“[T]he legislation contemplates that modifications to a definitive map and statement made as a result of a review pursuant to section 53 should be made by order. That degree of formality is consistent with the conclusive effect afforded to the definitive map and statement (or revised definitive map and statement, as the case may be) by section 56………….The definitive map and statement provide certainty to the public, showing them where they are entitled to go, while the legislation also provides for the map and statement to be kept up to date and for errors in its preparation to be corrected through the review process.”
'Where the Secretary of State or an inspector appointed by him has to consider whether a right of way that is marked on a definitive map in fact exists, he must start with an initial presumption that it does. If there were no evidence which made it reasonably arguable that such a right of way existed, it should not have been marked on the map. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it should be assumed that the proper procedures were followed and thus that such evidence existed. At the end of the day, when all the evidence has been considered, the standard of proof required to justify a finding that no right of way exists is no more than the balance of probabilities. But evidence of some substance must be put in the balance, if it is to outweigh the initial presumption that the right of way exists. Proof of a negative is seldom easy, and the more time that elapses, the more difficult will be the task of adducing the positive evidence that is necessary to establish that a right of way that has been marked on a definitive map has been marked there by mistake.'
“the correct approach to interpretation of the definitive map and statement must be a practical one. They should be examined together with a view to resolving the question whether they are truly in conflict or the statement can properly be read as describing the position of the right of way. If they are in conflict, then the map must take precedence since the discretionary particulars depend for their existence upon the conclusiveness of the obligatory map. Unless the statement can properly be interpreted as describing the same footpath as that shown on the map, then the statement cannot be regarded as conclusive evidence of the position of the footpath shown on the map. The question whether the statement does describe the position of a footpath shown on the map is, I accept, a matter of fact and degree”
“The objectors argued there has not been a ‘discovery of evidence’, and they do not consider there to be an ‘irreconcilable conflict’ between the DM and DS. They considered the DS could be plainly read to describe the way shown on the DM having regard to the evidence of the state of the land at the relevant date. They believed HCC failed to read the DS with the necessary ‘degree of tolerance’ and considered extrinsic evidence when concluding that the DM and DS were in conflict”
“Taking into account the investigation at the time, I consider Rose Cottage would have been referred to in the statement if LB18 ran between No. 12 LBL and Rose Cottage or between Rose Cottage and Danes Cottage. I also do not consider Breach House would have been mentioned if LB18 did not run alongside it. Any reasonable person reading the DS would take it to mean that LB18 went past Breach House and Nos.10 and 12 LBL. Therefore, I consider there is sufficient evidence, on the balance of probabilities, of an irreconcilable conflict between the DM and DS. The discovery that there is a difference between the DM and the DS is, in accordance with Kotarski, a discovery of new evidence”
“Taken as a whole, I consider the evidence indicates, on the balance of probabilities, that LB18 exists on the route shown on the Order Plan as the ‘Bridleway to be Added’ along the line C-D-E-B. I do not consider the evidence indicates, on the balance of probabilities, any public rights over the route shown on the Order Plan as the ‘Bridleway to be Deleted’ along the line A-B”
“I consider there has been a discovery of cogent evidence of errors in the alignment of LB18 as shown on the original and current DM. I also consider there has been a discovery of cogent evidence of an error in the current DS. This discovery undermines the evidential value of the DMS. Having considered all the available evidence, I have concluded, on the balance of probabilities, that a public bridleway exists on the line C-D-E-B. I have also concluded, on the balance of probabilities, that there is no evidence of a public bridleway on the line A-B…..”
“The correct legal approach to the question of “irreconcilable conflict” is a point of difference between the Council and objectors in this case. On behalf of the objectors, Mr Bowes put questions to Mr Harbour-Cooper to the effect that it was “feasible” or “possible” to read the Map and Statement together, and therefore they could not be in “irreconcilable conflict”
“What the Secretary of State must do is to state his reasons in sufficient detail to enable the reader to know what conclusion he has reached on the “principal important controversial issues”
“The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal important controversial issues”, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in the dispute, not to every material consideration. They should enable disappointed developers to assess their prospects of obtaining some alternative development permission, or, as the case may be, their unsuccessful opponents to understand how the policy or approach underlying the grant of permission may impact upon future such applications. Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising that they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision”