The Chief Constable of Cambridgeshire Police, R (on the application of) v The Crown Court at Peterborough [2025] EWHC 1452 (Admin)

[2025] EWHC 1452 (Admin)Case No AC-2024-LON-001941
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 12/06/2025
Before
LORD JUSTICE JEREMY BAKERMR JUSTICE JAY
Between
On the application of THE CHIEF CONSTABLE OF CAMBRIDGESHIRE POLICEClaimantTHE CROWN COURT AT PETERBOROUGHDefendantADRIAN KIMBERInterested Party
Charlotte Ventham KC and Conor Monighan (instructed by Weightmans LLP) for ClaimantLouis Browne KC and David Illingworth (instructed by Brabners LLP) for Interested PartyThe Defendant was neither present nor representedHearing Hearing date: 5 June 2025
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 12 June 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................MR JUSTICE JAY

INTRODUCTION

[1]In these judicial review proceedings the Chief Constable of Cambridgeshire Police (“the Chief Constable”) challenges the refusal of his public interest immunity (“PII”) application by HHJ Enright (“the Judge”) sitting at Peterborough Crown Court (“the Crown Court”) on 18 March 2024. That was in the context of a firearms appeal brought by Mr Adrian Kimber.[2]The Crown Court takes no role in these proceedings. Mr Kimber takes a neutral stance but through Mr Louis Browne KC and Mr David Illingworth has advanced helpful written and oral submissions. The submissions advanced on behalf of the Chief Constable by Ms Charlotte Ventham KC and Mr Conor Monighan have also been of considerable assistance.

ESSENTIAL FACTUAL BACKGROUND

[3]Mr Kimber was first granted a shotgun certificate in 2003. Thereafter, the certificate was renewed at each 5-year point until February 2018. On 31 March 2023 Mr Kimber was advised by a member of Firearms and Explosives Licensing staff to lodge his shotguns with another holder due to concerns raised about his suitability.[4]On 25 May 2023 T/DCI Clatworthy acting under the delegated authority of the Chief Constable took the decision to refuse Mr Kimber’s application to renew his shotgun certificate. The decision letter stated that T/DCI Clatworthy had information in his possession which was “sufficient to indicate a danger to public safety or the peace”. That information was not specified. The clear inference is that the information in question was of a sensitive nature which the decision-maker assessed should not be disclosed in the public interest.[5]On 8 June 2023 Mr Kimber appealed that decision to the Crown Court under s. 44 of the Firearms Act 1968 (“the FA 1968”). It is common ground that this appeal was in the nature of a full appeal on the merits rather than a review. The Chief Constable filed both OPEN and CLOSED evidence in opposition to the appeal. T/DCI Clatworthy stated in OPEN evidence that he assessed that disclosing the information upon which the refusal decision was based would be damaging to the public interest but that the appeal could not be resisted without reliance on it. What is known is that Mr Kimber is a former firefighter who has now retired, and that his two historical convictions in 1984 and 1985 arose when he was a teenager and in the context of attempting to resist arrest. Plainly, these were no longer relevant because they had not been a bar to Mr Kimber first receiving his shotgun certificate in 2003.[6]Mr Kimber also filed a mass of character evidence in support of his appeal.[7]The Chief Constable asserted PII over material in the CLOSED bundle. His OPEN evidence identified a number of factors to which he had regard when deciding to ask the Crown Court to uphold the claim for PII in respect of the Chief Constable’s CLOSED evidence and, as a result, to proceed by way of a closed material procedure (“CMP”) in the appeal.