opportunity for evidence of practical difficulties or adverse effects to be provided and considered. This is relied upon to support the contention that the Secretary of State did not close her eyes to relevant considerations, but adopted a framework capable of responding to evidence as it emerged[161]Essentially the Tameside dispute centres on a difference in characterisation. The Claimants treat the changes introduced by Version 11 as a substantive change with foreseeable adverse consequences requiring prior investigation. The Defendant treats them as a procedural reconfiguration, involving individual assessment and evidential safeguards, which did not trigger a duty to commission further enquiries about impacts that the policy was explicitly designed to prevent. Discussion and Conclusions Consultation

Discussion and Conclusions

[162]Mr Payne KC, on behalf of the Defendant, accepted, realistically, that there had been a practice of engagement along with assurances up until 2016. As it was put in the Defendant’s written argument:
“...the Defendant accepts that there has been the history of engagement with the Claimants in relation to asylum accommodation policy affecting those being assessed by the Claimants or receiving treatment from them as summarised. This is set out in detail in Ms. Tsangarides’ First Witness Statement: see paragraphs [80] – [192].”
[163]After that he submitted that there was no longer anything that could described as direct consultation whilst the SEG and NASS meetings were just a forum and did not represent formal consultation. A list of the changes that were made post-2016 were, he argued, plainly capable of relating to matters which would have been relevant for the claimants to have been consulted on, so that the fact that they were not must have indicated a change in approach at the very least. That was partly because, he argued, there had been a divergence in views that undermined the utility of consultation.[164]These submissions reflected Mr Büültjens’ evidence which was that:
“Therefore, there is no pattern or long-standing agreement of formal consultation or informal consultation prior to changes being made to the AOA policy with either of the Claimant organisations. However, there is a long-standing practice of communicating changes after they have been implemented through the NASF, and to engage with feedback, which was done in this case. Even if there was a previous pattern of consultation before December 2023, which we do not believe to be the case, it was brought to an end by the approach subsequent to that. Therefore, on any view there was no pattern of consultation in the period preceding the introduction of version 11.”
[165]I accept that in general terms, since the Claimants bear the burden of proof, I should accept the Defendant’s evidence at face value (see R (Soltany) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWHC 2291). However, that does not require resolving gaps or inconsistencies in the evidence in the Defendant’s favour as a matter of course or accepting matters of opinion or comment on the significance of, or conclusions to be drawn from, factual material.[166]Mr Payne KC advanced several further arguments regarding the history of the Defendant’s relationship with the Claimants. He sought to distinguish HBF, suggesting that arguments about an obligation to consult mainly emanated from interactions with FfT. However, there was in my view a clear acknowledgement of the role of both Claimants within the asylum system and a practical working partnership that began in 2000 for FfT (with Policy Bulletin 19) and in 2006 for HBF, when protective provisions were formally extended to their patients. This partnership was so entrenched that even in late 2023, Home Office civil servants internally described the relationship as being “on a par with the Salvation Army”.[167]The principal plank of his submissions was that there had been no prior consultation in relation to the introduction of the first version of the policy and then a gap in consultation, of any sort, between Versions 5 and 10. However as set out earlier the discovery of Version 2 by the Claimants led to exchanges in early 2015 which appear to me to acknowledge directly that there was an intention to consult prior to the introduction of changes which materially affected the Claimant’s clients. The reason advanced by the Defendant for not doing so was simply that she took the view that the changes did not make any significant alterations and were a continuation of the previous Policy Bulletin protections. That was a tacit acknowledgment that had there been significant changes (on a counterfactual basis from the Defendant’s standpoint) then there would have been consultation. This approach, in practice, set the parameters for consultation in future.