Sarvar Ismailov v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs [2025] EWHC 863 (Admin)

[2025] EWHC 863 (Admin)Case No AC-2024-LON-002593
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 09/04/2025
By way of remote hearing
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE SAINI
Between
SARVAR ISMAILOVClaimantSECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN, COMMONWEALTH AND DEVELOPMENT AFFAIRSDefendant
Hugo Keith KC and Rachel Scott KC (instructed by Gherson LLP) for ClaimantJason Pobjoy KC, Tom Leary and Luke Tattersall (instructed by Government Legal Department) for DefendantHearing Hearing dates: 4 April 2025This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.00am on 9 April 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives
JUDGMENT
[1]This is an interim application seeking further information under CPR 79.11(5) in a sanctions case. On 26 July 2022, the Defendant, the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs (“the Secretary of State”) designated the Claimant, Sarvar Ismailov, pursuant to the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (“SAMLA”) and regulations 5 and 6 of the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (“the Russia Regulations”). The designation imposes financial sanctions (asset freezing), trust services sanctions, and transport restrictions on the Claimant. On 30 July 2024, the Claimant challenged his designation by proceedings issued under section 38 of SAMLA. A person who has been designated under a power contained in regulations made under section 1 of SAMLA has a right to request that the designation be varied or revoked under section 23 of SAMLA. Section 38(1) of SAMLA provides a right to a Court review of the decision made following a request that the designation be varied or revoked. In determining such an application, the Court is to apply the principles applicable on an application for judicial review (section 38(4) of SAMLA), and the Court may make any order or give any relief as it could in judicial review proceedings, subject to sections 39(1)-(4) of SAMLA. In the proceedings before me, the Claimant seeks an order setting aside the Defendant’s decision to designate him. On 24 October 2024, the Defendant filed and served his grounds for contesting the Claimant’s designation challenge.[2]By an Application Notice dated 7 November 2024 (“the Application”), the Claimant seeks an order that the Defendant file and serve further information about his grounds for contesting the Claimant’s challenge to his designation. Hugo Keith KC and Rachel Scott KC appeared for the Claimant and Jason Pobjoy KC, Tom Leary and Luke Tattersall appeared for the Defendant. I am grateful to Counsel for their written submissions, and the well-structured and concise oral submissions which were made by Mr Keith KC for the Claimant, and by Mr Leary for the Secretary of State.[3]The Claimant was born in Tashkent, Uzbekistan on 14 March 1995. He has Uzbek, Cypriot and Russian nationality. The Claimant has lived, studied and worked in the United Kingdom for some 16 years. He moved here aged 13, and attended secondary school in Reading and then took a degree at City University. In 2017, the Claimant was married and set up home with his wife in London, applying for settled status (as a Cypriot national). In January 2019, the Claimant began working as a Global Partnership Consultant with Everton Football Club. On 8 March 2020, he was promoted to the position of Sporting and Commercial Director of Everton Women’s Team. In July 2021, he was appointed to the board of directors of Everton FC, but stepped down from that role in November 2021, due to criminal charges which were brought against him (these charges were dismissed for lack of evidence shortly after being brought). As a result of what he describes as a climate of anti-Russian hostility to which he and his family were subjected, the Claimant and his wife left the UK in March 2022. The Claimant has never been resident in Russia as an adult. Mr Keith KC emphasised on behalf of the Claimant that he has no political profile or political connections in Russia. He also submitted that there is no evidence that he has any personal or other relationship with, or close access to, President Putin or any other decision-makers within the Russian Government; still less that he holds any form of special status or would be capable of holding any influence over political or military policy.