[8]The Chief Constable’s application came before the Crown Court on 18 March 2024. The Chief Constable had filed an OPEN and CLOSED skeleton argument. The OPEN skeleton argument set out the relevant legal framework governing s. 44 appeals as well as relevant authority. The submissions further explained that the PII application should be determined in accordance with the three-stage test set out in R v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police, ex parte Wiley [1995] 1 AC 274 (“Wiley”).[9]Mr Kimber through his lawyers indicated his acceptance that the Chief Constable had accurately set out the relevant law in his OPEN submissions and that, in those circumstances and in order to save costs, he would neither file a skeleton argument nor attend the hearing. The parties had agreed that a special advocate was not required for the PII hearing.[10]The Judge rejected the Chief Constable’s submission that the application must be heard by him sitting with two lay Magistrates. He discharged the Magistrates, without giving reasons, and stated that the hearing would be heard in camera. The Crown Court then heard submissions on behalf of the Chief Constable in line with the OPEN and CLOSED skeleton arguments and the accompanying evidence. The Judge then gave an ex tempore OPEN judgment in these terms:
“Somewhat unusually I’m sitting alone on this application, which relates to an appeal against a refusal of a shotgun licence, on an ex parte application brought by the Crown. And I’ve read the Respondent’s bundle of case law, I’m familiar with them and the closed bundle of evidence and the Respondent’s skeletons, and the Appellant’s bundle also. I have read a number of times the material on which the Crown seek to rely, and also Mr Cla[t]worthy’s statements, which set out and have sensitised my mind to the issue of the gravity of what is at stake when one grants a firearms licence, and the difficulties that might ensue if I do not accede to this application. And I accept that Mr Cla[t]worthy says as being measured and careful. The Appellant’s counsel were, as I understand it, invited to come to court and make submissions in open court, as to how the law should be applied but have, effectively, conceded. The Chief Constable’s counsel has set out the law correctly and declined to attend. The three stage test in Wiley is one I’m invited to apply and I do so, and I have no difficulty with limb 1 or 2. So far as limb 3 is concerned, make an order for disclosure, I think I have said more than once in this case, I’m not making an order for disclosure but in balancing, and may I say, I agree with prosecuting counsel’s analysis of the case law and the way it’s put out. Ultimately, it comes down to a decision as to whether I should go with this route or not. My judgment is it’s not appropriate to allow the Chief Constable to adduce evidence via this route, and I note, in particular, there are no effective safeguards for the Appellant, and he cannot test the evidence the Crown seek to adduce. In all the circumstances, that is my ruling. I make it abundantly plain; I’m not making an order for disclosure. That is all I wish to say, by way of a judgment, and it does not seem to me I need to make an open and a closed judgment in the circumstances.”
[11]The final sentence is difficult to follow. The Judge clearly did give an OPEN judgment, and I have just set out its terms. He did not give a CLOSED judgment. My interpretation of his OPEN judgment is that, although the Judge considered that the Wiley balance came down against disclosure, because the public interest outweighed the countervailing interest in open justice and Mr Kimber’s Articles 6 and 8 rights, it would not be fair to Mr Kimber to proceed down the CMP route.