[168]As Ms Luh argued on behalf of the Claimants, if there was an established practice it was not broken by a lack of consultation on changes that did not adversely affect their clients. None of the updates in Versions 5 through 10 negatively impacted FfT or HBF clients; in fact, the trajectory of these updates, particularly Version 7, was the strengthening of the protective presumption against room-sharing. Because the core protections remained intact, the duty to consult on material, adverse changes was never triggered during that period, meaning that the established practice remained entirely unbroken until the abrupt publication of Version 11. Whilst Mr Payne KC sought to argue that some of the changes would potentially affect the Claimants clients in future this struck me as a rather speculative argument. The Defendant had herself set the precedent for when she would consult as turning upon whether specific changes directly affected the Claimants’ clients.[169]The Defendant also asserted that the Asylum SEG support subgroup was consulted on policy implementation, not policy change. The Claimants were able to point to multiple instances from 2013, 2014, 2016, 2020, and 2022, where the Home Office shared draft policies for consultation with subgroup members, for example: i) Minutes from 21 November 2013 and 20 February 2014 record the Home Office sharing drafts of asylum support guidance affecting accommodation allocation with subgroup members for consultation. ii) On 22 June 2016, the Home Office sent an email to the SEG group sharing a draft of the Allocation of Accommodation policy (which would become Version 4), explicitly inviting views, comments, and proposals. iii) Witness evidence from Kat Lorenz detailed several occasions in 2020 and 2022 when subgroup members were consulted on substantive policy changes, such as the cessation of accommodation to failed asylum seekers during the Covid-19 pandemic, safeguarding and anti-social behaviour policies, and reviews of asylum support weekly subsistence rates.[170]As the Claimants pointed out the SEG support subgroup’s own agreed Terms of Reference expressly defined it as a “consultative forum” in contrast to other subgroups. An October 2023 report on SEG subgroups had in fact confirmed that the Asylum Support subgroup was the only subgroup so designated.[171]In its evidence, the Home Office referred to a meeting on 12 December 2023 as supporting the contention that there was no practice of consultation prior to changes being made and that there was an express indication that advance consultation was not always possible.[172]On a proper reading I do not consider that the exchanges during the meeting carry the weight of this argument. The first item in the meeting minutes referred to communication and engagement with the voluntary sector in relation to a tabled question which read: “Is there still a commitment to engage with the voluntary sector on asylum support issues? We have noticed a reduction in the level of engagement with the SEG support subgroup over the last year ie not being told of changes in advance not being consulted on them not receiving answers to queries” [my emphasis].[173]This question was therefore predicated on a deviation from existing practice. The minutes record the following exchange:
“KL expressed concerns of non-engagement from the HO to clarify if this was an intended shift. GS clarified it isn’t an intentional shift more to do with pace and ministerial requests, advising vol sector colleagues to feedback on suggestions/improvements related to issues as a constant rather than arranging particular sessions for specific issues. AR advised as stakeholder engagement lead for the ASPEN card contract rollout, wanting to improve engagement with people seeking asylum. CM reiterated HO was not disengaging, feedback is welcomed from the vol sector to ensure good services to the users. However, it is not always possible to engage on matters due to level of changes/pace and sensitivity before sign off. Can’t always notify external agencies of changes which have not been agreed at ministerial level. KL mentioned this forum was previously for informal discussions for the vol sector to make suggestions to enable smoother processes, before the decisions were made. She asked HO colleagues continue engaging in this way because this can help identify the glitches which have a significant impact on people.”
