“1. The Appellant appeals underS.40 Medical Act 1983 against the decision of the Medical Practitioners Tribunal (MPT) at a Fitness to Practise Review hearing (“Review”) notified on24th November 2023 which made findings that the Appellant is unfit to Practise as of that date and went on to give a direction for suspension for a further 12 months. The Appellant attended the Review but was denied an opportunity to fairly address the issue of her fitness to practise and insight into the issues previously found against her.”
“[she] had been practising as a Naturopath since 2020 (and no longer practised as a GP). … The Appellant’s treatments are successful albeit not mainstream and often her practice involves progressive medicine and alternative remedies.”
"I myself would prefer to put it this way, that he is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art. I do not think there is much difference in sense. It is just a different way of expressing the same thought. Putting it the other way round, a man is not negligent, if he is acting in accordance with such a practice, merely because there is a body of opinion who would take a contrary view. At the same time, that does not mean that a medical man can obstinately and pig-headedly carry on with some old technique if it has been proved to be contrary to what is really substantially the whole of informed medical opinion. Otherwise you might get men today saying: "
“The Appellant did not attend or participate in FTP [Original Tribunal] as she felt victimised by GMC, had been practising as a Naturopath since 2020 (and no longer practised as a GP) and had lost faith in the GMC not least because she had been subjected to many previous allegations of misconduct, many of a similar nature, all having been unsuccessfully investigated and or pursued against her. These previous matters involved submissions of bad faith against GMC because of repeated allegations of, and investigations for, similar alleged “misconduct”, for example use of B12 injections as treatment, which have never been proved as misconduct against the Appellant. The Appellant’s treatments are successful albeit not mainstream and often her practice involves progressive medicine and alternative remedies.”
“7. The January 2023 Tribunal found proved that on one or more occasions tween March and May 2020, Dr Myhill promoted and endorsed the use of agents to treat and protect against viral and bacterial infections, including Coronavirus. Dr Myhill failed to clearly articulate a number of factors in relation to ‘the Agents’ namely, Vitamin C, Iodine, Vitamin D and Ivermectin, including that they were not universally safe when used in the way she recommended and were not licensed to be used as anti-viral agents. 8. The January 2023 Tribunal found that Dr Myhill’s recommendations and actions risked patient safety by exposing patients to potential serious harm, including toxicity, and/or, failed to meet NICE guidance of Vitamin D dosing, and were unproven in terms of their benefits. 9. The January 2023 Tribunal found proved that Dr Myhill’s recommendations and actions undermined public health by exposing patients to potential serious harm, including toxicity, and/or, failed to meet NICE guidance of vitamin D dosing, were not supported by any professional UK medical body or the NHS and were unproven in terms of their benefits. 10. The January 2023 Tribunal found that Dr Myhill had breached paragraphs 1, 15, 16, 22, 49, 65, 68, 70, 71 and 73 of GMP. [Good Medical Practice or “GMP”] 11. The January 2023 Tribunal determined that Dr Myhill’s failures amounted to serious professional misconduct.”
“Professionalism in action 1 Patients need good doctors. Good doctors make the care of their patients their first concern: they are competent, keep their knowledge and skills up to date, establish and maintain good relationships with patients and colleagues, are honest and trustworthy, and act withintegrity and within the law. Domain 1: Knowledge, skills and performance Apply knowledge and experience to practice 15 You must provide a good standard of practice and care. If you assess, diagnose or treat patients, you must: a adequately assess the patient’s conditions, taking account of their history (including the symptoms and psychological, spiritual, social and cultural factors), their views and values; where necessary, examine the patient b promptly provide or arrange suitable advice, investigations or treatment where necessary c refer a patient to another practitioner when this serves the patient’s needs. 16 In providing clinical care you must: a prescribe drugs or treatment, including repeat prescriptions, only when you have adequate knowledge of the patient’s health and are satisfied that the drugs or treatment serve the patient’s needs b provide effective treatments based on the best available evidence c take all possible steps to alleviate pain and distress whether or not a cure may be possible d consult colleagues where appropriate e respect the patient’s right to seek a second opinion f check that the care or treatment you provide for each patient is compatible with any other treatments the patient is receiving, including (where possible) self-prescribed over-the-counter medications g wherever possible, avoid providing medical care to yourself or anyone with whom you have a close personal relationship Domain 2: Safety and quality Contribute to and comply with systems to protect patients 22 You must take part in systems of quality assurance and quality improvement to promote patient safety. This includes: a taking part in regular reviews and audits of your work and that of your team, responding constructively to the outcomes, taking steps to address any problems and carrying out further training where necessary b regularly reflecting on your standards of practice and the care you provide c reviewing patient feedback where available Establish and maintain partnerships with patients 49 You must work in partnership with patients, sharing with them the information they will need to make decisions about their care, including: a their condition, its likely progression and the options for treatment, including associated risks and uncertainties b the progress of their care, and your role and responsibilities in the team c who is responsible for each aspect of patient care, and how information is shared within teams and among those who will be providing their care d any other information patients need if they are asked to agree to be involved in teaching or research. Act with honesty and integrity 65 You must make sure that your conduct justifies your patients’ trust in you and the public’s trust in the profession. Communicating information 68 You must be honest and trustworthy in all your communication with patients and colleagues. This means you must make clear the limits of your knowledge and make reasonable checks to make sure any information you give is accurate. 70 When advertising your services, you must make sure the information you publish is factual and can be checked, and does not exploit patients’ vulnerability or lack of medical knowledge. 71 You must be honest and trustworthy when writing reports, and when completing or signing forms, reports and other documents. You must make sure that any documents you write or sign are not false or misleading. (a) You must take reasonable steps to check the information is correct. (b) You must not deliberately leave out relevant information. 73 You must cooperate with formal inquiries and complaints procedures and must offer all relevant information while following the guidance in Confidentiality.”
“12. The January 2023 Tribunal determined that a reasonable and well-informed member of the public would expect a finding of impairment to be made in this case, both to mark the seriousness of the misconduct, and to uphold proper standards across the medical profession. It considered that Dr Myhill’s misconduct had brought the medical profession into disrepute. The Tribunal considered that public confidence in the profession would be undermined if a finding of impairment was not made in this case. In terms of Patient B and the internet allegations the January 2023 Tribunal determined that Dr Myhill’s fitness to practise was impaired by reason of misconduct.”
“It is not difficult to think of examples of matters on which doctors’ opinions on medical matters will differ. The simple fact that one opinion could legitimately be described as “widely accepted” ought not, of itself, provide a sufficient justification for professional discipline of medical practitioners who held a different opinion. In many instances, there will be obvious value in legitimate discussion of different or conflicting medical hypotheses, or of whether received wisdom should be revisited. Disciplinary action in such circumstances could amount to an unjustified interference with article 10 rights. Neither holding nor expressing an outlying opinion on a matter of professional practice ought to give rise to punishment, absent clear justification, for example where there is evidence of harm to patients or public health.”
“… this Tribunal’s use of the standard that asked whether what Mr Adil had said was “contrary to widely accepted medical opinion” (taken from paragraph 4b. of the charge sheet), was hostage to fortune. Any general practice on the part of the GMC of applying disciplinary sanctions to medical practitioners simply because they held or expressed views that were “not part of widely accepted medical opinion” (Determination on the Facts at paragraph 52) would engage the operation of article 10, and applying that standard to a particular case is clearly capable of leading to disciplinary conclusions amounting to unjustified interference with article 10 rights. From the perspective of compliance with article 10, action taken by reference to such a standard would require clear justification. As a general rule it would be preferable for the Tribunal to address such situations within the confines of standards expressly set by the GMC, and consider by reference to those standards whether the misconduct found to be taken place was sufficiently serious as to amount to impairment of fitness to practise”
“5. When the Appellant was notified that over 100 allegations in total had been proved at FTP and that she had been found unfit to practise with a suspension for 9 months, her mistrust of GMC and the disciplinary process was exacerbated. An appeal to the High Court seemed to be an unnecessary mountain to climb, very costly and with potential cost risks. Since the Appellant has practised as a Naturopath from 2020 (not as a GP) and no longer even pays fees to GMC, no longer undergoes reappraisal and her licence to practice medicine expired in 2020 and has no medical indemnity for GP work, she did not appeal and did not expect that her professional reputation as a doctor would be smeared or that she should need to prove her innocence. However, she later discovered that her name now appeared on the GMC website as suspended for misconduct with details of the numerous (over 100) proved allegations including those in respect of Patient A and learned of mainstream press articles (including BBC news) which stated that she was a risk to patients’ safety and had given false information to the public including recommending “animal medication”
“7. The Appellant felt obliged to engage with the Review proceedings which were to readdress her fitness to practise as of November 2023 so that she could demonstrate that she is in fact fit to practise, should not be publicly considered as a doctor who has committed matters of misconduct (Bolam principles properly applied) and should not be subjected to a sanction of suspension. This seemed to be the necessary way to correct the wrong against her.”
“We know that the December 2022 Tribunal [that ultimately delivered the27 January 2023 decision], as I’ll refer to them, had considered, Dr Myhill, your fitness to practise and they made the assessment, the determination, that your fitness to practise was impaired then in December of 2022. We are tasked now with whether your fitness to practise is impaired as of today and so to do that we’ll consider whether there’s been any development of insight or remediation since December 2022 and whether there remains a risk of repetition of any misconduct. We have no power to overturn any findings of fact of the December 2022 Tribunal and we’re not able to overturn their conclusion that the facts found proved amounted to serious misconduct. So because we don’t have the power to deal with that, we don’t want to hear any submissions from either party or any evidence designed to persuade us that the previous Tribunal was wrong because we’re not empowered to deal with that. To reiterate, the Tribunal’s actual role today, then, is extremely narrow because we’re going to be concerned only with whether Dr Myhill’s fitness to practise is impaired as of today’s date or possibly if we go into tomorrow tomorrow’s date and whether a finding of impaired fitness to practise is necessary. So if it assists, what we are likely to be assisted by both parties is for any submission and evidence to focus on whether there has been a development of insight; second, whether there has been a development of remediation; and, third, any risk to further misconduct.”
