Gary Lewis v Listing Officer, Vale of Glamorgan Council [2025] EWHC 628 (Admin)

[2025] EWHC 628 (Admin)

Case No AC-2024-CDF-000161

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING'S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Venue Cardiff Civil and Family Justice Centre, 2 Park Street, Cardiff, CF11 1ET

Date 21/03/2025

Before

HIS HONOUR JUDGE JARMAN KC

Sitting as a judge of the High Court

Between

GARY LEWISAppellant

LISTING OFFICER, VALE OF GLAMORGAN COUNCILRespondent

The Claimant in person for in person

Mr Mathew Donmall (instructed by HMRC Legal Group) for Respondent

Hearing Hearing dates: 10 March 2025

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.00am on 21 March 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

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HIS HONOUR JUDGE JARMAN KC

HHJ JARMAN KC:

[1]The appellant Mr Lewis purchased a mobile home in 2021 at Cambrian Residential Park, Cardiff, for the sum of £264,000. It has two bedrooms, a bathroom, kitchen and living room with a total of 96m 2 floor space. It was entered into the council tax valuation list with effect from 23 May 2022 in band D. On 25 January 2023 Mr Lewis proposed that it should be entered in band A, the lowest of all bands, and when that was not agreed an appeal to the Valuation Tribunal for Wales followed. In a decision dated 11 September 2024 the tribunal determined that the mobile home should remain in band D. Under regulation 32 of the Council Tax (Alteration of Lists and Appeals) Regulations 1993 an appeal lies from the tribunal to this court on a point of law.

[2]Mr Lewis takes three points. The first two relate to assumptions which he says were applied which were factually incorrect. The third is that the tribunal erred by relying upon settlements which other mobile home owners at Cambrian Park made with the respondent as to which council tax band should be applied to their homes respectively.

[3]Each of these grounds is disputed on behalf of the respondent. Mr Domball, on his behalf, submits that the assumptions must, by statute, be applied. He submits that this does not mean that evidence of the factual background is not relevant, and that it may be appropriate to make what he calls adjustments in light of that evidence. He gave examples of where that might be appropriate, although he did not specify what the adjustments might be, saying it depended on the evidence. The facts of the present case are different to the examples he gave. He also submits that the tribunal was entitled to have regard to the bands agreed in the six other appeals. The statutory framework

[4]The assumptions are dealt with in regulation 6 of the Council Tax (Situation and Valuation of Dwellings) Regulations 1992. Regulation 6(1) of the 1992 regulations provides that:

“6. —(1) Subject to regulation 7, for the purposes of valuations under section 21 (valuations for purposes of lists) of the Act, the value of any dwelling shall be taken to be the amount which, on the assumptions mentioned in paragraphs (2) and (3) below, the dwelling might reasonably have been expected to realise if it had been sold in the open market: (a) in relation to a list under section 22 or section 22A of the Act, on 1 April 1991; and (b) in relation to a list compiled for a billing authority in Wales under section 22B of the Act, on the date determined under section 21(2A)(b) of the Act as the appropriate date for the list in question.”

[5]Section 21 is of the Local Government Finance Act 1992 which materially provides:

“21 Valuations for purposes of lists. (1) The Commissioners of Inland Revenue shall— (a) carry out such valuations of dwellings in England and Wales; (b) furnish listing officers with such information obtained in carrying out the valuations or in the exercise of the powers conferred by section 27 below; and (c) disclose to such officers such contents of particulars delivered documents, as they consider necessary or expedient for the purpose of facilitating the compilation and maintenance by those officers of valuation lists in accordance with this Chapter. (2) The valuations shall be carried out by reference to the appropriate date and on such assumptions and in accordance with such principles as may be prescribed. (2A) For the purposes of subsection (2) above, the appropriate date is— (a) in relation to a list under section 22, 1st April 1991, and (b) in relation to a list under section 22B, the later of— (i) two years before the date on which the list falls to be compiled, and (ii) such date, if any, within that two year period as may be specified by regulations. (2B) The power to make regulations under subsection (2A)(b)(ii) is exercisable— (a) in relation to a list to be compiled for a billing authority in England, by the Secretary of State, and (b) in relation to a list to be compiled for a billing authority in Wales, by the National Assembly for Wales.”