[4]The grounds upon which the Secretary of State designated the Claimant were that there were reasonable grounds to suspect that the Claimant was an “involved person” (a statutory term under SAMLA) by virtue of being “associated” with a person who was or had been involved in either destabilising Ukraine or undermining or threatening its territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence, or obtaining a benefit from or supporting the Russian Government. The person the Claimant was said to be “associated” with is his uncle, Alisher Usmanov (“Mr Usmanov”), a well-known Uzbek-born industrialist. Mr Usmanov had himself been designated by the Defendant on 3 March 2022 and made subject to both financial sanctions (asset freezing) and an immigration designation for the purposes of section 8B of the Immigration Act 1971. Mr Usmanov was designated on the basis that he was said by HMG to be “a prominent Russian businessman and pro-Kremlin oligarch” and “closely associated with high-profile individuals within the Government of Russia, both financially through his considerable business links and through relationships with significant individuals including President Vladimir Putin”, as well as carrying on business in sectors of strategic significance to the Government of Russia via his holding company, USM Holdings. Mr Keith KC informed me that Mr Usmanov is in the course of challenging his designation under section 23 of SAMLA.[5]The Claimant’s association with Mr Usmanov relied upon by the Defendant is solely that of familial link. More particularly, the Defendant did not designate the Claimant on the basis that he is associated with Mr Usmanov because he obtained a financial benefit or other material benefit from him.[6]The pleaded grounds for review to set aside the Defendant’s designation decision are set out at §27 of the Claimant’s Statement of Facts and Grounds (“the SFG”) dated 30 July 2024, accompanying his Claim Form. The Claimant’s skeleton for the hearing before me summarised the grounds as including the following: a challenge to the legality of regulation 6(2)(d) of the Russia Regulations, which provides for designation solely on the ground of familial relationship with an ‘involved person’ (ground 1); a ‘Padfield’ challenge(Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997) (ground 3); a rationality challenge (ground 5); a disproportionality/ECHR challenge (ground 6); and an arbitrariness challenge (ground 7).[7]Mr Keith KC argued that each of these grounds, through different “legal prisms”, puts in issue what he called the Defendant’s “motivation and justification” for designating the Claimant. In particular, he submitted that the process by which the Claimant came to be selected to be designated appears to have been motivated by political and presentational considerations as opposed to faithful application of the statutory criteria. In summary, he argued that the further information sought by the Claimant concerns an apparent attempt by an unidentified public body (which Mr Keith KC said may have been the NCA) to lobby the Defendant in favour of the Claimant’s designation. Mr Keith KC argued the Application raises important issues regarding how the Defendant, as the decision-maker entrusted to pursue specific and limited legislative purposes when exercising his powers under the Russia Regulations, engaged with, responded to and took into account this third party lobbying. He submitted that although the Application was for “further information” it was in effect a form of hybrid application in the form of a specific disclosure request, combined with a request for further information.[8]For the Secretary of State, Mr Leary opposed the application principally on the basis that it fails the test in the CPR 79.11(5). In short, he argued that the information sought is not “about the appropriate Minister’s grounds” for the purposes of that rule, nor is the information “necessary for determination of the application to set aside the… sanctions decision” for the purposes of CPR 79.11(7)(a). Mr Leary also submitted that there was no basis for the Court to conclude that the Defendant had failed to properly comply with his disclosure obligations under CPR 79.23(1)(b). He focussed on the nature of the pleaded challenge in support of these submissions. In the alternative, Mr Leary submitted that an order for disclosure would be disproportionately costly and time-consuming because it would be likely to trigger an application for a closed material procedure and/or Public Interest Immunity. II. The Factual Background[9]The Application arises in the following context. Together with its pleaded response to the challenge, the Defendant served on the Claimant a ‘disclosure bundle’ comprising three sets of documents: two internal submissions (‘DB/1’ and ‘DB/2’) and an email chain (‘DB/3’). The Application before me arises out of the content of DB/3, which is a redacted email chain that originates with an email sent on 9 May 2022 from an undisclosed ‘Public Body’ to Daniel Drake (Head of the FCDO Sanctions Taskforce, Russia/Ukraine) with the subject, “Further proposals for UK sanctions”. I understand that an unredacted version of DB/3 has been sent to the Administrative Court. As I said at the hearing, I have not seen or read the unredacted email chain.