“9. I recall pulling my trousers down to the top of my thighs and lying on my back with my legs in the air. Mr Stan told me that I had to pull my trousers all the way down or take my trousers off. I felt very uncomfortable and vulnerable. However, I took my trousers off as instructed by Mr Stan. … 11. I remember at the start of the procedure Mr Stan rubbed lubricant around my anus in a circular motion. He stopped to advise me that I was too tense and then he started the motion again. I remember that this continued for approximately five to seven minutes. I then remember that Mr Stan inserted the suppository pushing his entire finger into my anus. This was a very distressing experience. I felt debased, embarrassed, exposed and vulnerable. I was visibly distressed by the experience. … 14. I remember that I was very upset. I lay on the hospital bed and cried about the procedure for a very long time. I do not cry often. I had not cried when I had attempted to take my own life, but this experience caused me to feel very upset. I tried to reassure myself that the procedure was normal and that I should trust the doctor. Despite this I remained deeply uncomfortable about what had happened, I felt that it was not right. I was terrified and I felt shaken up.”
“At the Facts stage of these proceedings, the Tribunal had found that Dr Stan’s behaviour was sexually motivated in relation to multiple patients and multiple paragraphs of the Allegation. He had subjected patients to unnecessary, invasive and intimate procedures for his own sexual gratification. In some cases the same patient had been subjected to intimate and invasive procedures by Dr Stan on multiple occasions.”
“[W]e do not therefore accept that the facts arguably meet the high threshold for a breach of Article 3 but even if they do (which is not admitted), we consider that the Article 3 positive obligation to investigate has been and continues to be met by the combination of an independent investigation by the professional regulator the GMC, a public MPTS hearing which has culminated in the erasure of Dr Stan from the medical register, and an independent investigation by the Police which is ongoing.”
“because both the Trust’s fact finding investigation and the MHPS report are confidential internal documents which rely on confidence being respected if Trust staff are to be expected to be open and transparent in raising concerns. In addition, because those documents are neither public nor independent they do not form part of the State’s discharge of Article 3 investigative obligation, rather they were the trigger to make the referral to the GMC which led to the MPTS hearing. It would not therefore be appropriate for the Trust to disclosure [sic] these reports because they contain sensitive and confidential personal information both about patients and staff.”
“I want an inquiry to be held into the actions of Mr Stan so that people within the Trust are held accountable for their failure to keep patients safe and to make sure changes are made to protect patients in the future[.] My experience with Mr Stan has been devastating. I now know that he sexually assaulted me. This happened in 2019 in an NHS hospital. I think that an inquiry is important to ensure that there is a proper investigation into what went wrong with the hospital systems which should have kept me and other patients safe from harm.”
“Article 2 has been interpreted as imposing three distinct duties on states and those exercising state functions: (1) There is a negative duty to refrain from taking life without justification… (2) There is a positive duty to protect life which has two aspects: (a) There is a duty to put in place a legislative and administrative framework to protect the right to life, involving effective deterrence against threats to life, including criminal law provisions to deter the commission of offences, backed up by a law enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and sanctioning of breaches of such provisions; and in the healthcare context having effective administrative and regulatory systems in place… This is the framework duty, of which the latter aspect is sometimes referred to as a systems duty. (b) There is a duty, first articulated in Osman v United Kingdom(1998) 29 EHRR 245 , to take positive measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk in certain circumstances. This is the positive operational duty. … [T]here is often no clear dividing line between this operational duty, and the systems duty below the national level. (3) There is an investigative duty to inquire into and explain the circumstances of a death. As I explain below, there are two different investigative duties which have a different scope and different juridical basis. One is a substantive duty to investigate every death as an aspect of the framework duty; the other is a procedural obligation which arises in some cases, and is parasitic on the possibility of a breach by a state agent of one of the substantive operational or systems duties. When the latter arises, it is a duty of enhanced investigation, to initiate an effective public investigation by an independent official body. This is the enhanced investigative duty.” (1) There is a negative duty to refrain from taking life without justification… (2) There is a positive duty to protect life which has two aspects: (a) There is a duty to put in place a legislative and administrative framework to protect the right to life, involving effective deterrence against threats to life, including criminal law provisions to deter the commission of offences, backed up by a law enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and sanctioning of breaches of such provisions; and in the healthcare context having effective