“Since the review will assess my insight in respect of the matters found against me it is important and necessary for me to determine why I do not agree with the findings which were in my absence and therefore why, despite not agreeing with those findings, my insight is not impaired and that I am fit to practise. It should not matter that I did not appeal the findings or the reasons for why I did not do so because this review hearing is still dependent on those findings and consideration of my insight about them.”
“I do not wish to challenge the findings of the Fitness to Practise hearing, it had its evidence base then, I wish to present new evidence not available to that Tribunal which I believe renders those findings unsound. This must be done out of fairness to the practitioner, ie, myself.”
“In my absence witnesses were allowed to present their own personal opinions and chose to ignore the large body of medical opinion that supported the advice contained within my website and what I had told patients. … The second reason that I wish to cross-examine Julia Oakford [legal chair of Original Tribunal] is that in my absence she failed to apply the Bolam test in her assessment of GMC expert witness evidence”
“DETERMINATION 1. The Tribunal was provided with written skeleton arguments from Dr Myhill and Ms Emsley-Smith, Counsel on behalf of the GMC. Dr Myhill also supplied the Tribunal with a 1352 page preliminary argument bundle. Submissions 1. Dr Myhill told the Tribunal, that she wishes to call three witnesses Mrs Julia Oakford Legally Qualified Chair of the January 2023 Tribunal, Dr Kevin O’Shaughnessy and Dr Richard Quinton, both GMC expert witnesses at that hearing. Dr Myhill said that the witnesses are necessary in order for her to be able to cross examine them in order to demonstrate that her hearing in January 2023 was unfair. She said that she wishes to present new facts which demonstrate evidence of insight and remediation. Dr Myhill submitted that the Tribunal should allow the witnesses to give evidence as the January 2023 Tribunal was misled resulting in unfairness of the proceedings. She said that the processes followed to date have not been in accordance with her Human Rights, specifically her freedom of expression and right to a fair trial. 2. Ms Emsley-Smith stated that the submissions made by Dr Myhill are that which could be heard by the High Court on any appeal rather than submissions relevant to a review hearing. She reminded the Tribunal that it does not have the power to revisit the findings of fact, impairment and sanction decisions made by the January 2023 Tribunal. Further, she refuted any suggestion of bad faith on the part of the GMC legal team and the GMC, then and now. Background 3. Dr Myhill’s registration was made subject to an order of suspension for a period of nine months following a hearing in January 2023 (‘the January 2023 Tribunal’) which found that her fitness to practise was impaired by reason of misconduct and directed a review. 4. The Tribunal has noted Rules 29(2) and 34(1) which state: ‘Rule 29(2) (2) Where a hearing of which notice has been served on the practitioner in accordance with these Rules has commenced, the Committee or Tribunal considering the matter may, at any stage in their proceedings, whether of their own motion or upon the application of a party to the proceedings, adjourn the hearing until such time and date as they think fit. Rule 34(1) The committee or a Tribunal may admit any evidence they consider fair and relevant to the case before them, whether or not such evidence would be admissible in a court of law. This Tribunal does not have the power to revisit the findings of the January 2023 Tribunal. The purpose of a review hearing is for this Tribunal to determine whether Dr Myhill’s fitness to practise remains impaired by reason of her misconduct. It must consider Dr Myhill’s insight, remediation and the risk of repetition. 5. Given that the Tribunal cannot revisit the determinations made by the January 2023 Tribunal, it was not satisfied that calling the witnesses is relevant to its duty in determining Dr Myhill’s current fitness to practise. There is nothing to evidence that any of these witnesses could possibly be in a position to assist the Tribunal in determining the matters before it at this review. Much of Dr Myhill’s arguments focus on what she feels is an injustice created by the January 2023 Tribunal’s findings, however, that is not a matter that this Tribunal can revisit. 6. In relation to fairness, the Tribunal noted that Dr Myhill will be permitted to give evidence, should she choose to do so, and/or address the Tribunal by way of submissions. 7. Any consideration as to the success or otherwise of setting aside the witness summons by Cardiff County Court, including any possible appeal of that decision, is not a consideration for this Tribunal. The Tribunal must determine for itself whether it is fair and relevant to call the witnesses Dr Myhill seeks. 8. Dr Myhill made representations about the lateness of receiving the GMCs skeleton argument and a further response from the MPTS Case Management. Although Dr Myhill did not apply for an adjournment to further consider the same, the Tribunal considered whether fairness to Dr Myhill necessitated a delay in the hearing. The GMC skeleton argument set out the Tribunal’s powers at a review hearing but otherwise did not add anything relevant to the Tribunal’s decision. The GMC had consistently communicated to Dr Myhill since June 2023 that they objected to the three witnesses being called and why and therefore the Tribunal did not consider that any further period of consideration with the papers would assist when weighed against the delay that would be caused by adjourning. 9. Accordingly, the Tribunal determined to refuse Dr Myhill’s application to call witnesses.”