[10]The content of DB/3 suggests the following series of events:(i) On 9 May 2022, a ‘Public Body’ made a ‘proposal’ that the Claimant (and his brother) be sanctioned as “the nephews of Alisher USMANOV and sons of Gulbakhor ISMAILOVA (also UK sanctioned)”.(ii) ‘Open source packages’ were submitted to the FCDO by the ‘Public Body’, apparently in support of its ‘proposal’ for the Claimant and his brother to be sanctioned. The ‘Public Body’ contended that it would be “impactive” to “coordinate further UK designations with” announcements by an undisclosed ‘partner’.(iii) On 23 June 2022, a policy officer of the Defendant observed in an internal email that the “evidence pack” submitted by the ‘Public Body’ was “limited, and limited information as to how he is connected to his uncle”. The sender expressed the view that “We would need to make these cases based on association with Usmanov, and I don’t think simply them being his nephews is sufficient. We should ask the [‘Public Body’] for more information, both as to why they are interested in these two and more open source material. I will also ask [‘Partner’]”.[11]By a letter dated 24 October 2024, the Defendant notified the Claimant of the following categories of redactions applied to DB/3:
“1. Civil servant names and contact details have been redacted. Redactions have been made to this document on grounds of relevance. This material relates to potential designations of a third parties. Additional reactions have been made to this document on grounds of relevance and sensitivity. In order to assist the Claimants and Courts understanding of the material a gist has been provided.”
[12]By a subsequent exchange of correspondence (Claimant 5 November 2024 / Defendant 6 November 2024), the Defendant confirmed that what it refers to as a ‘gist’ consisted of the descriptors in square brackets which appear on the redacted copy of DB/3 (namely: ‘Public Body’ / ‘Partner’ / ‘Sentence discussing engagement with partner’).[13]The Application seeks further information about how, and why, the Defendant received, considered, responded to, acted upon and took into account this ‘proposal’ by a third party for the Claimant to be sanctioned. The Application seeks four sub-categories of information:a. The identity of the ‘Public Body’ referred to in DB/3 (Category 1);b. The content of its proposal that the Claimant be sanctioned, including the content of the open source package provided to the Defendant in support of that proposal (Category 2);c. Any communications between the Defendant and the public body in connection with the latter’s proposal that the Claimant be sanctioned (Category 3); andd. Any records of internal discussion between officers of the Defendant in connection with the merits of the proposal referred to in DB/3 (Category 4).[14]In response to the Application, the Defendant served a 2nd witness statement dated 28 November 2024 from Esther Phoebe Blythe (“Ms Blythe”) of the FCDO. Ms Blythe is the Deputy Director of the Sanctions Directorate (her 1st statement was made in support of the Defendant’s response to the claim). In her 2nd statement, she explains that pursuant to CPR r. 79.23, the Secretary of State is required to make a reasonable search for material relevant to the matters under consideration in the proceedings, and to disclose any material:(i) on which the Secretary of State relies;(ii) which adversely affects the Secretary of State’s case; or(iii) which supports the Claimant’s case. Ms Blythe’s evidence is that her colleagues in the FCDO Sanctions Directorate have undertaken reasonable searches in accordance with this obligation. Ms Blythe then addressed each of the information Categories 1-4 in the Application. The reference below to “EB” is to exhibits to Ms Blythe’s statement.[15]The Defendant has disclosed the following further information to the Claimant: a. A redacted seven-page document (‘EB2/04/23’) which addressed the Claimant’s request under Category 2. This reproduces the EU’s published rationale for sanctioning Mr Usmanov, and refers to an article on the BBC website and an entry on the website of Everton Football Club, prefaced with the following introduction:
“Sarvar Ismailov may have benefited from USMANOV’s wealth and influence in the UK. ISMAILOV is a director at EVERTON F.C. which USMANOV was widely reported as a significant financier and sponsor for the club. Sarvar ISMAILOV is a son of Gulbakhor ISMAILOVA.”