administrative and regulatory systems in place… This is the framework duty, of which the latter aspect is sometimes referred to as a systems duty. (b) There is a duty, first articulated in Osman v United Kingdom(1998) 29 EHRR 245 , to take positive measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk in certain circumstances. This is the positive operational duty. … [T]here is often no clear dividing line between this operational duty, and the systems duty below the national level. (3) There is an investigative duty to inquire into and explain the circumstances of a death. As I explain below, there are two different investigative duties which have a different scope and different juridical basis. One is a substantive duty to investigate every death as an aspect of the framework duty; the other is a procedural obligation which arises in some cases, and is parasitic on the possibility of a breach by a state agent of one of the substantive operational or systems duties. When the latter arises, it is a duty of enhanced investigation, to initiate an effective public investigation by an independent official body. This is the enhanced investigative duty.”
“[65] I derive three important and related points from this analysis. First, the existence or otherwise of the operational duty is not to be analysed solely by reference to the relationship between the state and individual, but also, and importantly, by reference to the types of harm of which the individual is foreseeably at real and immediate risk. … [66] Secondly, the foreseeable real and immediate risk of the type of harm in question is a necessary condition of the existence of the duty, not merely relevant to breach. Without identifying such foreseeable risk of the type of harm involved, it is impossible to answer the question whether there is an operational duty to take steps to prevent it. [67] Thirdly, in cases where vulnerable people are cared for by an institution which exercises some control over them, the question whether an operational duty is owed to protect them from a foreseeable risk of a particular type of harm is informed by whether the nature of the control is linked to the nature of the harm.”
“[68] The existence and scope of the investigative duty was identified and expounded by Lord Bingham of Cornhill in R (Amin) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2004] 1 AC 653 and Middleton[2004] 2 AC 182 . In Middleton, having referred in para 2 to the negative duty not to take life without justification, and the framework duty, Lord Bingham expressed the investigative duty in these terms at para 3: ‘The European court has also interpreted article 2 as imposing on member states a procedural obligation to initiate an effective public investigation by an independent official body into any death occurring in circumstances in which it appears that one or other of the foregoing substantive obligations has been, or may have been violated and it appears that agents of the state are, or may be, in some way implicated.’ [69] This is the enhanced investigative duty. Its content is flexible and depends on the circumstances in which it is to be applied, but it is sufficient for the present case to take the summary given by Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers PSC in R (Smith) v Oxfordshire Assistant Deputy Coroner (Equality and Human Rights Commission intervening)[2011] 1 AC 1 , para 64: ‘The procedural obligation requires a state, of its own motion, to carry out an investigation into a death that has the following features: (i) It must have a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results. (ii) It must be conducted by a tribunal that is independent of the state agents who may bear some responsibility for the death. (iii) The relatives of the deceased must be able to play an appropriate part in it. (iv) It must be prompt and effective. This means that it must perform its essential purposes. These are to secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right to life and to ensure the accountability of state agents or bodies for deaths occurring under their responsibility. These features are derived from the Strasbourg jurisprudence, as analysed in the Middleton case and R (L (A Patient)) v Secretary of State for Justice[2009] AC 588 . I shall describe an investigation that has these features as an “article 2 investigation”.’” ‘The European court has also interpreted article 2 as imposing on member states a procedural obligation to initiate an effective public investigation by an independent official body into any death occurring in circumstances in which it appears that one or other of the foregoing substantive obligations has been, or may have been violated and it appears that agents of the state are, or may be, in some way implicated.’ ‘The procedural obligation requires a state, of its own motion, to carry out an investigation into a death that has the following features: (i) It must have a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results. (ii) It must be conducted by a tribunal that is independent of the state agents who may bear some responsibility for the death. (iii) The relatives of the deceased must be able to play an appropriate part in it. (iv) It must be prompt and effective. This means that it must perform its essential purposes. These are to secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right to life and to ensure the accountability of state agents or bodies for deaths occurring under their responsibility. These features are derived from the Strasbourg jurisprudence, as analysed in the Middleton case and R (L (A Patient)) v Secretary of State for Justice[2009] AC 588 . I shall describe an investigation that has these features as an “article 2 investigation”.’”