“17. Dr Myhill said that at the January 2023 hearing the GMC misled the Tribunal by failing to allow her to produce her own medical records of Patient A. Dr Myhill said the reason she did not attend that hearing was because it could not possibly be fair. She said that the GMC sent Patient A’s medical records which were not anonymised, and it was her view that even if she anonymised the records she held she would be unable to use them, which meant her hearing was intrinsically unfair, regardless of the outcome. She said she did not appeal the decision due to the financial cost of an appeal. 20. When asked about insight Dr Myhill said that the evidence at the January 2023 hearing was unfair and asked the Tribunal to consider the other evidence she had provided to demonstrate that the January 2023 Tribunal’s decision was “materially flawed”
“27 The Appellant attempted to demonstrate genuine insight by providing a large bundle of a responsible body of medical opinion evidence to the GMC and MPT (in advance of the hearing) which show that her views do not equate to misconduct. Furthermore, the Appellant emphasised that she practises as a Naturopathic doctor which is relevant to her views. 28 MPT found that the Appellant lacked insight as she does not agree with the findings against her at FTP. No weight was given to the facts that she was absent, unrepresented, the Bolam test was not applied at FTP, nor was she judged by her peers.”
“GROUND 1 MPT were wrong to make findings that C is unfit to practise by virtue of misconduct because the original findings of misconduct are unsound. GROUND 2 MPT were wrong to make findings that C lacks insight on the facts before them and that C should therefore be subject to further suspension. GROUND 3 MPT failed to take into account, and prevented C from addressing, the Bolam principle which would demonstrate that, while C’s opinions are not “widely accepted” that C’s opinions can be found in the bodies of medical and scientific opinion which C furnished to the court and wished to present to demonstrate she is fit to practise and has insight which was especially relevant as there was no evidence of harm to patients or public health. GROUND 4 MPT wrongly concluded that C’s evidence regarding vitamins and supplements was “research” that “showed some insight” when it in fact demonstrated evidence of expert peers within the same expertise and demonstrated her opinions online were not misconduct. GROUND 5 MPT failed to afford sufficient respect to C’s right under Article 10 to freedom of expression. GROUND 6 MPT failed to afford sufficient respect to C’s right under Article 8 to carry out her private practice as a Naturopath without unreasonable interference. GROUND 7 MPT failed to take into account and or give relevant weight to the specific factual circumstances regarding the allegations in respect of Patient B namely by concluding that C’s attempt to give an explanation was irrelevant and demonstrated lack of insight whereas in fact it demonstrates that there was no misconduct by C. GROUND 8 MPT failed to allow C to adduce evidence relevant to whether it was reasonable to expect admissions to alleged misconduct maters proven as the only way to demonstrate “insight” at the review namely evidence that shows the findings of misconduct regarding Patient A are either an abuse of process, proved in bad faith and or demonstrate total incompetence by the GMC (27 findings of misconduct from 52 allegations all of which were subject to a previous MPT ruling and therefore should not have formed part of the fitness to practise hearing). GROUND 9 MPT wrongly concluded that further suspension is appropriate and proportionate on the facts of the case and or due to C’s unusual circumstances. GROUND 10 MPT were wrong to allow 3 preliminary rulings in favour of GMC which prevented C (a litigant in person) from presenting her case namely (1) allowing late service of GMC skeleton argument dealing with their objections to C calling evidence; (2) refusal to postpone the hearing to allow C to appeal GMC’s applications made the week before the hearing to set aside C’s witness summonses (obtained by C over 6 months before and GMC having warned the witnesses in June 2023) and or to allow C reasonable time to consider the GMC skeleton argument contesting this evidence before the hearing; and (3) refusal to allow C to call witnesses to enable evidence to be put as to her current fitness to practise and issue of insight because the combination of the 3 rulings in respect of applications, all made extremely late, interfered with C’s right under Article 6 to have a fair hearing and prevented her from addressing the issues of fitness to practise and insight in a fair manner.”
“(1) There shall continue to be a body corporate known as the General Medical Council (in this Act referred to as “the General Council”) having the functions assigned to them by this Act. (1A) The over-arching objective of the General Council in exercising their functions is the protection of the public. (1B) The pursuit by the General Council of their over-arching objective involves the pursuit of the following objectives— (1) to protect, promote and maintain the health, safety and well-being of the public, (2) to promote and maintain public confidence in the medical profession, and (3) to promote and maintain proper professional standards and conduct for members of that profession.” (1) to protect, promote and maintain the health, safety and well-being of the public, (2) to promote and maintain public confidence in the medical profession, and (3) to promote and maintain proper professional standards and conduct for members of that profession.”