The redactions to the remainder of the document are said to “all relate to other individuals” (EB2, §20). In his note from Counsel filed on his behalf in advance of a directions hearing before me on 28 February 2025, the Defendant clarified that the content of this document is the entirety of the ‘proposal’ and supporting ‘open source package’ submitted to the FCDO by the ‘Public Body’ referred to in DB/3. Category 2 is accordingly no longer in issue and was not pursued by Mr Keith KC before me. b. The ‘partner’ with whose announcements the ‘Public Body’ claimed it would be “impactful” to coordinate UK sanctions is “an international partner which the FCDO was engaging with in respect of the designation” (EB2, §11).[16]The remainder of the Claimant’s requests for further information are resisted by the Defendant. During the 28 February 2025 directions hearing, it was confirmed to me by Mr Leary for the Secretary of State that the Defendant would not rely upon the content of any closed material in resisting the Application. I recorded that in a recital to my Order made that day. I also made an Order at that hearing granting the Defendant’s application for redaction of the names of civil servants from his disclosure, applying the principles in Dana Astra v Secretary of State [2025] EWHC 289 (Admin) at [97]-101]. I held that well-founded and specific reasons had been provided to justify the redactions. III. Relevant CPR Provisions[17]Although the Application is made under CPR 79.11(5), the way in which it was argued included in substance a complaint that the disclosure obligations in CPR 79.23 had not been complied with. I will set out each of these rules below but it is to be noted that by operation of CPR 79.22(1) the general rules in CPR Part 31 for disclosure and inspection (which would include the provision for specific disclosure under CPR 31.12) are disapplied. Accordingly, it follows that within the bespoke regime for challenging sanctions decisions created by CPR Part 79, there is no power in the Court to direct specific disclosure. However, as Mr Leary for the Defendant rightly accepted when I put it to him during submissions, the Court must have the power to police the Defendant’s compliance with CPR 79.23 and to make remedial orders if there has been non-compliance. I turn then to the two relevant rules.[18]CPR 79.11, which provides as follows (with my underlined emphasis):
“Response by the appropriate Minister 79.11 (1) Where the appropriate Minister intends to oppose the application to set aside the financial restrictions decision or sanctions decision, the appropriate Minister must file with the court – (a) the grounds for contesting the application; and (b) any relevant evidence of which the appropriate Minister is aware at that stage. (2) Unless the appropriate Minister objects to the grounds and evidence in paragraph (1) being disclosed to the claimant and the claimant’s legal representative, the appropriate Minister must serve a copy of the grounds and evidence on the claimant at the same time as filing the grounds. (3) Where the appropriate Minister objects to the grounds and evidence in paragraph (1) being disclosed to the claimant and the claimant’s legal representative, the appropriate Minister must make an application in accordance with rule 79.25. (4) Where a special advocate has been appointed the appropriate Minister, the appropriate Minister must serve on that special advocate a copy of the grounds and evidence filed under paragraph (1). (5) The claimant and any special advocate may apply to the court for an order directing the appropriate Minister to file and serve further information about the appropriate Minister’s grounds filed under paragraph (1)(a). (6) The application under paragraph (5) must set out – (a) what information is sought; and (b) why the information sought is necessary for the determination of the application to set aside the financial restrictions decision or sanctions decision. (7) The court may make an order on an application under paragraph (5) where it considers that the information sought is – (a) necessary for the determination of the application to set aside the financial restrictions decision or sanctions decision; and (b) may be provided without disproportionate cost, time or effort. (8) Where the appropriate Minister objects to serving on the claimant and the claimant’s legal representative the information sought under paragraph (5), the appropriate Minister must make an application in accordance with rule 79.25.”
