Director of Public Prosecutions v Ryan Jackson [2025] EWHC 2797 (Admin)

[2025] EWHC 2797 (Admin)Case No AC-2025-LON-002013
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 28/10/25
Before
LORD JUSTICE JEREMY BAKERMR JUSTICE JAY
Between
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONSAppellantRYAN JACKSONRespondent
James Boyd (instructed by CPS Appeals and Reviews Unit) for Appellant for The Respondent did not appear and was not representedHearing Hearing date: 23 October 2025
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 28 October 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................MR JUSTICE JAY

INTRODUCTION

[1]This is the judgment of the Court.[2]The Director of Public Prosecutions (“the Appellant”) appeals by way of case stated against a decision of St Albans Magistrates’ Court (“the Magistrates”) made on 5 February 2025 that the prosecution of Mr Ryan Jackson (“the Respondent”) for common assault in a domestic abuse case was brought one day late, with the consequence that there was no jurisdiction to hear it.[3]Section 39A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (“the CJA 1988”) creates a special rule for domestic abuse cases. Any prosecution may be brought subject to two conditions. The first is that no more than two years have elapsed since the date of the offence; the second that proceedings are issued “within six months from” the date of the complainant’s witness statement. The issue for our determination is whether, in calculating this six-month period, the date of the witness statement is included or excluded.[4]The facts may be shortly stated. The alleged assault took place on 28 June 2023. The complainant made her witness statement on 27 September 2023. The prosecutor issued a postal requisition charging the offence of common assault on 27 March 2024. The Magistrates rejected what they understood to be the prosecutor’s argument and included the date of the statement in their calculation, holding that time started to run at 23:59 on 27 September 2023, expiring on 23:59 on 26 March.[5]The question posed for our determination is as follows:
“In calculating the time-limit under s. 39A of the 1988 Act, were we correct in concluding that the period begins on the date on which the complainant made her witness statement in accordance with s. 39A(2)?”
[6]A week before the hearing, the Respondent’s solicitors wrote to the Court stating that they had advised their client that this appeal could not be defended. We are grateful for their courtesy. However, this is not a jurisdiction where appeals can be allowed by consent, and in the circumstances we have heard full argument, albeit from the Appellant’s side only.

THE STATUTORY TIME LIMIT

[7]Section 49 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, by inserting section 39A into the CJA 1988, introduced a special time limit for the commencement of proceedings for offences of common assault or battery in domestic abuse cases, thereby disapplying the general six-month limitation period set out in section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 where time runs from the date of commission of the offence.[8]Section 39A provides in material part:
“39A Time limit for prosecution of common assault or battery in domestic abuse cases (1) This section applies to proceedings for an offence of common assault or battery where - (a) the alleged behaviour of the accused amounts to domestic abuse, and (b) the condition in subsection (2) or (3) is met. (2) The condition in this subsection is that — (a) the complainant has made a witness statement with a view to its possible admission as evidence in the proceedings, and (b) the complainant has provided the statement to — (i) a constable of a police force, or (ii) a person authorised by a constable of a police force to receive the statement. (3) The condition in this subsection is that— (a) the complainant has been interviewed by— (i) a constable of a police force, or (ii) a person authorised by a constable of a police force to interview the complainant, and (b) a video recording of the interview has been made with a view to its possible admission as the complainant’s evidence in chief in the proceedings. (4) Proceedings to which this section applies may be commenced at any time which is both — (a) within two years from the date of the offence to which the proceedings relate, and (b) within six months from the first date on which either of the conditions in subsection (2) or (3) was met. …”
[9]It was not in dispute before the Magistrates that this was a domestic abuse case.

DISCUSSION

[10]In his helpful written and oral arguments, Mr James Boyd for the Appellant drew our attention to what he submitted was a consistent line of authority to the effect that where a statute uses prepositions such as “after” or “from” in connection with a specified date, that date is excluded from account when calculating the expiry of the relevant time limit. This, he submitted, was the “exclusionary rule”. He further submitted that the “corresponding date rule” applies in a situation like the present: the six-month period ends at midnight on the day in the 6th month that bears the same number as the day the witness statement was made.[11]Mr Boyd deployed a number of cases in support of his argument.[12]In Radcliffe v Bartholomew [1892] 1 Q B 161, this Court (Wills J and Lawrance J) construed a statute which stated that any criminal complaint had to be made “within one calendar month after the cause of such complaint shall arise”. An information was laid on 30 June in relation to an offence which took place on 30 May. This Court, applying earlier authority, held that the date of the offence must be excluded from the computation. Time therefore expired just before midnight on 30 June, and the information was laid in time. Wills J, giving the sole reasoned judgment, considered that there was no distinction to be made between a civil and a criminal statute.[13]In Stewart v Chapman [1951] 2 KB 793, this Court adopted a similar approach to s. 21 of the Road Traffic Act 1930, which required a summons to be served “within fourteen days of the commission of the offence”. Lord Goddard CJ reviewed a number of 18th and 19th Century cases and concluded as follows:
“The rule is now well established that where a particular time is given, from a certain date, within which an act is to be done, the day of the date is to be excluded.” (at 799) Lord Goddard held that there was no difference for these purposes between “of” and “from”
. His application of an exclusionary rule to a case involving “of” was based on authority which considered the wording “from”.[14]Marren v Dawson Bentley & Co Ltd [1961] 2 QB 135 was one of the two authorities expressly referred to by the Magistrates. There, the plaintiff was injured on 8 November 1954 and his writ was issued on 8 November 1957. Section 2(1) of the Limitation Act 1939, read in conjunction with the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions etc.) Act 1954, provided that proceedings could not be brought “after the expiration of three years from the date on which the cause of action accrued”. Havers J, following Radcliffe in this civil context, held that the writ was issued in time because in calculating the relevant three-year period for bringing a claim for personal injuries the date of the accident must be excluded. In our opinion, it is not altogether easy to understand why the Magistrates appear to have thought that this authority availed the Respondent.[15]Marren was approved by the Court of Appeal (Lord Denning MR, Karminski LJ and Megarry J) in Pritam Kaur v S. Russell & Sons Ltd [1973] 1 KB 336. In that case, the fatal accident occurred on 5 September 1967 and the writ was issued on 7 September 1970, which was a Monday. The main issue in the appeal was whether the weekend should be excluded because the court offices were closed, but the Court of Appeal also ruled on the Respondent’s cross-appeal contending in the context of s. 2(1) of the Limitation Act 1939 that the limitation period expired on 4 September 1970. Lord Denning MR rejected that argument in these terms: “The first thing to notice is that that, in computing the three years, you do not count the first day, 5 September 1970, on which the accident occurred. It was so held by Havers J in Marren. The defendants here, by their cross-notice, challenged that decision: but I think it was plainly right.” (at 348D-E) Megarry J (at 351H) was of a similar view.[16]The second authority expressly referred to by the Magistrates was Dodds v Walker [1981] 1 WLR 1027, a decision of the House of Lords. Under section 29 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954, a tenant’s counter-notice applying for a new tenancy has to be made “not less than two nor more than four months after the giving of the landlord’s notice”. The landlord’s notice was given on 30 September 1979 and the tenant’s counter-notice on 31 January 1979. The House of Lords held unanimously that the tenant’s counter-notice was given one day late.[17]The only reason why the case reached the House of Lords was because September is a shorter month than January, and the landlord’s notice was issued on its very last day. Bridge LJ (as he then was), dissenting in the Court of Appeal, was of the view that time started to run on 1 October and ceased running just before midnight on 31 January. It was common ground that in the ordinary course and putting this slight oddity to one side, the calculation of a calendar month ends on the corresponding date in the month which falls at the end of the specified period. Thus, if the landlord’s notice had been issued on 29 September, it would not have been at issue that the tenant’s time expired just before midnight on the corresponding day in January, i.e. 29 January. Lord Russell of Killowen, giving the second reasoned judgment, did not think that the slight oddity engendered by the actual facts of the case should affect the outcome. Lord Diplock expressed himself more broadly: “My Lords, reference to a “month” in a statute is to be understood as a calendar month. The Interpretation Act 1889 [now the First Schedule to the Interpretation Act 1978] says so. It is also clear under a rule that has been consistently applied by the courts since Lester v Garland [1808] 15 Ves. Jun. 248, that in calculating the period that has elapsed after the occurrence of the specified event such as the giving of a notice, the day on which the event occurs is excluded from the reckoning. It is equally well established, and is not disputed by counsel for the tenant, that when the relevant period is a month or specified number of months after the giving of a notice, the general rule is that the period ends upon the corresponding date in the appropriate subsequent month, i.e. the day of the earlier month on which the notice was given. The corresponding date rule is simple. It is easy of application. Except in a small number of cases, of which the instant case is not an example, all that the calculator has to do is to mark in his diary the corresponding date in the appropriate subsequent month.” (at 1029B-D)[18]Again, it is unclear how the Magistrates, having been referred to this case and no doubt aware that it was binding authority, could have concluded that the corresponding date in March 2024 was other than 27 March. That was the date which corresponded with 27 September the previous year. It also respected the principle that the 27 September itself falls to be excluded from account, time not beginning to run until just after midnight on 27/28 September.[19]In Zoan v Rouamba [2000] EWCA Civ 8; [2001] 1 WLR 1509, Chadwick LJ provided the following valuable summary of the position:
“23. Where, under some legislative provision, an act is required to be done within a fixed period of time "beginning with" or "from" a specified day it is a question of construction whether the specified day itself is to be included in, or excluded from, that period. Where the period within which the act is to be done is expressed to be a number of days, months or years from or after a specified day, the courts have held, consistently since Young v Higgon (1840) 6 M&W 49, that the specified day is excluded from the period; that is to say, that the period commences on the day after the specified day. Examples of such an “exclusive” construction are found in The Goldsmith's Company v The West Metropolitan Railway Company [1904] 1 KB 1 (“the powers of the company for the compulsory purchase of lands for the purposes of this Act shall cease after the expiration of three years from the passing of this Act”) and in In re Lympe Investments Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 523 (“the company has for three weeks thereafter neglected to pay”). In Stewart v Chapman [1951] 2 KB 792 (“a person ... shall not be convicted unless ... within fourteen days of the commission of the offence a summons for the offence was served on him”) Lord Goddard, Chief Justice, observed, at pages 78-9, that it was well established that "whatever the expression used" the day from which the period of time was to be reckoned was to be excluded. 24. Where, however, the period within which the act is to be done is expressed to be a period beginning with a specified day, then it has been held, with equal consistency over the past forty years or thereabouts, that the legislature (or the relevant rule making body, as the case may be) has shown a clear intention that the specified day must be included in the period. Examples of an “inclusive” construction are to be found in Hare v Gocher [1962] 2 QB 642 (“if within [the period of two months beginning with the commencement of this Act] the occupier of an existing site duly makes an application ... for a site licence”) and in Trow v Ind Coope (West Midlands) Ltd [1967] 2 QB 899 (“a writ ... is valid ... for 12 months beginning with the date of its issue”). As Lord Justice Salmon pointed out in Trow v Ind Coope, at page 923, the approach adopted in the Goldsmith's Company case and Stewart v Chapman can have no application in a case where the period is expressed to begin on the specified date. He observed, at page 924, that “I cannot ... accept that, if words are to have any meaning, “beginning with the date of its issue” can be construed to mean the same as “beginning with the day after the date of its issue”.”
[20]In R (oao Zaporozhchenko) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2011] 1 WLR 994, Burnett J (as he then was) giving the judgment of this Court drew a distinction between cases where the statute specifies the time limit as “starting with the appropriate day” (as in the Extradition Act 2003), where the day in question falls to be included, and situations where the statute specifies a time limit “after” the occurrence of an event, where the day in question must be excluded. The corresponding date rule applies to the latter situation but not the former. Similarly, in Barker v Hambleton DC [2012] EWCA Civ 610, [2013] PTSR 41, wording such as “[no] later than the end of the period of six weeks starting with the relevant date” (see section 113(4) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004) has the effect that the relevant date itself must be included in the calculation. At para 12 of his judgment, Maurice Kay LJ drew a distinction between this situation and the contrasting wording of s. 287(4) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, which uses the preposition “from” – this meant that the first day to be counted was the day after the relevant date.[21]Mr Boyd fairly drew our attention to the decision of this Court (Collins and Stanley Burnton JJ, the latter as he then was) in Verderers of the New Forest v Young [2004] EWHC 2954 (QB). Although this Court correctly applied the exclusionary rule laid down in Marren and other cases, it appears that on the arithmetic the relevant time-limit was extended by one day such that jurisdiction was wrongly conferred. A detailed examination of the facts of this complex case is not required. In these circumstances, it is unnecessary to say any further about it.[22]In our judgment, these clear principles emerge from the line of authority we have cited, recognising as we do that there are many other cases which are on the same theme:(1) there is no difference for these purposes between the civil and criminal context. See, in particular, Radcliffe, which has never been doubted.(2) the rationes of the authorities which specifically interpret and apply the preposition “from” are The Goldsmith’s Company and Stewart. There are other authorities which address “from” as obiter: see Zoan, Zaporozhchenko and Barker. Marren and Pritam Kaur were both cases where the draftsperson has used more emphatic language including both “after” and “from”.(3) there is in any case no practical difference in effect between the prepositions “from” and “after”. Although there may be some limited force in the observation that “after” is even clearer than “from”, we can discern no real linguistic and practical distinction between the two terms; and we note that Bennion, Bailey and Norbury on Statutory Interpretation, 8th edition, at para 19.7 is of the same opinion.(4) the key distinction is between these prepositions and prepositional phrases such as “starting with”. The latter phrases are inclusionary, in the sense that the date the relevant act or thing is done must be included in the calculation of the time-limit: see, Zoan, Zaporozhchenko and Barker.(5) on the other hand, the effect of wording such as “of”, “after” or “from” a certain date is that that date itself must be excluded from the calculation of the time-limit: see, where this conclusion was part of the ratio of the decision in question, The Goldsmith’s Company, Radcliffe; Stewart; Marren; Pritam Kaur; and, in particular, Dodds.(6) the consequence of applying this exclusionary rule is that, if a period of months is specified in the relevant statute, the corresponding date rule applies: see, Dodds.[23]This final point is capable of brief elaboration. If, as on the facts of the present case, the relevant condition (i.e. the complainant’s witness statement being given and dated) is fulfilled on the 27th day of the given month, the effect of the exclusionary rule is that time does not start running on that day (whether at 00:01 or 23:59) but begins for these purposes on the 28th day (it matters not whether at 00:01 or 23:59). The straightforward calculation thereafter is that the six months expires on the 27th day of the future month in question. Thus, the consequence of applying the exclusionary rule is that the time-limit expires on the corresponding date of the later month. This consequence, as Lord Diplock explained in Dodds, is entirely straightforward and gives the calculator no difficulty.[24]Applying these principles to the present case, we consider that it is clear that the Magistrates erred. By holding that time started at 23:59 on 27 September 2023, they in effect included the start date in their calculation. We have already made the point that there is no practical difference for this purpose between 23:59 and 00:01, and it is also clear that the formulation of the question posed in the Case Stated indicates that an inclusionary approach was adopted. The Magistrates’ methodology clearly offended the exclusionary rule, and, consequently, the corresponding date rule. The Magistrates, having been referred to Dodds, ought to have apprehended that 26 March 2024 did not correspond with 27 September 2023.

DISPOSAL

[25]The answer to the question posed to us in the Case Stated is that the Magistrates were incorrect to conclude that the period begins on the date on which the complainant made her witness statement in accordance with s. 39A(2) of the CJA 1988. Our conclusion is that this date must be excluded from account, and that the proceedings were brought in time, on the last possible day.[26]It follows that the appeal must be allowed and that the case be remitted to the Magistrates for trial.[27]As Jeremy Baker LJ pointed out in oral argument, the difficulties that arose in the present case would have been avoided if proceedings had not been commenced on the last possible available day. We understand from Mr Boyd that the police did not refer the case to the CPS until Thursday 21 March 2023, which left little time for the file to be considered properly. It follows that it would not be fair to blame the CPS for taking this case to the wire.

Cited in 1 later judgment