“(2) Where the Medical Practitioners Tribunal find that the person's fitness to practise is impaired they may, if they think fit— […] (b) direct that his registration in the register shall be suspended (that is to say, shall not have effect) during such period not exceeding twelve months as may be specified in the direction”
“18. (1) This Part shall apply to any hearing (a review hearing) at which a Medical Practitioners Tribunal is to determine whether or not to make a direction under section 35D(5)”
“21A. (1) If, since the previous hearing, a new allegation against the practitioner has been referred to the MPTS for them to arrange for it to be considered by a Medical Practitioners Tribunal, it shall first proceed with that allegation in accordance with rule 17(2)(a) to (j). (2) The Medical Practitioners Tribunal shall thereafter proceed in accordance with rule 22 except that, when determining whether the fitness to practise of the practitioner is impaired and what direction (if any) to impose under section 35D(5), (6), (8) or (12) of the Act, it shall additionally have regard to its findings in relation to the new allegation.” (1) If, since the previous hearing, a new allegation against the practitioner has been referred to the MPTS for them to arrange for it to be considered by a Medical Practitioners Tribunal, it shall first proceed with that allegation in accordance with rule 17(2)(a) to (j). (2) The Medical Practitioners Tribunal shall thereafter proceed in accordance with rule 22 except that, when determining whether the fitness to practise of the practitioner is impaired and what direction (if any) to impose under section 35D(5), (6), (8) or (12) of the Act, it shall additionally have regard to its findings in relation to the new allegation.”
“(1) The following decisions are appealable decisions for the purposes of this section, that is to say— (a) a decision of a Medical Practitioners Tribunal under section 35D above giving a direction […] for suspension.”
“(4) A person in respect of whom an appealable decision falling within subsection (1) has been taken may, before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date on which notification of the decision was served under section 35E(1) above, or section 41(10) ... below, appeal against the decision to the relevant court. (5) In [subsections (4) and (4A)] above, “the relevant court”— … (c) [in the instant case] means the High Court of Justice in England and Wales.”
“102 Derived from Ghosh [[2001] 1 WLR 1915 ] are the following points as to the nature and extent of the section 40 appeal and the approach of the appellate court: (i) an unqualified statutory right of appeal by medical practitioners pursuant to section 40 of the 1983 Act; (ii) the jurisdiction of the court is appellate, not supervisory; (iii) the appeal is by way of a rehearing in which the court is fully entitled to substitute its own decision for that of the tribunal; (iv) the appellate court will not defer to the judgment of the tribunal more than is warranted by the circum- stances; (v) the appellate court must decide whether the sanction imposed was appropriate and necessary in the public inter- est or was excessive and disproportionate; (vi) in the latter event, the appellate court should substitute some other penalty or remit the case to the tribunal for reconsideration. 103 The courts have accepted that some degree of deference will be accorded to the judgment of the tribunal but, as was observed by Lord Millett at para 34 in Ghosh, “the Board will not defer to the Committee's judgment more than is warranted by the circumstances”. […] Laws LJ in Raschid and Fatnani[2007] 1 WLR 1460 […] stated that on such an appeal material errors of fact and law will be corrected and the court will exercise judgment but it is a secondary judgment as to the application of the principles to the facts of the case (para 20).”
“26. The appeal is brought undersection 40 of the Medical Act 1983 which provides a practitioner with a right of appeal to the High Court inter alia from a decision of an FTP under section 35D giving a direction for suspension. By virtue of section 40(7) on an appeal under section 40 the High Court may - (a) dismiss the appeal; (b) allow the appeal and quash the direction or variation appealed against; (c) substitute for the direction or variation appealed against any other direction or variation which could have been given or made by a Fitness to Practise Panel; or (d) remit the case to the Registrar for him to refer it to a Fitness to Practise Panel to dispose of the case in accordance with the directions of the court. 27. The issue for the court is whether the FTP's determination was wrong: seeCPR 52.11 (3). 28. Whilst the appeal constitutes a “re-hearing”, it is a re-hearing without hearing again the evidence. 29. I venture to repeat certain quotations from earlier cases that I made in the case of Chyc v General Medical Council[2008] EWHC 1025 (Admin) concerning the approach of this court to challenges to findings of fact. I referred in Chyc to what was said by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Gupta v General Medical Council[2002] 1 WLR 1691 where the following appears at paragraph 10: “[T]he obvious fact [is] that the appeals are conducted on the basis of the transcript of the hearing and that, unless exceptionally, witnesses are not recalled. In this respect, these appeals are similar to many other appeals in both civil and criminal cases from a judge, jury or other body who has seen and heard the witnesses. In all such cases the appeal court readily acknowledges that the first instance body enjoys an advantage which the appeal court does not have, precisely because that body is in a better position to judge the credibility and reliability or the evidence given by the witnesses. In some appeals that advantage may not be significant since the witnesses' credibility and reliability are not in issue. But in many cases the advantage is very significant and the appeal court recognises that it should accordingly be slow to interfere with the decisions on matters of fact taken by the first instance body. This reluctance to interfere is not due to any lack of jurisdiction to do so. Rather, in exercising its full jurisdiction, the appeal court acknowledges that, if the first instance body has observed the witnesses and weighed their evidence, its decision on such matters is more likely to be correct than any decision of a court which cannot deploy those factors when assessing the position. In considering appeals on matters of fact from the various professional conduct committees, the Board must inevitably follow the same general approach. Which means that, where acute issues arise as to the credibility or reliability of the evidence given before such a committee, the Board, duly exercising its appellate function, will tend to be unable properly to differ from the decisions as to fact reached by the committee except in the kinds of situation described by Lord Thankerton in the well known passage in Watt or Thomas v Thomas[1947] AC 484 , 484-488.” 