Norbert Rozgonyi v Veszprem Regional Court, Hungary [2025] EWHC 2999 (Admin)

[2025] EWHC 2999 (Admin)Case No AC-2024-LON-002386
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 14/11/2025
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE SWEETING
Between
Norbert ROZGONYIAppellant/ApplicantVeszprem Regional Court, HUNGARYRespondent
Ania Grudzinska (instructed by Lawrence & Co) for AppellantLucia Brieskova (instructed by the Crime Prosecution Service, Extradition Unit) for RespondentHearing Hearing dates: 14 th October 2025
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.00am on 14.11.2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE SWEETING

Introduction

[1]This is a substantive appeal and rolled up permission application by the Appellant/Applicant (“the Appellant”) in relation to the decision of District Judge Minhas (“the Judge”) to order extradition pursuant to two Arrest Warrants (“AW1” and “AW2”) following a final hearing that took place on 6 June 2024. The Arrest Warrants AW 1

The Arrest Warrants

[2]AW1 is a conviction warrant issued on 7 June 2022 and certified by the National Crime Agency (“NCA”) on 6 December 2022. It relates to two judgments: i) Judgment no 3. Bf 636/2021/12: the facts of the offence are that on 16 July 2014 the Appellant stole a safe from within a domestic property. A suspended sentence of 2 years and 6 months was imposed. ii) Judgment no 5.B 403/2015/103: the facts of the offending are that on 14 December 2018 the Appellant drove to his former partner’s flat in the Rigo housing estate and began shouting from his car. He then got out of car with a golf club which he held above his head in aggressive manner and approached Jozsef Kolompar who ran into the flat and away from him. He then hit the boot of a car owned by Joszef and Eva Kolompar causing damage. On the same day he returned to Joszef Kolompar’s flat and hit the front door several times with a golf club. He also hit Joszef Kolompar and Antal Kolompar with a golf club. A sentence of 1 year and 10 months was imposed.[3]The conviction in relation to the December 2018 offence resulted in activation of the suspended sentence for the July 2014 offence.[4]The total sentence imposed was 4 years 4 months of which 3 years, 11 months and 19 days remains to be served.

AW 2

[5]AW2 is an accusation warrant issued on 23 February 2023 and certified by the NCA on 6 April 2023. The Appellant is sought in relation to a single offence of forgery arising out of the misrepresentation of his identity in relation to a sales contract for a vehicle on 21 August 2019. The forged document was then unwittingly submitted to the state authorities by a named third party. The maximum sentence which can be imposed is 3 years imprisonment. The Appellant was arrested in relation to AW2 on 2 March 2023.[6]AW2 is supplemented by Further Information (“FI”) dated 14 August 2023. The FI confirmed that a decision to charge or try the Appellant had not been made, explaining that the “reason for this is the fact that the proceedings cannot be conducted in absentia”.

The Extradition Hearing

[7]The issues raised under the provisions of the Extradition Act 2003 (“the Act”) were: i) Section 12A – that there had been no decision to charge the Appellant (AW 2 only); ii) Section 21A – proportionality (AW 2 only); iii) Section 21A/Article 8 ECHR and; iv) Section 25 – that it would be unjust/oppressive to extradite the Appellant due to his poor health and medical needs.[8]The matter was initially listed for an extradition hearing on 10 July 2023. This was vacated because Dr Filo (a legal expert) was required to give evidence regarding section 12A, necessitating an application for a video link to Hungary. The hearing was re-listed for 30 October 2023.[9]On 30 October 2023, District Judge Sternberg granted a defence application to vacate the hearing due to the Appellant’s deteriorating health. The hearing was adjourned to 22 February 2024.[10]On 19 February 2024, the court re-fixed the hearing to 6th June 2024 due to a lack of court time. A prison assurance was provided by the Hungarian authorities on 6 April 2024 which related to the size of cell in which the Appellant would serve his sentence if extradited. A defence application to vacate on 28 May 2024 because of new medical issues regarding the Appellant’s breathing and the trial of a Continuous Positive Airway Pressure (“CPAP”) machine, was refused by the Judge. The extradition hearing took place on 6 June 2024. The Defence renewed the application to vacate, which was refused. Due to his poor health the Appellant gave evidence via video link.[11]Following the hearing the Judge made an order for extradition dated 8 July 2024.

The Appeal/Application

[12]An application for permission to appeal was lodged on 12 July 2024. Perfected grounds were filed on 31 August 2024. Permission to appeal was refused by Bennathan J on 27 March 2025. Renewal grounds were filed on 4 April 2025. An application to adduce fresh evidence was served on 20 June 2025.[13]An oral renewal hearing was held before Hill J on 24 June 2025. Permission to appeal was granted in respect of section 12A (the absence of a prosecution decision) and section 21A (proportionality). The determination of permission in respect of section 25 (that extradition would be unjust or oppressive) and section 21/Article 8 ECHR was adjourned to the substantive hearing, which was to proceed as a “rolled up” hearing in relation to these grounds. The Appellant’s application to adduce fresh evidence (dated 20 June 2025) was granted. This related to: i) An updated proof of evidence of the Appellant, dated 19 June 2025; ii) A Consultation Information Sheet, 27 May 2025; iii) An updating letter from Appellant’s GP, dated 2 May 2025; iv) An updating report from Dr Filo, dated 21 May 2025.[14]Hill J also granted the Appellant’s application to extend the representation order to allow the instruction of Dr Iyer, a Consultant Respiratory and Sleep Physician. The Appellant now seeks permission to introduce his evidence in the form of a report dated 17 October 2025.

