“a) Positively prepared – providing a strategy which, as a minimum, seeks to meet the area’s objectively assessed needs [FN 21 Where this relates to housing, such needs should be assessed using a clear and justified method, as set out in paragraph 61 of this Framework.]; and is informed by agreements with other authorities, so that unmet need from neighbouring areas is accommodated where it is practical to do so and is consistent with achieving sustainable development; b) Justified – an appropriate strategy, taking into account the reasonable alternatives, and based on proportionate evidence; c) Effective – deliverable over the plan period, and based on effective joint working on cross-boundary strategic matters that have been dealt with rather than deferred, as evidenced by the statement of common ground; and d) Consistent with national policy – enabling the delivery of sustainable development in accordance with the policies in this Framework and other statements of national planning policy, where relevant.”
“soundness was a matter to be judged by the Inspector and the Council and raises no issue of law unless their decision is shown to have been irrational, or they are shown to have ignored the relevant guidance or other considerations which were necessarily material in law.”
“22. … many policies are framed in language the application of which to a given set of facts requires the exercise of judgment. Matters of that kind fall within the jurisdiction of planning authorities as decision-makers and their exercise of judgment can only be challenged in the Courts if it is irrational or perverse... Therefore, in a case where the decision-maker has had regard to a policy which he was required to take into account, it is essential for practitioners to keep in mind the distinction between interpretation and application of policy and the very different functions of the court in each area… 83. … Because of the critical difference between these two types of challenge as to the juridical basis upon which a court may intervene, a claimant must not dress up what is in reality a criticism of the application of policy as if it were a misinterpretation of policy. 84. Normally a claimant fails to raise a genuine case of misinterpretation of policy unless he identifies (i) the policy wording said to have been misinterpreted, (ii) the interpretation of that language adopted by the decision-maker and (iii) how that interpretation departs from the correct interpretation of the policy wording in question. A failure by the claimant to address these points, as in the present case, is likely to indicate that the complaint is really concerned with application, rather than misinterpretation, of policy.”
“6. In my judgment at first instance in Bloor Homes East Midlands Ltd. v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government[2014] EWHC 754 (Admin) (at paragraph 19) I set out the “seven familiar principles” that will guide the court in handling a challenge under section 288. This case, like many others now coming before the Planning Court and this court too, calls for those principles to be stated again – and reinforced. They are: “(1) Decisions of the Secretary of State and his inspectors in appeals against the refusal of planning permission are to be construed in a reasonably flexible way. Decision letters are written principally for parties who know what the issues between them are and what evidence and argument has been deployed on those issues. An inspector does not need to “rehearse every argument relating to each matter in every paragraph” (see the judgment of Forbes J. in Seddon Properties v Secretary of State for the Environment (1981)42 P. & C.R. 26, at p.28). (2) The reasons for an appeal decision must be intelligible and adequate, enabling one to understand why the appeal was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal important controversial issues”
“… the courts should respect the expertise of the specialist planning inspectors, and start at least from the presumption that they will have understood the policy framework correctly.”
“Generally at least, the reasons provided in an inspector’s report on the examination of a local plan may well satisfy the required standard if they are more succinctly expressed that the reasons in the report or decision letter of an inspector in a s.78 appeal against the refusal of planning permission. As Mr Beglan submitted, it is not likely that an inspector conducting a local plan examination will have to set out the evidence given by every participant if he is to convey to the “knowledgeable audience” for his report a clear enough understanding of how he has decided the main issues before him.”
“24. The reasons given by an Inspector on the examination of a local plan under s20 PCPA should not be assessed by unqualified application of authorities dealing with reasons on appeals against the refusal of planning permission, notably the oft-cited principles in particular in South Bucks DC v Porter (No.2)[2004] UKHL 33 at [36]. The public examination of a plan is not an inquiry into objections raised by individual parties. The examination is structured around the issues which the Inspector has identified as crucial for his judgment on the soundness of the plan. It alerts parties to the Inspector’s proactive and inquisitorial role; representations do not dictate the structure or focus of the examination. If contentions do not assist him to reach a judgment on the soundness of the plan, he will not spend time at the hearings on them. The hearings are only part of his examination of the soundness of the plan. 25. Accordingly, the Inspector should reach clear conclusions backed by reasoned judgments on the plan’s compliance with the PCPA 2004, including the requirement of soundness. The report does not summarise the parties’ individual cases, will avoid direct reference to specific representations and will not describe discussions at hearings. But it will explain concisely why the Inspector has reached the views he has on soundness and the compliance issues. Accordingly, reasons may be more succinctly expressed than in a decision letter on a planning appeal (Cooper Estates Strategic Land Assessment v Royal Tunbridge Wells Borough Council[2017] EWHC 224 (Admin) confirmed in CPRE Surrey v Waverley Borough Council v Secretary of State for Housing Communities and Local Government[2019] EWCA Civ 1826 ).”
“137. The Government attaches great importance to Green Belts. The fundamental aim of the Green Belt policy is to prevent urban sprawl by keeping land permanently open; the essential characteristics of Green Belts are their openness and their permanence. 138. Green Belt serves five purposes: (a) to check the unrestricted sprawl of large built-up areas; (b) to prevent neighbouring towns merging into one another; (c) to assist in safeguarding the countryside from encroachment; and (d) to assist in urban regeneration, by encouraging the recycling of derelict and other urban land.”
“139. The general extent of Green Belts across the country is already established. New Green Belts should only be established in exceptional circumstances, for example when planning for larger scale development such as new settlements or major urban extensions. Any proposals for new Green Belts should be set out in strategic policies, which should: a) demonstrate why normal planning and development management policies would not be adequate; b) set out whether any major changes in circumstances have made the adoption of this exceptional measure necessary; c) show what the consequences of the proposal would be for sustainable development; d) demonstrate the necessity for the Green Belt and its consistency with strategic policies for adjoining areas; and e) show how the Green Belt would meet the other objectives of the Framework.”
“140. Once established, Green Belt boundaries should only be altered where exceptional circumstances are fully evidenced and justified, through the preparation or updating of plans. Strategic policies should establish the need for any changes to Green Belt boundaries, having regard to their intended permanence in the long term, so they can endure beyond the plan period. Where a need for changes to Green Belt boundaries has been established through strategic policies, detailed amendments to those boundaries may be made through nonstrategic policies, including neighbourhood plans. 141. Before concluding that exceptional circumstances exist to justify changes to Green Belt boundaries, the strategic policy-making authority should be able to demonstrate that it has examined fully all other reasonable options for meeting its identified need for development. This will be assessed through the examination of its strategic policies, which will take into account the preceding paragraph, and whether the strategy: a) makes as much use as possible of suitable brownfield sites and underutilised land; b) optimises the density of development in line with the policies in chapter 11 of this Framework, including whether policies promote a significant uplift in minimum density standards in town and city centres and other locations well served by public transport; and c) has been informed by discussions with neighbouring authorities about whether they could accommodate some of the identified need for development, as demonstrated through the statement of common ground.”
“142. When drawing up or reviewing Green Belt boundaries, the need to promote sustainable patterns of development should be taken into account. Strategic policy - making authorities should consider the consequences for sustainable development of channelling development towards urban areas inside the Green Belt boundary, towards towns and villages inset within the Green Belt or towards locations beyond the outer Green Belt boundary. Where it has been concluded that it is necessary to release Green Belt land for development, plans should give first consideration to land which has been previously-developed and/or is well-served by public transport. They should also set out ways in which the impact of removing land from the Green Belt can be offset through compensatory improvements to the environmental quality and accessibility of remaining Green Belt land.”
“143. When defining Green Belt boundaries, plans should: a) ensure consistency with the development plan’s strategy for meeting identified requirements for sustainable development; b) not include land which it is unnecessary to keep permanently open; c) where necessary, identify areas of safeguarded land between the urban area and the Green Belt, in order to meet longer-term development needs stretching well beyond the plan period; d) make clear that the safeguarded land is not allocated for development at the present time. Planning permission for the permanent development of safeguarded land should only be granted following an update to a plan which proposes the development; e) be able to demonstrate that Green Belt boundaries will not need to be altered at the end of the plan period; and f) define boundaries clearly, using physical features that are readily recognisable and likely to be permanent.”