[174]I have no difficulty in concluding on the evidence that for over 20 years FfT, and later HBF, maintained a long-standing, collaborative relationship with the Home Office as key non-governmental expert stakeholders which involved prior consultation in relation to policy changes. Consultations were routinely conducted both directly and through the Asylum SEG support subgroup, which was expressly defined in its terms of reference as a consultative body for updated policies and operational guidance.[175]This consultative relationship directly shaped the development of protective “concessions” for survivors of torture, most notably the Single Room Provision, the Medical Adviser Provision, and the Dispersal Provision. The Home Office actively recognised the expertise of the Claimants to the extent that they performed an acknowledged function within the asylum system. In 2009, the Home Office provided a written assurance that FfT would be consulted before any amendments were made to the policy governing their clients’ accommodation. This was followed by dedicated meetings in February 2010 and September 2011 to consult FfT and HBF on terms for a replacement policy, irrespective of whether they resulted in a new policy at that stage. The 2010 and 2011 meetings were a direct continuation of the consultative practice that started in 2000. Nor do I consider, as the Defendant argued, that the assurance, given by Mr Ind in 2009, establishes that no practice of consultation existed prior to that date. As the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Medical Justice makes clear, formally articulating an obligation to consult does not negate the fact that a prior practice was already established.[176]Even on the rare occasions when this practice briefly faltered, the Home Office was quick to re-engage. When Version 1 of the policy was published in late 2014 without FfT’s knowledge, the Home Office responded promptly to FfT’s complaints, explaining that the omission was not deliberate and that they believed the changes were not material. It immediately initiated new consultations that directly led to the protective updates seen in Versions 3 and 4. The February 2015 letter from Ms Samedi, the Head of Asylum Policy, expressly confirmed that the old bulletin “was drafted in consultation with” FfT. Although the Defendant argued that Ms Samedi was a layperson and would not have used the word “consultation” as a term of any legal significance, she was a senior official responding specifically to FfT’s formal complaints about a lack of consultation. There is no reason to regard her terminology as anything other than deliberate and it goes directly to the issue of the acknowledgment of a practice of prior consultation. As I have already observed it can also be inferred that there was in fact advance consultation in the early period because both Versions of Policy Bulletin 19 were explicitly directed at managing asylum seekers attending FfT (the Medical Foundation as it then was) for treatment.[177]The Defendant argued that even if a consultative relationship had existed with FfT and HBF up until 2016, the Home Office had provided no specific assurance or promise that this practice would continue into the future. That argument, in my view, conflates the different ways a legal duty to consult can arise under the common law. The legal principles set out in Plantagenet, mean that a common law duty to consult can emerge in three distinct ways only one of which depends upon a specific promise. Leaving aside Mr Ind’s earlier assurance, by 2016 a clear practice was already firmly established based on the Defendant’s consistent conduct. This included the Home Office’s Policy Bulletin 19 in 2000 which must have been informed by consultation with FfT (as Ms Samedi confirmed), its subsequent Version 2 in 2002, discussions for a replacement policy in 2010 and 2011, and the proposals that ultimately became Version 4 of the Allocation of Asylum Accommodation policy in 2015 and 2016. Where there is a long-standing and unequivocal pattern of past behaviour, the absence of an explicit promise to continue the consultation is unnecessary. The legal test asks whether the past practice itself possessed the requisite “clarity, unequivocality and unconditionality”. What is however striking is that, despite the Defendant’s acknowledgement of at least consistent engagement up until 2016, there was no express statement by the Defendant to the Claimants that the Home Office intended to change its practice. It was precisely because of this unbroken chain of consultation that FfT and HBF were caught completely by surprise when the Home Office, in effect, bypassed them to publish a new policy in December 2014, triggering the immediate fallout and subsequent 2015 consultations.[178]Throughout the subsequent releases of Versions 5 through 10, the core protections for FfT and HBF clients either remained fully intact or were strengthened. Because their clients remained exempt from room-sharing and large-site placements under these versions of the policy, the Claimants had no expectation or need to be consulted on the unrelated operational changes. I agree with Ms Luh’s submission that an established practice of consultation is not broken simply because a public authority skips consultation on subsequent changes that have no material, adverse effect on the protected cohort (in fact the very explanation given by the Defendant in relation to the absence of consultation on Version 1). The Claimants were not insisting on a duty to consult on every Home Office policy. Rather, their claim was strictly focused on the Allocation of Asylum Accommodation policy, specifically because the Defendant made material changes to provisions that directly impacted the Claimants’ clients.