The Grounds of Appeal

[15]Whilst it is clear which issues were the subject of the grant of permission and which require permission to be considered, the numbering of the grounds differs between the parties’ skeleton arguments. I have taken the grounds as numbered in the Perfected Grounds of Appeal (“the Grounds”) dated 31 August 2024 (which appear to have been the subject of a retrospective extension of time in the Order made by Hill J). I nevertheless consider the Grounds in the order in which they were addressed in skeleton arguments and at the hearing before me.[16]Section 27 of the Act provides that on an appeal against an extradition order under section 26, the appeal may be allowed if the conditions in section 27(3) are satisfied. The conditions are that the appropriate judge ought to have decided a question before him at the extradition hearing differently and that if he had decided the question in that way, he would have been required to order the person’s discharge.

Ground 2 – Section 25 in respect of AW 1 and AW 2

[17]Section 25 of the Act provides: 25 Physical or mental condition(1) This section applies if at any time in the extradition hearing it appears to the judge that the condition in subsection (2) is satisfied.(2) The condition is that the physical or mental condition of the person in respect of whom the Part 1 warrant is issued is such that it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite him.(3) The judge must— (a) order the person’s discharge, or (b) adjourn the extradition hearing until it appears to him that the condition in subsection (2) is no longer satisfied. (b) adjourn the extradition hearing until it appears to him that the condition in[18]The Appellant submitted that it would be unjust and oppressive to extradite him to Hungary because of his poor health, that permission should therefore be granted and that he should be discharged.[19]The Appellant’s detailed submissions before me focused on arguing that his health has deteriorated since extradition was ordered that his conditions are complex, and that the Respondent has failed to provide sufficient assurances of adequate care.[20]In considering section 25 of the Act the Court must determine whether extradition would be “unjust or oppressive” due to the Appellant’s physical or mental condition. That determination requires “intense focus” on the Appellant’s medical condition, what it means for his daily living, and what effects extradition and incarceration would have on him (see Magiera v District Court of Krakow, Poland [2017] EWHC 2757 (Admin)). The Court must then assess the extent to which any adverse effects or hardship can be met by the requesting state providing medical care or other arrangements. It may or may not be necessary to go beyond the assumptions which the court is entitled to make in relation to the provision of medical assistance. Extradition ordinarily causes stress and hardship, but neither factor alone is sufficient to engage the bar.[21]It would be difficult to conclude that there was anything other than an “intense focus” on the Appellant’s medical problems at the extradition hearing as well as a consideration of how he would cope in the prison system. Consideration of the issues raised under section 25 (and Article 8) and the Appellant’s state of health takes up the larger part of the judgment. The Judge had extensive medical evidence before her and the Appellant had the opportunity to give his own account of his condition and difficulties. Mr Paul, an orthopaedic consultant, dealt with the Appellant’s back pain and had confirmed that the Appellant required a ground floor cell with a toilet nearby due to his mobility problems. The Judge also considered Dr Burgin’s conclusions (a General Practitioner and Disability Analyst) regarding the Appellant’s “learned helplessness” and the potential benefits of a secure environment. Dr Burgin suggested that if the Appellant were incarcerated in the UK, the prison estate would assign him another inmate as a paid carer to assist. Dr Burgin had in fact adopted a cautious approach by not recommending extradition due to breathlessness or undiagnosed cardiorespiratory symptoms.[22]There was an email from Dr Bedawi, dated 23 May 2024, raising concerns regarding the Appellant’s breathing, from which it is plain that the relationship between his sleep apnoea, the risk of other complications and the need for a CPAP machine were fully rehearsed before the Judge:
“This gentleman had a sleep study indicative of severe obstructive sleep apnoea, by virtue of the fact that his oxygen saturation levels drop were shown to drop to dangerously low levels at night in his sleep. His CPAP machine is therefore vital to keep his airway patent at night to prevent this. Patients with uncontrolled or poorly controlled sleep apnoea are at risk of significant adverse events in the form of increased risk of cardiovascular events (heart attacks) and raised blood pressure contributing to an increased risk of stroke as well as diabetes. Therefore, the risks from interrupting his treatment would be significant.”