“68. There is no definition of the policy concept of “exceptional circumstances”
“The fact that it was open to the Inspectors to adopt the approach they did is clear from Copas in which Simon Brown LJ took the view that, in the case before him, there could not be exceptional circumstances “unless some fundamental assumption which cause the land initially to be excluded from the Green Belt is thereafter clearly and permanently falsified by a later event”
“[the Inspector’s decision] falls very far short of the stringent test for exceptional circumstances that any revision of the Green Belt boundary must satisfy. There is nothing in this case that suggests that any of the assumptions upon which the Green Belt boundary was set has proved unfounded, nor has anything occurred since the Green Belt boundary was set that might justify the redefinition of the boundary.” (Emphasis added)
“As it directly prejudices landowners in the otherwise proper development of their land an extension to the green belt should not be brought into effect unless it can be justified directly by those purposes for which the green belt is designed. There must there be an inhibition in extending a green belt so as to avoid sterilising unnecessarily neighbouring land …. just as much as reductions in the boundaries of the green belt, which would prejudice the purposes of that green belt must also only be made in exceptional circumstances. On this basis I think that the general concept of the advice in the circulars is that once a green belt has been established it must require exceptional circumstances rather than general planning concepts to justify an alteration. Whichever way the boundary is altered there must be serious prejudice one way or the other to the parties involved.”
“…. A prime character of Green Belts is their ability to ensure through changes of such policies. For the reasons set out in Carpets of Worth (at page 346 per Purchas LJ) it is important that a proposal to extend a Green Belt is subject to the same, stringent regime as a proposal to diminish it, because whichever way the boundary is altered “there must be serious prejudice one way of the other to the parties involved.”
“2.48 In summary, I believe that there are exceptional circumstances which necessitate a revision of the Green Belt boundary in this instance. I have not reached that conclusion lightly because I recognise the need for such boundaries to be permanent wherever possible. However, the most recent appeal decision justifies a very different perception of the site than that which prevailed when the present boundary was set. It also means, in my view, that the continued omission of the site from the Green Belt would be an incongruous anomaly.”
“39. It must, of course, be recognised that PPGs have no formal statutory force and are not to be construed and applied as if they had. The only statutory obligation ….. is to have regard to them. All this was pointed out by Purchas LJ in the Carpets of Worth (at p.88). That said, the Guidance must be given some reasonable meaning and be properly understood by those charged with forming the relevant planning judgment. 40. I would hold that the requisite necessity in a PPG 2 paragraph 2.7 case like the present - where the revision proposed is to increase the Green Belt - cannot be adjudged to arise unless some fundamental assumption which caused the land initially to be excluded from the Green Belt is thereafter clearly and permanently falsified by a later event. Only then could the continuing exclusion of the land from the Green Belt properly be characterised as "an incongruous anomaly". The Secretary of State's 1991 objection to development was neither sufficiently long-term nor sufficiently clearly applicable to all possible development on all parts of the site to be capable of constituting such an event, still less when it seemed of itself to demonstrate the sufficiency of existing planning controls to safeguard the various amenity interests identified.”
“124. There is a considerable amount of case law on the meaning of “exceptional circumstances” in this context. I was particularly referred to Carpets of Worth Limited v Wyre Forest District Council(1991) 62 P & CR 334 (“Carpets of Worth”), Laing Homes Limited v Avon County Council(1993) 67 P & CR 34 (“Laing Homes”), COPAS v Royal Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead[2001] EWCA Civ 180 ;[2002] P & CR 16 (“COPAS”), and R (Hague) v Warwick District Council[2008] EWHC 3252 (Admin) (“Hague”). 125. From these authorities, a number of propositions are clear and uncontroversial. i) Planning guidance is a material consideration for planning plan-making and decision-taking. However, it does not have statutory force: the only statutory obligation is to have regard to relevant policies. ii) The test for redefining a Green Belt boundary has not been changed by the NPPF (nor did Mr Dove suggest otherwise). a) In Hunston, Sir David Keene said (at [6]) that the NPPF “seems to envisage some review in detail of Green Belt boundaries through the new Local Plan process, but states that ‘the general extent of Green belts across the country is already established’”
“When drawing up or reviewing Green Belt boundaries local planning authorities should take account of the need to promote sustainable patterns of development…”
“130. ….. In other words, something must have occurred subsequent to the definition of the Green Belt boundary that justifies a change. The fact that, after the definition of the Green Belt boundary, the local authority or an inspector may form a different view on where the boundary should lie, however cogent that view on planning grounds, that cannot of itself constitute an exceptional circumstance which necessitates and therefore justifies a change and so the inclusion of the land in the Green Belt (see Hague at [32] per Collins J. Collins J in Hague held that, in addition to the undoing of an assumption on which the original decision was made, a clear error in excluding land from the Green Belt is sufficient, no such error is suggested here; and I need not consider that aspect of Hague further.) 131. COPAS is, of course, binding upon me. Mr Dove said that these cases are fact-sensitive, and the facts of that case were very different from this. That is true; but, in the passage I have just quoted from Simon Brown LJ’s judgment, he was clearly and deliberately determining, as a matter of principle, what “exceptional circumstances” required, as a matter of law, in a case such as this. It is expressly a holding, with which the whole court agreed. I am consequently bound by it. In any event, it seems to have been consistently applied for over ten years; and, in my respectful view, is right.”