[179]Whilst, as Mr Payne KC observed, the publication of Version 7, which strengthened the protective presumption against room-sharing, was evidence of a policy change which affected the Claimants’ clients occurring without consultation, that has to be seen in context. The Claimants had already been consulted on this specific change, as they had originally proposed it during the 2015 consultations. Implementing a favourable policy change that the Claimants had specifically sought could hardly be considered unfair, or capable of bringing to an end an otherwise long-established practice of consultation.[180]The publication of Version 11 on 12 February 2024 did mark a significant break in established practice. Version 11 drastically dismantled the established protections for torture survivors who were clients of the Claimants by entirely removing the Single Room and Medical Adviser Provisions and significantly weakening the Dispersal Provision. I do not accept that the changes were not fundamental but simply a reversion to the regime set up under Policy Bulletin 19; but even if that was the case reverting back to the earlier policy was still a highly material change to policy which had been discussed and agreed with the Claimants over a sustained period of engagement.[181]The Home Office implemented these significant changes without giving the Claimants any advance notice or opportunity to consult, suddenly abandoning an established practice of consultation that had governed their relationship for over two decades.[182]The failure to consult on Version 11 starkly contrasts with the Home Office’s historical approach and its own internal communications. As late as October 2023, Home Office staff had explicitly planned to consult the Claimants on the proposed policy changes that ultimately became Version 11. As set out earlier, the internal emails showed a policy team member, Ms Ilahi, inviting suggestions for stakeholders to consult, receiving recommendations to engage the SEG support subgroup and HBF, and explicitly warning that failing to consult these “respected NGOs” would be “reputationally risky”. During oral submissions, the Defendant attempted to downplay these internal warnings by describing Ms Ilahi as a “cog in the wheel”. This was unsupported by witness evidence, and I note that Ms Ilahi’s emails were sent under the direct oversight of Catherine Stratton, the Accommodation Transformation Policy Lead.[183]The suggestion that consultation was “not collaborative or supportive,” is at odds with the history of engagement. There was no internal document or communication indicating that a conscious decision was made not to consult because engagement was not constructive. Reliance on the 11 March 2024 SEG minutes to establish that relationships were too strained for consultation is, in my view, illogical because that meeting took place after Version 11 had already been published. It was understandable that NGO stakeholders raised questions and expressed disappointment at this meeting. The tensions which emerged were the result of the Home Office’s failure to consult, not the reason for it. The requirement for consultation exists to ensure a decision-maker receives all relevant information, tests it properly, and ultimately makes better decisions reflective of democratic principles. If public authorities only consulted when stakeholders were likely to agree with them, it would completely defeat the principal purpose of consultation: to improve policy making by hearing a diversity of differing voices and views.[184]This lack of consultation is particularly striking given that the Home Office continued to seek the Claimants’ expert input on other trauma-related accommodation matters shortly after Version 11 was published. The evidence indicates that, while the Home Office did not consult stakeholders on the February 2024 changes to the Allocation of Asylum Accommodation Policy, it did continue to consult on other asylum‑related policies through the same period, including at the same Asylum SEG support subgroup meetings. For example, at the SEG meeting of 12 March 2024, held shortly after Version 11 was published, the Home Office used the subgroup to consult on policies concerning asylum seekers with care needs and dependants, as well as guidance under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. Earlier SEG meetings in 2023 also show that the Home Office consulted stakeholders on other discrete areas of asylum support policy, such as the section 4 support policy, destitution assessments, and accommodation related guidance, while continuing to receive operational feedback from NGOs on the implementation of existing accommodation provisions.