[6]Under section 22B(2), the list fell to be complied on 1 April 2005, and so under section 21(2A) the appropriate day in Wales is 1 April 2003.

[7]It is well established in case law that the purpose of the assumptions is to provide a common basis for comparison of dwellings which may have been sold or leased on different terms.

[8]The assumption in regulation 6(2)(b) is that the hypothetical sale, as applied to Mr Lewis’ mobile home, was of the freehold interest, when in fact, as is common ground, sales of mobile homes at Cambrian Park are not of the freehold interest.

[9]Mr Lewis makes a similar submission in his next point. The assumption in regulation 6(2)(c) is that the dwelling was sold free of any rent charge, when in fact, again as is common ground, sales of mobile homes at Cambrian Park are subject to the payment of monthly rent.

[10]His final point is that the tribunal erred in having regard to bands which were settled between the parties to appeals in relation to the banding of six other mobile homes on Cambrian Park, which settlements disposed of the hearing of the appeals.

[11]Before I turn to those grounds in more detail, I should deal with whether Mr Lewis’ mobile home is subject to any council tax. In his grounds of appeal, there appeared to be a suggestion that it is not. However, in his oral submissions when I asked him this question, he responded that provided the right procedures were followed, he accepted that his home is so subject. In my judgment that was a fair and proper concession.

[12]Section 1 of the 1992 Act provides that in Wales, county (borough) councils shall levy and collect council tax payable on dwellings in its area. Section 3 defines “dwelling” as being any property which is not a non-domestic hereditament. Section 66 of the Local Government Finance Act 1988, as amended by the Rating (Caravan and Boats) Act 1996, deals with domestic property. Subsection (3) provides that where a caravan on a pitch is the sole or main residence of an individual, the pitch and the caravan, together with any garden, yard, outhouse or other appurtenance belonging to or enjoyed with them, comprise domestic property. “Caravan” is defined by section 66(7) by reference to the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960, section 29 of which in turn defines the word as any structure designed or adapted for human habitation which is capable of being moved from one place to another.

[13]It is common ground that Mr Lewis’ mobile home is his sole or main residence, and it follows in my judgment that it is a dwelling which is subject to council tax. The decision of the tribunal

[14]I next turn to deal with the decision of the tribunal. This first set out the case for the listing officer, including the following, referring to the listing officer as LO:

“4. The LO explained the definition of a caravan as defined in Section 66(7) of The Local Government Finance Act (LGFA) 1988 by reference to Part 1 of The Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960."Caravan means any structure designed or adapted for human habitation which is capable of being moved from one place to another (whether by being towed, or by being transported on a motor vehicle or trailer) and any motor vehicle so designed or adapted’’. The Rating (Caravan and Boats) Act 1996 clarifies when a caravan pitch comprises domestic property, if it is occupied by a caravan that is the sole or main residence of an individual, it is therefore treated as a dwelling. 5. The caravan is owned by the homeowner under a licence, with security of tenure provided by the Mobile Homes Act 1983. The LO advised that the basis of valuation makes no distinction for mobile homes and the council tax band is derived from the assumed freehold value as at the antecedent valuation date (AVD) 1st April 2003, the property is available with vacant possession and is in a state of reasonable repair as prescribed by the Council Tax (Situation and Valuation of Dwellings) 1992 Regulations. 6. The LO pointed out that there is often little sales evidence for Park Home properties. In this case, he provided photographs and measurements of six comparable properties which sold in 2016, 2021, and 2022, indicating values within Bands C and D. Previous appeals on similar homes were settled or dismissed. 7. The LO advised that in the absence of AVD sales evidence, ‘tone of the list’ and decisions from proposals and appeals are relied upon. This approach is endorsed in Domblides v LO (2008). 8. During cross-examination, Mr Lewis spoke on behalf of the appellants and argued that no Tribunal decisions had been made for this park, however, the LO considered that a ‘tone’ had been established, where properties ranging from 53m2 – 78m2, and over 78m2, were banded C and D accordingly. The LO contended that ‘tone’ was set on the park since 2005 when the Valuation List commenced, and from other agreements reached with appellants at the same residential park. 9. The appellant questioned the assumptions prescribed within The Council Tax (Situation and Valuation of Dwellings) Regulations 1992 used in valuing his property and the LO clarified that valuations are adjusted if any assumptions are incorrect.”

