Muhammad v East London Magistrates' Court [2025] EWHC 1700 (Admin)

Case No AC-2025-LON-000431

[2025] EWHC 1700 (Admin)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING’S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Venue The Royal Courts of Justice

Date Thursday, 19 June 2025

Strand

London WC2A 2LL

Before

MR JUSTICE WALL

Between

MUHAMMADAppellant

EAST LONDON MAGISTRATES' COURTRespondent

CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE

Interested Pary

MS K WALCOTT appeared for Appellant

for THE DEFENDANT did not appear and was not represented.

MS M MILLAR (instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service, Appeals Unit) appeared for Interested Party

JUDGMENT

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[1]MR JUSTICE WALL: This is an appeal by way of case stated. It follows the appellant's conviction in the East London magistrates' court, sitting in Stratford, on 25 July 2024 of an offence of driving without due care and attention, contrary to section 3 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The allegation related to an incident on 24 September 2023 when the appellant was driving a Volkswagen Golf motor vehicle.

[2]There is a preliminary matter. The appeal notice was filed late. In accordance with paragraph 2.2 of practice direction 52E, the notice of appeal must be filed within ten days of the date on which the case is stated by the court. The case stated is dated 20 December 2024. The appeal notice records that it was received by the appellant's solicitor by email at 5.39 pm on that date. The rules, therefore, required that the appeal notice be filed by 30 December 2024. There is a record that it was lodged by the e.filing portal at 3.36 pm on that date, but rejected because it had been filed in the wrong place.

[3]It was lodged again on 1 January 2025, but, again, rejected because it was in some way incorrectly filed. An attempt followed to email it directly to the Administrative Court Office. Again, the application was rejected because of the improper state of the bundle. The office guided the appellant's solicitors as to how to remedy their defects and advised them to lodge the application through the e.filing portal once that had been done. The claim was finally successfully filed in this way some few weeks out of time.

[4]It is important, of course, that time limits are complied with: failure to do so causes delay. That is especially important in criminal cases where there is a need both for finality and timely justice.

[5]However, on the facts of this case, I am prepared to extend time. There were numerous attempts to file this appeal which failed for what might be termed "technical reasons". I am sure that there was no lack of effort on the part of the appellant's solicitors, although it must be said that, with a little more attention to the rules, the problem could easily have been avoided.

[6]In these circumstances, it would be unjust to deny the appellant a remedy, if one is merited, on the basis of late service of documents, which late service has caused but a short delay and no prejudice to anyone.

[7]I turn then to the appeal itself. The justices heard from two witnesses called by the prosecution, Mr Fitori and Mr Pham. Mr Fitori described how he had been stationary in his Tesco delivery van when it had been hit by a vehicle from behind. The vehicle was being driven by the appellant. He described the force of the impact as "ten out of ten". It was sufficient to push his van forward by three to four metres into the rear of the vehicle stopped in front of him. He said that he described the force with which his van was hit as "ten out of ten" because it was at the time fully laden and yet still propelled forward as it was. He did not witness the appellant's driving before the collision occurred.

[8]Mr Pham was driving the vehicle which was hit by the Tesco van; his children were passengers in his car. He again did not see the way in which the appellant was driving before the collision occurred, but he heard a screeching sound before impact. Once his vehicle had been hit and he had got out of his car, he saw that his vehicle had been hit by the Tesco van and that the appellant's vehicle was behind the van and appeared to be badly damaged to the front end; he thought it must have been written off. He said that there were other vehicles at the scene which appeared to have sustained damage.

[9]Mr Pham also gave evidence that he was approached by the appellant after the collision, who said to him that he did not know how the collision had occurred but that he would "sort it". He was, said Mr Pham, very apologetic.

[10]Having heard this evidence, the justices were invited to conclude that there was no case for the appellant to answer. This was on the basis that neither prosecution witness was able to describe the manner of the appellant's driving before the collision occurred and, in those circumstances, the collision might have been a true accident rather than a manifestation of the careless driving of the appellant.

[11]The justices, having been given by their legal advisor proper directions as to the approach to be taken on submissions of no case to answer, decided that there was evidence upon which a reasonable tribunal of fact could convict the appellant. They, therefore, rejected the submission.

[12]The appellant did not then give evidence. The justices convicted him, giving as their brief reasons: "The appellant's driving fell below the standard of a competent and careful driver. Both witnesses' vehicles were stationary. Mr Fitori's vehicle was hit from behind with a force described as 'ten out of ten'. The force of the impact propelled his vehicle into the back of Mr Pham's vehicle. Mr Pham described the appellant's vehicle as being 'written off'. Both witnesses corroborate that Mr Fitori went into the back of Mr Pham's vehicle".

[13]There are two questions for this court to address: first, could a reasonable bench have found that there was a case to answer based on the evidence provided by both Mr Fitori and Mr Pham? Secondly, could a reasonable bench have gone on to find the appellant guilty based upon the evidence provided by both Mr Fitori and Mr Pham?