[23]Dr Ivany is an attorney-at-law practicing in Hungary. His report was summarised and referred to throughout the judgment. The Judge relied on Dr Ivany’s confirmation that the Hungarian prison estate could provide self-care aids such as incontinence pads, medication, CPAP machines, and that wheelchair users could be accommodated. Nevertheless, the report also fairly detailed difficulties prisoners had with obtaining incontinence pads (such as receiving only two per day) and provided examples of detainees with severe apnoea facing delays and rejection when trying to obtain CPAP machines.[24]The Judge made extensive and detailed findings regarding the Appellant’s specific health issues based on the evidence available at the time of the hearing. She found asthma to be a common condition that is readily treatable within a prison environment, noting that the Appellant’s asthma was not complex and that inhalers should be readily available. She also found there was no evidence that the Appellant could not self-administer his treatment.[25]The Judge found the Appellant was undergoing a trial of the CPAP machine. She concluded it was unclear whether the CPAP machine was solely for obstructive sleep apnoea or also for his asthma. The Judge noted that, on the evidence before her, CPAP machines are available within the Hungarian prison estate, although there might be a delay in obtaining one. She was unclear whether the Appellant had been officially diagnosed with Obstructive Sleep Apnoea (“OSA”) and found no evidence that the CPAP machine was required for daytime use or would prevent travel.[26]The Judge accepted that the Appellant suffered from health conditions including back pain/disc prolapse, asthma, high blood pressure, and depression, but found that these were common, not complex, and could be treated with medication and inhalers in Hungarian prisons. The Judge found that it was unclear whether the Appellant was officially diagnosed with urinary incontinence or the extent of this. She accepted it was self-reported, occasional, and treated with pads, which could be catered for in the Hungarian prison system.[27]The Appellant’s submissions before me drew heavily on the recent report from Dr Iyer which the Appellant seeks to rely on as fresh evidence. The report provided updated diagnoses and specified care requirements, which the Appellant argued undermined the Judge’s earlier findings.[28]Dr Iyer confirmed that the Appellant has been diagnosed with very severe OSA. This is the most common sleep-related breathing disorder. The diagnosis necessitated, he said, the long-term, nightly use of a CPAP machine. His report noted that the Appellant had mild left ventricular systolic dysfunction with previous episodes of decompensated heart failure, which was medically managed. Dr Iyer linked the Appellant’s breathlessness not definitively to asthma (as previously suggested), but possibly to “cardiac wheeze” due to his heart failure.[29]Dr Iyer explained that untreated OSA can worsen heart failure and increase the risk of sudden cardiac death, heart attack, and stroke, especially in obese patients (the Appellant being severely obese with a BMI over 40kg/m2). This was in similar terms to the views expressed by Dr Bedawi.[30]In the light of this additional medical material the Appellant submitted that the DJ’s findings “underplay the true conditions” and are “no longer an accurate picture” of his current diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis.[31]One of the most striking features of Dr Iyer’s report is the information it contains as to the use of the CPAP machine by the Appellant:
“NR’s three month compliance report (see appendix 1) between 02/07/2025 and 29/09/2025 demonstrates very poor compliance with average usage (for all days) of 24 minutes and average usage (on days used) of 55 minutes. The therapy data shows that when he does use the machine, his sleep apnoea is well controlled with an AHI of <5. Mask leak continued to be significant and his median pressure was 4.9cm of water”
[32]As the Respondent submitted the Appellant has now had the CPAP machine since just before the extradition hearing. His average use was 17 minutes per day, but the machine was only used on 24% of days. Although the Appellant had been admitted to hospital on seven occasions because of worsening breathlessness, chest pain or uncontrolled hypertension, none of these admissions culminated in an episode of decompensated respiratory failure requiring non-invasive ventilation, and there was no evidence of acute coronary syndrome (heart attack). It is evident that he chooses not to use the machine or to follow medical advice as to the extent he should do so. There is nothing to suggest that his extradition to Hungary would interrupt a settled regime of treatment or, on the evidence, one which could not be provided within the Hungarian prison estate. Any submission that delay in providing him with a CPAP machine carries with it some potentially fatal consequence must be considered in the light of the limited use which the Appellant makes of the device at present.[33]The primary cause of the Appellant’s respiratory problems is his obesity which is simply not being addressed at present. Dr Iyer’s view, which mirrored other medical opinion that had been before the Judge, was:
“In NR’s case, obesity is likely to be the primary driving factor for his having developed OSA. There may well be a genetic component with regard to his upper airway anatomy but given his BMI is well above 40 and large neck, the majority component of his OSA is likely to be due to his obesity.”
[34]The Appellant’s BMI has not changed (or at least Dr Iyer could not say that it had) and there is little if anything in Dr Iyer’s report to suggest that there has been a marked worsening of the Appellant’s condition since the extradition hearing.[35]As far as the possible unavailability in prison of the Appellant’s morphine-based pain medication is concerned, Dr Iyer’s opinion was:
“I cannot comment on the impact of withdrawing morphine and gabapentin, but both of these medications will contribute to making OSA worse by reducing the respiratory drive for breathing. Therefore, if anything, withdrawing these medications is likely to improve his OSA although it may not help with his anxiety which is another stumbling block to NR complying with CPAP therapy regularly.”
[36]The points taken in the Grounds are to a significant extent disagreement with the conclusions reached by the Judge as part of the assessment of the evidence. As the court observed in Love v USA [2018] EWHC 172 (Admin):
“Extradition appeals are not re-hearings of evidence or mere repeats of submissions as to how factors should be weighed; courts normally have to respect the findings of fact made by the district judge, especially if he has heard oral evidence.”

The Judge’s summary, after a detailed assessment of the evidence, was as follows:

“59. In summary, I recognise that if extradited, the RP will not easily transition to life within the JA’s prison estate. There will be a period of hardship as he adjusts to only having his needs rather than wants met by the prison estate and living without the support offered by his wife. Notwithstanding the RP’s discomfort during the transition phase, I find the RP’s medical conditions can be managed within the Hungarian prison estate. For the reasons given above, I find the depression, high blood pressure, asthma and back pain are not complex medical conditions nor is there any complexity in the treatment of these conditions, most of which are managed by medication, inhalers and/or physical therapy (which the RP does not engage with at present). The RP’s obesity is not addressed in the UK at all. 60. I find a level of complexity is added by the RP’s possible diagnosis of OSA for which a CPAP machine has recently been provided, but the evidence of Dr Ivany is that such machines can also be provided within the JA prison estate, albeit with a delay. Dr Bedawi’s email stated there would be a grave risk to the RP if the CPAP machine was not made available, but on the RP’s evidence, he had been waiting in the UK for over a year for the machine, and at the time of the hearing, only had the machine for one day. I find the risk is manageable in view of this history if the RP is diagnosed with OSA. 61. The RP’s breathlessness/cardiorespiratory symptoms did not present a heightened level of complexity in my view. The cause of his symptoms is not known in the UK and is under investigation. I find there is no reason why those investigations cannot continue in Hungary through the prison estate or the civilian hospitals if greater specialised care is required. I rely on the presumption that the RP will receive adequate healthcare in respect of the concerns around his dignity in personal care. The evidence of Dr Ivany did not, in my view, rebut the presumption as the examples given were a handful of incidents across the whole prison estate rather than an indication of systematic failure within the healthcare system. I was not provided with any CPT reports or other evidence of context. I had no indication of how many prisoners had access to CPAP machines across the prison estate, or how many prisoners had multiple health conditions, such as the RP, to gauge whether the examples provided by Dr Ivany were isolated or not. 62. I accept there will be some initial hardship to the RP. However, I find the RP has not established, on the balance of probabilities, it will be unjust or oppressive to extradite him by virtue of his physical or mental health conditions, either taken individually or collectively for the reasons given above.”
[38]Against this background I consider that: i) The Judge was entitled, for the reasons she gave, to conclude that Appellant’s conditions are multiple but are not complex and can be managed in the Hungarian prison system. ii) The DJ did not err in failing to seek further specific information from the Judicial Authority (“JA”) regarding healthcare provision. She was entitled to find that the Applicant’s evidence, notably the report of Dr Ivany, was not sufficient to rebut the presumption that Hungary will be able to provide adequate medical treatment for the Applicant. iii) Extradition would not be oppressive to the Appellant by reason of his physical health, and therefore, extradition is not barred by section 25 of the Act. iv) It is not arguable that the Judge should have decided the matter differently and was wrong to order extradition because of the matters raised under section 25, including the report of Dr Iyver.[39]I therefore refuse permission on this ground.[40]The admission of the fresh evidence is not automatic but is a matter for the discretion of the Court. The material must comply with 50.20(6)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Rules and the principles in Zabolotnyi v Hungary [2021] UKSC 14 and Hungary v Fenyvesi [2009] EWHC 231. The Court must be satisfied that the evidence would have resulted in the Judge deciding the relevant question differently, so that she would have ordered the Appellant’s discharge. In other words, the fresh evidence must be decisive. Dr Iyer’s report does not clear that strict threshold in my view. I therefore decline the application to admit it as fresh evidence notwithstanding that I have fully considered its potential impact on the issues before the Judge.

Ground 3 – Section 21A / Article 8 ECHR in respect of AW1 and AW2

[41]The legal framework for Article 8 ECHR in extradition cases requires the court to examine the way in which extradition will interfere with family life. The central question is always whether the interference with the private and family lives of the requested person and their family members is outweighed by the public interest in extradition. The public interest, which is constant and weighty (and includes ensuring those convicted serve sentences and that the UK honours treaty obligations), will generally outweigh Article 8 rights unless the consequences of the interference are exceptionally severe.[42]The appropriate approach for judges is the “balance sheet approach,” setting out the ‘pros’ and ‘cons’ before arriving at a reasoned conclusion (Polish Judicial Authorities v Celinski and Others [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin)). The Judge followed that approach in this case.[43]The Appellant submitted that: i) The Judge failed to properly consider the Appellant’s medical issues and take account of them in the balancing exercise. ii) The Judge erred in finding that the Appellant was a fugitive in relation to AW1 iii) The Judge’s finding in relation to the delay in respect of both warrants was incorrect and the impact of delay was not fully taken into account. iv) The Judge failed to attach sufficient weight to the impact of the extradition on the Appellant’s family. v) The Judge should have reached a different view in relation to the gravity of the offending in AW1 (a point more fully developed in relation to the arguments advanced under Ground 4 in relation to proportionality).[44]The Respondent contended that the Judge correctly cited the relevant caselaw and conducted the balancing exercise, and it is not reasonably arguable that she was wrong to order the Appellant’s extradition. This was not a rare case where extradition would be disproportionate and thus in violation of the Appellant’s Article 8 rights.

The Appellant’s Health

[45]As Ms Grudzinska acknowledged, her submissions largely replicated those made under section 25 (Ground 2 above), albeit that the legal context was different. For the reasons set out above I have concluded that the Judge correctly relied on the rebuttable presumption that the Hungarian authorities would provide sufficient care and that the Appellant’s multiple conditions are not complex and can be managed in the Hungarian prison system. The fresh medical evidence (Dr Iyer’s report) is not decisive or determinative. The Judge expressly identified the fact that the impact of imprisonment on the Appellant would be greater due to his poor health, observing that “the weightiest factor against extradition in the balancing exercise was the RP’s physical and mental health.” In my view it was properly taken into account in the balancing exercise.

Fugitivity

[46]The Appellant submitted that the Judge erred in her finding of fugitivity. The Judge had to be sure to the criminal standard before she could make such a finding. There was, it was argued, no evidence produced from the JA to indicate that the Appellant had deliberately and knowingly placed himself beyond the reach of the legal process, as per De Zorzi v France [2019] EWHC 2062 (Admin). The Appellant was subject to a suspended sentence. There was no information as to any obligations attached to the suspended sentence. Whilst he was arrested in respect of the AW2 matters and interviewed, he had no reason to believe that his suspended sentence would be activated at that time.[47]However, the Judge made a clear finding of fact in relation to the issue of fugitivity which turned largely on the Appellant’s evidence at the hearing [22]:
“I find the RP is a fugitive. The RP admitted in cross-examination he was aware he was subject to a suspended sentence and aware that the authorities could not find him if he was moving from address to address. He admitted he had been arrested in respect of the December 2018 offending, was aware that the Hungarian police did not believe his account but denied that he had left the jurisdiction to evade proceedings stating he believed everything had ended and there would be no consequence. I do not find the RP credible in this regard. He gave evidence that the Hungarian police made the other 2-3 persons arrested give an account against him and that they were prejudiced towards the RP because of his gypsy background. In this context, I do not find it at all plausible that the RP believed there would be no consequence because of his arrest. I find the RP was fully aware he would be subject to proceedings, that he was at risk of having his suspended sentence activated and left Hungary to place himself beyond the reach of the JA.”
[48]The Respondent argued that the Judge was entitled to conclude that the Appellant was a fugitive regarding AW1 based on the documentary and oral evidence, particularly having observed the Appellant’s credibility. I agree and conclude that there is no basis on which to impugn the Judge’s finding in this respect.

Delay

[49]The District Judge made a specific finding that “there was no delay of note” in respect of AW1, whereas there is, in fact, a 4-year delay unaccounted for in respect of that warrant (based on the activation date of the suspended sentence). The Judge found some culpable delay in respect of AW2. Given the fact that there was no clear information to explain delay in respect of either warrant, it was submitted that the Judge erred in only attributing delay to AW2.[50]The Respondent accepts there may have been an error regarding the date that the suspended sentence for the 2014 offences was imposed. Nevertheless, it was argued, this error does not undermine the weight the District Judge placed on the delay, given her findings on fugitivity, the seriousness of the offence, and the length of the sentence regarding AW1.[51]It does not seem to me that the error identified could possibly have tipped the balance the other way given the factors which the Judge was bound to take into account in favour of extradition.

Gravity of Offending

[52]In respect of the convictions in AW1 (criminal damage and two common assaults), the Appellant argued that this conduct falls towards the lower end of the spectrum of criminal behaviour. In relation to the accusation warrant (AW2) for forgery, the Appellant argued that the offence is not serious enough to warrant extradition, especially given the lack of response from the JA regarding less coercive measures (see further below).[53]The District Judge was, in my view, plainly entitled to find that the offences were serious.[54]The offending in AW1 included assaults using a weapon (a golf club) and criminal damage. The 2014 theft was characterised as a serious offence of dwelling burglary involving significant planning and breaking into a property with others. This was reflected in the sentence.[55]The alleged offence in AW2 is not a trivial offence of dishonesty and carries a maximum penalty of up to 3 years imprisonment.

Impact on Family

[56]The Appellant submitted that the District Judge understated the impact of extradition on the family unit. The family may have to move from their adapted home, requiring the Appellant’s children to potentially change schools and lose friendships while coping with the loss of their father for a significant time.[57]The Respondent submitted that the impact on the children and family was given sufficient weight in the Judgment. This is not a sole carer case and while the family may have to move, provision for alternative housing in their local area is possible and the Appellant’s wife would continue to receive social benefits and other eligible support.[58]The Judge identified the interests of the Appellant’s children as being a primary consideration observing:
“73. …However, due to his own health issues, the RP is not the primary carer for the children and based on the evidence of the RP’s health difficulties, unlikely to be assisting with any day-to-day care for the children. If the RP is extradited, inevitably there will be an emotional impact for the children not seeing their father on a day-to-day basis, but they will remain in the care of their mother who is, and will remain, their primary caregiver. I perceived the RP’s wife will be freed from her caring duties for the RP and likely have more time to address the needs of the children to mitigate any impact from the loss of the RP’s presence. 74. The RP’s wife’s witness statement detailed that she would struggle financially without the RP’s additional benefit income. If the RP is extradited, it is likely they will have to move from the property they currently reside in as it is a disability adapted home. If extradited, the RP’s partner would be the sole carer for 3 minor children. I am sure she would be entitled to state financial assistance, she is already in receipt of some, and the Local Authority would have an obligation to house her due to the children. I accept she may lose her current accommodation given it is a disability adapted home, but she will still be entitled to state assistance and housing support. In my view, moving to an alternative property is not an exceptional consequence of extradition rendering extradition disproportionate. Whilst there may be some financial hardship due to a reduced benefit income, the RP or his wife have not demonstrated, on evidence, that the hardship experienced by the RP wife and children will go beyond that normally experienced during extradition.”

Overall Conclusion on Article 8 grounds

[59]There were a number of features of the case in the Appellant’s favour, which were properly considered by the Judge, in particular his poor health. However, the Judge gave appropriate weight to all the relevant factors in the case, and it cannot be said that her conclusion was wrong. Whilst there has been a delay in respect of which the Judge may have been under a misapprehension, she was entitled to find that the Appellant was a fugitive who had failed to face his criminal responsibility in Hungary. The impact of delay on the balancing exercise was therefore reduced. The Appellant did not have a false sense of security.[60]Whilst there will inevitably be hardship caused to the family in the event of the Applicant’s extradition, this is not a sole carer case. The Appellant’s wife is capable of running the household and looking after her children by herself because that is, to all intents and purposes, the present position. At the moment she also has to care for the Appellant. There are many sources of support for her. In all these circumstances, the consequences of extradition amount to hardship, of the sort which is inevitable, but are not exceptionally severe.[61]As the Respondent submitted the Judge carried out an orthodox balancing exercise and correctly concluded that the Appellant’s extradition would be compatible with his Article 8 rights. It was open to her on the evidence to find that the features in favour of extradition outweighed those militating against it. Amongst the factors in favour of extradition were the sentence which remains to be served and the powerful public interest in the UK honouring its international obligations.[62]In the context of an appeal on Article 8 grounds, the sole question for the court is whether the District Judge’s ultimate decision was wrong: that is a question which considers the overall outcome of the determination in a complex balancing exercise, rather than the identification of any individual errors or omissions. It is not arguable in my view that the judge came to the wrong decision in this case. For that reason, I refuse permission to appeal.

Ground 4 - AW2 whether disproportionate section 21A(1)(b)

[63]The assessment of whether the extradition on AW2 would be disproportionate is governed by section 21A of the Act, focusing on the seriousness of the conduct, the likely penalty, and the possibility of less coercive measures.

Seriousness of the Conduct (Section 21A(3)(a))

(a) )

[64]The Appellant argued that the offence described in AW2, forgery committed on 21 August 2019 by purchasing a car, signing a sales contract using a forged signature (in the name of Tamas Meszaros), and handing the forged document to Balint Hertner for submission to the District Office of Papa, should fall under the Practice Direction category for “minor financial offences (forgery, fraud and tax offences)”. The Appellant contended, in particular, that the Judge erred by inferring harm to Balint Hertner, arguing there is no evidence in the Arrest Warrant that Hertner was suspected of criminality, and therefore the inference of indirect harm was unsupported.[65]The Respondent submitted that the Judge was correct to find that the offence of forgery of administrative documents did not fall within the categories set out in the Practice Direction as being “minor or trivial”. The offence, which is punishable by imprisonment not exceeding three years, could not be considered a trivial act of dishonesty. The Judge was justified in finding the conduct “serious enough” because the forged document was allegedly provided to an innocent third party, who then submitted it to a government office, which was likely to have caused indirect harm or cast suspicion upon that innocent party.

Likely Penalty (Section 21A(3)(b))

(b) )

[66]The Appellant argued that applying domestic sentencing guidelines for low-level fraud, the starting point would be a medium level community order. It was submitted that an immediate custodial sentence would not necessarily follow for a “one-off” offence, even considering the Appellant’s history.[67]The Respondent submitted that the Judge correctly found that while the starting point might be a community sentence, there was a real likelihood of the Appellant receiving a custodial sentence. This conclusion took into account several aggravating factors: the Appellant’s previous convictions and the fact that the accusation matter (AW2) was committed while he was subject to a suspended sentence order. The previous 2014 offence was a serious dwelling burglary that had previously attracted a suspended sentence, which was subsequently activated due to further offending in December 2018.

Less Coercive Measures (Section 21A(3)(c))

(c) )

[68]The Appellant argued that the JA failed to respond to a request for less coercive measures made in June 2023, and the Judge’s justification that the Appellant’s presence was required to progress the case (to make a decision to charge or try) was contradictory to her acceptance that the lack of response could weigh against extradition if AW2 stood alone.[69]The Respondent submitted that the lack of response from the JA regarding less coercive measures is not a bar to extradition. The Judge was entitled to afford it a low weight given the specific context of the proceedings, which involved two separate Arrest Warrants, with AW1 relating to serious offences carrying a long custodial sentence. The Further Information (“FI”) specified that the JA could not progress the case in the Appellant’s absence and required his presence to determine whether to charge or try him, justifying the view that less coercive measures are not presently available.