“This analysis reinforces the distinction between the two aspects of an article 2 investigative duty which Lord Phillips had identified in L’s case and Smith. One is a substantive investigative duty, which arises as a positive article 2 obligation to comply with the framework duty, and arises irrespective of any breach of the systemic or operational duty. The other is a procedural investigative duty, which is parasitic upon a breach of the systemic or operational duty. There is not a separate third category of cases in which the procedural duty arises automatically where there is no question of a breach of the systemic/operational duty.”
“[5] Articles 2 and 3 have been interpreted as imposing certain positive obligations on public authorities. The adjectival descriptions of the different positive obligations are not always consistent. I will use the language of a ‘systems obligation’, an ‘operational obligation’ and an ‘investigative obligation.’ … [6] Systems obligation: the authorities establish that: (1) The state must put in place a system that protects life and safeguards against IDT… (2) This systems obligation operates at different levels… (3) At a ‘high level’, the state must ensure that there are effective criminal law provisions to deter offences against the person, a police force to investigate such offences, and a court and judicial system to enforce those criminal law provisions… (4) In certain situations, public authorities fall under a ‘lower level’ duty to adopt administrative measures to safeguard life… (5) Such additional administrative measures are required in the context of any activity in which the right to life may be at stake… (6) In particular, the lower level duty arises whenever a public body undertakes, organises or authorises dangerous activities… It also arises in the context of public health and social care… (7) The contexts in which such additional measures are required therefore include hospitals… (8) The contexts in which the Strasbourg court has found that the systems duty applies are not exhaustive of the situations in which it may apply… (9) Where the lower level system obligation arises, the public authority must implement measures to reduce the risk to a reasonable minimum… (10) In interpreting and applying the systems obligation, the court must not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on public authorities and must have regard to the operational choice made by public authorities in terms of priorities and resources… [7] Operational obligation: The authorities establish that: (1) An operational obligation arises where a public authority knows or ought to know of the existence of a real and immediate risk of IDT from the criminal acts of a third party… (2) In deciding what a public authority ‘ought to know’ a court should take account of risks that the public authority ought to have appreciated on the information it had available… It might also extend to risks that the public authority would have appreciated if it had carried out reasonable enquiries… (3) Serious physical assaults causing significant harm amount to IDT for these purposes… (4) A risk may be ‘real’ if it is substantial or significant, but not if it is remote or fanciful… (5) A risk that is ‘present and continuing’ may amount to an immediate risk… (6) In practice, in cases involving risk due to the criminal acts of someone who is not a state agent, the level of risk required to cross the ‘real and immediate’ threshold is very high: Van Colle per Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood at para 30, G4S Care and Justice Services Ltd v Luke [2019] Inquest LR 150, paras 74–75, R (Kent County Council) v HM Coroner for Kent (North West District) [2012] Inquest LR 110, paras 44–47… (7) In assessing whether there was a real and immediate risk, the court must only take account of that which was known, or ought to have been known by the public authority. Hindsight must be left out of account… (8) It is not necessary that the identity of the target of the risk is identifiable in advance of the risk materialising… (9) Where the ‘real and immediate’ threshold test is met, the obligation is to take measures, within the scope of the authority’s powers, which, judged reasonably, might be expected to avoid the risk… (10) This is an obligation of means, not result. If reasonable measures are taken to avert the risk, then there is no breach of the operational obligation if the risk nonetheless materialises… [8] Investigative obligation: The authorities establish that: (1) An obligation to investigate arises in different circumstances, including deaths in custody and the use of lethal force by the state. It also arises whenever a person is (arguably) unlawfully killed or is (arguably) subject to IDT. In such a case there is a requirement for a police investigation which must be capable in principle of leading to the identification of those responsible… (2) An obligation to investigate also arises where it is known that there is an arguable breach by a public authority of one or more of its positive obligations under articles 2 or 3 ECHR… (3) The purpose of such an investigation is to secure the effective implementation of the rights guaranteed by the