[15]The decision then set out the case for Mr Lewis, including the following, which Mr Lewis repeated in his submissions before me:

“13. The appellant argued that mobile homes depreciate, which the LO agreed. but noted that relevant legislation is in place to provide the process to allow the valuation of properties for council tax banding purposes. However, he contended that caravans depreciate at a much faster rate than ‘standard properties’ which increase year by year. He questioned whether the mobile homes should be valued more often. 18. The appellant advised that he did not understand why there were no sales values at the antecedent date but that the VOA had considered the tone of the list. He maintained that there should be electronic records of these sales when in 2003 there were 109 properties on site, although recognised that there was no land transaction tax to pay. 19. The LO responded with regards to the lack of sales evidence and apportioned to the fact that as confirmed by the appellant, there is no land transaction tax on mobile homes from which the VOA obtains that information from the Land Registry. 20. The appellant concluded by saying that he thought that, with all the restrictions that apply, there is a massive injustice in the way mobile homes are valued, and claimed there was no evidence to suggest these had been considered in the valuation method and that he didn’t think that a mobile home can be valued in this manner and is unlawful.”

[16]The tribunal, which is a specialist tribunal with expertise in council tax, then set out its conclusions as follows:

“22. In arriving at its decision, the Tribunal had regard to the statutory basis of valuation and relevant date provisions. The basis of valuation is established by Regulation 6(1) and (2) of the Council Tax (Situation and Valuation of Dwellings) Regulations 1992. This basis requires that the value of any dwelling be taken to be the amount it might reasonably have been expected to realise, and having made a series of statutory assumptions, if it had been sold on the open market, by a willing vendor on 1st April 2003. 23. Whilst all evidence is admissible, no evidence regarding sales figures around the Antecedent Valuation Date was available, therefore the Tribunal found the most compelling evidence was supplied by the Listing Officer where examples of banding agreements had been made on other mobile homes on the same site. Whilst the Tribunal appreciated that these agreements were settled prior to a Tribunal Hearing, it agreed with the Listing Officer that a tone had been set. Consequently, it was noted that those properties, which measured in excess of 78m2had been placed in Band D. 24. The Tribunal concluded that having regard to the appeal property’s size at 96m2 and its character and layout, it would have achieved a value in excess of £91,001 had it been sold on the open market on the Antecedent Valuation Date 1st April 2003 falling into the Band D range of values as set out in The Council Tax (Valuation Bands) (Wales) Order 2003. 25. The Tribunal could not comment on the valuation methods used for the 2005 List as it only had jurisdiction to decide whether the banding was correct based on the Legislation and available evidence. 26. Case Law has established that the burden of proof rests with the appellant to show why the appeal property’s banding should be reduced. From the information provided, the Tribunal was not persuaded that Mr Lewis and Ms Johnson had proven their case and dismissed the appeal.”

[17]It is clear therefore that there was little evidence before the tribunal on which it could make its determination as to the appropriate band. This was partly because there is usually little evidence of sales of mobile homes, which do not attract land transaction tax, and so information from HM Land Registry is not available. There was no expert evidence. There were no comparable sales. Mr Lewis’ mobile home did not exist in 2003. Indeed, in his submissions he stated that the original mobile homes at Cambrian Park had all been demolished by 2005. The points on appeal

[18]I accept Mr Lewis’ submission that the tribunal did not fully engage with the issue of assumptions. In my judgment, it did not need to. It found that the most compelling evidence was the six settlements as to the appropriate bands for other mobile homes on Cambrian Park. It was not suggested before the tribunal or before me that those mobile homes were held on a different basis to that of Mr Lewis, or that they were not subject to similar rent charges. In other words, there was no suggestion that the assumptions should be applied differently to those mobile homes as compared to that of Mr Lewis. It was this evidence, rather than an explicit application of assumptions, which formed the basis of the tribunal’s decision. Mr Lewis asserted that in England most mobile homes are assessed as band A, but I have no evidence of that and in any event the issue for me on this appeal is whether the tribunal in the present case made an error of law. On the facts of this particular case, therefore, in my judgment Mr Lewis’ first two points are not made out.

