Claudiu Mihai Chiribau v Prosecutor General's Service in Antwerp, Belgium [2025] EWHC 3234 (Admin)

[2025] EWHC 3234 (Admin)Case No AC-2024-LON-003105
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPEAL UNDER THE EXTRADITION ACT 2003
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 17 December 2025
Before
HON SIR PETER LANE
Between
CLAUDIU MIHAI CHIRIBAUAppellantPROSECUTOR GENERAL’S SERVICE IN ANTWERP, BELGIUMRespondent
Mr Matthew Herbert (instructed by Hodge, Jones and Allen) for appellantMs Honor Fitzgerald (instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service) for respondentHearing Hearing date: 19 November 2025
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on Wednesday 17 December 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
[1]The appellant appeals, with permission granted by me on 24 July 2025, against the judgment of District Judge Minhas dated 9 September 2024, in which she ordered the appellant’s extradition to Belgium.[2]There is a single ground of appeal; namely, that the District Judge should have found that extradition cannot take place under the Extradition Act 2003 because the appellant was previously discharged by the same District Judge on 23 October 2023 and the re-issuing of the warrant amounted to an abuse of process. The appellant’s discharge occurred because the District Judge found that the warrant, as originally issued, contained insufficient particulars for the purposes of section 2 of the 2003 Act.[3]The appellant’s extradition is sought by the respondent in order to serve a sentence of imprisonment of four years (of which 1,366 days are outstanding). The sentence was imposed in respect of 184 offences. The appellant belonged to a group which, between 6 July 2016 and 27 July 2017, placed skimming devices on ATM terminals in petrol stations. Data from cash cards was placed on other cards, which were sold to Romanians or Bulgarians who used them fraudulently to purchase fuel. Some of the copied cards were fraudulently used by the group to purchase fuel and sell it on or to purchase fuel for lorry drivers who paid a reduced amount in cash to the group. The appellant was said by the respondent to have been involved as a perpetrator or co-perpetrator throughout Belgium.[4]The appellant has a number of other convictions. He was convicted in Italy in 2016 in respect of an offence of installing equipment to intercept telegraphic communications. The appellant was convicted in the United Kingdom of 12 offences between 2003 and 2009, including conspiracy to defraud and possession of articles for use in fraud. He received a sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment for these offences.

The first extradition proceedings

[5]The first hearing of the extradition request took place before District Judge Minhas on 15 August 2023. Both the appellant and the respondent were represented by counsel.[6]The District

Judge dealt with the section 2 issue as follows:

“12.The AW was not challenged for the sufficiency of particulars of the offending behaviour. I find the description of the conduct involved in the184 offences, whilst limited, is sufficient for the purposes of s2 of the Act. The challenge by Mr Wotherspoon related to the particulars for the location of the offending and the RP’s role within the 184 offences. In respect of the location of the offending, the AW sets out the offending occurred in “Veurne and elsewhere in the country”
. No other details are provided. In respect of the RP’s role, the detail is limited to “as a perpetrator/co-perpetrator”. 13.Post-hearing, whilst considering the arguments put forward by Mr Wotherspoon, I notified the parties by email that I required further information as to location of offending and the RP’s role within the offending. I gave the JA an additional 4 weeks until 2nd October 2023 to obtain further information and timetabled a written response from each advocate. Mr Wotherspoon made submissions by email upon my decision to request further information. In response to those submissions, I am of the view that I have case management powers to request further information prior to making a final decision upon discharge, or not, pursuant to paragraphs 74 and 76 of Alexander v France. In any event, no further information nor submissions were forthcoming prior to the drafting of my judgment. I based my decision on the particulars contained within the AW only. 14.The authorities are clear that a balance must be struck between the need for an adequate description and the objective of simplifying extradition procedures. The purpose of the particulars is to be sufficient to allow any available point on a bar to be taken and for dual criminality to be considered. In this regard, I find the description of the location of offending to be brief, but nonetheless sufficient for the purposes of s2 of the Act. The AW clearly stated the offending occurred in Veurne and elsewhere in the country. It is clear the country referred to is Belgium. Mr Wotherspoon could not specify any bar to extradition that he had been hindered on relying upon because of the brevity of the description. In my view, there is none. There was no submission that the details were too brief for the dual criminality exercise to be conducted and I have done so, being satisfied to the criminal standard that the offending occurred within the territory of the JA as required by s65 of the Act. I find the challenge to extradition based upon the sufficiency of particulars for location of offending failed. 15.I then considered the submissions in respect of the RP’s role within the offending as set out within the AW. The description is minimal, limited to “perpetrator/co-perpetrator” in 184 offences. I concur with the submission of Mr Wotherspoon that the particulars are insufficient as to the RP’s role. The RP was not present at trial. There is no information as to what details he was given whilst on remand in Belgium. There is no detail at all about the nature and extent of his role in the offending. It is not known how the 32 cards located are linked to the RP. It is unclear whether the RP had a role further up the hierarchy, with detailed involvement in the planning and execution of the offending or whether he was at the bottom of the hierarchy, directed by others, with limited autonomy receiving little benefit from the offending. There is no explanation as to whether the RP was directly involved in each of the 184 offences or whether he had been convicted on a joint enterprise basis. The lack of description of the RP’s role coupled with the brevity of the description for the offending behaviour, in my view, prejudiced the RP in considering speciality in the future, and in making submissions on the proportionality of his sentence, which is a factor that could be considered under s21 of the Act. I find the particulars on the AW to be insufficient as to the RP’s role in offending. I find the challenge under s2 of the Act is successful. In the language of A Alexander v France, the warrant can properly be described as a “wholesale failure” to comply with the provisions of s2(6)(b) EA 2003. Therefore, I find the AW is invalid ab initio, consequently I discharge the RP.”[7]The District Judge found that extradition would not violate Article 3 or Article 8 of the ECHR. It was, accordingly, solely on the section 2 issue that she discharged the appellant. Her judgment of 23 October 2023 ended, however, with the following:
“43. The Requested Person is to be advised that the JA may re-issue the Arrest Warrant with better particulars.”
[8]I have seen a copy of the email which District Judge Minhas sent to the parties on 3 September 2023, referred to at paragraph 13 of her judgment. She stated that “I requirebetter particulars as to location and the RP’s role in the conduct.” (original emphasis). The email directed the “JA to file and serve further information regarding the particulars of offending, location, RP’s role in offending by 4pm on 2nd October 2023”. The written observations of counsel for the appellant on the contents of the further information were to be filed and served by 4pm on 9 October 2023, with written representations from counsel for the respondent being filed and served by 4pm on 16 October. A hearing arranged for 12 September 2023 was to “remain listed as callover/remand hearing.”[9]The following chronology is taken from the judgment dated 9 September 2024 of District Judge Minhas and the skeleton arguments of the parties prepared for the hearing before me. I do not understand any of it to be factually controversial.[10]On 12 September 2023, District Judge Minhas presided over a call over hearing (the appellant being on remand). She fixed the next such hearing for 10 October 2023, stating that if the information she had requested was not forthcoming, she might bring forward her judgment in the extradition case. On 12 September, the CPS sent the request to the respondent. On 21 September, the further information was received by the CPS in email format. On 22 September, the CPS requested the respondent to provide the information in authenticated form.[11]On 10 October 2023, the second call over hearing took place, before District Judge Robinson. The District Judge was informed by the respondent that the requested information had been sent by email on 21 September. It had not, however, been authenticated or signed. Those acting for the appellant objected to the admission of the information in its email form. The respondent applied for an extension of time in order to serve the information in proper form. District Judge Robinson did not grant the respondent’s application. Instead, he invited the parties to liaise directly with District Judge Minhas regarding any application to vary her directions of 3 September 2023, as he said she would likely have set aside time for writing her judgment, with those directions in mind.[12]In the event, contact was not made with District Judge Minhas; and she proceeded on 23 October 2023 to hand down her judgment in the terms set out above, not knowing of the sequence of events just described.[13]On 31 October 2023, the respondent informed District Judge Minhas that it had decided not to appeal her decision. The appellant was released from custody, subject to bail conditions, including an electronically monitored daily curfew between 11pm and 3am.

