“it would not be right, in my judgment, to describe the warrant a[s] no more than a piece of paper. But for the extent of the particularisation of the merged sentence (which I do consider to be an important issue), the warrant is valid in all other respects. Furthermore, there is no basis, in my judgment, for concluding that the deficiency arose as a matter of bad faith; and in my judgment there would be no abuse of process argument which could be mounted if the judicial authority withdrew the existing warrant and then re-issued a fresh warrant all the information in the existing warrant and the three tranches of further information. Accordingly, in my judgment, receiving all three tranches of further information in these proceedings would be consistent with the principle of mutual cooperation and I am satisfied that it would be in the interests of justice for me to do so.”
“In this case there was a document in the prescribed form, presented as an AW and setting out to address the information provided by the Act, including giving particulars of the offence of which the appellant was convicted which was the subject of extradition proceedings. Whilst the detail of the offending of criminal case 24/2016, relevant to sentence, is absent from the warrant, I do not consider there to have been a wholesale failure to provide the necessary particulars such as to make the AW a nullity. The AW is not internally contradictory or confusing. It did not merely state that there was a longer sentence to be served than that imposed for the offence for which extradition was sought without more. It did not simply state that there was another offence. It provided the information set out in [39] above.”
“This warrant refers to a total of 1 crime for which he was tried in this file and 1 crime for which he was tried in files of other courts where penalties were applied that were merged by criminal sentence..”
“31. The underlying matters of substance contained within the EAW reflecting the provisions of ss.2 , 5 and 6 of the 2003 Act are identified as the April 2010 offence of failing to provide a specimen and a final sentence of 4 years' imprisonment. The final sentence of 4 years is not the sentence of 2 years originally imposed for the 2010 offence; it is a sentence which includes periods of imprisonment in respect of unparticularised offences which have been discharged. 32. The difficulty with the respondent's submission, namely that in the event of extradition for the 2010 offence a 2-year sentence would be served by the appellant, is that it does not reflect the wording of the EAW as to the final sentence to be served in respect of which extradition is sought. Nor does it reflect the specifically requested further information from the IJA. 33. In my judgment, as the stipulated sentence of 4 years is not the sentence which was imposed for the 2010 offence, the EAW does not meet the identified requirements of s.2(6) of the 2003 Act. One purpose of s.2 is to protect the rights of a requested person. The means of so doing is to ensure that the EAW complies with its provisions. They will not be protected if that person is extradited to serve a longer sentence than was originally imposed for the identified offence in the EAW. This case is on all fours with the facts of Pascariu in Edutanu . I find that the EAW does not meet the requirements of s.2(6) of the 2003 Act and accordingly is invalid.”
“where it appears from the terms of an EAW read as a whole that the IJA is seeking a return that would mean the requested person will serve a longer sentence than the sentences for the offences for which extradition is sought and that the total sentence is in respect of offences which have not been particularised rather than only aggravating those which have been particularised it will not be valid. As I stated at para 9 above, particular care must be taken in ascertaining the meaning of the EAW in such cases. The fact that the EAW refers to a total sentence to be served that is longer than the sentence for the particularised offences is a strong pointer to construing the sentence as “originating from” and being for the unparticularised conduct. Of the cases before us, only the EAW in Pascariu’s case falls into this category.”
“i) Unless an EAW satisfies the terms of s.2 of the 2003 Act, extradition cannot be ordered. ii) It is for the Judicial Authority to show that what purports to be an EAW does indeed satisfy the requirements of s.2 - see s.206 of the 2003 Act iii) In this, as in all other matters relating to the extradition, the Judicial Authority must prove its case to the criminal standard ibid . iv) In approaching the EAW, the District Judge must do so in the spirit of mutual trust and confidence. This must include making reasonable allowance for difficulties that may arise because of documents being written in languages other than English.”
“In my view, such a distinction is less certain or clear than it might at first appear. Taking the present case as an example, it is equally possible to characterise the information admitted by the District Judge as updating information, supplementing the warrant to take account of events necessitated by the passage of time since it was first issued, rather than as contradictory information. In my view, the line identified by the court in Alexander as to the limits on the use of supplementary information is an expression of the principle of mutual cooperation that underpins the system established by the Framework Decision. In any particular case the question for the court is whether admitting the supplementary information is consistent with that principle of mutual cooperation, or whether it tends to undermine it. The point arising from the judgment of Irwin LJ is that admitting supplementary information to make good a wholly deficient EAW would itself go against the principle of mutual cooperation because that principle is to be adhered to as much by the requesting authority as by the extraditing authority.”
“73. My starting point is an assessment of the seriousness of the conduct of which the requested person has been convicted. I am satisfied that the offences are properly to be regarded as serious, given the length of the sentence imposed. Whilst no explanation has been given for the decision [to] merge [the] two separate sentences and activate the suspended sentence, I must afford a proper degree of mutual confidence and respect to the decision of the judicial authority in this respect. 74. The lengths to which the requested person has gone to develop himself in this country by enrolling on the course at Arden University is commendable and much to his credit. I agree, however, with the submissions of Mr Squibbs that the requested person is currently at a stage between the foundation course and the degree course. It would be open to him, in the event of extradition, to return to his studies after serving the sentence imposed either in the UK if he returned here or in Romania. This, together with other aspects of the requested person’s life in the UK, does not amount to very strong counterbalancing factors. 75. In my judgment, this is a case where the public interest factors in favour of extradition that I have identified above weigh heavily in the balance and the balance lies decisively in favour of extradition. There will, sadly, be an impact of extradition for the requested person; but in my judgment it will be what Lord Mance described in Norris as the adverse consequences which extradition has by its nature.”