THE GROUNDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

[12]The Chief Constable advances four grounds of challenge:(1) GROUND 1: the Judge should not have sat without lay magistrates.(2) GROUND 2: the Judge failed to give adequate reasons for refusing the application.(3) GROUND 3: the Judge failed to conduct and/or properly to conduct the Wiley balancing exercise.(4) GROUND 4: the Judge failed to have regard to, or properly apply, the decision of this Court (Dame Victoria Sharp P. sitting with Sir Stephen Irwin) in R (oao Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis) v Kingston-upon-Thames Crown Court [2023] EWHC 1938 (Admin); [2024] 1 WLR 686 (“Kingston”).[13]In my view, Grounds 2 and 4 should be considered together. Ground 3 has no merit, because the Judge clearly did conduct a Wiley balancing exercise and upheld the Chief Constable’s objection to disclosure. There is more force in the Chief Constable’s contention that the effect of refusing the PII application was that he could not continue to defend the appeal without disclosing the sensitive material. That contention I will address under the rubric of Ground 2, but first of all I will address Ground 1.

GROUND 1

[14]The constitution of the Crown Court on an appeal is provided for by s.74(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (“the SCA”), which states:
“On any hearing by the Crown Court —” (a) of any appeal; the Crown Court shall consist of a judge of the High Court or a Circuit judge or a Recorder or a qualifying judge advocate who, subject to the following provisions of this section, shall sit with not less than two nor more than four justices of the peace […] (6) No decision of the Crown Court shall be questioned on the ground that the court was not constituted as required by or under subsections (1) and (2) unless objection was taken by or on behalf of a party to the proceedings not later than the time when the proceedings were entered on, or when the alleged irregularity began.”
[15]Section 73(3) of the SCA provides:
“(3) Where a judge of the High Court, Circuit judge, Recorder or qualifying judge advocate sits with justices of the peace he shall preside, and— (a) the decision of the Crown Court may be a majority decision; and (b) if the members of the court are equally divided, the judge of the High Court, Circuit judge, Recorder or qualifying judge advocate shall have a second and casting vote”
[16]Rule 4 of the Crown Court Rules 1982 (as amended) details limited circumstances in which justices of the peace may be dispensed with:
“(1) The Crown Court may enter on any appeal … notwithstanding that the Court is not constituted as required by section 74(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 … if it appears to the judge that the Court could not be constituted without unreasonable delay and the Court includes — [...] (e) in any other case, one justice: Provided that the judge may sit without one or both of the justices required by sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above if the parties appearing at the hearing of the appeal agree. … (3) The Crown Court may at any stage continue with any proceedings with a Court from which any one or more of the justices initially comprising the Court has withdrawn, or is absent for any reason.”
[17]In R v Ashton [2006] EWCA Crim 794; [2007] 1 WLR 181, the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division addressed the consequences of failing to comply with procedural requirements imposed by statute or secondary legislation. The Court held as follows:
“4. … it is now wholly clear that whenever a court is confronted by failure to take a required step, properly or at all, before a power is exercised (a procedural failure), the court should first ask itself whether the intention of the legislature was that any act done following that procedural failure should be invalid. If the answer to that question is no, then the court should go on to consider the interests of justice generally, and most particularly whether there is a real possibility that either the prosecution or the defence may suffer prejudice on account of the procedural failure. If there is such a risk, the court must decide whether it is just to allow the proceedings to continue. 5. On the other hand, if a court acts without jurisdiction – if, for instance, a magistrates court purports to try a defendant on a charge of homicide – then the proceedings will usually be invalid. […] 9. …the prevailing approach to litigation is to avoid determining cases on technicalities (when they do not result in real prejudice and injustice) but instead to ensure that they are decided fairly on their merits. […] absent a clear indication that Parliament intended jurisdiction automatically to be removed following procedural failure, the decision of the court should be based on a wide assessment of the interests of justice, with particular focus on whether there was a real possibility that the prosecution or the defendant may suffer prejudice. If that risk is present, the court should then decide whether it is just to permit the proceedings to continue.”