[19]This leads on to Mr Lewis’ third point. I accept his submission that the case of Dolmides v Listing Officer

[2008] EWHC 3271 (Admin)

, referred to by the tribunal, was a case concerning reliance by a valuation tribunal on previous decisions of the tribunal, and not, as here, reliance on settlements of appeals. However, His Honour Judge Bidder KC, sitting as a judge of the High Court in that case, cited the book Ryde on Rating, as follows: “34… This method adopted by the tribunal was not one that was prohibited by the regulations, which leave it to the specialist tribunal to determine what type of evidence it considers appropriate to do the exercising of placing a particular property in the band. Secondly, it is the case that over time valuation tribunals' decisions will shift from a consideration of individual sale prices, as they were in 1991, and will develop a body of case law which establishes that certain types of properties fall within bands. Thus, in relying on the later decisions, the tribunal is not relying on specific valuations; though it was specific valuations that underlay the subsequent decisions of the tribunal. This resembles the accepted method of valuation known as relying on the, "tone of the list" and this is an appropriate valuation method that is supported by a reference to Ryde on Rating. Chapter 6 of this is set out in an extract in the bundle of legal authorities. The introduction at paragraph 481 is relied on and I quote: "While it may be doubted whether reference to the assessments of comparable hereditaments is truly a method of 'valuation' [that was the initial complaint of Mr Domblides to which I have already referred] it is of necessity widely used as a means of ascertaining the rateable value of an hereditament where better evidence is lacking or in order to supplement other evidence." 35. The tone of the list is referred to at paragraph 483: "The assessments of comparable hereditaments have become an important source of evidence. This was especially so under the 1973 valuation list (now called rating list) which remained in force for some seventeen years due to postponements of the requirement to prepare a new list. The term 'tone of the list' probably derives from the side note to the General Rate Act 1967, section 20. [This should obviously be recognised when dealing with the preceding system but the principle is perfectly applicable to this.] Since all rateable values in the rating list must be assessed at a common valuation date, the 'tone of the list' for a particular category of hereditament is the general level of value for that type of hereditament at that date. Assessments under appeal will carry less weight than assessments which are settled in the absence of the appeal or following determination of an appeal. [I stress the last phrase, these in the List Officer's list were following, four of them, determination appeals.] The weight to be attached to comparable assessments increases over time." "While it may be doubted whether reference to the assessments of comparable hereditaments is truly a method of 'valuation' [that was the initial complaint of Mr Domblides to which I have already referred] it is of necessity widely used as a means of ascertaining the rateable value of an hereditament where better evidence is lacking or in order to supplement other evidence." "The assessments of comparable hereditaments have become an important source of evidence. This was especially so under the 1973 valuation list (now called rating list) which remained in force for some seventeen years due to postponements of the requirement to prepare a new list. The term 'tone of the list' probably derives from the side note to the General Rate Act 1967, section 20. [This should obviously be recognised when dealing with the preceding system but the principle is perfectly applicable to this.] Since all rateable values in the rating list must be assessed at a common valuation date, the 'tone of the list' for a particular category of hereditament is the general level of value for that type of hereditament at that date. Assessments under appeal will carry less weight than assessments which are settled in the absence of the appeal or following determination of an appeal. [I stress the last phrase, these in the List Officer's list were following, four of them, determination appeals.] The weight to be attached to comparable assessments increases over time."

[20]In my judgement, it is clear that the reference to “assessments which are settled in the absence of the appeal” is apt to cover the six settlements which the tribunal took into account in the present case. It is also clear that the authors of Ryde on Rating accepted that such assessments carried more weight than assessments under appeal, for obvious reasons. That was accepted by HHJ Bidder KC, and is accepted by me. In reality, the tribunal had little else, if anything, to go on, and was entitled to conclude as it did. Conclusion

[21]Accordingly, notwithstanding the clear and focussed way in which Mr Lewis presented his case, none of his points succeed and the appeal is dismissed. I would be grateful if the parties could, within 14 days of handing down of this judgment, file a draft order, agreed if possible, together with written submissions on any consequential matters such as costs which cannot be agreed. Any such matters will then be determined on the basis of such written submissions.