“Change of use of business unit from office (Land Use Class E(g)(i)) to a flexible use comprising office (Land Use Class E(g)(i)) or a dog grooming business (Land Use Class sui generis)”
“A dog grooming salon is a very noisy place. Dogs barking all day long (being in an unfamiliar environment with other unfamiliar dogs) loud machinery running, raised voices to overcome the previous two problems, and possibly music as well, such an establishment would shatter the peace and quiet client and family have enjoyed for many years (and are entitled to continue to enjoy). It was for that very peace and quiet that they moved here. The incidental use of the annexe is regular, by any one of [the Claimant’s] five children at different times. Having a dog grooming salon through the wall (and unacceptable commotion outside or via open windows) would render the annexe unusable other than in the evenings and on Sundays due the constant noise from the dog grooming salon through the wall and outside. Client reports that they spend a lot of time outside in the gardens and having all that noise from the dog grooming salon constantly, six days per week, would render the gardens unusable. The applicant’s current salon causes unbearable outdoor noise according to a neighbour. Our client and family would likely have to sell the house, assuming they could find a buyer if this were permitted. To be clear, they do not want to move, they love it here, they just don’t want a dog grooming salon or anything else that’s noisy within earshot”
“The fact is the applicant presents zero noise attenuation evidence. It is surprising to read a glass partition has insulating properties. Opening just one window would be seriously harmful and the applicant’s letter does not engage with commotion externally. He has no answer to this. A few PINS decisions [that is to say appeal decisions from the Planning Inspectorate concerning other proposals] are attached which highlight why such external noise is unacceptable, given the applicant has no control (despite platitudes otherwise). The council knows from experience that dog grooming is a seriously noisy activity, dogs in unfamiliar location meetings [sic.] unfamiliar dogs causes barking, raised voices etc. The applicant denies seeking more than 5 days a week; but his application form says otherwise. His letter effectively admits 6 days a week, his argument is factually wrong”
“- Noise arising from a dog grooming salon (all-day barking, loud machinery running, raised voices and possibly music) - The proposal would render an incidental residential annex adjoining the subject premises unusable other than in the evenings and on Sundays. - Residential garden adjoining the subject premises would also be rendered unusable. - Salon causes unbearable outdoor noise. - The applicant presents nothing regarding sound proofing. - People coming and going outside, people shouting would be impossible to overcome/attenuate. - Sound proofing to avoid noise transferring through walls is not 100%. - Scale of noise levels and disturbance effective will be wholly inappropriate to this location causing significant harm to amenities.”
“Policy NBE11 of the HLP32 and Saved policy GEN1(iii) and GEN6 of the HLP06 along with Paragraph 135 of the NPPF 2023 all seek to protect and/or achieve a high standard of amenity for existing and future users and also do not undermine quality of life for communities. The subject business unit adjoins the grounds of a residential property. The main house is located 70m away from the subject site. However, there are two ancillary/incidental buildings on the grounds of this neighbouring residential property. One of them adjoins the subject site/unit ('the annexe') and the other is sited on a southwest direction from the subject unit, 40m away. An objection received from this adjacent neighbouring property, states that residential occupiers spend most of the time gardening and enjoying their outdoor space and that family stays in the annexe regularly. Strong concerns have been raised citing that unbearable levels of noise would arise from the proposal rendering the use of the annex only possible in the evenings and on Sundays. However, the objection is not accompanied by any substantial evidence to back up such assertions. It is not uncommon to find such business in town centre locations where there is a tighter grain of premises in different uses, including residential. In fact, the current location of the subject business in a small shopping parade in Farnborough with residential uses above, opposite and to the side which demonstrates that such use is compatible with land uses of different nature, including residential. It is noted that the objection submitted states that an existing neighbour to the business has stated that it causes unbearable outdoor noise, however no substantive evidence has been submitted to support such statements. Officers are not persuaded that such use would be incompatible a residential use, adjoining or adjacent to commercial premises. Whilst the grooming experience may cause anxiety to some dogs and in some occasions, and some animals may get agitated, this would not be the case for every single animal on every single visit to the business. Additionally, it is in the interest of the business to maintain the animals calmed and relaxed to undertake the grooming at ease. It is acknowledged the proposed business would potentially generate different noises when compared to an office use, however there is nothing to suggest they would such as to constitute a nuisance. In any event the main living accommodation of the adjacent residential property is 50m away from the subject building, the adjoining building to the subject site is ancillary/incidental and the operations of the business would not occur during unsociable hours. Therefore, no demonstrable detrimental impacts to the living conditions of adjacent residents and or enjoyment of their dwelling house and garden are anticipated as a result of the change of use proposed. Environmental Health officers from the Council have been consulted on this application, as they deal with statutory nuisances (noise, odours, etc) and have raised no objections to the application. Therefore, officers find the change of use acceptable in this regard and no conflict with the above referenced policies and paragraphs of the NPPF is found. If the Council is minded to approve this application, a planning condition would be suggested to restrict operations to the times/days suggested in the application form and to also restrict the presence of animals on the premises overnight to ensure that no disturbance occurs outside business hours”