“135. …..the Inspector, unfortunately, did not adopt the correct approach to the proposed revision of the Green Belt boundary to include the Sites, which had previously been white, unallocated land. He performed an exercise of simply balancing the various current policy factors, and using his planning judgment, concluding that it was unlikely that either of these two sites would, under current policies, [be] likely to be found suitable for development. That, in his judgment, may now be so; but that falls very far short of the stringent test for exceptional circumstances that any revision of the Green Belt boundary must satisfy. There is nothing in this case that suggests that any of the assumptions upon which the Green Belt boundary was set has proved unfounded, nor has anything occurred since the Green Belt boundary was set that might justify the redefinition of the boundary.”
“87 The claimant contends that the local authority has persistently misunderstood the approach to the revisions of the Green Belt. He relies on Copas v Windsor and Maidenhead Royal Borough Council[2002] 1 P & CR 199 which dealt with previous guidance on Green Belt in PPG2. There, Simon Brown LJ made it clear that the terms of the guidance were clear so that unless there were exceptional circumstances which necessitated a revision of the Green Belt boundary a single composite test would not be satisfied. Further, from para 40 of the judgment the claimant derives a proposition which he describes as the falsification doctrine. Para 40 reads: …… 88 From that it is said that a revision proposed to increase a Green Belt cannot arise unless the fundamental basis on which the land was originally excluded from the Green Belt was subsequently falsified. The converse must also apply when the Green Belt is to be rolled back. 89 The local authority and interested parties assert that the falsification doctrine does not exist. It is a misreading of the Copas case on the part of the claimant. In any event it is not the relevant test. That is whether a necessity has been established as a result of the exceptional circumstances to bring about a boundary alteration. 90 Gallagher Homes Ltd v Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council[2014] EWHC 1283 (Admin) deals with the test for redefining a Green Belt boundary since the publication of the NPPF. Paras 124—125 of the Gallagher case read: ….. 91 From that review it can be seen that there is no test that Green Belt land is to be released as a last resort. It is an exercise of planning judgment as to whether exceptional circumstances necessitating revision have been demonstrated. ….. Discussion and conclusions 95 In my judgment to refer to a falsification doctrine is to take the words of Simon Brown LJ out of context. To elevate the words that he used into a doctrine is to overstate their significance. 96 What is clear from the principles distilled in the Gallagher case is that for revisions to the Green Belt to be made exceptional circumstances have to be demonstrated. Whether they have been is a matter of planning judgment in a local plan exercise ultimately for the inspector. It is of note that in setting out the principles in the Gallagher case there is no reference to a falsification doctrine or that any release of Green Belt land has to be seen as a last resort.”