[18]In R (oao Bromley) v Secretary of State for Justice [2012] EWHC 112 (Admin), this Court considered that the erroneous decision of a Crown Court Judge to sit with two Magistrates, as opposed to sitting alone, did not invalidate the arrest warrant which had been issued. The following paragraphs are relevant:
“50. …we think that we must ask: did Parliament intend by section 73(1) and any other relevant provisions of [the SCA] that the failure to ensure that it was the judge alone who exercised the power to issue a warrant for the arrest of Miss Bromley in this case was that the warrant was invalid and her detention unlawful? Our answer to that question, at least on the facts of this case, is a clear “no”
. There is no logical or practical reason why Parliament should have intended that consequence. It was an unfortunate procedural lapse and nothing more. 51. If that is right, then we have to go on to consider the interests of justice generally and the question of whether there is a real possibility that Miss Bromley may have suffered prejudice as a consequence of this lapse. The interests of justice must be that a person who has not surrendered to her bail is brought before the court as soon as possible and the way to do that is by a warrant for her arrest. On possible prejudice, none was suggested by Mr Abzarian and we cannot think of any ourselves.”[19]Mr Monighan appeared below. He informed this Court that the Judge went into Court alone although two Magistrates were within the building.[20]Mr Monighan, who presented the Chief Constable’s case on Ground 1 with clarity and economy, submitted that, an objection having been made to the Judge sitting alone, the Court did not have jurisdiction to determine the PII application in these circumstances. He argued that the terms of s. 73(3) of the SCA made it clear that decisions of the Crown Court are to be majority decisions, and by definition these cannot be if a Judge is sitting alone. He relied on the terms of s. 74(6) of the SCA which made it clear that a decision could be questioned if objection were taken, as it was here. That factor distinguished the Bromley case, and in any event there is an obvious point of difference between a situation where a Court is constituted with too many members as opposed to too few. Further, he submitted that the present case did not fit within the limited circumstances in which Magistrates could properly be dispensed with under rule 4 of the Crown Court Rules 1982: that provision would be otiose if non-compliance did not go to jurisdiction. In the alternative, Mr Monighan submitted that there is a real possibility that the Chief Constable was prejudiced by the absence of Magistrates because they might have come to a different view.[21]In my judgment, Mr Monighan’s submissions are well-founded. The Judge should not have sat alone after objection was taken. In terms of inferring the legislative intent, I consider that Kingston makes it clear that a Judge should sit with Magistrates and they are not there simply to make up the numbers. The purpose of the statutory scheme is to require decisions of this sort to be taken by more than one member of the relevant tribunal on the basis that, unless the tribunal is equally divided and the Judge has a casting vote, each member’s voice carries equal weight. Further, s. 74(6) of the SCA makes it clear that a jurisdictional objection cannot be taken unless objection is made at the relevant time, with the implication that the converse is the case if an objection is properly made. Finally, there is force in Mr Monighan’s argument that rule 4 of the Crown Court Rules 1982 has been enacted for a reason, including rule 4(3) – on which he did not specifically rely.[22]Overall, the correct analysis is that s. 74 of the SCA contains a procedural requirement which, in circumstances where an objection is taken or the prerequisites of rule 4 do not apply, is in the nature of being a precondition to the Crown Court’s jurisdiction.[23]In the present case, the Judge knew of the difficulty, because it was drawn to his attention, distinguishing this situation from that considered by the Court of Appeal in Baldock v Webster [2004] EWCA Civ 1869 where the Recorder was unaware.[24]In any event, even if I were wrong on the issue of jurisdiction, I agree with Mr Monighan’s alternative submission that there is a real possibility that the outcome might have been different had the Crown Court been constituted as a tribunal of three members rather than just one. Sitting in the Special Immigration Appeals Commission chairing panels of three (save in the circumstances specifically provided for under the Procedure Rules where the Chair can sit alone), I have experience of that happening.[25]It follows that the Chief Constable’s application for judicial review succeeds on Ground 1. But it is not right that I stop there, because the Chief Constable’s Grounds 2 and 4 raise matters which must be addressed, not least to assist the Crown Court when this case is remitted for redetermination.