“- Social Benefit/Harm Social benefit of moderate nature would arise as a result of an additional business being located in the district for the benefit of its residents that want/need to make use of it. No social harm would arise as a result of the proposal. - Economic Benefits/Harm Economic benefits of moderate nature would also be attracted by the proposal as a result of relocating to the district and the additional expenditure in the local economy following occupation. No economic harm is identified. - Environmental Benefits/Harm Environmental benefits arising are limited to continuing the active use of existing commercial premises in the district and avoiding deterioration of the building as a result of any potential long-term vacancy. Environmental harm of limited nature would arise as a result of the location of the business in an area that is not highly sustainable, and access can mainly be achieved by private motor vehicle. However the same situation would be presented with any business making use of the premises (offices or any other commercial use) in this undesignated employment site. In considering the benefits above against the harm identified, officers view is that the proposed development would result in more benefits and of higher weight than the harm identified. As such the proposal would not present a material conflict with the HLP32 as a whole”
“(1) Where an application is made to a local planning authority for planning permission: (a) Subject to sections 91 and 92, they may grant planning permission either unconditionally or subject to such conditions as they think fit; or (b) They may refuse planning permission (2) In dealing with an application for planning permission … the authority shall have regard to: (a) the provisions of the development plan, so far as material to the application, and … (c) any other material considerations”
“If regard is to be had to the development plan for the purpose of any determination to be made under the Planning Acts the determination must be made in accordance with the plan unless material considerations indicate otherwise”
“42. The principles on which the court will act when criticism is made of a planning officer's report to committee are well settled. To summarise the law as it stands: (1) The essential principles are as stated by the Court of Appeal in R v Selby District Council, ex parte Oxton Farms [1997] E.G.C.S. 60 (see, in particular, the judgment of Judge L.J., as he then was). They have since been confirmed several times by this court, notably by Sullivan L.J. in R (on the application of Siraj) v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council[2010] EWCA Civ 1286 , at paragraph 19, and applied in many cases at first instance (see, for example, the judgment of Hickinbottom J., as he then was, in R (on the application of Zurich Assurance Ltd., t/a Threadneedle Property Investments) v North Lincolnshire Council[2012] EWHC 3708 (Admin) , at paragraph 15). (2) The principles are not complicated. Planning officers' reports to committee are not to be read with undue rigour, but with reasonable benevolence, and bearing in mind that they are written for councillors with local knowledge (see the judgment of Baroness Hale of Richmond in R (on the application of Morge) v Hampshire County Council[2011] UKSC 2 , at paragraph 36, and the judgment of Sullivan J., as he then was, in R v Mendip District Council, ex parte Fabre (2000) 80 P. & C.R. 500, at p.509). Unless there is evidence to suggest otherwise, it may reasonably be assumed that, if the members followed the officer's recommendation, they did so on the basis of the advice that he or she gave (see the judgment of Lewison L.J. in Palmer v Herefordshire Council[2016] EWCA Civ 1061 , at paragraph 7). The question for the court will always be whether, on a fair reading of the report as a whole, the officer has materially misled the members on a matter bearing upon their decision, and the error has gone uncorrected before the decision was made. Minor or inconsequential errors may be excused. It is only if the advice in the officer's report is such as to misdirect the members in a material way – so that, but for the flawed advice it was given, the committee's decision would or might have been different – that the court will be able to conclude that the decision itself was rendered unlawful by that advice. (3) Where the line is drawn between an officer's advice that is significantly or seriously misleading – misleading in a material way – and advice that is misleading but not significantly so will always depend on the context and circumstances in which the advice was given, and on the possible consequences of it. There will be cases in which a planning officer has inadvertently led a committee astray by making some significant error of fact (see, for example R (on the application of Loader) v Rother District Council[2016] EWCA Civ 795 ), or has plainly misdirected the members as to the meaning of a relevant policy (see, for example, Watermead Parish Council v Aylesbury Vale District Council[2017] EWCA Civ 152 ). There will be others where the officer has simply failed to deal with a matter on which the committee ought to receive explicit advice if the local planning authority is to be seen to have performed its decision-making duties in accordance with the law (see, for example, R (on the application of Williams) v Powys County Council[2017] EWCA Civ 427 ). But unless there is some distinct and material defect in the officer's advice, the court will not interfere”
“Appeals should not, in future, be mounted on the basis of a legalistic analysis of the different formulations adopted in a planning officer’s report. An appeal will only succeed, as Lindblom LJ has said, if there is some distinct and material defect in the report. Such reports are not, and should not be, written for lawyers, but for councillors who are well-versed in local affair and local factors”
“As this court has said before, a planning officer's report must not be read in an overly critical spirit or with an unrealistic view of what needs to be set out in assessing the proposal on its merits (see, for example, my judgment in Mansell v Tonbridge and Malling Borough Council[2017] EWCA Civ 1314 at [41]-[42], and the judgment of the Chancellor of the High Court at [62]-[64]). I see no reason to apply a different approach to a report prepared by a planning officer where the decision is being taken under delegated powers and there is a duty on the officer making the decision to give reasons for that decision, under regulation 7 of theOpenness of Local Government Bodies Regulations 2014 . The court will only intervene if there is some distinct and material defect in the report, such as a clear misunderstanding of relevant national or local policy”
“Strong concerns have been raised citing that unbearable levels of noise would arise from the proposal rendering the use of the annex only possible in the evenings and on Sundays. However, the objection is not accompanied by any substantial evidence to back up such assertions”
“Environmental harm of limited nature would arise as a result of the location of the business in an area that is not highly sustainable, and access can mainly be achieved by private motor vehicle”