[19]CPR 79.23 provides as follows (with my underlined emphasis):
“Search for, filing of and service of material 79.23 (1) A party (the disclosing party) must– (a) make a reasonable search for material relevant to the matters under consideration in the proceedings to which Section 2 or 3 of this Part applies; and (b) file and serve on the other party and any special advocate material other than closed material – (i) on which the disclosing party relies; (ii) which adversely affects the disclosing party’s case; or (iii) omitted (iv) which supports the other party’s case. (2) The factors relevant in deciding the reasonableness of a search under paragraph (1)(a) include – (a) the amount of material involved; (b) the nature and complexity of the proceedings; (c) whether the material is in the control of the party making the search; (d) the ease and expense of retrieval of any material; and (e) the significance of any material which is likely to be located during the search. (3) The duty to search for, file and serve material under paragraph (1) continues until the proceedings to which Section 2 or 3 of this Part applies have been determined. (4) Where material, other than closed material, to which the duty under paragraph (1) extends comes to a party’s attention before the proceedings to which Section 2 or 3 of this Part applies have been determined, that party must immediately – (a) file it with the court; (b) serve it on the other party; and (c) serve it on any special advocate.” (i) on which the disclosing party relies; (ii) which adversely affects the disclosing party’s case; or (iii) omitted (iv) which supports the other party’s case. (2) The factors relevant in deciding the reasonableness of a search under paragraph (1)(a) include – (a) the amount of material involved; (b) the nature and complexity of the proceedings; (c) whether the material is in the control of the party making the search; (d) the ease and expense of retrieval of any material; and (e) the significance of any material which is likely to be located during the search. (a) file it with the court; (b) serve it on the other party; and (c) serve it on any special advocate.”
IV. The arguments[20]Mr Keith KC submitted that the issue which arises on the Application concerns the need for the Defendant to divulge information about a third party initiating a proposal for sanctions against the Claimant and about how the Defendant dealt with that proposal. He says that the apparent lobbying for sanctions revealed by DB/3 gives rise to such clear and important questions about the Defendant’s compliance with its public law duties as statutory decision-maker that the disclosure sought is plainly necessary for the proper disposal of the claim, per CPR 79.11(5). Mr Keith KC argued that it must be necessary for information capable of demonstrating third party lobbying for the Claimant’s designation to be disclosed, in circumstances where the Defendant is the statutory decision-maker, tasked with imposing self avowedly draconian and oppressive sanctions on individuals in furtherance of specified legislative purposes. He submitted that it is incumbent on the Defendant to disclose the fact and content of such proposals, as well as details of the extent to which they were scrutinised and/or taken into account and/or acted upon by the Defendant as decision maker. He prayed in aid the judicial review principles (which apply in a SAMLA challenge: see [1] above) and submitted that if the Defendant has taken into account an irrelevant consideration (such as the desire of a third party to see a particular individual sanctioned) in reaching his decision, that would plainly be capable as a matter of public law in justifying an order to set it aside.[21]Mr Leary’s main response was that the Application is a “fishing expedition” and fails the test in CPR 79.11(5). In short, he says that the information sought is not “about the grounds” for designation nor necessary for determination of the substantive challenge. He submitted that the Defendant has already considered the documents and information being requested and has disclosed pursuant to CPR 79.23 all relevant material on which he relies, or which is capable of adversely affecting his case, or which might support the Claimant’s challenge. In this regard, he relied on Ms Blythe’s evidence and submitted there was no basis for the Claimant to question compliance with the material disclosure obligations. He took me in particular to Ms Blythe’s witness statement at paragraphs 8-10 which he submitted demonstrated how disclosure was carried out in accordance with the requirements under CPR 79.23. Mr Leary argued that DB/3 was not included in any ministerial submissions or document packs considered by the Secretary of State or ministers in making the designation decision, or for that matter deciding whether to amend the Russia Regulations. He said it was wholly extraneous to the decision making under challenge. V. Analysis and Conclusions[22]As I observed at the hearing, there seemed to me to be two ways in which the Application was being put. In form, it is a CPR 79.11(5) application but in substance it could also be seen as a complaint that the Defendant had not complied with the disclosure duties imposed by CPR 79.23. I propose to address each of these ways of putting the case separately.[23]I preface my discussion by underlining that caution needs to be exercised when seeking to import general candour in disclosure principles from judicial review case law. Those principles were comprehensively described by Fordham J in Rex (Police Superintendents Association) v Police Remuneration Review Body and another [2023] EWHC 1838 (Admin) at [15]. I will call this the “Police Superintendents” case. The principles of candour in disclosure which have developed at common law in judicial review cases are the result of the non-application of standard disclosure obligations in public law cases. But in the present context, there are express disclosure obligations on the Defendant. I return to this issue below. The further information application: CPR 79.11(5)[24]Mr Keith KC’s arguments were forcefully and attractively presented. I can also understand why his lay client would naturally feel some suspicion that his designation might have been the result of third party lobbying by an unidentified public body, as opposed to conscientious application of the legislative provisions by the designated statutory decision-maker. I was not however persuaded that this was a proper application within CPR 79.11(5). That provision sets the parameters for a legitimate request for further information. It is not a provision intended to be used for a specific disclosure application.[25]I start by noting that the submissions on behalf of the Claimant (see [7] above, and in particular Mr Keith KC's reference to the "legal prisms" through which the grounds should be viewed ) appeared to me to suggest that the Claimant’s existing pleaded challenge raised a substantive issue as to whether the Secretary of State had been improperly influenced in his decision-making. I do not accept that the pleaded case raises an improper influence case whether through the "prism" mechanism, or otherwise. In any event, Mr Keith KC has helpfully clarified that his submission was that, although the appearance of impropriety had been "alluded to" in his existing grounds (via the reference to ‘political and presentational considerations’ on account of the targeting of the Claimant, the chronology, and the change to the regulatory structure), the Claimant had not been in a position to plead any case on lobbying prior to the disclosure of DB/3. It follows that DB/3 does not relate to any existing case made by the Claimant, nor does it relate in any manner to the Defendant's defence to this claim. I can go further. In my judgment no such improper influence ground could properly be pleaded (were a proposed draft amendment to be put before the Court). That conclusion is for the following brief reasons.[26]As was made clear in the disclosure already provided, DB/3 (the communication from the public body in question) was not itself included or referred to in the ministerial submissions leading to the designation decision, and did not form part of the decision-making process in this case. I accept that factual position. I was not persuaded by Mr Keith KC that he had any basis to question it and do not accept his submission that DB/3 may have "tainted" the decision-making process in some way. The Secretary of State has also confirmed that nothing in the information being sought would be capable of adversely affecting his case or of supporting the Claimant’s claim. Further, nothing in DB/3 suggests any basis for challenging designation on the basis of purported “lobbying”, nor for going behind the assurances that have been given by the Secretary of State. I accept the submission that the respective sanctions bodies of states regularly communicate with each other and with other public authorities to ensure sanctions can be most effective. There is nothing surprising or troubling in this such as to give rise to a ground of challenge. As I see matters, DB/3 simply records a public body proposing that the Claimant be designated based upon open-source material. It is clear from the FCDO’s comments on the proposal (which have been disclosed) that officials considered at the time that the information being provided in the proposal was “limited” and that FCDO officials would need to take their own course when it came to a designation decision (which appears to me to be precisely what occurred).[27]The only relevance of DB/3, and the reason it was disclosed at all, is that (on a rather broad approach to his disclosure obligations) the Secretary of State considered that the FCDO’s internal comments on the proposal might be capable of adversely affecting his case or supporting the Claimant’s case. I accept Mr Leary’s core submission that this was not because of any “lobbying” issue but rather because DB/3 records an official’s comments that the open-source material provided in the proposal was “limited” and that the official did not think that the Claimant “being [Mr Usmanov’s]… nephew” would be “sufficient” for his designation. Matters go no further than that.