30. The passage from Lord Thankerton's opinion was as follows: “I do not find it necessary to review the many decisions of this House, for it seems to me that the principle embodied therein is a simple one, and may be stated thus: I. Where a question of fact has been tried by a judge without a jury, and there is no question of misdirection of himself by the judge, an appellate court which is disposed to come to a different conclusion on the printed evidence, should not do so unless it is satisfied that any advantage enjoyed by the trial judge by reason of having seen and heard the witnesses, could not be sufficient to explain or justify the trial judge's conclusion; II. The appellate court may take the view that, without having seen or heard the witnesses, it is not in a position to come to any satisfactory conclusion on the printed evidence; III. The appellate court, either because the reasons given by the trial judge are not satisfactory, or because it unmistakably so appears from the evidence, may be satisfied that he has not taken proper advantage of his having seen and heard the witnesses, and the matter will then become at large for the appellate court. It is obvious that the value and importance of having seen and heard the witnesses will vary according to the class of case, and, it may be, the individual case in question.” 31. I referred also to Threlfall v General Optical Council[2004] EWHC 2683 (Admin) , at paragraph 21, where Stanley Burnton J, as he then was, said this: “Because it does not itself hear the witnesses give evidence, the court must take into account that the Disciplinary Committee was in a far better position to assess the reliability of the evidence of live witnesses where it was in issue. In that respect, this court is in a similar position to the Court of Appeal hearing an appeal from a decision made by a High Court Judge following a trial ….” 32. So those are the parameters for considering the issues raised in this appeal in relation to the findings. It is plain that where the conclusion of the FTP is largely based on the assessment of witnesses who have been “seen and heard”, this court will be very slow to interfere with that conclusion. Nonetheless, the court has a duty to consider all the material put before it on an appeal in order to discharge its own responsibility, appropriate deference being shown to conclusions of fact reached on the basis of the advantage of having seen and heard the witnesses. Where this court does not feel disadvantaged by not having heard the witnesses, and the issues can be addressed with little emphasis on the direct assessment of the evidence by the Panel, it is in a position to take a different view in an appropriate case.” “[T]he obvious fact [is] that the appeals are conducted on the basis of the transcript of the hearing and that, unless exceptionally, witnesses are not recalled. In this respect, these appeals are similar to many other appeals in both civil and criminal cases from a judge, jury or other body who has seen and heard the witnesses. In all such cases the appeal court readily acknowledges that the first instance body enjoys an advantage which the appeal court does not have, precisely because that body is in a better position to judge the credibility and reliability or the evidence given by the witnesses. In some appeals that advantage may not be significant since the witnesses' credibility and reliability are not in issue. But in many cases the advantage is very significant and the appeal court recognises that it should accordingly be slow to interfere with the decisions on matters of fact taken by the first instance body. This reluctance to interfere is not due to any lack of jurisdiction to do so. Rather, in exercising its full jurisdiction, the appeal court acknowledges that, if the first instance body has observed the witnesses and weighed their evidence, its decision on such matters is more likely to be correct than any decision of a court which cannot deploy those factors when assessing the position. In considering appeals on matters of fact from the various professional conduct committees, the Board must inevitably follow the same general approach. Which means that, where acute issues arise as to the credibility or reliability of the evidence given before such a committee, the Board, duly exercising its appellate function, will tend to be unable properly to differ from the decisions as to fact reached by the committee except in the kinds of situation described by Lord Thankerton in the well known passage in Watt or Thomas v Thomas[1947] AC 484 , 484-488.” “I do not find it necessary to review the many decisions of this House, for it seems to me that the principle embodied therein is a simple one, and may be stated thus: I. Where a question of fact has been tried by a judge without a jury, and there is no question of misdirection of himself by the judge, an appellate court which is disposed to come to a different conclusion on the printed evidence, should not do so unless it is satisfied that any advantage enjoyed by the trial judge by reason of having seen and heard the witnesses, could not be sufficient to explain or justify the trial judge's conclusion; II. The appellate court may take the view that, without having seen or heard the witnesses, it is not in a position to come to any satisfactory conclusion on the printed evidence; III. The appellate court, either because the reasons given by the trial judge are not satisfactory, or because it unmistakably so appears from the evidence, may be satisfied that he has not taken proper advantage of his having seen and heard the witnesses, and the matter will then become at large for the appellate court. It is obvious that the value and importance of having seen and heard the witnesses will vary according to the class of case, and, it may be, the individual case in question.” “Because it does not itself hear the witnesses give evidence, the court must take into account that the Disciplinary Committee was in a far better position to assess the reliability of the evidence of live witnesses where it was in issue. In that respect, this court is in a similar position to the Court of Appeal hearing an appeal from a decision made by a High Court Judge following a trial ….”