The second extradition proceedings

[14]On 7 November 2023, the CPS sent a letter to the respondent advising that the arrest warrant relating to the appellant be re-issued with the required particulars. On 22 November 2023, the arrest warrant was re-issued. The appellant did not consent to extradition. His case came before District Judge Minhas on 8 August 2024. The appellant appeared in person. Three grounds were dealt with by the District Judge: Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR and abuse of process.[15]The re-issued arrest warrant contained the following additional particulars regarding the places where the offences were committed and the appellant’s role in the offending:
“The facts were committed at different places throughout the entire Belgian territory more precisely in the following Municipalities: Veurne, Zaventem, Ruisbroek, Rumst, Kalken, Woutersbrakel, Nijvel, Jabbeke, Monceaux-sur-Sambre, Recht, Sankt-Vith, Zellik, Vilvoorde, Turnhout, Maldegem, Dessel, Mol, Geel, Sint-Truiden, Messency, Wetteren, 3 Meer, Habay, Gembloux, Heffen, Antwerpen, Scoten, Ternat, Gentbrugge, Meise, SintMichiels and Anderlecht. In relation to the role of [the Appellant]: during a house search performed at the residence of a co-sentenced person, 14 illegally copied tank cards were found; this co-sentenced person stated that these cards were delivered to him by 2 Romanians, of which one was [the Appellant]. During a house search performed at the residence of [the Appellant], 20 more tank cards were found. [The Appellant] himself also placed skimming devices in petrol stations which turned out because he was filmed by CCTV or because his vehicle was filmed by CCTV or because his mobile telephone fell within the coverage of a nearby cell tower (he placed these devices in Veurne and in Zaventem). Tanking itself by making use of the illegally copied cards was made by a co-sentenced person; [the Appellant] was sentenced for this as a co-perpetrator, because he had copied the cards and had delivered these to this co-sentenced person (facts throughout the entire country).”
[16]The District Judge dismissed the challenge brought by reference to ECHR Article 3, which concerned prison conditions in Belgium. She also found against the appellant on ECHR Article 8. Although the present appeal is concerned solely with the abuse of process issue, it is relevant to note the District Judge’s findings on Article 8, as they were made in the light of the fact that the appellant’s extradition was being sought for the second time in respect of the same convictions:
“23.I find that it will not be a disproportionate interference with the Article 8 Rights of the RP for extradition to be ordered. My reasons and findings are as follows: i. It is very important for the UK to be seen to be upholding its international extradition obligations and the decisions of the JA should be afforded proper mutual confidence and respect. It is important that offenders are brought to justice. All these factors weighed heavily in favour of extradition. ii. I have found the RP to be a fugitive, this also weighed in favour of extradition. The RP ought not to benefit from his decision to leave Belgium. The RP required strong counterbalancing factors to mitigate against removal. iii. The RP was convicted of 184 offences committed within a group over a considerable period. The RP received a weighty 4-year sentence of which the AW stated 1366 days is outstanding to serve. The RP spent almost seven months on remand in prison in the UK during the previous proceedings, but even when this time is deducted, the RP still had a substantial sentence to serve. The calculations are a matter for the Belgian authorities. The length of the sentence weighed in favour of extradition. iv. I accept the RP’s offending in the UK is of some age and that he had not been convicted in the UK since 2018, but I note offending the AW made the RP a a recidivist. The RP has not lived a law-abiding life in general prior to the offending in the AW which weighed in favour of extradition. In my view, this militated little against the age of the offending and his law-abiding life in the UK since 2018. v. There has been no culpable delay in the re-issue of the AW which weighed in favour of extradition. This is not an instance where the JA have delayed for several years in re-issuing the AW. The RP was not lulled into a false sense of security. My previous judgment recorded the RP should be advised that the JA can re-issue the AW. The AW was re-issued within a month of the RP’s discharge in previous proceedings. vi. I accept the RP had established a private and family life in the UK with his wife and son, which he continued to build upon after his release in October 2023. I accept that extradition will be an interference with that private and family life, and I place weight on this interference as a factor militating against extradition. I am mindful there is no evidence from the RP’s wife and son before me. I presume they were able to manage without his support when he was in custody in the UK previously and that his absence had no significant financial or emotional impact as there is no evidence to suggest otherwise. The RP lives with his son, naturally there will be an emotional impact on the RP’s son if the RP is extradited but there is no evidence that the consequences of extradition will go beyond the hardship often experienced by family members. The RP’s partner is in work and has access to state benefits. The RP’s son will remain in the care of his mother and continue with his schooling. The RP now has settled status in the UK. He advanced no evidence that he will be unable to return to the UK once he has served his sentence in Belgium. The RP has maintained employment, a personal relationship and accommodation in the UK. There is no evidence before me to suggest he cannot do the same again, just as he did when released in after the previous extradition proceedings. vii. I accept that the impact on the RP and his family of the re-issued proceedings weighed against extradition. As does the JA’s failure to provide the missing information in the correct format, in a timely manner. In my view, both these factors are weighty in the balancing exercise against extradition. The RP is entitled to finality in legal proceedings. Despite this, in the circumstances of this case, I find the impact is mitigated given the RP was informed the AW could be re-issued. It was re-issued, and the RP re-arrested within a matter of months. The RP explained the second set of proceedings had caused difficulties between him and his wife but gave no detail. The imposition of bail conditions is a curtailment of the RP’s liberty again. viii. Notwithstanding the militating weight to be attributed to the failure to provide the information sought by me in previous proceedings in a timely manner and in an authenticated format, and despite the impact on the RP of a second set of proceedings, I still find that the extradition of the RP will not be a disproportionate interference with his or his family’s article 8 rights. There was no delay of note in the re-issue of the AW. There is next to no evidence before me about the impact of extradition or the second set of proceedings on the RP’s wife or son. The hardship arising from extradition, if any, does not, in my view, amount to exceptionally severe consequences flowing from extradition such to make extradition disproportionate. The individual or combined weight to be attributed to the weightiest and main factors militating against extradition; the failure to provide the information requested in a timely manner previously, the impact of a second set of proceedings on the RP, the RP’s family and private life in the UK are not such that they amounted to exceptionally severe consequences which outweighed the public interest in favour of extradition especially given the nature and seriousness of the offending, the length of sentence yet to be served and the public interest in honouring extradition arrangements. The evidence of hardship and the impact which will result from extradition does not, in my view, go beyond that which is often present when extradition is ordered. I find the consequences of extradition are not so significant that they will have a disproportionate impact on the Article 8 rights of the RP, his wife or son.” i. It is very important for the UK to be seen to be upholding its international extradition obligations and the decisions of the JA should be afforded proper mutual confidence and respect. It is important that offenders are brought to justice. All these factors weighed heavily in favour of extradition. ii. I have found the RP to be a fugitive, this also weighed in favour of extradition. The RP ought not to benefit from his decision to leave Belgium. The RP required strong counterbalancing factors to mitigate against removal. iii. The RP was convicted of 184 offences committed within a group over a considerable period. The RP received a weighty 4-year sentence of which the AW stated 1366 days is outstanding to serve. The RP spent almost seven months on remand in prison in the UK during the previous proceedings, but even when this time is deducted, the RP still had a substantial sentence to serve. The calculations are a matter for the Belgian authorities. The length of the sentence weighed in favour of extradition. iv. I accept the RP’s offending in the UK is of some age and that he had not been convicted in the UK since 2018, but I note offending the AW made the RP a a recidivist. The RP has not lived a law-abiding life in general prior to the offending in the AW which weighed in favour of extradition. In my view, this militated little against the age of the offending and his law-abiding life in the UK since 2018. v. There has been no culpable delay in the re-issue of the AW which weighed in favour of extradition. This is not an instance where the JA have delayed for several years in re-issuing the AW. The RP was not lulled into a false sense of security. My previous judgment recorded the RP should be advised that the JA can re-issue the AW. The AW was re-issued within a month of the RP’s discharge in previous proceedings. vi. I accept the RP had established a private and family life in the UK with his wife and son, which he continued to build upon after his release in October 2023. I accept that extradition will be an interference with that private and family life, and I place weight on this interference as a factor militating against extradition. I am mindful there is no evidence from the RP’s wife and son before me. I presume they were able to manage without his support when he was in custody in the UK previously and that his absence had no significant financial or emotional impact as there is no evidence to suggest otherwise. The RP lives with his son, naturally there will be an emotional impact on the RP’s son if the RP is extradited but there is no evidence that the consequences of extradition will go beyond the hardship often experienced by family members. The RP’s partner is in work and has access to state benefits. The RP’s son will remain in the care of his mother and continue with his schooling. The RP now has settled status in the UK. He advanced no evidence that he will be unable to return to the UK once he has served his sentence in Belgium. The RP has maintained employment, a personal relationship and accommodation in the UK. There is no evidence before me to suggest he cannot do the same again, just as he did when released in after the previous extradition proceedings. vii. I accept that the impact on the RP and his family of the re-issued proceedings weighed against extradition. As does the JA’s failure to provide the missing information in the correct format, in a timely manner. In my view, both these factors are weighty in the balancing exercise against extradition. The RP is entitled to finality in legal proceedings. Despite this, in the circumstances of this case, I find the impact is mitigated given the RP was informed the AW could be re-issued. It was re-issued, and the RP re-arrested within a matter of months. The RP explained the second set of proceedings had caused difficulties between him and his wife but gave no detail. The imposition of bail conditions is a curtailment of the RP’s liberty again. viii. Notwithstanding the militating weight to be attributed to the failure to provide the information sought by me in previous proceedings in a timely manner and in an authenticated format, and despite the impact on the RP of a second set of proceedings, I still find that the extradition of the RP will not be a disproportionate interference with his or his family’s article 8 rights. There was no delay of note in the re-issue of the AW. There is next to no evidence before me about the impact of extradition or the second set of proceedings on the RP’s wife or son. The hardship arising from extradition, if any, does not, in my view, amount to exceptionally severe consequences flowing from extradition such to make extradition disproportionate. The individual or combined weight to be attributed to the weightiest and main factors militating against extradition; the failure to provide the information requested in a timely manner previously, the impact of a second set of proceedings on the RP, the RP’s family and private life in the UK are not such that they amounted to exceptionally severe consequences which outweighed the public interest in favour of extradition especially given the nature and seriousness of the offending, the length of sentence yet to be served and the public interest in honouring extradition arrangements. The evidence of hardship and the impact which will result from extradition does not, in my view, go beyond that which is often present when extradition is ordered. I find the consequences of extradition are not so significant that they will have a disproportionate impact on the Article 8 rights of the RP, his wife or son.”
[17]The District