[28]I turn then to the relevant rule about seeking further information in more detail. CPR 79.11(5) does not provide for specific or further disclosure, rather it enables a Claimant to make an application for further information “about the appropriate Minister’s grounds”. It is a bespoke provision with a limited scope. In my judgment, if an analogy is to be made at all, this regime should be approached in a similar way to the CPR Part 18 process. Pursuant to Part 18, a request for further information about a party’s case must relate specifically to a matter in dispute in the proceedings. It is well-established that the requirement for a request under CPR 18 to concern a matter which is “in dispute in the proceedings” excludes requests intended to elicit information that might support a new claim against the other party. As is well-established, CPR 18 (and its historic predecessor the request for further and better particulars) does not exist to facilitate “fishing expeditions”. As in conventional civil proceedings, one would expect a request for further information to be related to facts and matters pleaded by the other party. The request must be directed to that pleading and seek clarification of the nature of the pleaded case. Each of these principles, which are simply commonsense, apply with equal force to CPR 79.11(5). But the Application before me is not directed to (or “about”) any aspect of the Defendant's pleaded response (“the grounds” within the language of CPR 79.11) dated 24 October 2024 to the claim (or indeed to the supporting 1st witness statement of Ms Blythe).[29]To summarise, a compliant CPR 79.11(5)-(7) application must satisfy the following threshold conditions:(i) it must request information that is “about the appropriate Minister’s grounds” for contesting the challenge; and(ii) it must set out “why the information is necessary for the determination of the application to set aside… the sanctions decision”.[30]The Application satisfies neither of these threshold requirements. The Claimant seeks further disclosure on the vague basis that the information is “relevant to questions at issue in the claim” but has not explained how the requested information is said to be “about”the Secretary of State’s grounds for contesting the claim, or why the information is necessary for the determination of the challenge as presently pleaded.[31]In more detail, none of the three categories of information still in issue is “about” the Secretary of State’s grounds or “necessary” for the determination of the challenge for the following reasons: Category 1. The identity of the public authority referred to in the July email at DB/3 is irrelevant to the issues in these proceedings. In my judgment, it cannot properly be treated as going to the rationality of the decision to designate, nor is it relevant to the question of relevant and irrelevant considerations. The reasons for the decision and the documents relied upon when making the decision have already been disclosed. Category 3. Communications between the Defendant and the public body in relation to the designation proposal, to the extent not already disclosed, do not need to be disclosed for the Claimant to understand the Secretary of State’s grounds or for determination of the challenge. Any relevant material has already been provided in accordance with CPR 79.23. Category 4. Internal communications in relation to the merits of the proposed designation do not fall to be disclosed for similar reasons. The relevant internal discussions going to the designation decision have already been disclosed pursuant to CPR 79.23. Other preliminary internal discussions between officials are not relevant or necessary for the fair disposal of the challenge.[32]The written submissions for the Claimant which seek to address these issues served in my judgment to demonstrate why the Claimant had been unable to address them in the Application itself:(1) In the skeleton on behalf of the Claimant it is argued that the information sought is “plainly” about the Secretary of State’s grounds because those grounds are themselves “about” the Claimant’s SFG, and the Claimant’s SFG raises issues to which the information is relevant. However: (i) The information sought has nothing to do with the Secretary of State’s grounds for contesting the challenge, nor has the Claimant identified any part of the Secretary of State’s grounds to which the information relates; (ii) If the phrase “about the appropriate Minister’s grounds” were intended to encompass information that is merely “about” the Claimant’s SFG, CPR 79.11(5) would have been drafted to say so in terms; and (iii) The information sought is not “about” the Claimant’s SFG in any event. The Claimant has raised no ground of challenge to which this information relates.