Conclusions

[70]The Judge was, in my view, not wrong to find the extradition proportionate in relation to AW2. The offence of forgery of administrative documents was not minor, especially considering the indirect harm caused to an innocent third party. A custodial sentence was a likely outcome given the Appellant’s recidivism and commission of the offence while subject to a suspended sentence. Finally, the low weight given to the lack of response regarding less coercive measures was justified, particularly in the context of the co-existing, more serious AW1. The fact that less coercive measures had been applied for but no response received is not itself a bar to extradition. Ground 1 – Section 12A in respect of AW 2 only: absence of a decision to charge or try[71]Section 12A of the Act provides:
“(1) A person’s extradition to a category 1 territory is barred by reason of absence of prosecution decision if (and only if)— (a) it appears to the appropriate judge that there are reasonable grounds for believing that— (i) the competent authorities in the category 1 territory have not made a decision to charge or have not made a decision to try (or have made neither of those decisions), and (ii) the person’s absence from the category 1 territory is not the sole reason for that failure, and (b) those representing the category 1 territory do not prove that— (i) the competent authorities in the category 1 territory have made a decision to charge and a decision to try, or (ii) in a case where one of those decisions has not been made (or neither of them has been made), the person’s absence from the category 1 territory is the sole reason for that failure.” (a) it appears to the appropriate judge that there are reasonable grounds for believing that— (i) the competent authorities in the category 1 territory have not made a decision to charge or have not made a decision to try (or have made neither of those decisions), and (ii) the person’s absence from the category 1 territory is not the sole reason for that failure, (b) those representing the category 1 territory do not prove that— (i) the competent authorities in the category 1 territory have made a decision to charge and a decision to try, or (ii) in a case where one of those decisions has not been made (or neither of them has been made), the person’s absence from the category 1 territory is the sole reason for that failure.”
[72]The Respondent accepted that the first limb of the section 12A test, that a decision to charge or try the Appellant had not been made, was satisfied. The FI of 14 August 2024 confirmed this, explaining that the reason was “the fact that the proceedings cannot be conducted in absentia”.[73]The Appellant submitted that, despite the statement in the FI, the Respondent must have known that a procedural route allowing them to charge the Appellant in his absence in the circumstances of this case would become applicable (and was, it is said, in fact available as of May 2024). As a consequence, it was argued that the Judge erred in finding that the Respondent could meet the second stage of the test, where the Respondent must prove, to the criminal standard, that absence was the sole reason. The argument relies in part on the interpretation of Hungarian procedure, specifically the “special procedure” outlined in Dr Filo’s report, which the Appellant submits was accepted by the Respondent (as the FI stated they had “no observations to make” regarding the report and Dr Filo was not required to attend for cross examination).[74]Dr Filo’s report at paragraph 3.2 states:
“The CCP regulates in absentia proceedings as a special procedure that may be used if its preconditions are met. The general rule is that proceedings should be conducted in the presence of the charged person where he can exercise his rights personally. However, the unavailability of ‘the person who may be considered to be under a well-substantiated suspicion’ or the charged person may not be a bar to carrying out the proceedings (special procedure). According to the CCP in absentia proceedings may be carried out when a) the ‘person who may be considered to be under a well-substantiated suspicion’ or the charged person escaped, went into hiding or it may be presumed on a solid basis to have made himself unavailable during the criminal procedure in order to avoid it any other way; b) the measures taken to find the charged person did not produce a result within a reasonable time c) it is justified by the weight of the offence or the requirements of evaluating the case. [...] If the suspect is abroad at a known place, the CCP established further special conditions of conducting the proceedings in his absence. It is possible to conduct in absentia proceedings when an EAW had been issued and the extradition did not take place within 12 months from the capture of the suspect, or the extradition was denied, or postponed extradition of the suspect was ordered. In even these situations the conditions that carrying out in absentia proceedings should be justified by the weight of the offence or by the requirements of evaluating the case, and the presence and participation in the proceedings of the suspect cannot be ensured by requesting international criminal judicial assistance or using means of telecommunication.”
[75]In considering this evidence

the Judge reached the following conclusions in her judgment:

“30. The contents of Dr Filo’s report have not been challenged by the JA. At paragraph 3.2 of the report, Dr Filo stated that the general rule was for proceedings to be conducted in the presence of the charged person. I acknowledge there may be provision in Hungary for the JA to proceed in absence by adopting the special procedure described by Dr Filo at paragraph 3.2. Alternatively, Dr Filo explained in the circumstance where AW2 had been executed, if the RP was not surrendered within 12 months, the JA could proceed in absence. The RP was arrested on AW2 in May 2023, and the FI was provided in August 2023. At that date, 12 months since the execution of AW2 had not passed so clearly the JA could not adopt the procedure explained by Dr Filo of proceeding in absence. 31. The special procedure set out by Dr Filo had three requirements, a well-substantiated suspicion of the RP who had made himself unavailable, a requirement that the measures taken to the find the RP did not produce a result within a reasonable time and that the action was justified by the weight of the offence. AW2 was issued in February 2023 and executed in May 2023, in my view, it cannot be said that the measures taken by the JA to find the RP did not produce a result in a reasonable timeframe – they clearly did as the RP was located and arrested within months. It appeared to me that the JA would be unable to use the special procedure described by Dr Filo for this reason. 32. Despite the contents of Dr Filo’s report, for the reasons explained above, I find the challenge to extradition pursuant to s12A of the Act was not successful in respect of AW2. I am satisfied to the criminal standard that at the time of issuing AW2, the decision to try or charge the RP had not been made, for the sole reason that the RP was not present in Hungary.”
[76]In Dr Filo’s addendum report he give his opinion that

the Judge has misunderstood his evidence:

“It is my expert opinion that the District Judge’s conclusion regarding the inapplicability of the in absentia (CCP) procedure was based on a misunderstanding of the timing requirements under Hungarian law. The provision of FI in August 2023 is not legally relevant to the calculation of the 12-month threshold. Consequently, the conclusion that the JA “could not adopt the procedure explained by Dr Filo” is not supported by Hungarian procedural law as described in my report. It is worth emphasizing that under Hungarian procedural law the 12-month period triggering the possibility of proceeding in absentia starts from the date of the European Arrest Warrant’s issuance or the suspect’s apprehension. The provision of Further Information in August 2023 is procedural and does not affect this timeframe. The misinterpretation by the District Judge risks undermining the principle of timely and fair proceedings, potentially prejudicing the rights of the Requested Person. Given the over 16-month lapse since the EAW was issued, the procedural conditions for in absentia proceedings have clearly been met, in accordance with Hungarian law and consistent with EU legal frameworks governing extradition and criminal justice cooperation.”
[77]In support of her submissions on this point Ms Grudzinska pointed out that the alleged offence took place in 2019, and a domestic warrant had been issued in May 2021. Thus, some years had passed, with no result within a reasonable time and the Appellant had not been found to be a fugitive in relation to AW2. However, the focus for present purposes is on absence and the Appellant was found by the Judge to be a fugitive, and so absent from the Hungarian jurisdiction, in respect of AW1. In addition, the material provisions set out by Dr Filo related to the passage of time after a European Arrest Warrant had been issued. The Judge was correct therefore to concentrate on the issue of the warrant as the earliest relevant date; indeed, that accorded with the evidence of Dr Filo.[78]As to this, the Appellant contended that the Judge was wrong to take into account at all the date the FI was provided (August 2023). The correct approach, according to Dr Filo, is that the 12-month period must be assessed from the EAW’s issue, in February 2023, to the decision to extradite in July 2024. Approached in this way more than 16 months had elapsed which it was argued “squarely triggers the relevant provision in Hungarian law that allows the issuing JA to proceed in absentia”. Since the Respondent should be taken to have been aware that the special procedure would become applicable before July 2024, enabling the Appellant to be charged in his absence, the Appellant submitted that on his uncontradicted evidence he had established reasonable grounds for believing his absence from Hungary was not the reason for the failure to charge him and that the Respondent could not prove, to the criminal standard, that his absence was the sole reason.[79]Ms Brieskova, on behalf of the Respondent, submitted that the FI contained a clear statement indicating that a decision to charge or try had not been made because the Appellant was absent from Hungary and that in the face of a such a statement, either in the warrant or in the FI, the Court should not look at additional material (such as expert reports). In any event the expert evidence provided by the Appellant confirmed that the general rule is that proceedings should be conducted in the presence of the requested person. There was no doubt, as the Judge found, that at the time AW2 was issued in February 2023, the Respondent could not proceed in his absence and nothing to suggest that any other factor was relevant. Although extradition had not been ordered within 12 months of the issue of the warrant, or indeed the Appellant’s arrest in May 2023, that was the result of delay in the proceedings, essentially at the request of the Appellant.

Discussion and Conclusion

[80]As far as the Respondent’s overarching submission is concerned, the Judge did in fact engage with the expert evidence adduced by the Appellant and the Respondent did not seek to contradict it. Irrespective of whether or not the Judge should have simply accepted the statement in the FI she was undoubtedly correct to say that at the date of the issue of the warrant or the later FI it was not possible to proceed in the Appellant’s absence; to that extent her conclusions took into account and were based on the Appellant’s expert evidence as to Hungarian law. She was equally entitled to conclude that on the evidence this answered the predicate statutory question as to whether the absence of a prosecutorial decision was solely due to the Appellant’s absence. She was also correct in my view to conclude that this question was to be determined as at the date of the warrant which she was considering, as supplemented by the FI; that is a matter of English rather than Hungarian law.[81]Even if that was wrong and it was necessary to consider the position as at date of the extradition hearing, that did not mean the identified impediment to charging or trying the Appellant had ceased to be his absence. The “special procedure” described by Dr Filo was not mandatory, it is articulated in his reports as a procedure which the JA “may” invoke. There are obvious questions of fairness which would arise, not least by reference to the general principle set out in Dr Filo’s report, if the Respondent sought to charge, and possibly convict, the Appellant in his absence where his extradition was potentially imminent. The Judge, in my view, correctly found that the sole reason for the failure to charge or try the Appellant was his absence from Hungary and accepted, at paragraph 29 of her judgment, the JA’s statement to this effect. That was the position both at the date of the issue of the warrant and by the time of the extradition hearing. She fairly considered the evidence of the Appellant’s expert, as factual evidence of foreign law, and accepted much of it but was not in error when applying it to the statutory question which arose under the Act. Fresh Evidence Kolompar Witness Statements

Fresh Evidence

[82]Eva and Joszeph Kolompar were the complainants in relation to some of the matters in AW1 in respect of which extradition is sought. There are statements from both of them dated the 7 October 2025 in which they say that they are now reconciled with the requested person. Whilst I have considered this material it does not seem to me that it could possibly have made a difference. The conduct which made up the relevant offences took place in public. This is not civil litigation, and prosecutions are brought by the requesting state in the public interest, not at the behest of individuals.[83]I therefore refuse the application to rely on these witness statements as fresh evidence.

Overall Conclusion

[84]For the reason set out in this judgment I refuse the application for permission in relation to Grounds 1 and 4 and dismiss the appeal in relation to Grounds 2 and 3. I also refuse the applications for fresh evidence. END