“32 In short, the purpose of FTP proceedings is not to punish the practitioner for past misdoings but to protect the public against the acts and omissions of those who are not fit to practise. The FPP thus looks forward not back. However, in order to form a view as to the fitness of a person to practise today, it is evident that it will have to take account of the way in which the person concerned has acted or failed to act in the past.”
“The principles to be applied are the same as those always applied when fresh evidence is sought to be introduced. In order to justify the reception of fresh evidence or a new trial, three conditions mast be fulfilled: first, it must be shown that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial: second, the evidence most be such that, if given, it would probably have an important influence on the result of the case, though it need not be decisive: thirdly, the evidence must be such as is presumably to be believed, or in other words, it must be apparently credible, though it need not be incontrovertible.”
“10. In resisting the reopening of these matters, Mr Dunlop on behalf of the respondent contends that it is now too late for the appellant to seek to disturb the findings and conclusions of the 2011 MPT panel and that the appeal against the MPT’s findings in 2011 is the subject of an issue estoppel preventing the re-litigation of the points which were decided by the MPT in 2011. Mr Dunlop relies upon the decision of the House of Lords in Arnold v National Westminster Bank PLC[1991] 2 AC 93 .”
“It is a very substantial doctrine, and it is one of the most fundamental doctrines of all courts, that there must be an end to all litigation, and that the parties have no right of their own accord, having tried a question between them, and obtained a decision of a court, to start that litigation over again on precisely the same question.”
''… There are many causes of action which can only be established by proving that two or more different conditions are fulfilled. Such causes of action involve as many separate issues between the parties as there are conditions to be fulfilled by the plaintiff to … establish his causes of action; and there may be cases where the fulfilment of an identical condition is a requirement common to two or more different causes of action. If in litigation upon one such cause of action any of such separate issues as to whether a particular condition has been fulfilled is determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, either upon evidence or upon admission … neither party can, in subsequent litigation between one another upon any cause of action which depends upon the fulfilment of the identical condition, assert that the condition was fulfilled if the court has in the first litigation determined that it was not, or deny that it was fulfilled if the court in the first litigation determined that it was.''
“67. It follows that the Ladd v Marshall test applies (by analogy in public law cases) to attempts to overturn final decisions on the basis of new material, not because the challenge is based on fraud or deception, but because of the high importance ascribed to finality in litigation. Indeed, although Ladd v Marshall was a case of an appeal seeking to challenge a judgment based on an allegation that it had been obtained by fraud, Denning LJ made plain that the test was one generally applicable to the admission of fresh evidence on appeal.”
“See also in New Zealand Dental Council of New Zealand v Gibson [2010] NZHC 912 (dentist bound by findings of disciplinary tribunal). In some cases the same result has been achieved by finding that the disciplinary tribunal is functus officio after the first decision: Chandler v Alberta Association of Architects[1989] 2 SCR 848 (Canadian Supreme Court).”
“Any doctor found impaired by a tribunal can appeal the decision underSection 40 of the Medical Act 1983 within 28 days of being notified of the tribunal’s decision.”
“Note for the information of practitioners on the suspension of registration by direction of a Medical Practitioners Tribunal.”
“Review of my Suspension then took place on 16th and17th November 2023 (which I do now appeal).”
“There was a political narrative at the time of the prosecution [disciplinary proceedings]: a narrative for people to take vaccines. Dr Myhill’s view is not mainstream, but that does not mean it is not responsible. The vaccines were of an experimental nature and had a provisional licence, but could not be fully licenced if there was an alternative treatment. There were alternatives such as vitamin D and iodine (ivermectin). Naturopathic medical practitioners did not want to say anything, as it was opposite to the narrative [meaning: they were afraid to speak out due to fears of disciplinary proceedings and thus were effectively silenced]. So that is the political context in trying to get the Bolam issue before the public.”
“The appellant’s assertion that “many of the relevant studies relied upon in the appeal evidence had not yet been published” is wrong (c.f. skeleton §19(1)(ii)): (a) all of the papers (other than a single slide) in Evidence Bundle 2 pre-date both the Original Hearing and the Review Hearing; and (b) there is nothing in the statements of any of the witnesses to suggest that they would have given materially different evidence if asked to provide a statement at the time of the Original Hearing or the Review Hearing (c.f. skeleton §19(1)(iii)).”