“51 In Gallagher Homes Ltd v Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council [2014] JPL 1117, para 125, Hickinbottom J helpfully gathered together a number of the relevant principles regarding the Green Belt. Firstly, the test for redefining a Green Belt boundary has not been changed by the NPPF. Secondly, the mere process of preparing a new local plan is not in itself to be regarded as an exceptional circumstance justifying an alternative to a Green Belt boundary. Thirdly, the test for redefinition of a Green Belt under the NPPF remains what it was previously: exceptional circumstances are required which necessitate a revision of the boundary. That is a simple composite test because, for this purpose, circumstances are not exceptional unless they necessitate a revision of a boundary. Fourthly, whilst each case is fact-sensitive and the question of whether circumstances are exceptional for these purposes requires an exercise of planning judgment, what is capable of amounting to exceptional circumstances is a matter of law, and a plan-maker may err in law if it fails to adopt a lawful approach to exceptional circumstances. Fifthly, once a Green Belt has been established and approved, it requires more than general planning concepts to justify an alteration. Hickinbottom J’s fifth point was endorsed on appeal: the Gallagher Homes case [2015] JPL 713, paras 33 and 36. 52 When Patterson J considered the applicant’s judicial review, R (IM Properties Development Ltd) v Lichfield District Council[2014] PTSR 1484 , para 90, she endorsed Hickinbottom J’s enunciation of the relevant principles in the Gallagher Homes case. In Calverton Parish Council v Nottingham City Council (No 2)[2015] EWHC 1078 (Admin) at [44], Jay J considered Patterson J’s judgment where, at para 100, she considered the issue of planning judgment and slightly recast the issue as follows: “[Whether], in the exercise of planning judgment and in the overall context of the positive statutory duty to achieve sustainable development, exceptional circumstances existed to justify the release of Green Belt.”
“68. There is no definition of the policy concept of “exceptional circumstances”
“146. I begin by summarising principles set out by Sir Duncan Ouseley in Compton Parish Council v Guildford Borough Council [2020] JPL 661 at [68]-[72]:- (i) There is no definition of the policy concept of “exceptional circumstances”
“153. It should also be emphasised that what may be judged by a decision-maker to amount to exceptional circumstances” is highly fact sensitive in each individual case. It will be sensitive to a range of case-specific considerations and the varying weight given to each, including the circumstances of a particular area, the policy context, the evidence base and the arguments advanced in the consultation and examination stages. That is why Sir Duncan Ouseley was, with respect, entirely correct to place much greater emphasis upon the court’s role of determining whether a decision-maker’s judgment was irrational, and not on attempting to define “exceptionality”
“156. Before looking at the Inspector’s report, it is helpful to have in mind the approach which the Council took to the review of green belt boundaries in Part Two of its assessment. Paragraph 2.4 states:- “The Council’s position is that, exceptional circumstances will not exist unless all four of the following requirements are satisfied: i The location is capable of contributing to sustainable development. This means it must be a logical extension to an existing settlement in Tiers 1-4 as identified in the Settlement Hierarchy. (Settlements in these tiers include all identified transport hubs). ii The site is capable of removal from the Green Belt. In this context, a site is considered ‘capable’ of removal from the Green Belt when its removal from the Green Belt could be acceptable having regard to a) the purposes of including land in the Green Belt, b) the general extent of the Green Belt, and c) the requirement for permanent and robust boundaries. On its own, ‘capable’ does not mean that there are ‘exceptional circumstances’. iii If proposed for housing, the site must also be a deliverable or developable site in the terms set out in para 47 of the NPPF (footnotes 11 and 12) – this means that it is suitable from a detailed sustainability perspective, and has a reasonable prospect of delivery within the plan period, thereby contributing to meeting the OAN. If proposed for employment, the site must similarly have realistic prospects of delivering the proposed allocation within the plan period, having regard to local market indicators and any other relevant factors. iv The OAN is not being met from other sources of supply and the scale of unmet need balanced against the contribution a site makes to the quality and function of the Green Belt weighs in favour of release.” 157. Mr. Burton accepted that there was nothing unlawful about the criteria set down in that paragraph. Criteria (i) and (iii) related in part to paragraph 84 of the NPPF 2012 and the deliverability requirement is an obviously sensible precaution before considering changes to a green belt boundary. Criterion (iv) rightly required the scale of any unmet need to be weighed. Criterion (ii) required an assessment to be made of green belt function. Here I note Mr Burton’s acceptance that where an area of land had ceased to serve any green belt function that could amount to an exceptional circumstance. In my judgment, the criteria used by the Council are an example of the sort of “open-textured” approach referred to by Jay J which cannot be impugned.” “The Council’s position is that, exceptional circumstances will not exist unless all four of the following requirements are satisfied: i The location is capable of contributing to sustainable development. This means it must be a logical extension to an existing settlement in Tiers 1-4 as identified in the Settlement Hierarchy. (Settlements in these tiers include all identified transport hubs). ii The site is capable of removal from the Green Belt. In this context, a site is considered ‘capable’ of removal from the Green Belt when its removal from the Green Belt could be acceptable having regard to a) the purposes of including land in the Green Belt, b) the general extent of the Green Belt, and c) the requirement for permanent and robust boundaries. On its own, ‘capable’ does not mean that there are ‘exceptional circumstances’. iii If proposed for housing, the site must also be a deliverable or developable site in the terms set out in para 47 of the NPPF (footnotes 11 and 12) – this means that it is suitable from a detailed sustainability perspective, and has a reasonable prospect of delivery within the plan period, thereby contributing to meeting the OAN. If proposed for employment, the site must similarly have realistic prospects of delivering the proposed allocation within the plan period, having regard to local market indicators and any other relevant factors. iv The OAN is not being met from other sources of supply and the scale of unmet need balanced against the contribution a site makes to the quality and function of the Green Belt weighs in favour of release.”