(2) The Claimant further submitted in his skeleton that it “must be necessary for information capable of demonstrating third party lobbying for… designation to be disclosed”. However, that submission is not tied or related in any meaningful way to the requirements of CPR 79.11(5) or to the facts: (i) The suggestion of “lobbying” is not grounded in what has been disclosed in the redacted DB/3; (ii) In any event, such information would not be about the Secretary of State’s grounds; and (iii) Such information would not even be relevant to the decision-making process in this case. All information that was actually considered by the decision-maker has already been disclosed. It does not include DB/3 or anything else that could be described as “third party lobbying” for designation. The disclosure obligation under CPR 79.23[33]As I have said above, it is open to a claimant to complain, by way of an application to the High Court, that the Minister has not complied with the express disclosure obligations under CPR 79.23. I have approached the Application as if it were made on that wider basis. I am satisfied on the basis of Ms Blythe’s evidence and Mr Leary’s persuasive submissions that the Secretary of State has provided disclosure pursuant to CPR 79.23 of anything relevant on which he relies, which adversely affects his case, or which supports the Claimant’s case.[34]Indeed, the Secretary of State’s disclosure of the redacted copy of DB/3 itself shows that his approach to disclosure has been generous. On the evidence before me, DB/3 was not even part of the material taken into account by the decision-maker, yet it was disclosed because it records an official’s comments that the open-source material provided in support of the designation proposal by the public authority was “limited” and that the official did not think that the Claimant “being [Mr Usmanov’s]…nephew” would be “sufficient” for designation.[35]Given the reliance placed by Mr Keith KC on the part of the decision in the Police Superintendents case where the “Unpleaded Grounds Principle” was set out by Fordham J, I should address how that principle could apply in a sanctions case. Mr Keith KC argued that the Defendant was under an obligation to give the disclosure he seeks even if (which he did not accept) it does not relate to a current pleaded issue. One needs to bear in mind that Fordham J’s summary of the law was in the context of common law judicial review principles of disclosure/candour which have developed in the absence of any rule of civil procedure requiring a public body to give disclosure. In that context, Fordham J explained at para. 15 [10] that the duty of candour extends to documents and information which will assist the claimant’s case or “...may give rise to further grounds of challenge which might not otherwise occur to the claimant”. That principle is well-established by authority. However, I consider that applying it in the context of CPR Part 79 is problematic. That is because the sanctions challenge procedural regime, unlike judicial review, in fact provides a bespoke regime for the minister to give disclosure. That regime, which is a familiar one in civil proceedings and matches standard disclosure under CPR 31.6, requires the minister to provide disclosure of material relied upon or adversely affecting the disclosing party’s “case”, or which is supportive of the other party’s “case”. The “case” is defined by the pleadings (essentially, the claim form under CPR 79.6(1) and the grounds for contesting the claim under CPR 79.11(1)(a)). In ordinary civil proceedings, in applying the concepts of material “adversely affecting” and “supporting” a case, the pleadings are an essential reference point: see Harrods Limited v Times Newspaper Limited [2006] EWCA Civ 294 at [12] and the discussion at White Book [2025] Vol 1 at [31.6.2]. I should record that this case was not cited to me but I consider it states nothing beyond a well-established principle in civil litigation.[36]Although the application of the Unpleaded Grounds Principle does not arise in this case (because there are in fact no properly arguable grounds based on DB/3 and the evidence in relation to it), I find it hard to see how it could apply when there is a bespoke disclosure regime governing sanctions proceedings under section 38 of SAMLA. I have not overlooked the fact that judicial review principles apply in determining such an application. That is concerned however with the merits of a claim and not with the separate issue of the disclosure process which is governed by its own self-contained regime. In short, a Minister does not have to go looking for disclosure which might support an unpleaded challenge. Such an obligation would be in direct conflict with the scope of the express disclosure obligation under CPR 79.23. That is not to say that the Minister can act with anything other than candour when explaining why a claimant has been sanctioned. There is no credible argument on the evidence before me that the Minister’s reasons for designating the Claimant were other than those given in the Statement of Reasons and the Sanctions Designation Form Evidence Pack, as described in Ms Blythe’s first statement.[37]I do not need to address proportionality. It does not arise. The Application is dismissed.

Cited in 2 later judgments