“DR MYHILL: Of course my insight is that they had no evidence base and here I am supplying the evidence base and thereby providing a Bolam defence. As I said I am reiterating. The point of a Bolam defence is I don’t have to prove that O’Shaughnessy and Quinton were wrong [the Original Tribunal medical experts], I simply have to prove that there is a body of evidence who agrees with me and that I have done.”
“28. MPT found that the Appellant lacked insight as she does not agree with the findings against her at FTP. No weight was given to the facts that she was absent, unrepresented, the Bolam test was not applied at FTP, nor was she judged by her peers.”
“Regular Use of Ivermectin as Prophylaxis for COVID-19 Led Up to a 92% Reduction in COVID-19 Mortality Rate in a Dose-Response Manner: Results of a Prospective Observational Study of a Strictly Controlled Population of 88,012 Subjects”
“Lucy Kerris is a paid consultant for both Vitamedic, an ivermectin manufacturer, and is co-founder, as well as acting as a paid consultant, for Médicos Pela Vida (MPV), an organization that promotes ivermectin as a treatment for COVID-19 and discourages COVID-19 vaccination. Flavio A. Cadegiani was a paid consultant (USD 1,600.00) for Vitamedic, an ivermectin manufacturer. Dr. Cadegiani is a founding member of the Front Line COVID-19 Critical Care Alliance (FLCCC), an organization that promotes ivermectin as a treatment for COVID-19. Pierre Kory is the President and Chief Medical Officer of the Front Line COVID-19 Critical Care Alliance (FLCCC), an organization that promotes ivermectin as a treatment for COVID-19 and discourages COVID-19 vaccination. Dr. Kory reports receiving payments from FLCCC.”
“COVID-19 Masks Are a Crime Against Humanity and Child Abuse: Testimony of a virologist”
“For children and adolescents, masks are an absolute no-no. “Where are our health departments, our health insurance, our medical associations? It would have been their duty to be vehemently against the lockdown and to stop it and stop it from the very beginning. “Why do the medical boards give punishments to doctors who give people exemptions? “Who is responsible for this crime? The ones who want to enforce it? The ones who let it happen and play along, or the ones who don’t prevent it?[..]It’s not about masks, it’s not about viruses, it’s certainly not about your health. It is about much much more. I am not participating. I am not afraid.”
“Mask wearing is ineffective (from Dr Clare Craig’s report)”, echoing the view of Dr Myhill. Dr Craig provides a statement in the fresh evidence bundle. While her statement has a statement of truth at the end, it does not contain any CPR expert declaration. Dr Craig states at para 1.2: “Since September 2020 I have carried out independent, autonomous, comprehensive and unpaid research into SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19 (hereinafter ‘Covid’), offering an unbiased, multi-faceted perspective on the pandemic.”
“5.4. Wider evidence base on effects of masking: There was an established broad body of evidence that has been added to over the last few years which shows the lack of significant impact on transmission rates from masking. Historical and recent reviews, including those from the World Health Organization (WHO) and various researchers, consistently find limited support for the effectiveness of masks in the general population.”
“We examined the association between face masks and risk of infection with SARS-CoV-2 using cross-sectional data from 3,209 participants in a randomized trial of using glasses to reduce the risk of infection with SARS-CoV-2. Face mask use was based on participants’ response to the end-of-follow-up survey. We found that the incidence of self-reported COVID-19 was 33% (aRR 1.33; 95% CI 1.03 – 1.72) higher in those wearing face masks often or sometimes, and 40% (aRR 1.40; 95% CI 1.08 – 1.82) higher in those wearing face masks almost always or always, compared to participants who reported wearing face masks never or almost never.”
“We believe the observed increase in the incidence of infection associated with wearing a face mask is likely due to unobservable and hence nonadjustable differences between those wearing and not wearing a mask. Observational studies reporting on the relationship between face mask use and risk of respiratory infections should be interpreted cautiously, and more randomized trials are needed.”
“The World Health Organization has recently revised their guideline on infection prevention and control in the context of COVID-19, recommending face mask use to reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission in certain situations, including ‘when in crowded, enclosed, or poorly ventilated spaces’”
“(1) The evidence would probably have an important influence on the result of the case. (2) The evidence is credible and comes from a variety of expert witnesses with relevant experience, and from Patient B himself and from the Appellant.”
“[…] the initiation of proceedings in a court of justice for the purposes of mounting a collateral attack upon a final decision against the intending plaintiff which has been made by another court of competent jurisdiction in previous proceedings in which the intending plaintiff had a full opportunity of contesting the decision in the court by which it was made.”
“abuse of process, as now understood, although separate and distinct from cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel, has much in common with them. The underlying public interest is the same: that there should be finality in litigation […]. The bringing of a claim or the raising of a defence in later proceedings may, without more, amount to abuse if the court is satisfied (the onus being on the party alleging abuse) that the claim or defence should have been raised in the earlier proceedings if it was to be raised at all.”