[185]As far as pressure of time is concerned, when policy changes were first canvassed on 10 October 2023, the plan was to formulate proposals for delivery “in the coming months,” indicating no immediate urgency. Following a ministerial meeting on 20 October 2023, the policy team was given “a few weeks” to determine timelines and next steps. The Defendant successfully conducted a rapid consultation with health partners during this same period. The Home Office shared a draft policy with these partners on 8 December 2023, presented it on 11 December 2023, and required comments within three working days. As the Claimants argued, this strongly suggests that the pressures of implementing policy changes did not actually prevent the Home Office from conducting consultations at the material time. Although the Home Office initially aimed to implement the changes by mid-December 2023, they were delayed, with further iterations circulating until the Equality Impact Assessment was completed on 10 January 2024. There appears to have been no reason why the Home Office could not have replicated its rapid three-day consultation model with the Claimants during this four-week window.[186]I conclude that there was a duty on the Defendant to consult in advance of proposed policy changes which materially affected the Claimant’s clients/patients arising from its past practice of consulting and the legitimate expectation to which it gave rise. The practice was sufficiently clear and well established to be tantamount to an assurance that there would be consultation; an assurance that had in fact been given expressly at various times during the history of engagement by the Home Office with the Claimants. That expectation of consultation, once established, was not brought to an end at any stage prior to the introduction of Version 11 of the Allocation of Asylum Accommodation policy which was introduced without consultation.[187]If, contrary to my conclusions, the history of engagement between the parties was not such as to amount to consultation then I would have concluded in any event that the nature and extent of the engagement over such a lengthy period meant that it was conspicuously unfair to introduce the changes in Version 11 without consultation because the Defendant’s conduct in engaging with Fft and HBF and the nature of the changes proposed gave rise to a substantial expectation of consultation.[188]It follows that the Defendant was in breach of her duty to consult prior to introducing Version 11 of the policy and the versions which followed.

The PSED

[189]Because the PSED is a “due regard” duty, the Minister must consider the statutory principles compendiously; she must fully appreciate the impact on those adversely affected, properly assess the risk and extent of any adverse impact, and identify ways to eliminate that risk. Gathering information without conducting this proper assessment is insufficient.[190]The Defendant accepted the criticisms made by Mould J in the separate TG litigation, conceding that the January 2024 EIA was inadequate. Specifically, the Defendant accepted that she made no attempt to assess the equalities implications of the policy change that suddenly allowed disabled asylum seekers and those with serious mental health issues to be judged suitable for Wethersfield. But in addition, this EIA failed to acknowledge or assess the impact of requiring these individuals to room-share in standard community accommodation (like hotels or shared houses), as it was entirely focused on large sites.[191]As far large sites were concerned, the January 2024 EIA asserted that such sites “will not be used” for individuals with serious mobility problems, complex health needs or mental disabilities, and are “not considered practical” for those requiring adjustments. However, the EIA did not grapple with whether those exclusions are in fact achieved by the amended policy, which removed the former position that such individuals are “not suitable” for large sites and replaced it with language that they merely “may not be suitable”. That change materially weakened the protection ostensibly relied upon in the EIA, without any analysis of its effect. In particular, it did not assess the impact on asylum seekers with protected characteristics of: i) removing the previous exemption from room sharing for survivors of torture and other serious forms of violence (including HBF/FfT clients/patients); ii) shifting the policy presumption to one in favour of room sharing for all asylum seekers, thereby placing the evidential burden on individuals to demonstrate unsuitability even where protected characteristics are present; and iii) relying on desk based “second opinion” reviews by a Medical Advisor, in circumstances where there was no prior contact with the asylum seeker.[192]It does not seem to me that these policy changes can be regarded as simply measures affecting process given that the revised policy, in effect, introduced a different regime with potentially different outcomes and effects. Nor can the Claimants’ case be met by the argument that treatment by the Claimants is not itself a protected characteristic requiring a distinct equality assessment. Unlike Ground 1, which focuses narrowly on the failure to consult regarding the Claimants’ actual patients, Ground 2 concerns a much wider cohort of vulnerable individuals. The Defendant had accepted over a long period that survivors of torture, trafficking and other serious violence in treatment with FfT or HBF should not be required to share rooms with unrelated adults because of the recognised risk of serious harm, including re-traumatisation and increased self-harm and suicidal ideation. Those risks were repeatedly brought to the Defendant’s attention, including by reference to instances where vulnerable individuals were wrongly placed in shared accommodation in breach of the Defendant’s own policy. Neither the January 2024 EIA nor the March 2025 EIA, disclose any investigation into, or quantification of, the effect of the amendments on these individuals who have protected characteristics. The EIA in March 2025 failed to remedy these omissions and remained flawed. As the Claimants submitted, it did not recognise or assess the impact of removing the protective presumption against room-sharing for survivors of torture. It did not assess the clinical risks of leaving vulnerable people in shared rooms during the “wait and see” period while their new suitability evidence was being gathered and evaluated, nor did it assess the practical, legal, and health barriers disabled asylum seekers face when trying to obtain such evidence.