GROUNDS 2 AND 4

[26]Ms Ventham referred to a number of authorities. The leading case in this area is Kingston and my review of the jurisprudence may therefore be brief.[27]It is well established by Wiley and subsequent case-law that a three-stage test must be applied to PII applications. Those three stages are as follows:(1) Whether the evidence in relation to which PII is asserted is relevant to an issue in the proceedings;(2) Whether disclosure of that evidence would cause harm to the public interest; and if so;(3) Whether, balancing the public interest in the administration of justice against the harm to the public interest that would be occasioned by disclosure, an order for disclosure should be made.[28]It is for the Court to decide how the Wiley factors should be weighed in the particular circumstances of the case under consideration. Further, as Charles Hollander KC makes clear in his Documentary Evidence, 15th edn., at para 22-15:
“There are different principles applicable to different types of documents: documents relating to national security have a higher level of importance than documents affecting the police.”
[29]On the other hand, when it comes to undertaking the balancing exercise at Wiley stage 3 (assuming that it arises on the particular facts of the case), it is relevant that the context of firearms licensing and control is very different in terms of the significance of the individual rights at stake than, for example, the deprivation of citizenship on the grounds of national security. As Sir John Thomas P. (as he then was) stated in Chief Constable of Essex Police v Campbell [2022] EWHC 2331 (Admin), at para 36:
“It is in the overwhelming public interest that the tightest control is exercised over those who possess firearms. The danger to the public is too well-known to require any further observations by this court.”
[30]In a similar vein, in Kingston Sir Stephen Irwin said this (at para 49):
“the approach to the balance of rights in question here places the rights of the individual whose certificate is revoked even farther down any hierarchy of rights.”
[31]In Kingston, this Court made it clear that a PII application leading to a CMP, although impliedly mandated by the statutory scheme, should not be the normal or ordinary course. As Sir Stephen Irwin stated at para 52 of his judgment:
“It will be evident that a CMP should only be considered where it is critical for the fair disposal of a firearms appeal. The existence of the jurisdiction in such cases emphatically does not mean that such a procedure should become the norm. The starting point in every case should be that the approach laid down in Mason should be followed. In particular, the respondent to such an appeal must consider most carefully whether the appeal cannot properly be resisted without reliance on sensitive material, even where such exists and has been relied on in reaching the decision challenged.”
[32]Mr Louis Browne latched onto this paragraph and submitted that a CMP should not be the normal course. In the context of s. 44 generally, that submission was correct, but the particular circumstances of the instant case do need to be addressed. I think that the reference to “CMP” in paragraph 52 of Kingston is intended to encompass an application for PII. The final sentence makes that clear. Furthermore, not merely is it the role of the Chief Constable to keep the necessity for claiming PII under review, as well as the related duty to consider gisting CLOSED material to permit disclosure to an appellant without jeopardising the public interest, the Crown Court itself in appropriate circumstances could properly conclude that the appeal hearing should proceed without injustice to a Chief Constable without reliance on CLOSED material. I should emphasise that these circumstances do not apply in the present case because the CLOSED material is critical to the Chief Constable’s opposition to the appeal.[33]As for the possibility of gisting parts of the CLOSED material, Ms Ventham confirmed on instructions that this has already been considered. The Crown Court could in due course take a different view.[34]At Annex 2 of his judgment, Sir Stephen Irwin set out the procedure to be followed in cases such as this:
“3. At the hearing of the respondent's PII application: a. The Court should first hear the respondent's oral representations followed by those of the appellant in open court, before hearing the respondent's further CLOSED representations (and those of the Special Advocate, if applicable) in the appellant's absence (see Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v Bangs [2014] EWHC 546 (Admin) at [30]-[33]). b. The Court, if satisfied that (i) the sensitive material is relevant and material and (ii) its disclosure would cause harm to the public interest, must (iii) decide whether, balancing the public interest in the administration of justice against the harm to the public interest that would be occasioned by disclosure, an order for disclosure should be made (see R v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police, ex parte Wiley [1995] 1 AC 274, at 280G and 281E). c. No variation falls to be made to the application of the Wiley balance on the basis that the sensitive material might be considered by the court in a CMP (see R (Jordan) v Chief Constable of Merseyside [2020] EWHC 2274 (Admin); [2020] A.C.D. 125 and R (AIG) v HM Courts and Tribunal Service [2021] EWHC 584 (Admin; [2021] A.C.D. 71). d. Any derogation from open justice "must always be the minimum derogation necessary", meaning it is incumbent on the Court and the respondent's legal advisers to consider whether relevant extracts and/or gists can be disclosed (see Bangs at [42]). e. It may be useful to canvas at the hearing, in OPEN and/or CLOSED session as applicable, the anticipated procedure/sequencing of the substantive appeal hearing, subject to the outcome of the PII application. If either party considers (subject to the outcome of the PII application) that a Special Advocate is required to represent the interests of the appellant at the substantive appeal hearing, written submissions in support of the appointment of a Special Advocate must be filed in advance of the PII hearing to enable the Court to determine the issue at the PII hearing. 