Convention and accountability for any breaches of those rights… (4) That means that (depending on the context) the investigation must ensure so far as possible that the full facts are brought to light, that culpable and discreditable conduct is exposed and brought to public notice, that suspicion of deliberate wrongdoing (if unjustified) is allayed, that dangerous practices and procedures are rectified, and that (where appropriate) lessons are learned… The precise requirements of an investigation are dependent on the context—more is required in the case of a suspected unlawful killing or torture by a public servant than in cases which result from negligence on the part on non-State agents… (5) An investigation must be effective so as to be capable, in principle, of securing those objectives. This means that the investigation must be thorough, in that the authorities must make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation or as the basis of their decision. They must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence… (6) The investigative duty is an obligation of means, not result. The obligation may be discharged even if it does not (in the particular circumstances) result in the identification of those responsible, or punishment, so long as the public authority took the steps required to carry out an effective investigation… (7) An investigation must be conducted by a person or body that is institutionally, hierarchically and practically independent from those involved in the events… (8) A victim (or next of kin) of an arguable breach of articles 2/3 ECHR must have effective access to the investigative procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard their interests. There must also be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure practical accountability… (9) In some cases, the investigative obligation must include recourse to the criminal law. In other cases, the obligation can be satisfied if civil, administrative or disciplinary remedies are available to the victim… (10) An investigation must take place within a reasonable time…” (1) The state must put in place a system that protects life and safeguards against IDT… (2) This systems obligation operates at different levels… (3) At a ‘high level’, the state must ensure that there are effective criminal law provisions to deter offences against the person, a police force to investigate such offences, and a court and judicial system to enforce those criminal law provisions… (4) In certain situations, public authorities fall under a ‘lower level’ duty to adopt administrative measures to safeguard life… (5) Such additional administrative measures are required in the context of any activity in which the right to life may be at stake… (6) In particular, the lower level duty arises whenever a public body undertakes, organises or authorises dangerous activities… It also arises in the context of public health and social care… (7) The contexts in which such additional measures are required therefore include hospitals… (8) The contexts in which the Strasbourg court has found that the systems duty applies are not exhaustive of the situations in which it may apply… (9) Where the lower level system obligation arises, the public authority must implement measures to reduce the risk to a reasonable minimum… (10) In interpreting and applying the systems obligation, the court must not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on public authorities and must have regard to the operational choice made by public authorities in terms of priorities and resources… (1) An operational obligation arises where a public authority knows or ought to know of the existence of a real and immediate risk of IDT from the criminal acts of a third party… (2) In deciding what a public authority ‘ought to know’ a court should take account of risks that the public authority ought to have appreciated on the information it had available… It might also extend to risks that the public authority would have appreciated if it had carried out reasonable enquiries… (3) Serious physical assaults causing significant harm amount to IDT for these purposes… (4) A risk may be ‘real’ if it is substantial or significant, but not if it is remote or fanciful… (5) A risk that is ‘present and continuing’ may amount to an immediate risk… (6) In practice, in cases involving risk due to the criminal acts of someone who is not a state agent, the level of risk required to cross the ‘real and immediate’ threshold is very high: Van Colle per Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood at para 30, G4S Care and Justice Services Ltd v Luke [2019] Inquest LR 150, paras 74–75, R (Kent County Council) v HM Coroner for Kent (North West District) [2012] Inquest LR 110, paras 44–47… (7) In assessing whether there was a real and immediate risk, the court must only take account of that which was known, or ought to have been known by the public authority. Hindsight must be left out of account… (8) It is not necessary that the identity of the target of the risk is identifiable in advance of the risk materialising… (9) Where the ‘real and immediate’ threshold test is met, the obligation is to take measures, within the scope of the