“What are the exceptional circumstances for altering the established boundaries to justify adding 675 hectares of land to the Green Belt in 49 locations? The exceptional circumstances are that the sites proposed to be added to the Green Belt meet at least one of the five purposes of Green Belt set out in NPPF 138 and meet all five criteria to establish new Green Belt in NPPF 139. The Green Belt Topic Paper and Case for Exceptional Circumstances to amend the Green Belt Boundary (07.01.25) provides further details. Paragraph 6.30 and 6.31 on page 35 of the topic paper outline that the ‘Contribution Assessment of Proposed 2020 GMSF Green Belt Additions’ found that all 49 sites meet at least one purpose of Green Belt and Appendix 3 of the topic paper justifies how each site meets all five criteria to establish new Green Belt.”
“the major changes test, albeit set out in the framework, and albeit set out for new Green Belts, is not the test that’s been formulated by the courts for adding land to the Green Belt. And that’s, it’s the legal point which is the subject of our paper, which I very largely drafted which is GMCA79, a note re the Green Belt additions.”
“So one has an exceptional circumstances test and one wonders what that means, and were it not for the intervention of the courts, then I mean it may have, very would have been the case that we would have stuck to our guns and said 49 meet the exceptional circumstances test you know free of any case law telling you what that test means for Green Belt additions. But that’s not the position we’re in.”
“cannot be adjudged to arise unless some fundamental assumption which causes the land initially to be excluded from the Green Belt is thereafter clearly and permanently falsified by a later event. I have distilled this into the principle of fundamental change…”
“869. National policy advises that, once established, Green Belt boundaries should only be altered where exceptional circumstances are fully evidenced and justified through the preparation or updating of plans. The sites were added as they were considered to serve at least one Green Belt purpose set out in NPPF 138 and to meet all five criteria to establish new Green Belt in NPPF 139. 870. However, during the examination GMCA outlined a revised approach to considering whether each of the Green Belt additions made in the Plan is justified based on a Court of Appeal judgment. This approach involves considering whether there are exceptional circumstances for each Green Belt addition, based on whether there has been a fundamental change in circumstances since the extent of the Green Belt was established previously and/or whether a change is needed to correct an anomaly where the existing Green Belt boundary does not follow a readily recognisable physical feature. 871. GMCA applied the revised approach to each of the 49 Green Belt additions in the Plan and the findings are set out in a table in GMCA79. In summary, GMCA concluded that 17 of the additions meet the fundamental change test and/or would resolve an anomalous boundary, whereas the remaining 32 proposed additions did not meet either test. 872. We agree with the GMCA’s revised approach based on case law, and therefore most of the additions are not justified or consistent with national policy. However, we set out below the specific sites where we consider the addition to be justified based on the GMCA analysis, where we disagree with the GMCA assessment, or because there are circumstances relating to a site that need addressing. 873. We, therefore, recommend that the Plan be modified to delete the following Green Belt additions as exceptional circumstances have not been fully evidenced and justified: GBA01, GBA03, GBA04, GBA06 to GBA11, GBA13, GBA15 to GBA18, GBA20 to GBA24, GBA27, GBA30, GBA33, GBA36, GBA38, GBA42, and GBA45 to GBA49 [MMApxB.1 to MMApxB.4]……”
“872 We agree with the GMCA’s revised approach based on case law, and therefore most of the additions are not justified or consistent with national policy.”