Judge then directly addressed the abuse of process challenge:

“24.I remind myself of the scope of the residual abuse of process bar, the key principles of which were summarised by Aikens LJ in Belbin v The Regional Court of Lille, France [2015] EWHC 149 (Admin) at paragraph 59. I remind myself the test to be considered is set out within Government of United States of America v Bow StreetMagistrates Court [2006] EWHC 2256 (Admin), often referred to as the Tollman test. The abuse can occur both by way of bad faith on the part of the requesting state and/or the requesting state manipulating or usurping the procedures of the court. The abuse must be founded on cogent evidence as the starting point is one of mutual trust between the contracting states. In establishing bad faith on the part of the prosecutor/requesting state defendants face “a high hurdle of persuasion”
Aleksynas and Others -v- Republic ofLithuania at paragraph 80; Hanif Mohammed Umerji Patel–v-The Government of India and Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWHC 819 (Admin). 25.The first in a series of sequential steps is for the conduct alleged to constitute an abuse must be particularised. Then the Court must consider whether the conduct, if established, can amount to an abuse? If the answer is in the affirmative, the Court must consider whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the conduct may have occurred. If there are such grounds, the Court should not order extradition unless satisfied that an abuse has not occurred. The Court is entitled to seek further information or evidence from the JA to determine whether an abuse has occurred. 26.I apply this to the circumstances of the extant AW. The RP appeared before me for his extradition proceedings in relation to a previous AW founded on the same convictions. He was represented and it was submitted on his behalf that there was a paucity of information regarding his role within the offending. I agreed and sought further information. No further information was forthcoming. I discharged the RP with a warning that the AW could be re-issued. The RP essentially submitted it was an usurpation of the statutory scheme to re-issue the AW with the missing information when it was not provided in a timely manner an appropriate format beforehand. Thus, the conduct alleged to constitute an abuse is particularised and has been established. I acknowledged this conduct can amount to an abuse, so I proceeded to consider whether the RP has satisfied me that it is an abuse. The bad faith limb of the abuse provisions is not contended by the RP, and I am satisfied there is no bad faith by the JA in re-issuing the AW. 27.I have considered the timeline in relation to the provision of information in previous proceedings set out above. I was not made aware that the JA had in fact responded with additional information in the time I prescribed. The issue was aired at a remand hearing at which I was not present. There was no explanation for why the existence of the email with the information I sought was not brought to my attention, regardless of the lack of authentication. In my view, there were avenues available to resolve the dispute as to admissibility had I been aware of the email. As a result, the substance of the JA’s further information was not considered in previous proceedings. Had it been, then all the issues raised by the RP could have been addressed within the first set of proceedings. Against this, from the JA’s perspective, they had purported to provide the information sought in the time stated. This is not a case where the JA failed to respond at all and then issued a new AW sometime later. The JA were made aware of the discharge and re-issued the AW within a month, with the additional information sought. 28.I concur with the submissions of Mr Squibbs in respect of Rymarski. In my view, the additional information provided was wholly relevant to the issue to be determined. This is not a case where the same issue has been re-tried on the same information. 29.The authorities specify the abuse must be found on cogent evidence as the starting point is one of trust between the contracting states. Having considered the particular circumstances of this case, in view of the fact that information was provided in the time requested in the previous proceedings but not brought to my attention, regardless of the format it was in, and because the JA re-issued the AW in a timely manner, on balance I find there is no abuse of process or usurpation of the statutory scheme for extradition in the re-issue of the AW. I am of the view the RP has not established on the balance of probabilities sufficient grounds to stay the proceedings as an abuse. 30.I reject the RP’s challenge to extradition under the abuse limb.” Cases concerning abuse of process 18.In his extremely able written and oral submissions on behalf of the appellant, Mr Herbert draws detailed attention to a number of the authorities on abuse of process. In USA v Bow Street Magistrates’ Court, cited by the District Judge, Lord Phillips described a four stage process for determining whether abuse of process has occurred. The alleged conduct must be identified with particularity. The judge must then consider whether the conduct, if established, is capable of amounting to an abuse of process. If it is, then the judge must consider whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that such conduct may have occurred. If there are, then the judge should not accede to the request for extradition unless satisfied that such abuse of process has not occurred (paragraph 84). This is the “Tollman test” to which the District Judge referred at paragraph 24 of her judgment and which she proceeded to apply at paragraphs 25 to 29.

Cases concerning abuse of process

[19]In Belbin, which was also cited by District Judge Minhas, Aikens LJ emphasised that “the circumstances in which the court will consider exercising its implied abuse of process jurisdiction in extradition cases are very limited.” The jurisdiction, being residual, cannot be invoked if other bars to extradition are available. Furthermore, the jurisdiction will be exercised only where there is “cogent evidence, that the Judicial Authority concerned has acted in such a way as to usurp the statutory regime of the [Extradition Act 2003] or its integrity has been impugned...Thirdly, the court has to be satisfied that the abuse of process will cause prejudice to the requested person, either in the extradition process in this country or in the requesting state if he is surrendered” (paragraph 59).[20]In Giese v USA [2018] EWHC 1480 (Admin), Lord Burnett of Maldon CJ gave guidance on how to proceed in cases where the conduct cannot be categorised as being in bad faith, but may nevertheless be such as to constitute an abuse of process: “31. There will be cases where a judicial authority has, for example, failed to comply with court orders in the first extradition proceedings, where a question of abuse of process may arise for consideration in connection with a second set. Similarly, where in the first set of proceedings the requesting state has abjectly failed to get its evidential house in order. But a mechanistic approach to abuse is inappropriate. As Ouseley J observed in Camaras at [32], "Whether the attempted enforcement of a further EAW, in circumstances which fall short of Belbin abuse of process, so undermines the interest of the statutory scheme in speedy finality, and in upholding the decisions and orders of the courts, that enforcement should be denied, cannot be answered without consideration of all the circumstances."32. The key, in our judgment, to cases where it is said that the requesting state failed in the first set of proceedings such that the second set are an abuse of process is to make a "broad, merits-based judgment which takes account of the public and private interest involved and also takes account of all the facts of the case", see Johnson v GoreWood [2002] 2 AC 1 at [31] and Arranz v High Court of Madrid [2016] EWHC 3029 (Admin) at [32] and [33]. Such a broad, merits-based judgment should take account of the fact that there is no doctrine of res iudicata or issue estoppel in extradition proceedings.33. Underlying extradition are important public interests in upholding the treaty obligations of the United Kingdom; of ensuring that those convicted of crimes abroad are returned to serve their sentences; of returning those suspected of crime for trial; and of avoiding the United Kingdom becoming (or being seen as) a safe haven for fugitives from justice. The 2003 Act provides wide protections to requested persons through the multiple bars to extradition Parliament, originally and through amendment, has enacted. There are likely to be few instances where a requested person fails to substantiate a bar but can succeed in an abuse argument.” "Whether the attempted enforcement of a further EAW, in circumstances which fall short of Belbin abuse of process, so undermines the interest of the statutory scheme in speedy finality, and in upholding the decisions and orders of the courts, that enforcement should be denied, cannot be answered without consideration of all the circumstances."[21]It is helpful to give some context to paragraph 32 of Camaras vRomania [2016] EWHC 1766 (Admin), cited in paragraph 31 of Giese. At paragraph 29, Ouseley J said this:
“29. I am not concerned with cases where there has been a change of circumstances between one EAW and another, comprehensively disposed of in Auzins. I am concerned with those where the issuing authority or CPS did not deal with an issue as best it might, whether in breach of a court order or not, and seeks or would be enabled by a further EAW, as here, to re-open an issue and try again. I cannot hold that the fact that such an error, whether through negligence or accident, could be rectified by the enforcement of a further EAW, should always preclude extradition of a defendant from the UK, regardless of its effect on him or on the public interest in his extradition.”
[22]Camaras and Giese were cited with approval by Davis LJ and Swift J in Jasvins vGeneral Prosecutor’s Office Latvia [2020] EWHC 602 (Admin). In an appeal against a judgment ordering extradition, the appellant contended that he had been prosecuted in Latvia for the offence in respect of which his extradition was sought only because he had complained about being assaulted by the police when his home had been searched by them. Collins J directed the respondent to file further information regarding the procedure whereby the prosecution was instituted. When the appeal came before Dingemans J, he noted that the direction of Collins J had not been complied with. Towards the end of the hearing, counsel for the respondent applied for an adjournment, so that the materials could be obtained from Latvia. Dingemans J refused the application. Then, applying the Tollman test on the basis of the evidence that was before the court, Dingemans J held that he could not be satisfied that the abuse of which the appellant complained had not occurred. He accordingly allowed the appeal.[23]Five months later the respondent issued a second arrest warrant. Ordering the appellant’s extradition, the District Judge relied upon new information regarding the background to the prosecution; the very material which had been sought by the direction of Collins J.[24]At paragraph 20 of Jasvins, the court held that “Where there are successive warrants or successive extradition requests, if proceedings on the subsequent warrants can properly be characterised as a collateral attack on a decision in proceedings on the first warrant, the latter proceedings are capable of amounting to an abuse of process.” Although the court considered it might be possible to say that this would ordinarily be the case, nevertheless “the outcome in any given situation must depend on the overall merits-based assessment of the public interests and careful evaluation of the facts referred to at paragraph 32 of Giese.”[25]In the next paragraph, the court explained what such an evaluation should involve, in a situation where a court has made an order, such as that of Collins J: “21.... Put bluntly, if such orders are made, the starting presumption is that they will be complied with. Where, as in this appeal, the claim of abuse of process arises from a failure in earlier proceedings to comply with a court order, the court in the later proceedings must assess the significance of permitting the Requesting Authority to avoid the consequences of the earlier decision, while also taking account of the public interest in that particular extradition. This will also include considering the gravity of the alleged or actual offending, and the prejudice (if any) to the requested person arising from pursuit of the further warrant. In other words, a Giese -style broad, merits-based judgment taking account of the public and private interests as they are manifest on the facts of the particular case”.[26]The court’s concluded the issue of abuse of process as follows:
“25. Applying the test in Giese, we consider the District Judge reached the wrong conclusion. At paragraph 70 of her judgment she stated the conclusion that it would be "perverse" to ignore the information now relied on by the Prosecutor – i.e. the documents described at paragraph 22 above. With respect, that was wrong. Given what had gone before, the District Judge ought to have relied on this information only if the Prosecutor could justify why he should be able to rely on it in the proceedings on the May 2017 warrant, notwithstanding his failure to comply with Collins J's order, and the order then made by Dingemans J in the earlier proceedings. 26. On the facts of this case there are also other important matters relevant to the merits- based judgment of the public and private interests that are in play. There has been no explanation at all for the 16 months taken before the May 2017 warrant was certified. No doubt following the decision of Dingemans J in January 2017, Mr Jasvins would have been aware that further efforts might be made to extradite him. But the passage of time between then and his arrest on 15 November 2018 could only have lulled him into a false sense of security. Given the nature and extent of the offending that is the cause of the extradition request – an offence of possessing 6.499 grams of cannabis committed as long ago as 2010 – there was every reason why Mr Jasvins might have thought, as time passed, that further proceedings against him were ever less likely rather than more likely. Thus, he has been unfairly prejudiced by the Prosecutor's attempt to rely on the May 2017 warrant. Further, in reaching our conclusion that the extradition order made by the District Judge should be discharged, we have had regard to the nature and extent of Mr. Jasvins's offending. 27. The public interest in the return of offenders in accordance with agreed extradition arrangements to serve punishments imposed on them overseas is an important public interest. However, in the circumstances of this particular case it yields to the public interest in compliance with court orders and the finality of the decisions consequent on failures to comply with them. As we have made clear, both these interests support the integrity of the scheme contained in the 2003 Act and the EAW system.”
[27]Rymarski v Poland concerned a reissued arrest warrant following a requested person’s discharge. Johnson J considered the types of cases which would be unlikely to result in an abuse of process in these circumstances: “35. There are many circumstances in which it is unlikely to be abusive to seek to extradite someone whose extradition has previously been refused. Examples include(1) where the new extradition request is based on an entirely new underlying offence, particularly where that offence post-dates the previous proceedings.(2) where there has been a fundamental change in the underlying facts since the previous proceedings. An example may be where the extradition was refused on the grounds that it would be incompatible with the right to respect for his private or family life and where factors that were critical to the Article 8 balance have since ceased to apply.(3) where the requested authority takes steps to address concerns that led to the refusal of an extradition request, for example by giving an assurance as to prison conditions. Giese is such a case as Fordham J explained in Konczos v Hungary [2021] EWHC 3287 Admin at [30].(4) where new evidence comes to light after the proceedings and after the time for an appeal has expired in circumstances where the judicial authority could not have obtained such evidence at any earlier stage. Conversely, it is more likely to be an abuse if extradition is sought for the same offence and on the same evidence as in previous proceedings which resulted in the requested person's discharge. Such proceedings, in substance if not in form, are almost inevitably a collateral attack on the previous decision. 36. It may also be an abuse if a new arrest warrant is issued as a device for avoiding a litigation disadvantage that might otherwise apply on appeal. To take one example, the appellate court does not usually make its own decision as to where the Article 8 balance lies. Rather, it reviews the decision of the district judge in order to determine whether that decision was wrong. It follows that there will be marginal cases where the factors are finely balanced and where different district judges might reach different conclusions. In such cases, an appellate court may dismiss an appeal even if the court would, itself, have reached a different decision as to where the Article 8 balance lies. It would be quite wrong and abusive if, in such a case, a judicial authority simply kept issuing new arrest warrants until it found a first instance judge who reached a conclusion in its favour on the Article 8 balance”.[28]As well as relying on these paragraphs from Rymarski, Mr Herbert draws attention to the following: “42. Further, the effect of allowing the judicial authority to issue a second arrest warrant is that it thereby avoided the restrictions that apply to an appeal. It is only a judicial authority, not a requested person, that can, in effect, launch a second set of extradition proceedings. The need to ensure that parties are treated fairly and are on the same footing therefore requires a degree of rigour in ensuring that the restrictions that apply to appeals are not side-stepped in a way that is only available to one party. If the judicial authority had known of the further evidence clarifying the minor discrepancy and had considered that it would not be able or might not be able to adduce that evidence on an appeal as fresh evidence and had decided to issue a fresh arrest warrant as a way of avoiding the procedural requirements that are explained in Fenyvesi, then in my judgment the second set of proceedings would be a clear abuse of process for that separate reason”.[29]In Marinescu v Fourth District Court in Bucharest Romania [2025] EWHC 600, (Admin), the appellant was sought pursuant to a warrant that contained inadequate particulars for the purposes of section 2. He was accordingly discharged. The respondent sought permission to appeal to the High Court, which was refused. The warrant was then re-issued with the deficiency in the particulars remedied. In the second set of proceedings, the District Judge ordered extradition and the appellant appealed.[30]Collins Rice J rejected the challenge brought by reference to abuse of process. At paragraph 80, she found that the District Judge had performed the requisite overall balancing exercise, attributing significant weight to the fact that the respondent was seeking to remedy a deficiency that could have been easily remedied; and to the public interest in finality of litigation. On the other hand, there had not been a failure to abide by a previous court direction. The impact of the second set of proceedings on the family was not very strong, whilst the offending was serious and the appellant was a fugitive from justice. Collins Rice J found as follows: “82. It is the first two factors in favour of an abuse finding, cited above, which go most centrally to Miss Westcott's argument from Rymarski. The facts of that case were, however, strikingly different. What stands out is that the procedure there produced two successive rulings by different District Judges which were simply irreconcilable precisely because there had been no material change of circumstance. And there had been no appeal. The second decision was therefore itself a disguised appeal. The procedure was essentially a roll of the dice to get a different result from a different Judge on what was essentially the same basis.83. That is not the present case. It is material that the defects of particularity in the present case need not have arisen in the first place: a requesting state is under a clear obligation to get things right the first time. But here there had been an attempted appeal, and that had confirmed that there was a lack of particularity not remediable otherwise than by discharge and reissue. That is what then happened, undertaken, as the Judge found, without undue delay and on a basis giving no illusion of comfort to Mr Marinescu in the process. The reissued warrant had remedied the defects of particularity. The second proceedings were not therefore a rerun of the first: there has been a material change. Nor was it an attempt to avoid any directions of the court.84. In these circumstances, although the District Judge himself used the expression ‘collateral attack', it was not really any such thing. That term should properly be reserved for reissued warrants which are avoidance devices – backdoor routes to different results from those a court has decided otherwise, and for which consequential litigation steps have already been provided. The reissued warrant in this case was not a backdoor device. It was not trying to relitigate by way of avoiding extant court orders or appeal procedure; there were none of the former and the latter had been exhausted. It was entirely a front door device. It is perfectly proper, in principle, for an arrest warrant a court has found to lack material detail to be taken away and reissued with those details remedied. Whether overall that is abusive or not depends on all the individual and relevant circumstances of a case – the broad, merits-based approach.85. The Judge here addressed all of those circumstances and reached a broad, merits-based conclusion. He properly acknowledged the responsibility of the requesting state for taking two goes to get the warrant right, and gave significant weight to the burden that placed on Mr Marinescu and indeed the justice system. He also properly gave weight to the absence of substantive collateral attack, notwithstanding his own mislabelling; the only relevant litigation advantage here was the patent one of the requesting state being enabled to get the warrant right in the end. Whether that was overall unfair and abusive, or not, was a matter for full contextual evaluation, not an intrinsic quality arising from any misuse of litigation procedure.86. That was exactly the contextual evaluation the District Judge properly undertook. It discloses no error. The outcome was within the range of conclusions properly open to him on the materials before him and for the reasons he gave. Mr Marinescu's appeal cannot succeed on this ground”.[31]In Bakowski v Circuit Court in Plock (Poland) [2025] EWHC 1897 (Admin), District Judge Godfrey refused an application by the respondent for an adjournment in order to adduce evidence that went to the issue of whether the appellant was present or represented at his trial or that he had a right to retrial. Having done so, District Judge Godfrey discharged the appellant pursuant to section 20(7) of the 2003 Act. He also found that extradition would be a disproportionate interference with ECHR Article 8.[32]The respondent did not appeal the judgment of District Judge Godfrey. Some five months later, it issued a new arrest warrant, which contained the necessary information in respect of the section 20 issues. District Judge Minhas ordered extradition on the second arrest warrant, finding against the appellant on section 20 and ECHR Article 8.[33]Bourne J allowed the appeal against the order of District Judge Minhas. At paragraph 58, he regarded it as “of some significance” that District Judge Godfrey had struck the Article 8 balance in the appellant’s favour. At paragraphs 59 and 60, he regarded it as important that District Judge Godfrey had refused an adjournment and that the new warrant was, therefore, “a way of side-stepping" that refusal. At paragraph 61, he found that “whilst this is not the clearest case of a breach of a court order, it is a case where the judicial authority was given a deadline to get its case ready and it failed to do so.” He continued: 62 In addition, the new proceedings also gave the judicial authority a second bite of the cherry on fundamental issues which it had fought and lost. DJ Godfrey had made his ruling on the Article 8 balance as I have said, and the new warrant allowed that issue simply to be fought over again. The same is true of the issue of dual criminality in respect of the firearms offence, though it is not suggested that DJ Minhas reached the wrong conclusion about that. 63 In that regard, see the extract from Rymarski at [22] above. I am not suggesting that the judicial authority was "shopping around" for a more sympathetic forum on Article 8, but the practical effect of re-issue was, in substance, to obtain that outcome. 64 The second bite of the cherry on those issues would never be available to a requested person. That is one reason why this Court will carefully scrutinise its availability to a judicial authority. 65. In this case the impact on the requested person was severe, in both a legal and a personal sense. Legally he was made to re-litigate issues on which he had succeeded, and he was defeated on them. Personally he was subjected to the stress of the renewed proceedings and the strictures of bail, months after he thought, not unreasonably, that he had won the case. In my judgment that was oppressive. 66 I also bear in mind that the re-litigated issues were issues of historic fact, making this case very different from Konczos. 67 The case also does not fall into any of the non-abuse categories The case also does not fall into any of the non-abuse categories identified in Rymarski and quoted at [20] above. Rather it is the type of case mentioned in the extract at [21] above where extradition is sought on the same facts and, subject to the section 20 point, the same evidence. The effect was to give "an improper and unfair litigation advantage to the requesting state" ( Marinescu ), achieving by re-issue what was not or could not have been achieved by an appeal. 68 This is not a case where any single criticism of the judicial authority leads to a "mechanistic" finding of abuse of process. Rather, when all the facts are analysed together, the oppressive effect on the appellant and the need for finality are decisive. I will therefore allow the appeal on ground 1.”[34]Mr Herbert seeks to rely on the judgment of District Judge Sternberg in Spain vDorobantu, acknowledging that it carries no more than potentially persuasive value. In that case, the District Judge had in 2023 discharged the requested person on the basis that the warrant did not comply with sections 2 and 10 of the 2003 Act, there being no additional information regarding the place of offending, despite the proceedings having been adjourned in August 2022 to allow the judicial authority time to provide further information on that issue. The court made a direction for the information to be provided by 29 September 2022. The direction was not complied with. No application to adjourn was made to District Judge Sternberg at the hearing. The judicial authority did not appeal the decision to discharge. Instead, it issued a fresh extradition request, specifying the place in which the offending occurred.[35]District Judge Sternberg heard the challenge to this second request. The requested person submitted that the proceedings were a re-run of the first proceedings and amounted in effect to an attempt to gain an unfair litigation advantage. Had an appeal been pursued against the decision to discharge, the requesting authority would have had to overcome the restrictions on the admission of fresh evidence on appeal, identified in Hungary vFenyvesi [2009] EWHC 231 (Admin). District Judge Sternberg made the following findings on the issue of abuse of process:
“37. I can state my decision relatively briefly. I am satisfied that these proceedings do amount to an abuse of process. The proceedings on the first warrant were specifically adjourned on 25 August 2022 to allow the Judicial Authority to provide further information as to the location of offending. The Court set a direction for such information to be provided by 29 September 2022. No such information was provided in those proceedings, and I ordered the requested person’s discharge on 26 March 2024. The Judicial Authority did not appeal my decision. It was open to them to do so, they did not. Instead, the current warrant was issued shortly thereafter. There is no indication that the information now contained in the current warrant, stating that the banks were located in Spain and the Requested Person was observed in Spain, was not available at the time of 2023 proceedings. Since the Requested Person was convicted of the offending in 2020, it would be odd if that information was not available in 2020. 38. I make no finding of bad faith. However, these proceedings do amount to an attempt to circumvent my decision to order discharge, which was not appealed. There is no material difference between the two sets of proceedings in relation to the conduct. The only difference is the new information that has been provided, which the Judicial Authority rely on to make good the deficiency of the earlier warrant. There was no reason has given for non-compliance with the Court’s directions for further information regarding the location of the offending in the earlier proceedings. Nor was any application to adjourn the proceedings made before me in 2023 to seek a further opportunity to obtain that information. None of the circumstances which Johnson J outlined in Rymarski at paragraph 35 are present in this case. I accept that at paragraph 35(3) Johnson J did refer to the requesting authority taking steps to address concerns that led to the refusal of an extradition request, but the example given relates to the giving of prison assurances. The authorities are clear that such assurance can be admitted during first instance proceedings or on appeal. 39. What, in my judgment, is of greater relevance is what Johnson J says at paragraphs 42-44 of Rymarski. I find the effect of allowing the issue of a second warrant is that it avoided the restrictions that apply to fresh evidence on an. I endorse Johnson J’s explanation that the need to ensure that parties are treated fairly and are on the same footing requires a degree of rigour in ensuring that the restrictions that apply to appeals are not side-stepped in a way that is only available to one party. There is no suggestion before me that the material now relied upon was not available or could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence in the first set of proceedings. Had the Judicial Authority sought to serve the information on appeal, they would have had to overcome the Fenyvesi test; it is not suggested they would have been able to do so. 40. Accordingly, for all these reasons I conclude these proceedings are collateral attack on my decision of 6 March 2023; they are an abuse of the Court’s process. 41. To the extent that it is necessary to take broader factors into account following Camaras v Romania [2016] EWHC 1766 (admin) at [33], whilst the underlying the offending is not minor, the Requested Person has been here since 2018 and has spent a significant amount of time on curfew. I accept that there would be hardship caused to him and his family if he were surrendered, even if not amounting to disproportionality. Those matters support my conclusion on this ground and I urge caution in eliding the test a court must take in relation to article 8 and that which applies to abuse of process. I consider the analysis of broader factors supports my conclusion and the outcome of the broad merits based judgement required of me, taking into account the public and private interest, is that these proceedings do amount to an abuse of the court process.”

The appellant’s case

[36]Mr Herbert submits that, in the present case, District Judge Minhas erred in her assessment of the abuse of process issue. She failed to consider what he says is the separate category of abuse contemplated by Johnson J at paragraph 42 of Rymarski; namely, reissuing the arrest warrant and thereby avoiding the evidential restrictions that apply on appeal. Mr Herbert says that the fact that the respondent may have sent the information via email in the wrong format is irrelevant. The respondent failed to liaise with District Judge Minhas, despite being invited by District Judge Robinson to do so at the call over hearing on 10 October 2023.[37]Marinescu falls to be distinguished, according to Mr Herbert, on the basis that in that case the respondent had applied unsuccessfully to the High Court for permission to appeal; with the result that the lack of particulars was not remediable except by issuing the warrant. Furthermore, the respondent has provided no satisfactory explanation for why the further information could not have been put before the court in the appropriate format in accordance with directions.[38]Mr Herbert submits that, given the absence of any explanation for the failure to appeal the decision of District Judge Minhas to discharge the appellant in the first set of proceedings, it is reasonable to infer that the CPS advised the respondent that it would be tactically advantageous simply to re-issue the warrant.[39]Mr Herbert contends that it is irrelevant that, in her first judgment, District Judge Minhas invited the appellant’s representatives to advise him that the respondent might seek to reissue the warrant. None of the examples given by Johnson J at paragraph 35 of Rymarski apply to the present case. As a result, the appellant has been forced to face a second set of extradition proceedings, all the while being subject to bail conditions.[40]In short, the appellant’s case is that District Judge Minhas failed properly to undertake the broad merits-based assessment required for cases of this kind.

Discussion

[41]Helpful though they are, the examples given in Rymarski of situations where abuse of process is, or is not, likely to be established are no substitute for making, in every case of this kind, the broad merits-based assessment mandated by Camaras and Giese. Proceeding by analogy with those examples or with the facts of other cases is not necessarily a reliable route to an outcome which properly reflects the limited ambit of what is in reality a residual or “fail-safe” jurisdiction.[42]Whilst there may, of course, be instances where the problematic actions of a requesting authority (albeit not amounting to Belbin/bad faith behaviour) is accorded such great weight as to overwhelm the factors pulling in favour of extradition, undertaking the broad-based assessment should not be relegated to an afterthought, such as is perhaps the case in paragraph 41 of Dorobantu (paragraph 35 above). To do so risks diluting Ouseley J’s finding at paragraph 29 of Camaras, that, in cases of negligence or accident, it is possible for the authority “to re-open an issue and try again” (paragraph 21 above).[43]If one is to proceed by reference to other decided cases, it is important that the facts of those cases are properly understood. In Rymarski, Johnson J found there was no material difference between the two sets of proceedings concerning the appellant’s extradition. The fact there was no such difference, apart from the outcome, was an important part of Johnson J’s conclusions that there had been an abuse of process in seeking extradition for the second time. He explained the lack of difference as follows:
“39. District Judge Tempia made the order for discharge on the basis that the respondent had failed to satisfy to the criminal standard the test in s. 20. She took the critical date to be December 2016. The judicial authority accepted before her that the appellant had not been informed of that date. It was on that basis that she discharged the appellant under s. 20 . On a fair reading of her decision, the possible confusion over the name of the person who signed for the notification of the summons did not make a material difference to the outcome. Indeed, she did not make an explicit finding that the appellant was unaware of the 2014 hearing. 40. In the second set of proceedings, the judge considered that the critical date was 2014. She, therefore, focussed on the question of whether the appellant was aware of that hearing. She found that he was. The critical basis for that finding is that the summons had been served at the correct address, that he had admitted guilt, that he had engaged in the preparatory process and that he had expressed his consent to the passing of judgment. All of those facts were known and were before the first district judge. There does not seem to me to have been any material change in the relevant factual position. A possible confusion as to the identity of the person who signed the receipt of the summons was cleared up, but that possible confusion was not material to the first district judge's decision and the clarification of that confusion was not a critical part of the second district judge's decision. 41. Accordingly, I do not consider that there was a material difference between the ambit or evidence in the two sets of proceedings. The issues were the same; the evidence was materially the same. The critical point is that in both sets of proceedings the evidence was that the summons had been served at the correct address. The precise identity of the person signing for the receipt was not material. The decisions of the two district judges cannot be reconciled. In effect, although not expressed as an appeal decision, the second district judge simply disagreed with the first district judge. In effect, it was a rerun of the extradition proceedings. In effect, it was a collateral attack on the judgment of the first district judge. It was, in my judgment, an abuse of the court's process.”
[44]In other words, the new information, said to justify the re-issuing of the arrest warrant, was, on analysis, not plugging an information gap that would have made any difference to the outcome before District Judge Tempia. The re-issuing was, accordingly, a collateral attack on District Judge Tempia’s conclusions; a second “roll of the dice” to get another judge to decide that issue differently. This is very different from the facts of the present case and those of other cases, such as Marinescu, where there has been discharge owing to a failure to provide sufficient particulars of the offence to satisfy section 2, and where the new information materially addresses that failure.[45]In many cases, the re-issuing of the warrant where there has been non-compliance with section 2, will lead to the second District Judge having to undertake an Article 8 proportionality assessment. In Barkowski, the first Article 8 assessment had been in the appellant’s favour. In such a situation, there is plainly a risk of collateral attack on the first judge’s conclusion on that issue.[46]Proceeding by way of comparison with the facts of other cases also means that judges may feel the need to identify potential distinguishing features, which are not necessarily of material relevance. One such feature is whether the respondent sought permission to appeal the decision to discharge. I have difficulty in seeing why, as a general matter, the failure of the respondent to seek to appeal should automatically be accorded significant weight in favour of the appellant on the abuse of process ground. If the respondent has sought permission to appeal and been refused by reference to Fenyvesi principles, it is hard to see why the respondent should be in a better position than if it had concluded that Fenyvesi meant permission to appeal would not be forthcoming; and that it was therefore not worth wasting the time and resources of the court and the parties in making an application. In so saying, I am not to be taken as downplaying the inherent litigation advantage that the respondent possesses, in being able to re-issue an arrest warrant. That advantage is, however, the reason why, even in cases not involving bad faith, the Tollman test applies.[47]One situation that is certainly capable of assuming significant weight is where there has been non-compliance with court orders or directions. As a general matter, despite the public interest in giving effect to extradition requests, the courts of this jurisdiction must be able effectively to enforce compliance with their procedures. In Jasvins, we see this consideration being given very substantial weight, where the new warrant was an attempt to circumvent a decision of the High Court in the previous proceedings. Again, however, one cannot assume that a failure to comply with any court order or other decision must necessarily carry great weight.[48]With these observations in mind, it is necessary to address the challenge to the judgment of District Judge Minhas.[49]I do not accept that the District Judge fell into error in failing to consider the re-issuing of the arrest warrant as a separate category of abuse, based on the litigation advantage enjoyed by the respondent. It is the very fact that the respondent could and did re-issue which led the District Judge to conclude at paragraph 26 of her judgment that “this conduct can amount to an abuse”. That led her directly to examine whether, on all the facts of the case, the conduct was abusive. She was, in other words, conducting the broad-based assessment required in cases of this kind.[50]I do not accept that the District Judge was somehow compelled to find that the sending of the information in the wrong format was irrelevant. The District Judge was ideally placed to make findings on this issue, as she had been the judge who had conducted the first hearing and who had made directions for the provision of further information regarding the location of the offending and the appellant's role in it. The District Judge was plainly aware of the deficiency regarding the form in which the information had been provided. As she noted at paragraph 26, “it was not provided in a timely manner [and] appropriate format beforehand”. At paragraph 27, she said in terms that she was “not made aware that the JA had in fact responded with additional information” and that there was no explanation for this failure. It was, therefore, the respondent’s fault that the information had not been conveyed to her when it should have been. All of this was factored into the District Judge’s assessment.[51]As I have said, a failure to comply with a court order or direction is capable of being a significant issue in the assessment. Whether it does so in a particular case will be a matter of judgment. Again, District Judge Minhas was ideally placed to determine the weight to be given to this issue, since she was the judge who had issued the directions of 3 September 2023 (paragraph 8 above). Looking at what had happened from her vantage point in September 2024, she concluded that, despite the failure just mentioned, the case was not one “where the JA failed to respond at all and then issued a new AW sometime later.” She was entitled to that view.[52]I do not consider that anything turns on the fact that District Judge Robinson did not grant the respondent an extension of time at the call over hearing on 10 October 2023 (paragraph 11 above). That decision was linked with his view that the respondent should liaise directly with District Judge Minhas which, as she was aware, did not happen.[53]The judgment of District Judge Minhas does not refer to the fact that the respondent did not seek to appeal her earlier decision to discharge the appellant. I find nothing turns on this. As I have said, a failure to seek permission to appeal does not automatically carry substantial weight in the assessment exercise. The appellant has not explained why, on the particular facts of this case, the issue must be treated as of such significance as to vitiate the District Judge’s analysis. Mr Herbert invites me to infer that the respondent was advised it would be tactically advantageous to re-issue the warrant. Given that the material had been provided, albeit not in proper form; that the CPS had requested the respondent on 22 September 2023 to provide authenticated information; and that the District Judge’s first judgment ended with an express acknowledgment that “the JA may re-issue the Arrent Warrant with better particulars”, the decision to re-issue rather than seek to appeal is understandable, on the basis that the respondent would be aware that the appellant could (and likely would) raise an abuse of process ground.[54]The appellant submits it is irrelevant that the District Judge mentioned the possibility of re-issue in her first judgment. This brings me to the issue of prejudice.[55]At paragraph 26 of her judgment, the District Judge recorded the fact that she had warned the appellant about the possibility of re-issue. That needs to be seen together with her finding at paragraph 29 that the warrant was re-issued “in a timely manner”.[56]The District Judge’s conclusion that there was, on the facts, no abuse of process requires to be read in conjunction with paragraph 23 of her judgment on the issue of ECHR Article 8. There, the District Judge made careful findings on the Article 8 position, specifically in light of the fact that the warrant had been re-issued and that the appellant had, therefore, been subject to earlier extradition proceedings. At paragraph 23iv, the District Judge found that there had been no culpable delay in re-issuing and that the appellant had not been lulled into a false sense of security. At paragraph 23vi, she accepted that the appellant had continued to build upon his private and family life after his release from custody in October 2023, following his discharge in the first extradition proceedings. At paragraph 23vii, she assessed the impact on the appellant and his family of the new proceedings, giving weight on the appellant’s side of the balance to the failure of the respondent to produce the required information in a timely manner. At paragraph 23vii, she found that, despite the failure and the effect of the new proceedings, extradition would not be disproportionate.[57]It is important to mention that, in her first judgment, District Judge Minhas had found against the appellant on the Article 8 issue. The present case is, accordingly, not one where the effect of the second proceedings was to give the respondent a second chance to succeed on Article 8, having failed on the first occasion.[58]On the facts of this case, there is an obvious interplay between the District Judge’s conclusions on Article 8 and those on abuse of process. At paragraph 34 of Camaras, Ouseley J considered that the effect of the second set of extradition proceedings on the person concerned as regards (inter alia) his private and family life was a matter that involved consideration under sections 21 or 21A of the 2003 Act:
“Such an approach, placing this issue within the context of the statutory bars to extradition, avoids extending the residual jurisdiction to areas where its language shows it was not intended to venture.”
[59]Although the courts have subsequently adopted the “overall merits-based approach” where the facts could amount to an abuse of process, even where Article 8 is also raised as a bar, the fact remains that it will often be inappropriate to treat a judge’s Article 8 findings as hermetically sealed off from her findings on the overall merits, as part of the Tollman test. It would certainly be wrong to do so in the present case, given the emphasis placed by the District Judge on the fact that the private and family life issue fell to be assessed in the light of the re-issuing of the arrest warrant.[60]Before me, Mr Herbert said that it was relevant to the issue of prejudice in the broad-based assessment that the appellant had not qualified for legal aid in the present proceedings. That accounted for his not being represented before the District Judge in August 2024. He was also subject to an electronically monitored curfew.[61]I take account of both of these matters. I am entirely satisfied that, had they been raised before the District Judge, they would not have affected her decision. The absence of legal aid will no doubt have contributed to the appellant’s concern at having to face a fresh set of proceedings but it has not been shown that it has done so to any material degree. The curfew hours are 11pm-3am, which cannot be properly characterised as inherently oppressive. I was not told that the curfew had had any materially adverse impact on the appellant.[62]The appeal is dismissed.