authority’s powers, which, judged reasonably, might be expected to avoid the risk… (10) This is an obligation of means, not result. If reasonable measures are taken to avert the risk, then there is no breach of the operational obligation if the risk nonetheless materialises… (1) An obligation to investigate arises in different circumstances, including deaths in custody and the use of lethal force by the state. It also arises whenever a person is (arguably) unlawfully killed or is (arguably) subject to IDT. In such a case there is a requirement for a police investigation which must be capable in principle of leading to the identification of those responsible… (2) An obligation to investigate also arises where it is known that there is an arguable breach by a public authority of one or more of its positive obligations under articles 2 or 3 ECHR… (3) The purpose of such an investigation is to secure the effective implementation of the rights guaranteed by the Convention and accountability for any breaches of those rights… (4) That means that (depending on the context) the investigation must ensure so far as possible that the full facts are brought to light, that culpable and discreditable conduct is exposed and brought to public notice, that suspicion of deliberate wrongdoing (if unjustified) is allayed, that dangerous practices and procedures are rectified, and that (where appropriate) lessons are learned… The precise requirements of an investigation are dependent on the context—more is required in the case of a suspected unlawful killing or torture by a public servant than in cases which result from negligence on the part on non-State agents… (5) An investigation must be effective so as to be capable, in principle, of securing those objectives. This means that the investigation must be thorough, in that the authorities must make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation or as the basis of their decision. They must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence… (6) The investigative duty is an obligation of means, not result. The obligation may be discharged even if it does not (in the particular circumstances) result in the identification of those responsible, or punishment, so long as the public authority took the steps required to carry out an effective investigation… (7) An investigation must be conducted by a person or body that is institutionally, hierarchically and practically independent from those involved in the events… (8) A victim (or next of kin) of an arguable breach of articles 2/3 ECHR must have effective access to the investigative procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard their interests. There must also be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure practical accountability… (9) In some cases, the investigative obligation must include recourse to the criminal law. In other cases, the obligation can be satisfied if civil, administrative or disciplinary remedies are available to the victim… (10) An investigation must take place within a reasonable time…”
“[9] In addition to prohibiting certain conduct, article 2 imposes a positive obligation on contracting states to take ‘appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within [their] jurisdiction’… This is a very general statement and the various aspects and specific content of this positive obligation have been clarified in a substantial body of case law both in Strasbourg and domestically. [10] It has been held that article 2 imposes certain substantive positive obligations on a state to take steps to protect life. These are typically analysed as being of two types, an obligation to have appropriate legal regimes and administrative systems in place to provide general protection for the lives of citizens and persons in its territory (‘the systems duty’) and an obligation to take operational steps to protect a specific person or persons when on notice that they are subject to a risk to life of a particularly clear and pressing kind (‘the operational duty’). [11] The distinction between these two types of substantive positive obligation has been emphasised at the highest level in the domestic case law and the Strasbourg case law… As it was put in Oliveira, these are ‘distinct albeit related positive obligations under article 2’. The operational duty derives, in particular, from the judgment of the Strasbourg court in Osman v United Kingdom(1998) 29 EHRR 245 (‘Osman’). [12] In addition, article 2 imposes certain positive obligations of a procedural nature regarding investigation of and the opportunity to call state authorities to account for potential breaches of the substantive obligations to which it gives rise. The precise content of the procedural obligation on a state varies according to the context in which an issue regarding the application of article 2 arises. There is no simple monolithic form of procedural obligation which applies in every such case. Rather, the procedural obligation applies in a graduated way depending on the circumstances of the case and way in which in a particular context the state may be called upon to provide due accountability in relation to the steps taken to protect the right to life under article 2.”
“(1) Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances of the victim’s behaviour. (2) However, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of article 3. The assessment of that minimum is, in the nature of things, relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, the manner and method of its execution, its duration, its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim. (3) The Court has considered treatment to be inhuman because, inter alia, it was premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch, and caused either bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. (4) It has deemed treatment to be degrading because it was such as to arouse in the victim feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them. (5) On the other hand, the court has consistently stressed that the suffering and humiliation involved must go beyond that inevitable element connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment. Measures depriving a person of liberty may often involve such an element.”
“[87] Ill-treatment that attains such a minimum level of severity usually involves actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. However, even in the absence of these aspects, where treatment humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for or diminishing his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual’s moral and physical resistance, it may be characterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibition set forth in art.3. It should also be pointed out that it may well suffice that the victim is humiliated in his own eyes, even if not in the eyes of others. … [105] The court reiterates that it may well suffice that the victim is humiliated in his own eyes for there to be degrading treatment within the meaning ofart.3 of the Convention . Indeed, it does not doubt that even one unpremeditated slap devoid of any serious or long-term effect on the person receiving it may be perceived as humiliating by that person. [106] That is particularly true when the slap is inflicted by law-enforcement officers on persons under their control, because it highlights the superiority and inferiority which by definition characterise the relationship between the former and the latter in such circumstances. The fact that the victims know that such an act is unlawful, constituting a breach of moral and professional ethics by those officers and—as the Chamber rightly emphasised in its judgment—also being unacceptable, may furthermore arouse in them a feeling or arbitrary treatment, injustice and powerlessness.”
“[159] Nevertheless, according to the Court’s well-established case-law, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of that level is relative and depends on all the circumstances of the case, principally the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim. … [160] In order to determine whether the threshold of severity has been reached, the Court also takes other factors into consideration, in particular: (a) The purpose for which the ill-treatment was inflicted, together with the intention or motivation behind it …, although the absence of an intention to humiliate or debase the victim cannot conclusively rule out its characterisation as ‘degrading’ and therefore prohibited by Article 3… (b) The context in which the ill-treatment was inflicted, such as an atmosphere of heightened tension and emotions… (c) whether the victim is in a vulnerable situation, which is normally the case for persons deprived of their liberty…, but there is an inevitable element of suffering and humiliation involved in custodial measures and this as such, in itself, will not entail a violation of Article 3.” (a) The purpose for which the ill-treatment was inflicted, together with the intention or motivation behind it …, although the absence of an intention to humiliate or debase the victim cannot conclusively rule out its characterisation as ‘degrading’ and therefore prohibited by Article 3… (b) The context in which the ill-treatment was inflicted, such as an atmosphere of heightened tension and emotions… (c) whether the victim is in a vulnerable situation, which is normally the case for persons deprived of their liberty…, but there is an inevitable element of suffering and humiliation involved in custodial measures and this as such, in itself, will not entail a violation of Article 3.”
“(1) Inhuman or degrading treatment within Article 3 involves a high level of suffering, usually actual bodily harm or intense physical or mental suffering. Treatment is inhuman or degrading if, to a serious detrimental extent, it denies the most basic needs of any human being. The treatment must achieve a minimum standard of severity: Limbuela §7 and Humnyntski §202. (2) Other than in the case of actual injuries, the burden is on the complainant to demonstrate a breach of Article 3 and it is a very high hurdle: ASK §72 and Limbuela §7.”
“The Court observes that cases concerning medical interventions, including those carried out without the consent of the patient, will generally lend themselves to be examined underArticle 8 of the Convention … In a number of cases the Court has nonetheless accepted that under certain conditions, medical interventions can reach the threshold of severity to be regarded as treatment prohibited byArticle 3 of the Convention .”