4. The Court should hand down OPEN and CLOSED judgments on the PII application (making suitable arrangements for the secure transmission of the CLOSED judgment). The OPEN judgment should seek to identify every conclusion in that judgment which has been reached in whole or in part in the light of points made in evidence referred to in the CLOSED judgment and state that this is what has been done; and the OPEN judgment should say as much as can properly be said about the CLOSED material (see Bangs at [34]-[35]). 5. Upon hand down of the PII judgment, the Court should make further directions making provision for: a. Service (within a suitable timeframe) by the respondent of any further evidence/gist ordered to be disclosed by the Court. b. Service (within a suitable timeframe) of any further evidence by the appellant in response thereto. c. Service of all OPEN and CLOSED evidence on any Special Advocate appointed (if applicable). d. The listing of the substantive appeal hearing before the same constitution of the Court (the sequencing and timing of which will depend on a variety of factors including the nature and extent of the OPEN and CLOSED evidence and when it is to be served). [Note: the timing of any CLOSED hearing may need to be withheld from the appellant, for example if non-police witnesses are to be called.] e. Filing by the respondent of a composite OPEN hearing bundle (ordinarily 7 days in advance of the hearing). f. Exchange and filing of OPEN skeleton arguments for the substantive appeal and filing of an OPEN authorities bundle (ordinarily 7 days in advance of the hearing). g. Filing of any CLOSED skeleton argument and CLOSED authorities bundle (including by the Special Advocate, if applicable) (ordinarily 7 days in advance of the hearing), subject to satisfactory security arrangements. [Note: the Court will additionally need to consider its own arrangements for provision of the composite OPEN hearing bundle to the lay members of the Court in advance of the appeal hearing. Any CLOSED material will only be provided to the lay members at Court pursuant to appropriate handling conditions.] At the hearing of the substantive appeal, unless for good reason the court directs otherwise, the evidence for the chief officer is to be followed by the evidence for the appellant, and thereafter submissions made in the same order, subject to the arrangements required to be made for the holding of OPEN and CLOSED hearings. The Court should hand down OPEN and CLOSED judgments observing the same principles that apply to its PII ruling.”
[35]I draw particular attention to para 3(c) of Annex 2. The Wiley balance must be performed without reference to the next stage in the process, namely a CMP. That appears to be common ground between the parties.[36]In my judgment, the procedure laid down by this Court in Kingston is very clear and it was not followed by the Judge in the present case. He did not hand down a CLOSED judgment. Having found that the Wiley balance came down against disclosure, he then refused the PII application without explaining why. The consequence of doing so was that the Chief Constable could not continue to resist the appeal on OPEN evidence (that was insufficient), and so would either have to concede the appeal or – contrary to the Judge’s evaluation of where the public interest lay – disclose the sensitive information to Mr Kimber. It is not clear whether the Judge appreciated that this was the unfortunate upshot of his ruling.[37]Furthermore, I consider that the Judge was wrong to conclude that the Chief Constable should not be permitted to proceed down the CMP route. That was the next stage of the pathway set out in Kingston once the Wiley balance had been determined in the Chief Constable’s favour. The Judge did not explain why he came to this conclusion, and there is force in Ms Ventham’s submission that if the Judge were right a CMP could rarely if ever be appropriate. On the contrary, I consider that in a case such as the present where the CLOSED material is critical to the Chief Constable’s opposition to the appeal, a CMP would almost always be appropriate once the PII claim has been upheld.[38]Ms Ventham has also clearly explained why a CMP possesses a number of safeguards which go some considerable way to protect Mr Kimber’s Article 6 rights. These include:(1) The obligation of the court and the applicant’s legal advisers to consider whether relevant extracts of a document can be disclosed or a summary/gist made of the relevant effect of the material (see Bangs at para 42 and Wiley at 306H-307A).(2) The duty to disclose all relevant material to the court in ex parte proceedings, such as when making a PII/CMP application (see R (Malik) v Manchester Crown Court [2008] EWHC 1362 (Admin); [2008] EMLR 19 at para 101).(3) The “special obligation [of counsel for the public authority] to assist the court by identifying any points arising from the closed material which might arguably support the claimant or undermine the defence” (see Jordan at [para 35(c)]).(4) The court’s role (given the ex parte nature of the application) in “testing and probing the case which is presented” (see Malik at para 101);(5) The court’s function in providing an independent judgment as to whether PII is appropriate, which takes account of the state’s view but is not bound by it (see per Lord Woolf in Wiley at 289H-290A and 296G-H);(6) The court must keep any determination on PII under continuous review over the course of the trial (Wiley at [306E]);(7) Special Advocates may be appointed in appropriate cases at two points in the procedure: “firstly, at the PII hearing, and secondly at any substantive appeal which incorporates a CMP” (Kingston at para 55];(8) The requirement to hand down OPEN and CLOSED judgments, which provide an explanation for the decision which is in OPEN insofar as is possible (see the Kingston case at Annex 2, para 4 and Bangs at paras 34-35).[39]For all these reasons, Grounds 2 and 4 must succeed.

DISPOSAL

[40]If my Lord agrees, I would quash the Judge’s decision on Grounds 1, 2 and 4 and remit the Chief Constable’s PII application to the Crown Court for determination by a different Judge sitting with two lay Magistrates. The Presiding Judge of the South Eastern Circuit should be invited to determine the constitution of the Crown Court. Further, given the delays that have accrued in this case which are not the fault of Mr Kimber, the matter should be expedited.[41]I agree.