[193]There is no evidence that the Defendant took the necessary steps, either before or after implementation of Version 11 of the Allocation of Asylum Accommodation policy to obtain information required to discharge the PSED. Allocation of Asylum Accommodation Version 12 was published on 27 March 2024 without any indication that the Defendant had monitored or assessed the policy’s impact post-implementation, despite concerns raised by NGO stakeholders through the SEG support subgroup. The absence of monitoring meant the Defendant could not know whether, or how, the policy was disadvantaging those with protected characteristics. A failure to monitor aggravates rather than cures a breach of the PSED, since the duty is a continuing one.[194]The only evidence base for the March 2025 EIA appears to have been asylum statistics which did not identify any data for disabled asylum seekers. As the Claimants submitted, the Home Office did nevertheless possess evidence which it failed to analyse in the March 2025 EIA, which included: i) Over a year’s worth of internal data from the Home Office’s own on-the-ground monitoring arrangements (operating since February 2024), which tracked welfare, safeguarding checks, and relocation referrals. ii) Data previously provided to the National Audit Office regarding safeguarding referrals and suicide/self-harm incidents. iii) Detailed reports provided by HBF in December 2023 and June 2024, which contained real-life case studies of the severe impact forced room-sharing had on survivors. iv) An October 2024 report by the Institute for Public Policy Research (“IPPR”) linking room-sharing to increased safeguarding referrals. v) Expert clinical reports from Professor Katona and Dr Bonnet, filed in these proceedings, detailing the trauma-inducing nature of room-sharing. vi) Direct operational feedback provided by NGOs, including emails from HBF in November 2023 and joint letters from the SEG subgroup in February 2024 outlining operational crises.[195]The March 2025 EIA did not, in my view, cure the deficiencies identified in the January 2024 EIA. It did not widen its scope to address the impact of room sharing across community accommodation, did not investigate or quantify the differential impact of the policy on survivors of torture, trafficking and other serious violence with protected characteristics, and did not engage with the clinical risks identified by expert evidence and the Defendant’s own data. Nor was it informed by any meaningful post-implementation monitoring. Accordingly, it did not remedy the earlier failures to discharge the PSED.

The Tameside Duty

[196]The policy changes were made against a settled evidential background, accepted by the Defendant for nearly 25 years, that survivors of torture, trafficking and other serious violence face a real risk of harm if required to share rooms or live in large institutional sites. That evidence was reflected in expert material and in the Defendant’s own EIAs and suitability criteria. Yet there is no evidence that the Defendant took any steps to reexamine, test or update that evidence before removing or diluting those protections.[197]The amendments in Allocation of Asylum Accommodation Version 11 were fundamental: they removed existing exemptions, reversed the presumption in favour of non-sharing, and placed the evidential burden on vulnerable asylum seekers. Given the predictable risks of harm, it was incumbent on the Defendant to take reasonable steps to understand the impact of those changes on this cohort. She did not do so. As the Claimants argued this was not a case of inadequate inquiries, but of no inquiries at all. The Defendant made no attempt to consult FfT, HBF or other NGO members of the Asylum SEG support subgroup, despite having convened that forum precisely to draw on their expertise about the impact of asylum support arrangements on vulnerable groups. Such consultation was an obvious means by which the Defendant could have informed herself so as to reach a rational decision.[198]Had the Defendant consulted or otherwise engaged with stakeholders, she would have obtained compelling evidence about: i) the clinical risks of removing the existing protections, ii) the practical barriers faced by asylum seekers in meeting the new evidential burden, and iii) the deficiencies in existing suitability assessment processes.[199]The Defendant’s failure to gather or consider this material meant that she exercised a wide statutory discretion without having the information necessary to do so lawfully.[200]I conclude accordingly that no reasonable decision-maker could have considered that they possessed sufficient information to inform the policy changes, and the Defendant therefore acted in breach of the Tameside duty.