[14]These are questions of fact. That causes the appellant some difficulty. If the issue is one of fact, an appeal by way of case stated should only succeed if no reasonable tribunal could have reached the decisions reached by this particular bench (see Oladimoji v Director of Public Prosecutions

[2006] EWHC 1199 (Admin)

[15]If there is some evidence of an appellant’s guilt, but it is contended that the justices, in convicting, gave some of that evidence inappropriate weight, the remedy is for the appellant to appeal his conviction to the crown court, where his case will be reheard and a fresh assessment made as to the strengths and weaknesses in the evidence and the conclusions properly to be drawn from it.

[16]As to the offence, the law is clear: a person is guilty of driving without due care and attention if, and only if, the way the person drives falls below what will be expected of a competent and careful driver. The test is an objective test and it is a question of fact.

[17]The argument advanced by the appellant in an attractive fashion today is that there was no evidence of the manner of the appellant's driving before the collision occurred. There is no evidence of his driving at speed or in any other way inconsistent with the duties imposed on him by the Highway Code. There was, therefore, at least the possibility that the accident was not caused by any careless driving on the part of the appellant. It might have occurred, for example, because the appellant's own vehicle had been hit by another vehicle which propelled his car forward into the Tesco van, just as the Tesco van had been pushed forward into the car in front, being driven by Mr Pham.

[18]In this respect, reliance was placed on the fact that there were other vehicles at the scene which appeared to have sustained damage. It is further said that the magistrates placed undue emphasis on the fact of the collision without properly looking for evidence of a lack of due care and attention in the time leading up to that collision on the part of the appellant.

[19]The appellant also draws my attention to Director of Public Prosecutions v Parker [1989] RTR 413, where one vehicle had driven into the back of another in wet-and-slippery conditions. There was evidence that the vehicle responsible for the impact had been driven at a reasonable speed before the collision occurred. There was no evidence that the vehicle had been driven in any other way inappropriately. The justices acquitted the defendant placing some reliance on the road conditions at the time. The Divisional Court declined to overturn that verdict when they were invited to do so.

[20]The appellant in this case contends that this is an illustration that no conviction should result from a scenario where there was evidence that a collision has occurred but no more.

[21]The answer to this part of the submission is to be found in the judgment of

Judge J, as he then was, in Parker itself:

"In my judgment, no point of law arises in this case. It is a classic case in which local justices have to consider evidence and decide facts. It is difficult to imagine a more typical case than this of ones which are daily decided by justices up and down the country. On paper, on the basis of the case stated, I have to say that the decision reached by the justices was somewhat surprising. I personally may have reached a different conclusion"

. And later: "I do not regard the decision which I have just reached as authority for any proposition of road traffic law. Nor should it be taken as suggesting that in similar circumstances a different bench of justices is bound to reach either the conclusion reached by the present justices or the conclusions which I have indicated I might have reached. These cases are individual cases to be decided as questions of fact".

[22]For the reasons there given, Parker is no authority for the proposition that the mere fact of driving a vehicle into the rear of another vehicle without more cannot be sufficient evidence to establish that the driving must have been careless. It is a matter of fact to be determined on the established factual matrix of the case in hand.

[23]It is of note that Judge J did not think that he would have reached the same conclusions as those reached by the justices, but recognised that it was a factual matter which permitted of more than one reasonable answer. In any event, the factual matrix in Parker was materially different from that in hand as there was in Parker independent evidence of the road being wet and slippery, which might be thought to provide a possible alternative explanation for the collision.

[24]For all these reasons, I set Parker aside as being irrelevant to the decision that I have to make. My conclusions

[25]I am sure that driving one's car into the rear of another car without explanation can be good evidence that the driving was careless. A competent and careful driver would be expected to avoid colliding with other road users. That might be thought to be particularly true where, as here, the car which was collided with was stationary at the time. Save where there is clear evidence that the collision was solely caused by factors other than the nature of the driving, evidence of the fact of a rear-end collision, such as occurred in this case, will normally be enough to establish a prima facie case of careless driving against the driver and ensure that any submission of no case to answer fails.

[26]It is also sufficient to justify a conviction, should the appellant, when given the opportunity to do so, prove either unwilling or unable to provide an alternative explanation for what occurred. In some cases, there might be evidence, for example, that the driver's own car was hit from behind while he was stationary and propelled forward. It is not sufficient, however, that the defence merely raise in argument a spectre of the possibility of there being an alternative explanation for the collision. That is, in reality, what happened here. A tribunal of fact is entitled, if not obliged, to reject mere speculation and consider what conclusions could properly be drawn from the evidence they accept.

[27]The justices in this case were also entitled to consider that the actions of the appellant after the event, in offering apologies to Mr Pham and indicating to him that he did not know what had happened, were signs of guilt. A tribunal of fact would be entitled to conclude that the apology without further explanation amounted to an admission and that the appellant's indication that he did not know how the collision occurred was an indication that he had no other explanation for what happened than the obvious which was his own poor driving.

[28]It follows that I have no doubt that the justices were entitled to find that there was a case to answer. Indeed, I might go further and say that it would have been surprising had they not done so. They were also entitled to convict the appellant of the offence. They had no evidential basis for displacing the inference that someone who drives into the back of a stationary vehicle has done so because he drove without due care and attention. They were entitled to conclude that the evidence taken together established to the requisite standard that the appellant was guilty.

[29]This appeal is dismissed. __________ Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Email: civil@epiqglobal.co.uk