The most recent EIA and Policy Version

[201]As referred to earlier, on 13 January 2026, the Defendant produced a new EIA, the January 2026 EIA. Shortly after, on 22 January 2026, the Defendant published Version 14 of the Allocation of Asylum Accommodation policy. The Claimants contend that the publication of Version 14 and the January 2026 EIA do not resolve the unlawfulness of the Home Office’s actions but rather continue them. The Claimants argue that just as with Versions 11, 12, and 13, the Defendant failed to consult them prior to publishing Version 14 of the policy. Therefore, the breach of the duty to consult remains unremedied. In addition, the Claimants say that the January 2026 EIA fails to address the flaws identified in the earlier EIAs.[202]Since these arguments have not been the subject of any submissions from the Defendant they can and should, if necessary, be dealt with in relation to the consideration of final remedy which will in the circumstances need to be the subject of further submissions.

Overall Conclusions

[203]I am not determining the merits of the policy changes and do not doubt, on the evidence, that the Home Office faced considerable challenges in accommodating asylum seekers. The requirement to consult, where it arises, the duty to have regard to equality considerations, and the need to make enquiries are not designed to frustrate policy but to enhance decision-making and to allow the impact of policy changes on those affected to be properly considered. The present case is principally concerned with a relatively small group of asylum seekers who have been assessed by the Claimants, who are respected and expert bodies, as requiring treatment and assistance because of severe trauma as a result of their experiences.[204]The short answer to each of the agreed issues is in the affirmative.[205]There was duty on the Defendant to consult for the reasons set out in this judgment. The Defendant acted unlawfully by failing to consult and undertook no consultation or meaningful engagement before introducing fundamental policy changes. That failure cannot be justified by reference to urgency or policy development at pace, particularly given the factual circumstances at the relevant time and the long-standing history of constructive consultation. In the circumstances, consultation was an obvious and reasonable means by which the Defendant could and should have informed herself of the likely impact of the changes on a vulnerable group.[206]The Defendant acted in breach of the PSED. In introducing and maintaining the amendments to the Allocation of Asylum Accommodation policy, the Defendant failed to have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination and to advance equality of opportunity for asylum seekers with protected characteristics, in particular survivors of torture, trafficking and other serious violence. The EIAs were materially deficient and confined in scope, failed to assess or quantify the differential and adverse impact of the policy changes on this cohort, and did not engage with established evidence of clinical risk. There was no lawful pre-implementation assessment, no meaningful consultation, and no adequate post implementation monitoring, despite the PSED being a continuing duty. In consequence, the Defendant did not properly identify, understand or address the potential disproportionate harm caused to vulnerable asylum seekers. The policy changes were adopted and maintained in breach of section 149 of the EA 2010.[207]The Defendant’s amendments to the Allocation of Asylum Accommodation policy were introduced without properly informing herself of their impact on survivors of torture, trafficking and other serious violence, notwithstanding long standing, consistent evidence of the serious risks of harm faced by this cohort. The Defendant acted in breach of the Tameside duty by making fundamental policy changes without inquiry, consultation or engagement with obvious expert sources, and without gathering or considering plainly relevant material.[208]Taken together, these failures amount to a serious breach of the Defendant’s public law duties, rendering the impugned policy changes unlawful. END